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(A JOURNAL OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS)

VOLUME II

1962-63



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AFRICA QUARTERLY

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Note To Contributors

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PLURAL SOCIETIES, MULTIRACIAL GOVERNMENTS, RACIAL PARTNERSHIP

by

D. K. CHISIZA

THERE ARE THREE concepts which are the cause of much confusion and bitterness in Africa. They are the concepts of "plural" or "multiracial" societies and racial partnership. What exactly they are supposed to mean? According to J. S. Furnival, the man who is credited with the invention of the term, a plural or multiracial society is "a society composing two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling in one political unit"—alternatively, a country where "various communities, differing from one another in culture, religion, race or language, live within a single political framework." Indonesia, Malaya, India, Britain, the United States, France, Canada, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Morocco, Nyasaland and Rhodesia, to mention but a few, are all plural or multiracial societies, according to these definitions.

But what strikes one as strange in practice is that most of the countries mentioned in the preceding paragraph are not regarded as multiracial countries. No one thinks of France, Britain, the United States, Canada, Morocco or India as multiracial countries. Secondly, some of the countries, like Ghana and Uganda, which not long ago were also covered by the above definitions, were looked upon not as multiracial countries but as "primarily African States," i.e., predominantly African States. Thirdly, some of the countries, like Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, which are as predominantly African as Uganda, were classified, at the time Uganda was declared an African State, as multiracial countries.

Why all these contradictions? Why should Uganda with a white-black population ratio of 1:650 be declared an African State, while Southern Rhodesia and Kenya with similar ratios are labelled plural countries? The Rev. Adrian Hastings of Uganda declares emphatically that most of the so-called plural societies are, in fact, "primarily African" and explains that if Uganda and not Kenya is declared "primarily African," it is not because the latter is less predominantly African, but because Europeans in the latter country are more vociferous in their discouragement of any move by Britain to declare the territory "primarily African."

This opposition arises because for Britain to declare a country "primarily African" is to agree that democracy will be allowed to function unhampered in that territory, with the implication that since the country is predominantly African, major political power will of necessity be in the

hands of Africans. It is this implication of "African Rule" which European minorities hope to avoid by opposing the declaration of "primarily African States." But realising that they cannot defeat something with nothing, they suggest, as an alternative to democratic "African Rule," undemocratic, multiracial constitutional arrangements which are heavily weighted in their favour.

To account for these travesties of democracy, they invoke the concept of plural societies. They argue that these artificial constitutional arrangements are necessary because the countries in question are "plural," conveniently ignoring the fact that there are better qualified multiracial countries (Britain, Morocco, the United States, Ghana, etc.) which do not operate and would never think of operating under multiracial constitutions. The idea of plural societies, originally intended merely as a collective appellation for certain societies, is thus used by European settlers, like Sir Roy Welensky in Central Africa, for rationalising the establishment of settler-dominated governments.

The protagonists of multiracial governments would probably find support in some quarters if they were to advocate proportional racial representation. Under such a system, each race would have (with certain modifications in favour of minorities) parliamentary representation proportionate to its numerical strength. It is obvious, however, that Africans would have the major vote with which, unless restrained by goodwill, they could not only violate the rights of minorities but also de-entrench such safeguards as may be enshrined in the constitutions. South Africa holds a classic example in this respect. The problem is rather sticky for European settlers. But need it be so?

If the objective is to safeguard their own interests, the way to do so is certainly not by devising constitutions which are weighted in their favour nor by introducing systems of proportional racial representation in the absence of mutual goodwill between the blacks and the whites.

To say so is not to offer counsel of despair, still less to minimize the problem of European security. No one who has taken time to study colonial problems can doubt the genuineness of the misgivings of minority groups about their future in an Africa which is on the threshold of emancipation. What one strongly doubts is whether embittering the African majorities by dominating them politically and frustrating their efforts to gain independence will bring Europeans happiness and security.

The truth of the matter is that, in the final analysis, the only dependable safeguard for European interest is to be found not in the constitutions but in the hearts of Europeans. Europeans must win the goodwill of Africans if they are to live happily in Africa. And, considering the mood in which Africans are at present, there is only one way of doing so: granting them independence before they are irretrievably embittered and helping them to establish democratic government for the benefit of all. Unadulterated democracy, whatever its shortcomings—real or imaginary—is the only proven answer.

What of "partnership"? Well, what does it mean and what are its implications? At best, the concept of "partnership" is a delusion; at worst, it is a menace to racial peace in that it creates distrust. The Rev. Collin Morris, of the Methodist Mission in Northern Rhodesia, has called it the biggest confidence trick ever contrived by man. "Partnership" is a word which Gustave Lebon would have rated as weapon number one in the armoury of the propagandist; it at once means everything and nothing. In Rhodesia and Nyasaland at any rate the word is so devoid of meaning and has been so abused on public platforms that it requires quite some effort to get it out of one's mouth.

Historically, the political life of the word began in 1953 when it was embodied in the Preamble of the Federal Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The relevant part of the Preamble reads: "And whereas the association of the colony and the territories aforesaid in a Federation . . . would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants . . ." Seven long years have passed since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, but no one in Central Africa—high or low—is anywhere near knowing what the word means.

Some "liberal" Europeans in Central Africa would insist that the word must be equated (after some modifications) with the "Rhodes Dictum." Cecil John Rhodes, "Founder of Rhodesia," has gone down on record as having said: "My motto is—Equal Rights for every civilised man South of the Zambezi. What is a civilised man? A man whether white or black who has sufficient education to write his name, has some property or works. In fact, he is not a loafer."

Reactionary Europeans dismiss the doctrine off-hand as a fantasy fathered by old-time starry-eyed idealism. The disciples of Rhodes admit that Rhodes was too liberal, but think the doctrine can be made to work—provided it is modified. They point out that if it is applied without any modification, it will result in too many Africans having equal rights with Europeans. And that is the last thing they would like to be confronted with—"liberal" as they are.

If they had their way, these "liberals" would alter the content of the doctrine to suit their own ends, but would still call the doctrine "Rhodes Dictum" in order to lend the parody the dignity of the original doctrine. But the chances of the white electorate giving these liberals a chance to try out their "wild ideas" are, to say the least, pretty remote. Even if they were given a chance, their half-measures would find little support among Africans.

When the policy of racial partnership was first declared by Britain, people in the United Kingdom as well as in Africa took the declaration to mean Britain's rejection of the South African doctrine of "Herrenvolk" (political supremacy of a white minority) and the reaffirmation of her faith in democratic government with adequate safeguards for white minorities who have made their homes in Central Africa. But European settler politicians have left no one in doubt that to them partnership means the

rejection of not only the supremacy of a white minority but also the supremacy of a black majority. The rejection of the latter, it should be noted in passing, is the rejection of democracy itself inasmuch as majority rule is the cardinal feature of democracy.

"What we hope to avoid," they say, "is the creation of another South Africa or Ghana." Such a dubious stand would seem to imply "Parity Representation," i.e., equal racial representation in Parliament. (There is only one country which has tried this system in recent times: Tanganyika. But Tanganyika, the erstwhile best example of a multiracial society with a multiracial government, is now independent with an African government). Asked if this is in fact what they want, settler politicians reply that that would be a betrayal of European interests. "Political power must remain in the hands of Europeans for the foreseeable future," says Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. To that end Rhodesian Europeans overwhelmingly reject the principle of "one man, one vote." The strategy seems to be to reject publicly both the Ghanaian and the South African systems of government and then quietly practise a variation of the South African system.

Socially, the people in Britain expected "partnership" to mean the abolition of racial discrimination. Economically, they hoped it would lead to equality of opportunity. In other words, they conceived "partnership" as the African equivalent, as it were, of the word democracy in the same way that "automobile" is the American equivalent of the word "car". American cars are a bit different from British cars, but they are essentially cars. Similarly, partnership democracy would be modified here and there to suit local conditions and to accommodate minorities, but it would be essentially democracy as known in the West. Over the years that the Central African Federation has been in being, however, they have observed to their dismay that partnership is only much cry and little wool. Efforts to end the colour bar by parliamentary action have been thwarted, while the prospect of introducing the principle of equal opportunity is as remote as the resurrection of Rhodes.

African nationalists for their part maintain that the only racial policy which is likely to bring about racial harmony is a policy which recognizes the inevitability of African political leadership and European business leadership. Partnership, accordingly, must mean a marriage between European know-how and African rule. And this, they would add, is just a complicated way of saying: "Let democracy prevail." This is the view they present when asked. Otherwise, their tendency is to dismiss the concept as the brain child of muddled thinkers who are trying to produce a hybrid of democracy and fascism.

Dr. Bernard Chidzero, a Nyasa political scientist at Nuffield College, Oxford, speaks for many of them when he says: "Partnership is alright if it can be made to mean something. As it is, it's a term the Europeans employ when they want to complicate things. In America, for instance, black and white live together harmoniously, but they never choose to call

their co-existence 'partnership' because there just isn't such a thing. I have always emphasised that personally. I haven't come across the true definition of 'partnership' and I don't think I ever will."

The main points that emerge from this discussion can be summarised as follows:—

- (1) Most of the so-called "plural societies" are in fact "primarily African"; consequently, the basis for "multiracial governments" in such countries is non-existent.
- (2) "Multiracial governments" are nothing more than artificial constitutional arrangements weighted in favour of minority groups. As such, they can serve only as transitional arrangements as in Tanganyika. Alternatively, they can be the cause of dissatisfaction and strife.
- (3) In the words of Dr. Chidzero, there just isn't such a thing as "partnership." What will bring about racial concord are not political quibbles nor indeed the postponement of the inevitable, but the willing acceptance of majority rule by Europeans and the acceptance of Europeans as leaders in business by Africans.

Like investing money in a new venture, black-white relationship in Africa boils down to an act of faith. The prize of success is rich, while the cost of failure is high.

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN FRENCH TROPICAL AFRICA*

by

DR. DALEEP SINGH

THE CONCEPT OF PLANNING in the former French Tropical Africa, and for that matter in the whole of Colonial Africa, dates back to 1945-46 when, for the first time, a concerted effort was made to attempt a planned development of different sectors of the economy. In British Africa, the task was facilitated by the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1945 by virtue of which the colonies could retain the unspent annual balances of financial assistance funds. Unlike the British territories, the French colonies, however, were unfortunately placed in not having accumulated monetary reserves, resulting from high raw material and food prices during the Second World War period.

I

It would be useful, at this stage, to briefly review the development projects completed in the French Tropical Africa prior to 1945-46. Soon after the consolidation of the French rule in this region towards the close of the last century attempts were made to open up the interior. In the meanwhile, the Financial Law of April, 1900, granted financial autonomy to the colonies, whereby the civil and police expenditure became their charge. The colonies were to be self-supporting; the Metropolitan Government, however, guaranteed the loans raised by them in strict observance of Article 33 of the Financial Law¹. Loans were then raised by French West Africa and French Equatorial Region to finance their public works programmes. The pattern of utilisation of these loans was heavily biased towards basic infrastructure. A loan of 65 million gold francs, raised by FWA in 1902, was devoted mainly to railway construction (32.5 million), port development (12.5 million) and water supply (5.5 million). A little more than 14 million francs went towards repayment of loans contracted earlier.² Another loan of 100 million francs, raised in 1905, was utilised more or less in the same manner, i.e. 78.5 mil-

*French Tropical Africa is taken to mean the former French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. (Total area 2.8 million sq. miles; population 24 million.)

1. HAUMANT: *Initiation aux Finances Publiques des territoires d'Outre mer*, Pp. 221-224.

2. AUGUST TERRIER—*L'emprunt de l' A. O. F.*—*Afrique Française* (Bulletin mensuel), 1903, p. 115.

lion on railways, 11.5 million on ports and navigable water ways and 10 million on medical assistance and military installations etc.³ In French Equatorial Africa, or the French Congo as it was then called, a loan of 21 million gold francs was raised in 1907 and was mainly devoted to development of communications, water supply and putting up of military installations. A small part of the loan was used to repay the previous debts.⁴

The rate of interest charged on these loans was 3.5 per cent and, as already noted, the payment was guaranteed by the French Government. Loans were often raised in a haphazard manner since there was no overall plan for the development of colonies as a whole. The public works projects centred mainly on development of railways and ports.

In the period following the First World War a notable attempt was made by Albert Sarraut, the French Minister of Colonies, in preparing a blueprint for the development of French colonies.⁵ It was then that for the first time a plan was formulated for the entire French colonial possessions. There was, however, no departure from the earlier policy of priorities for investment outlays. In his scheme of things for French West Africa (FWA), Albert Sarraut urged the development of ports of the coastal colonies. "What FWA needs is convenient and equipped ports to enable big ships to load and unload goods... the mouths of navigable rivers be developed to facilitate the entry of ships,"⁶ he observed.

This plan could not be implemented owing to the financial crisis through which France was passing at that time. Nevertheless, an important step was taken in 1931 when a new programme was elaborated on the recommendation of M. Maginot. A law was passed authorising the issue of loans to the extent of 3,900 million francs (the share of FWA being 1,570 million)⁷. The new loans were to be utilised for increasing the production of raw material in the colonies in order to improve the balance of payments of France. According to Prof. Gaston Leduc, of the University of Paris, "Maginot loans of 1931 were dictated by the desire to support metropolitan industry, badly hit by depression, rather than by the desire to stimulate development (in the colonies)."⁸ On the eve of World War II, the total amount of loans contracted for public works projects was as follows:

3. *Les grands travaux sur fonds d'emprunts—Afrique Française (Renseignements Coloniaux)*, 1905, p. 378.

4. *L'emprunt de Congo Français—Afrique Française (Bulletin mensuel)*, 1908, Pp. 364-67.

5. ALBERT SARRAUT: *La mise en Valuer des Colonies Françaises*, Paris, 1923.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

7. *Les emprunts Coloniaux devant le Sénat—Afrique Française (Bulletin mensuel)*, 1931, Pp. 74-79.

8. GASTON LEDUC:

L'utilisation des Ressources Locales dans le Financement du Développement Economique de l' Outre mer.
Civilizations. Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 333.

TABLE I
FRENCH TROPICAL AFRICA: LOANS RAISED.

[millions of revalued (1956) francs]

	BEFORE 1914	1914—1930	1936—39
French West Africa	29,568	3,500	109,200
French Equatorial Africa	1,680	13,755	52,955

SOURCE: *Bloche Laine—Le Zone Franc*, p. 109.

The bulk of the loans raised in French West Africa before 1914 were used for construction of railways and ports. In French Equatorial Africa rail track was not laid till 1923 and the earlier loans were utilised for development of ports and provision of water supply etc. In the inter-war period the significant investments made there were accounted for by the construction of the Congo-Ocean Railway which remains till today probably one of the most expensive railway line in terms of money and human lives. In FWA, Niger Agricultural Scheme was started in 1929. Since 1931, millions of francs have been sunk into this project which was supposed to bring half a million hectares each under cotton and rice cultivation.⁹ In 1951-52, twenty years after the working of the project, the area under rice and cotton cultivation was 14,174 hectares and 6,000 hectares, respectively.¹⁰ Five years later, the area under rice increased to 28,793 hectares, while the actual area under cotton was only 5,043 hectares.¹¹ It proved to be a white elephant for a poor colony like FWA from whose annual budgets regular allocations were made in addition to repayable loans which were contracted to finance this pet project of the French Colonial Office in whose view this area "was to become an important centre for the supply of cotton to Metropolis as France had to pay a heavy charge by way of foreign exchange in procuring cotton for her spinning industry. . . and it was hoped that an increase of cotton production in overseas territories would contribute to diminish the deficit in the balance of payments of France."¹²

On the eve of World War II the French colonies had no investment in the fields of mining or manufacturing industry as in the case of Belgian, Congo, Angola and the British territories. That the French colonies were most unfavourably placed vis-a-vis the other colonial territories is evident from table 2.

9. Between 1925 and 1946 about 1,000 million metropolitan francs were invested—400m. before 1939: EMILE BELIME—*L'agriculture en Afrique noire*—Marches Coloniaux, Paris, April 11, 1953.

10. GEORGE PETER—*Le bilan de l'Office du Niger II*—Marches Coloniaux, March 29, 1952.

11. OFFICE DU NIGER: *Chronique d'Outre mer*, January, 1958, p. 4.

12. GEORGE PETER: *Le bilan de l'Office du Niger II*—Marches Coloniaux, April 26, 1952.

TABLE 2
CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN AFRICA (1870-1936)

(£ '000)

	Public listed	Private listed	Estimated non-listed	Total
French West Africa	16,477	12,500	1,449	30,426
French Equatorial Africa	15,248	5,000	1,012	21,260
Togo Cameroun	11,306	6,431	887	18,624
Angola	10,188	19,553	2,230	31,971
Mozambique	8,444	23,157	3,160	34,761
Belgian Congo & Ruanda Urundi	35,846	100,670	6,821	143,337
Gold Coast	13,465	20,160	1,681	35,303
Nigeria	34,721	36,790	71,511	75,087
Tanganyika	31,211	15,841	4,718	51,899

SOURCE: H. FRANKEL: *Capital Investment in Africa—Its Course and Pattern*.

The above table shows that the French colonies were the least developed in colonial Africa. This disparity becomes all the more glaring if we take into account the size and population of a territory like French West Africa which is many times bigger than Gold Coast or Angola or Mozambique. Capital investment in FWA lagged behind all these colonies.

The shortage of capital in French Africa could be attributed to the fact that prior to World War I the French private capital was invested in Russia and Balkans because of prospects of making quick and high profits. On the eve of World War I, out of a total capital export of 45 milliard gold francs from France, 30.4 milliard francs were invested in Europe (two-third of this in Russia and Balkans), the balance 14.6 milliard francs going to Egypt-Suez and South Africa (4.5 milliard), Asia (1.5 milliard), French colonies (4.5 milliard) and other countries.¹³ Unlike the other Metropolitan countries, the French colonies did not account for a big share in the French capital invested abroad. In the inter-war period, the bulk of French investments continued to be made in the East European countries. It was only after World War II that the French public and private capital was directed towards the colonies which badly needed equipment in post-war period after having furnished a long war effort which was all the more difficult with limited means available with them.

To sum up, till 1945, each overseas territory of French Tropical Africa was left to itself to finance its own equipment either from budgetary sources or by loans. There was, thus, no difference between investment expenditure and ordinary civil expenditure. The first step towards Metropolitan participation in the financing of development of overseas territories was taken when the French Government gave subsidies to local

13. MOULTON AND LEWIS: *French Debt Problem*, p. 20.

budgets in French Equatorial Africa, though it never took charge of annuities of loans contracted by FEA. The second step in this direction was taken on the eve of World War II when the French Government agreed to sanction treasury advances to those overseas territories which had not utilised the loans sanctioned by the 1931 law so as to enable them to pursue their development programmes.

II

The new phase of development planning took shape in 1946 when in the cadre of the French Monnet Plan was adopted the law of April 30, 1946, relating to overseas territories. This law constitutes the charter of state participation in the financing of development plans of overseas territories. A Commission of Modernisation and Equipment of Overseas Territories, under the chairmanship of M. Rene Plevan, was to define the nature of the programme which was to be implemented under the law. By 1947, the Plevan Commission had drafted a Ten-Year Development Plan, subdivided into two five-year plans. It is interesting to observe that this Plan was never formally endorsed by the French Parliament. It was nevertheless carried out in practice. The only inconvenience caused by the absence of legal approval was that necessary resources had to be put to vote in Parliament every year. The first Modernisation and Equipment Plan for French Tropical Africa was extended to 7 years, *i.e.* till July 1, 1954. In fact, the operation of the Plan did not commence till 1949. The second Plan was passed by Law No. 342 of March 27, 1956, for a period covering July, 1953 to June 30, 1957. The objectives of the Plan were defined by the first article of the April 30, 1946, law as follows:

"On one hand and by priority, to satisfy the needs of local population and to make the most favourable conditions to their social progress and on the other hand, to co-operate in the execution of programme of reconstruction and development of the economy of French Union on the Metropolitan plan as well as on International plan."¹⁴

A notable change compared to the pre-war practice was the substitution of the Metropolitan State for the private subscribers, thus partly replacing loans by subsidies under the form of (a) an annual subsidy listed in the French Budget and (b) loans granted at a very low rate of interest. This was sought to be achieved with the help of the two remarkable financial institutions *Caisse centrale de la France d' Outre mer* (Central Overseas bank) and *Fonds d'investissements pour le developpement economique et social des territoires d' Outre mer--FIDES* (The Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development in Overseas Territories). The operations of FIDES fall into two categories.

14. GASTON LEDUC: *Reflexions sur les plans de developpement des territoires francaises d' Outre mer*. Civilization (Brussels), Vol. VI (1956), No. 4, p. 531.

(1) **The General Section** which finances, on a straight grant basis, undertakings which benefit all or more than one territory, such as scientific research, public development corporations, joint economic companies. The resources for this operation come from state subsidies as well as participation by the *Caisse centrale* in the share capital of joint economic companies.

(2) **The Overseas Section** which finances, through grants or loans, local equipment expenditure on roads, railways, ports, airports, power, schools, hospitals, housing etc. The resources for this operation come on the one hand, from contributions of the territories to the projected expenditure and on the other, from state subsidies. The contribution originally fixed under this section was 55 per cent on the part of Metropolitan Government and 45 per cent by the territories concerned. The share of the Metropolitan Government was increased to 75 per cent in 1954. Since 1956, it has been increased to 100 per cent for expenditure on production and social equipment only—the proportion for expenditure for building up of infrastructure remaining the same at 75 per cent¹⁵. The total public investments in the above two categories effected between April 30, 1946, and June 30, 1958, have been as follows:

TABLE 3
CREDITS BY FIDES AND CAISSE CENTRALE: 1946-1958
(billions of francs)

	French West Africa	French Eq. Africa
General Section	20.9 (15%)	13.5 (20%)
Overseas Section	194.0 (62%)	75.3 (56%)
Credits of Caisse Centrale	55.8 (33%)	33.5 (34%)
	270.1	122.3

SOURCE: *Outre mer*, 1958, p. 600.

The investments under overseas section constitute the most important slice of the total public investment. It would be instructive to examine in details the break-up of the investments under different sectors of the economy. It may be noted here that the first Plan came to a close on June 30, 1955, while the second one started on July 1, 1953. The period from July 1, 1953 to June 30, 1955, has thus been covered by both the Plans. Table 4 shows the expenditure incurred on the overseas section by *FIDES*.

The figures in table 4 show the pride of place given to infrastructure in the first Plan. In the Second Plan, however, the pattern of investment outlay was slightly different as shown in table 5.

15. SERVICE DE STATISTIQUES: *OUTRE MER*, 1958, p. 579.

TABLE 4
FIDES CREDITS (OVERSEAS SECTION): 1946-58
(millions of francs)

Sector	French West Africa			French Equatorial Africa		
	Total of first Plan upto 30.6.1953	Total of second Plan upto 30.6.1958	Total of the two Plans	Total of first Plan	Total of second Plan	Total of the two Plans
Production (agriculture, fishing mining, industry, etc.).	25,763	28,586	54,349	6,091	10,996	17,087
Infrastructure	67,787	34,030	101,817	26,836	15,633	42,469
Social Equipment	18,181	16,202	34,383	6,766	8,627	15,393
Total	111,853	81,354	193,207	39,814	35,445	75,259

SOURCE: *Outre mer*, 1958, Pp. 584-87.

TABLE 5
INVESTMENT PATTERN IN THE TWO PLANS¹⁶

Sector	First Plan (Realised)	Second Plan (Projected)
Transport & Communication	50%	22%
Social equipment	20%	12%
Agricultural production	12%	18%
Mineral production	18%	48%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

The sectorial distribution, however, underwent a change in the revised estimates of the Second Plan, whereby social equipment accounted for 21.4 per cent. The share of transport and communication and agricultural production remained the same, while mining, hydro-electricity, petroleum research etc. absorbed 34 per cent of the total investment.¹⁷

The territorial distribution of *FIDES* credits is also revealing. It has been as follows:

TABLE 6
FIDES CREDITS (OVERSEAS SECTION) 1947-57¹⁷
(thousands of dollars)

French West Africa		French Equatorial Africa	
Mauritania	15,100	Gabon	49,600
Senegal	140,500	Middle Congo	91,000
Guinea	78,700	Ubangi-Shari	50,400
Ivory Coast	109,000	Chad	55,200
Upper Volta	44,700		
Dahomey	49,900		
Sudan	79,400		
Niger	25,200		
Total	542,500		246,200

16. DUMAINE: *La Signification Reelle du Second Plan*—Presence Africaine, Paris, Av.-Mai, 1955, p. 70.

17. *Ambassade de France*, New York, French Africa; A Decade of Progress (1948-58), p. 7.

One can see from the above table that some territories received special treatment. It is argued that in the FWA Plan, 75 per cent investment expenditure was incurred in the coastal areas and only 25 per cent in the interior.¹⁸ In the coastal region itself, Guinea and Ivory Coast accounted for 3/4 of the basic investment expenditure, while Senegal and Dahomey accounted for the remaining 1/4. The land-locked colonies of Niger, Upper Volta and to some extent Sudan remained neglected. It may, however, be stated here that some of franc counterpart funds of Marshall Aid were also used for financing the development plan of this territory. Out of the \$130 million aid directed to overseas territories of France, \$89.2 million went to the North African territories, mainly Algeria. FWA received \$15.5 million, while the share of FEA was only \$ 5 million.¹⁹

III

The financing of the Plan is assured by *Caisse Centrale* and *FIDES*. The former is a multi-functional body with such responsibilities as the issue of currency in the overseas territories and control of foreign exchange operations. The *Caisse* participates in the financing of development projects in French colonies by virtue of article 8 of the Ordinance of February 2, 1944. It also subscribes to the share capital of state societies and joint economic companies and advances loans to semi-official bodies (Chamber of Commerce, Agricultural Credit Societies etc.), private concerns or even to territories outside the framework of the Plans. Towards that end, it utilises its endowments as well as advances which it obtains from the French Treasury or Economic and Social Development Fund (F.D.E.S) and from the Metropolitan Budget appropriation. All the loans are examined and approved by the Supervisory Council of the *Caisse* from the standpoint of their efficiency and possible yield and also by the Directing Committees of *FIDES* from the point of view of their conformity with the general objectives of the Plan. The *Caisse* acts as a banker and unlike the British Colonial Development Corporation, never interferes with the management of the concerns which borrow from it.²⁰

The *FIDES* is financed essentially from the Budget appropriations of Metropolitan France which are fixed each year. The territories concerned bring a token contribution out of their permanent or extraordinary resources. This is practically paid from the funds advanced to the territories by *Caisse Centrale*. The French Parliament appropriates the funds required by the *FIDES* to carry out year after year the long-term

18. *Les fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social des territoires d'outre mer*—*Presence Africaine*, Feb. - Mar., 1957, p. 146.

19. HUMBLLOT: *L' aide du Plan Marshall et la France d'Outre mer*—*Marches coloniaux*, May 21, 1949.

20. *La Caisse Centrale et le financement du plan colonial*—*Marche Coloniaux*, May 17, 1947. Also see Postale Viney—*Le rôle de Caisse Centrale de la France d' Outre mer dans le financement des plans*—*Marches Tropicaux*, March 31, 1956.

Plan which it has previously approved. The Executive Committee of *FIDES* apportions the funds according to the needs of each territory on the basis of the development programmes submitted by each territory after due approval by the territorial assemblies.

The relationship between *Caisse Centrale* and *FIDES* is rather complicated. As already noted, the *Caisse* cannot sanction a loan unless it is approved by the Directing Committee of *FIDES*. But *FIDES* has neither administrative nor juridical authority.²¹ It is managed by the *Caisse Centrale* under the authority and control of the Directing Committee presided over by the Minister of Overseas France.

Normally, budgetary savings contribute a major portion of development finance. In the case of French Tropical Africa, however, local resources have contributed practically nothing to meet their share of contribution.²² In the case of other African countries the situation is different as is evident from the following table :

TABLE 7
FINANCING OF DEVELOPMENT PLANS OF SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES BY SOURCE OF FUNDS. (in percentages)

Country	Grants	Loans	Local Resources
Belgian Congo	6.4	39.6	53.8
Ghana	—	32.0	68.0
Angola	—	5.0	95.0
Rhodesia & Nyasaland	—	49	51
French Tropical Africa including Madagascar 1957-58	95	5	—

SOURCE: U. N. *Economic Survey of Africa since 1950*, p. 246.

IV

To what extent the Plans have met the aspirations of the African population? A precise answer to this question is difficult due to absence of statistical data relating to national income. The annual national income estimates at constant prices are indicative of the state of health of an economy. Nevertheless, the criticism of the Plans has come from Professors, journalists, civil servants and last but not the least from African nationalists. Prof. Luc Carbon, a noted authority on the economic problems of French Colonial Africa, remarks that "it was a plan of spectacular works rather than productive equipment; plan of exportable production rather than amelioration of level of life"²³ and has not justified hopes.

21. Notes et Etudes Documentaires, Paris, No. 1391. La Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre mer. p. 9.

22. See Gaston Leduc—L'utilisation des ressources locales au financement des plans de développement des territoires d'Outre mer—Civilization, Vol. III (1953), No. 3.

23. LUC CARBON: *Dix années de planification*.—Chronique d'Outre mer, May, 1956.

Big aerodromes, hospitals and administrative buildings have absorbed most of the *FIDES* funds. Vast hospital equipment is rather out of tune with the needs of the local population and resources. Variations in climatic conditions and difficulties of communication require dispersal rather than concentration of hospital facilities. African nationalist leaders maintain that aerodromes and big hospitals have been built primarily for the use of Europeans. It was, therefore, not justifiable to spend so much money on economic and social overheads. The need of the hour was establishment of small dispensaries in the interior. The error, thus, lay in allotting a big proportion of investment outlay to public works of doubtful utility and disproportionate social equipment which was incompatible with the existing situation. The amount devoted for agricultural development was meagre—a big portion of even this amount went in for equipment of administrative service etc. No principle was followed in allotting funds to different territories. Almost the entire outlay devoted to agricultural production in FWA in the First Plan went to two territories consisting of 4 million persons, while the other six territories with 12 million population received nothing.²⁴ The entire Plan, according to Saller, was ill-conceived badly evaluated and executed and badly supervised.

On the contrary, this disproportionate outlay has created some problems for the African countries. It has become difficult for them to maintain these vast projects with their budgetary resources. A poor country like French Congo, with a population of 8 lakhs, can hardly afford to maintain the Brazzaville airport which is one of the finest and the biggest aerodromes in Africa. The personnel expenditure has assumed a serious proportion. M. Ehrhard, Director-General of Finances of FWA, has remarked that 60 per cent receipts of the general and the local budgets are being devoted to meet the expenditure on personnel and that if it is continued, "it would be vain to continue to speak of equipment and economic effort."²⁵

The Plans have created disequilibrium in the economies of these countries by failing to create permanent employment opportunities. Workers were attracted to towns when there was a programme of urban housing and port development and after the Plan they found themselves out of job. This has led to problems of unemployment in all urban centres of French Tropical Africa. Investment in manufacturing industries would have led to permanent employment. Further, increased emphasis on export crops has disturbed the balance between food crops and non-food crops. It has been observed in Ivory Coast that despite big increase in coffee production, the net gain to the producer has been practically insignificant—the production of coffee increased from 95,700

24. SALLER: *Erreurs Commises dans le plan d'Outre mer*—Marches Coloniaux, January 27, 1951.

25. EHRHARD: *Le grave probleme financier dans toute l'Afrique noire*—Marches Coloniaux, No. 315.

tons in 1954 to 1,85,400 tons in 1961, but world coffee prices fell from 40.2 cents per lb. in 1957 to 19.9 in 1961.²⁶

The *FIDES* management has been criticised for its lack of flexibility, slow procedures, and administrative complexity.²⁷ The nature of investment outlay of *FIDES* credits has not been very beneficial to the territories. It has been estimated that 15 per cent of the money spent in FWA under the First Plan was retained by the country.²⁸

One cannot think of super-infrastructure on a stagnant agriculture. Development of infrastructure should be considered as an instrument of production and not as an end in itself.

It is hoped that the independent countries of French Tropical Africa would now profit by the mistakes of colonial planning in preparing their new blueprints for the prosperity and well-being of their people.

26. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT: *Quarterly Economic Review: French Africa*, February, 1962. Belgian Congo, March, 1962.

27. ANTOINE LAWRENCE: *Organisation du FIDES et deuxième plan économique—Afrique Nouvelle*, Dakar, March 8, 1956.

28. JACQUES LECAILLON: *Les incidences économiques et financières du code du travail*, p. 28.

THE AFRICAN SCENE

by

DINESH SINGH

The following are the texts of two talks delivered by Mr. Dinesh Singh over All India Radio on 7th and 14th February, 1962.

I

THE LAST FIVE years have seen the emergence of more than two dozen new independent states in Africa. The process started after the Second World War by the decline of the European power in Asia and Africa is almost complete, except for a few exceptions. But the exceptions are a glaring reminder that colonialism, far from being dead, is still a fact in Africa.

Starting from the north, we see its ugly face on the shores of the Mediterranean in Algeria. A large-scale war of liberation is going on there. Armed only with obsolete weapons, the people of Algeria have been engaging the armed might of France for more than seven years.* It is estimated by the nationalists that more than a million people have sacrificed their lives so that their children and their children's children may live in freedom. The armed forces of France equipped with the latest arms, some supplied under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Alliance, have not been able to crush the Algerians' yearning for independence. French cruelties have shocked the world and have been severely deplored by the liberal-minded Frenchmen. There have been many attempts at peaceful negotiations. The nationalists have always been willing to negotiate but only on the basis of complete independence and the territorial integrity of Algeria. The French have always been hesitating. At first, the French said they could not find the leaders who could represent the people. Thereupon, the Algerians formed a provisional government, which could speak on their behalf. Then the French took refuge behind the settlers and hit upon a plan to partition Algeria. An attempt was made to create an impression that Algeria was part of France and the Frenchmen living there would never agree to the independence of Algeria. The effect turned out to be so serious that the European settlers with the support

* This struggle has since ended with the signing of a truce agreement between France and the Algerian nationalists on March 18, 1962.

of the armed forces tried to take over the government in Algeria. Consequently, the French Government fell and the Fourth Republic came to an end. Now General de Gaulle is trying for a peaceful settlement but again his efforts are being frustrated by the 'Ultras'. It is incredible that a small group of ruthless people should hold the nation to ransom. Let us hope that the latest efforts of General de Gaulle will soon bring peace and freedom to the people of Algeria.

Next we see Portugal present in its colonies a spectacle of medieval colonialism in modern times. It is beyond comprehension that such a cruel and ruthless form of rule should exist today when every nation is putting forward proposals for universal freedom and peace. How can there be peace in the world when so many people in Africa are forced to live in bondage? It has been now exposed beyond any doubt that the Africans in the Portuguese colonies are living in conditions worse than under slavery.

The matter has been repeatedly brought before the United Nations and there has been a general feeling of horror and condemnation. The United Nations have made strong appeals to Portugal to wipe out this blot from the face of Africa. The Government of Dr. Salazar, however, continues to turn a deaf ear to world opinion. The people of Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies in Africa are rising up in armed revolts, determined to liberate their countries from the Portuguese. The process has already begun with the liberation of the Portuguese colonies in India and, I hope, it will not be long before the African colonies win their freedom. It is interesting that the only ally the Portuguese Government could find is the Union of South Africa.

Britain, too, has large areas in Africa under her colonial rule. Kenya, Uganda, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland are all British colonies. Although Britain had followed an enlightened colonial policy and had been quick to recognise the wind of change, there are many in Britain who are worried about their vested interests in dealing with the future of the East African and Central African territories. Britain's acceptance of the right of the dependent people to independence in South Asia and West Africa had given her great prestige and people had come to quote her example to other countries still burdened with out-of-date colonial policies. But now the British Government seems to find itself in a dilemma.

In East Africa, however, things have started moving. The independence of Tanganyika is paving the way for the independence of Uganda and Kenya. But the artificial federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland remains a major obstacle in the way of African nationalism. The British Government has its foot caught in a trap there. As *The Economist* put it in its issue of January 13, 1962, "It cannot move without being torn by the sharp teeth of either Sir Roy Welensky or Messrs. Banda, Kaunda and Nkomo; it cannot stand still without suffering the tightening wrath of anti-colonial world."

This is, however, of the British Government's own doing. They created the federation to try to rule over the African majority through the European settler minority. The position is now untenable. The African majority must be allowed to govern itself. It is the very essence of parliamentary democracy that the British practise at home. There is no alternative. The weightage in favour of the settler minority must be removed, the three territories must be given independence, and it should be left to them to federate in any manner they wish. The European minority must be willing to give up the idea of race superiority and learn to live in equality. It is difficult to accept that a few thousand white Rhodesians—like the *colons* of Algeria—are able to compromise the independent action of the British Government which has recognised the independence of more than 600 million people since the end of the last World War.

What is even more difficult to understand is the British policy with regard to the Congo. The British Government has declared its support for the unity of the Congo and its opposition to the secession of Katanga. Yet it seems to have done little to oppose Sir Roy Welensky, who is helping Mr. Tshombe to maintain Katanga as a separate state. The Central African Federation is not an independent state. Britain continues to be answerable to the world community for the actions of the Federal Government. Yet the Government of the Federation is doing everything in its power to oppose the United Nations' action.

Finally, we come to a country where the misguided European settlers are trying to achieve the impossible. The Union of South Africa is the only sovereign state in the world where the government is trying to deny by force the majority of its inhabitants their legitimate rights of citizenship only on the ground of the colour of their skin. Its policy of *apartheid* has shocked the conscience of the world and it has been declared to be in direct contravention of the fundamental human rights and the Charter of the United Nations. Again and again the people all over the world and their governments have pleaded with the ruthless rulers of South Africa to give up their insane policies. Year after year the matter has been brought in the United Nations. But all this has failed to persuade the Government of South Africa to see reason. As if driven by some irresistible evil force, they are heading towards disaster and every caution tends only to accelerate the pace. Can a handful of foreign settlers have the right to subjugate millions of Africans in their homeland and not satisfied with political subjugation alone, deny them education and other means of betterment so as to be able to lord over them for ever?

It is the same story everywhere in colonial Africa—the domination and exploitation of the Africans by a handful of foreigners. The difference is only of degrees. This must not continue. The subjugated people look up to the United Nations and other freedom loving countries for help. If that fails, the people will have no alternative except to rise in revolt as many have done in Angola.

II

The end of the Second World War saw the decline of the British and the French empires in South Asia. It was followed soon by the loss of the oil monopolies in West Asia and finally, the Suez Canal passed out of European control. The emphasis suddenly changed from Asia to Africa.

Coffee and tea growers from Ceylon and India moved into Kenya, rubber planters from Malaya started seeking new plantations in Nigeria and planters from other parts of the newly independent Asian countries started finding new homes in Africa. European banks also started making considerable investments in African mining industries.

The interest was not purely economic; there were strategic considerations too. Britain had to compensate for the loss of raw materials and her bases in Asia. France was in search of a Siberia as a protection against nuclear warfare and found it in the Sahara. The idea of a France extending from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset and with its associated states up to the Congo found great favour. To these ends, the British and the French were willing to make political concessions. Their main policy was to accede to African nationalists in the hope of keeping the newly independent nations under their military and economic sphere of influence. The story was different in the territories where there were sizable European settlers. It was considered that a system built on the superiority of European settlers in those territories would best serve their interests. Therefore, strategic and commercial interest, more than loyalty to settlers, was perhaps the reason for different policies being followed by the British in East and West Africa, and by the French in Algeria and Central Africa.

Fortunately, things did not work out exactly as the colonial countries might have expected. The newly independent countries began to cherish their hard won freedom and gradually started adopting independent foreign policies. In this they were greatly encouraged by the example of India, whose policy of peace and non-alignment had received international recognition. The Afro-Asian group in the United Nations started playing more and more important role not only in the liberation of the dependent territories, but also in the maintenance of peace and the general lessening of tension.

In their own continent, however, the new countries of Africa face great challenges. The arbitrary boundaries that separate them from one another are artificial and were drawn for the convenience of the European colonial rulers without any economic or ethnic considerations. This has resulted in an unbalanced development of the different parts of a territory that should have been one and has also created language problems between peoples of the same race. It is a serious obstacle in the way of a federation of regional units.

The unbalanced economic growth of the territories has worked to the advantage of the European rulers. Their main investments are in the ex-

exploitation of the raw materials, both in the industrial and the agricultural fields. Therefore, while Africa produces large amounts of raw materials, they have to be sent out to Europe and America for utilisation. The African economy is, thus, largely dependent on Europe. France, Britain, Belgium and the United States influence the economies of almost all the African countries.

To what extent this economic interest can interfere and undermine national independence of a country is best demonstrated by the situation in the Congo. It is only this vested interest which is responsible for the chaos and bloodshed in the Congo and even spreads beyond the boundaries of the Congo to plot, intrigue and render help from neighbouring Northern Rhodesia. It has even gone beyond the boundaries of Africa to compromise the position of Britain, whose policies in the United Nations and actions in the Congo and Northern Rhodesia remain irreconcilable.

Unless the countries of Africa are able to free themselves from this economic domination, which has come to be termed as neo-colonialism, they will always be in danger. The latest French move to bring the former French colonies in Africa into the European Common Market as associate members is bound to cripple their economies.

Next to economic problems, which all under-developed countries are facing, the newly independent countries of Africa face the problem of technicians and administrators to man their rapidly expanding institutions and governmental agencies. Some of the colonial rulers, like the British and to some extent the French after their experience in Guinea, followed a more liberal policy and built up in recent times, a small cadre of African administrators and technicians which formed a nucleus for further expansion. These territories are comparatively better off, although they, too, need considerable help from outside. The Belgians were guilty of neglect, but the Portuguese appear completely unconcerned about this important matter. The Belgians paid the price of neglect in the Congo; the Portuguese may have to suffer even more and cause greater suffering to the people for whom they have had responsibility for a long time.

What is, however, interesting is the growth of nationalism in the artificially created states of Africa. There are two forces developing, which are pulling in opposite directions. While there is a strong movement towards federation and the pooling of services, there is an equally strong pull towards nationalism born out of tribalism. Both face common problems of unbalanced development, language and artificial frontiers. One tends to overcome them by union and the other by regroupment. The former may lead to harmony and understanding; the latter may at times lead to strife. Although a beginning has been made towards the realisation of a Union of African States, it is too early to think of it at present.

More than all these problems, the independent countries face the problem of liberation of their brethren still living in bondage in the colonial territories and in the Union of South Africa. It is their moral

duty to render every possible assistance to the people of these countries in their struggle against European domination. For the time being they are proceeding cautiously and in conformity with the present-day international law. Let us hope the changes will be rapid and without bloodshed and Europeans will have the wisdom to foresee and accept them. Otherwise, there can be an explosion for colonialism and European domination in Africa cannot continue for long.

THE ART OF AFRICA

by

HARSIMRAN MALIK

SO LITTLE IS known of the art of Africa in the rest of the world that its wide variety of expression, the strength and power of much of its sculpture and the pleasing nature of its decorative elements are a complete revelation to a layman.

Even in art circles knowledge of African art is comparatively restricted. It was only in the beginning of the twentieth century, when European painters, such as Vlaminck, Picasso and Modigliani, discovered in the African art forms a creative virility and inspiration lacking in the conservative representation of their own art, that the outside world came into contact with the art of Africa. The complete lack of documents on African art has retarded research and investigation and prevented the emergence of any reliable chronological picture.

Essentially, African art is a tribal art; the many tribes inhabiting Africa have evolved traditional forms differing from each other in style and in matter. But, at the same time, there does exist a certain real unity, based perhaps on the fact that in all the tribes religion is the deeply emotional inspiration and the primary *raison d'être* for art.

The term "African art" usually excludes the art of Egypt and the Islamic art of North Africa. It covers in fact the Negro art which developed mainly in tropical Africa, stretching in the north, from Mauritania to the Sudan and in the south, from Angola to Zimbabwe and the coast of Mozambique. The development was an uneven one, branching out in varied art forms at different levels of artistic achievement, ranging from the sophisticated highly-developed masterpieces of the Ashanti of Ghana and the Bini of Nigeria to the crude and primary sculptures of the Longo in the south-eastern Sudan.

To the African, his art is a living thing and an integral part of his everyday existence, rather than an object for museums. Primarily, of course, it is an essential part of his religion, concentrated on ancestor figures, masks, fetishes and ritual objects. But in many tribes the artistic sense, the sense of beauty for decorative purposes, is actively present. Many prosaic and utilitarian items, like loom-pulleys, stools, neck-rests, musical instruments, bowls, boxes and other household objects, are elaborately carved and decorated. Some tribes paint designs on the walls of their huts.

The highest pinnacle of African art was reached in the sculpture form, in wood carving and bronze and brass casting. But there are several other art forms—the weaving and printing of cloth, beadwork, leatherwork, basket-weaving etc.—which flourished and added to the general artistic and cultural aspects of African life; they continue to do so even today.

Of painting there is very little known, perhaps because the materials painted upon were usually clay, bark and sand, which were not durable. In some regions there are rock paintings of hunting scenes and animals, strangely reminiscent of the pre-historic cave paintings in Southern France and Spain, and unrelated in style to the rest of African art. These are believed to be the work of "Bushmen" who were nomadic hunters and are now settled on the borders of the Kalahari desert.

In the majority of tribes, an artist, whether a sculptor or a smith, enjoys a position of prestige and favour. This is easy to understand in the religious context of African art. It is he who creates the figure or the mask in which the spirit of the all-powerful force or the spirit of the ancestor enters to communicate with the living members of the community. On the artist rests the great responsibility of making the statue or the mask beautiful and fitting enough to house, even temporarily, the incarnation of the divine power.

Ritual and detailed belief may vary regionally and according to tribes, but the basic Bantu philosophy is common to them all. According to this philosophy, there is only one omniscient, all-powerful spirit, the creator of all powers, the creator and preserver of all living things. Next in this hierarchical succession are the ancestral founders of the tribe, who are the intermediaries between God and man. They are followed first by the other prominent dead, then by the living elders of the tribe. Man is the next stage, and after him come animals, plants and minerals. In this pattern, everything in the universe shares the same life-force. The African's life is dependent on this life-force, which has always to be placated so that its goodwill and good offices ensure protection and well-being for the tribe.

The medicine man or the priest is an important member of the hierarchy, selected by the tribal elders and installed after a long period of training and testing. He is the living expression of the "invisible and transcendental." The medicine man is often the artist, the creator of masks and figures. But the independent artist or smith, who also creates these, is equally inspired by the high purpose of his work, which has to be carried out in accordance with strict rules and traditions passed down through the generations and which vary with the tribes. Secret societies abound, deriving their authority from great spirits and maintaining order and tradition in the community. To these societies masks are of great importance for ritual and sometimes for indicating the status of the members.

In some cases, sculpture is reserved for special castes—at certain

courts, the wood-carvers were given the highest rank of nobility. Women, as a rule, are not allowed to practise religious sculpturing, but work on pottery, textiles and the decoration of houses.

The African reached the highest level of his artistic expression in sculpture and carving. A tremendous variety of forms developed under the two basic conceptions of religious and lay sculpture, but it is only in the secular figures that the artist attempted natural and life-like representation. In the creation of his religious figures, masks and fetishes, his purpose was to project an abstract idea into a visible, tangible object of his imagination. To give prominence to certain abstract qualities, he emphasized particular facial or physical features in the representative figure. Or in some cases he produced a further abstraction of the abstract idea in a mask, which in its exaggerated simplicity was the barest evocation of the symbolic idea, such as the protective buffalo mask of the Mamma in northern Nigeria, which is merely a three-dimensional outline.

There are two main types of sculpture, the pole sculpture of the tribes like the Dogon in western Sudan, who practise the patriarchal system, and the rounded sculpture of regions such as Benin and Dahomey where the matriarchal order is observed. The latter is more naturalistic with gentle curves, while pole sculpture is abstract, severe and cubist.

Wood, metal, ivory and terracotta are the media used, all with equal success. But, perhaps, it is wood which is the *matiere de l' Afrique noire*, which lends itself best to the character of the finest African sculpture and carving, to its simplicity of form, its reduction to essentials, its unbroken curves and its strong planes. It is treated with grease or oil to prevent splitting, and is polished and stained to a beautiful patina. Bronze, brass and even gold were sometimes used. The African caster was a master of the *cire perdue* or waste form technique.

Ancestor figures, commemorative heads, fetishes and masks are common to nearly all the tribes. Generally speaking, fetishes possess little artistic value. They are usually made by the medicine men, endowed with magical powers, and used for a specific purpose by a specific individual, either to protect himself or, occasionally, to harm his enemy. After use, they are usually destroyed.

African masks, on the other hand, are a fascinating study both for the artistic achievement they represent, as well as for the powerful role they play in the life of the community and the individual. It is through the masks that the ancestors and the good spirits manifest themselves to the community and intervene actively in its affairs. Sacrifice, ritual, oblations and dances invoke the spirits to come and inhabit the mask which is supplemented by the body of a human dancer, who, in most cases, remains anonymous, and who, by the very strength of his belief, becomes "possessed" as it were, by the invoked

spirit, which then controls his actions and sometimes his words. The mask is the vital intermediary of communication.

Masks are used in death rites, to pass judgement in judicial hearings, before crop-sowing to ensure a good harvest, at harvest time to give thanks, to avert natural calamities, to ask for rain, and on countless other occasions. The power of a mask is determined by the social position of its owner in the community. His importance, in turn, is credited to the help given him by his ancestors acting through the mask. On his death, his own importance is added to that of his ancestors to enhance the potency of the mask. The mask, therefore, becomes a valuable inheritance to his descendants.

Of great importance, and seriousness too, is the making of the ancestor figure and the mask. Even the selection of wood is preceded by offerings to ancestors. Very often the sculptor retires to work alone, and in many cases leads a pristine existence before and during his work. The work itself requires deep concentration and thought, for while certain rules are laid down, the artist must make the mask as beautiful as possible so as to persuade the spirit to enter. In some families the artistic tradition passes from the father to the son. In some tribes, as mentioned before, certain castes are the artists and smiths. In other cases, young boys are apprenticed to a recognized artist and they follow his technique.

The Bambara, one of the most important tribes in western Sudan, is famous for its animal masks, of which the most well-known and beautiful are the "chi wara"; the antelope super-structure is an abstract carving, in wood, of extreme grace and delicacy, between two and three feet in height. The ceremonial "chi wara" dance is an invocation for rain, or for blessings on a hunting expedition, or for a rich harvest. It is also performed at initiation ceremonies which are an important feature of the tribal life.

From the same area the Dogon have produced some of the finest African sculpture. Their material is also wood. "Tellem" is the name given to their oldest ancestor figures, over two hundred years old. These are pole sculptures in dynamic poses, suggestive of invocation or pathos. The more modern ancestor figures are abstract, with a balanced serenity and charm.

Very different characteristics are evident in the work of the Senufo or Siena who live in the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta and are influenced by the cult of the Mother Goddess. Their figures are not abstract. They are heavier and lacking in grace. They are often seen as decorations on sacrificial vessels as well as on chairs and official staffs. The Senufo have a "Fire-Spitter" mask which drives away witches and is a devourer of souls. It is an animal-like mask with long horns, and with the help of a burning ember, the dancer emits sparks of fire through his jaws.

The Maga of Mali produce a vigorous wooden sculpture which

is related in style to the Bambara sculpture. The figures are smoothly carved in the abstract style with strength and an attractive simplicity. Their "Nimba" masks are monochrome shoulder masks, representing fertility and fecundity. The "Banda" mask, which is feared as part of a secret society, is a long and narrow, highly abstract human mask, decorated beautifully in design and colour.

One of the most beautiful and the most powerful of the African masks is the "Mother Mask" of the Dan, a symmetrical, oval mask of black wood, of severe simplicity and sensitivity, giving a feeling of great peace. It appears on stilts, in a flowing cloth garment, to settle disputes and to protect the newly born. The other Dan and Kran masks serve as judges and mediators, direct lightning and thunder, influence the course of war and act as protectors and patrons. One is a fire guardian and runs from one village to another if a bushfire breaks out. The Dan also make miniature copies of the larger masks, tiny wood or stone masterpieces, three to four inches long. These are also held sacred and used as badges for members of the secret society and as ancestral guardians against illness.

The Baule are a tribe that left Ghana over two hundred years ago and moved to the Ivory Coast where they founded a great kingdom. Their culture mixed with that of the Guru, already settled there. The Baule were traditional brass-casters, the Guru wood-carvers. Together they produced some fine pieces of art and introduced into African art an element of lyricism and poetry. Theirs is an art of gentleness and dignity, of gentle strength rather than primitive force. Yet it is by no means a decadent art. They try to portray important people and beautiful women as true to life as possible and the results hold a great attraction. Their masks too have the same delicacy and refinement of execution.

Perhaps the most famous, certainly amongst the most dramatic of the African masks, is the pure gold mask of the Ashanti King, Kofi Kakari, the sole surviving treasure of the fabulous wealth of the Ashanti kingdom of Ghana. This is a portrait, not just a stylized mask, and is proof of the high artistic standards that must have existed at the Ashanti court. The other art objects which have come down to the present-day are the small weights in cast brass used to weigh gold dust. These are charming, and represent human figures, insects and animals in a highly decorative fashion. Ashanti women make almost life-size statues of the dead in clay, to be placed over their burial places.

In Nigeria, the ancient art forms have survived to the present-day. Not only is there a continuous artistic tradition of folk art, but modern Nigerian artists have won international recognition in contemporary art circles. Ife, the sacred city of the Yoruba, in south-western Nigeria, was a flourishing centre of art hundreds of years ago. Heads of great beauty, unstylized and realistic, in cast brass and

terracotta, date back to the thirteenth century. The cast brass head of one of the kings of Ife, in the British Museum, is an excellent portrait study, full of life and character. Another head, in terracotta, also a portrait, reflects calm and serenity akin to Asian sculpture. Yoruba sculptors also worked on stone. Yoruba wood-carvers decorated the doors of palaces with carvings depicting scenes from Yoruba life as well as kings and mounted warriors and hunters stalking animals.

A hundred and six miles south-east of Ife was the ancient kingdom of Benin, renowned for the technical perfection and beauty of its bronze castings. Traditionally, it is believed that the art of bronze casting was introduced into Benin in the middle of thirteenth century. Benin was a fortified city with broad streets and large houses, the pillars of which were covered with carved bronze plaques. Pomp and luxury highlighted the Benin court. The bronze-workers were masters of the *cire perdue* process. They produced figures of strength and compactness, and portrait-like heads of the Oba, the kings, which were placed on their altars after death. These are beautifully cast, moulded with great feeling and sensitivity, and impress with their strength and life. The Benin artists also produced unique treasures—animal figures, masks and ornaments, carved in ivory and encrusted with copper.

A word is perhaps necessary on modern Nigerian art. Only two modern artists have received traditional training. Yemi Bisiri is a Yoruba bronze-caster, whose figures reveal a highly individual style with vitality and movement. Idah, a carver from Benin, is a man of great individuality, who creates sculptures of men and animals in cement.

Amongst the many younger Nigerian artists who have studied and exhibited abroad, two have already received international recognition. Ben Enwonwu, now Federal Art Adviser, cast in bronze "The Awakening" which stands outside the Nigerian Museum in Lagos. This is a creative work of much beauty and individuality, as are his long mystical figures in wood. Felix Idubor does wood-carvings of great simplicity and loveliness, on purely Nigerian themes, successfully blending in his technique the ancient traditions and the influence of his art studies in Europe. His work decorates the new National Hall in Lagos.

In the south-western Congo are found the western Bapende whose masks are amongst the most original in Africa. These are the elegant *minyaki* masks used in the initiation rituals. They are also used in short comedies, called the N'Buya plays, which are performed in forty different kinds of masks. The primary importance of the masks, however, is their relation to death and regeneration of the novices in the initiation dance.

The Bakuba kingdom, in the heart of the Belgian Congo, dates

back to the distant past. The Bakuba have contributed a wealth of decorative art to African culture. It is known that the solar eclipse of 1680 took place in the reign of their 98th king—upto now there have been 124—and between 1600 and 1620 the Bakuba reached the peak of their greatness under King Shaambe Bolongongo. He was a philosopher and conqueror, a lover of peace and high moral principles, and a patron of art. He summoned to his court the great wood-carvers and ordered them to produce a sculpture portrait of himself. The tradition of royal portraits in wood lasted many years and the result is a series of sculptures, full of dignity, highly individual, and with finely carved details. The court art was elaborate and of high quality since the finest artists were there, but the folk art, though cruder, possessed the same sense of style and beauty. All kinds of utensils were decorated, and the Bakuba cups and boxes are real works of art. They produced three different types of masks as well as wrought iron figures, a rare find in Africa.

The Baluba, in the south-eastern part of the Congo, made their own valuable contribution to African art. Theirs is a highly-developed art form where the grotesque and crude have entirely disappeared. Their sculpture is lyrical in quality, with gentle curves, refined elements and delicately carved details. It is rounded and natural, aesthetically pleasing to the eye and compact (with quite a strength and vitality). The walls of the houses of Baluba aristocrats are painted red, black and white; the beams, bed-posts, neck-rests, utensils and water-pipes all carved with beauty and style.

Zimbabwe in Southern Rhodesia is still one of the world's mysteries. Its history and its people are an unknown factor in the chronicles of civilisation. The great ruined walls of smooth granite block, the abandoned mines, the few pieces of fine pole sculpture that remain, cast no light on the mystery.

Much could be written about other art forms, the carved ritual objects, the innumerable modes of decoration of utensils and boxes used by the different tribes, the use of beads and cowrie shells to enhance the beauty of masks, the skilful adaptation of carving to the shape of neck-rests and drinking cups. And a great deal more could be said about the art of the many tribes not mentioned above. The variety and wealth of African art is boundless.

But the future of this art is in question today. Not only do the inroads of Islam and Christianity threaten to wipe out the whole basis and purpose of African art by supplanting or assimilating the traditional religious beliefs, but politically, socially and economically, the entire African continent is in the agony of a revolution. All the accepted values are being questioned and new ones are taking their place. Inevitably, colonial rule brought with it a disparagement of all native things, including art, and eulogised the superiority of the Western concepts. Tourist demands have introduced lower standards of taste

and workmanship—a commercialisation of the pure art. All this is true. Yet certain factors point to a hopeful future ahead.

An African has an ingrained sense of the artist. For generations art has been part of his everyday existence and of his deepest, most emotional beliefs. His keen imagination and sense of rhythm are innate qualities. In the larger African towns, art schools and academies have already started. Young modern African artists are making their mark in the international art world. As the old forms of artistic expression give way, new virile ones will surely be born. And once the danger of losing the priceless old traditions is faced, and overcome, the new art of the new emergent Africa will develop as a synthesis of the living modern genius and the ancient past.

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THE ALGERIANS' STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

by

LAYASHI YAKER

The following is the text of the speech delivered by Mr. Layashi Yaker, Representative in India of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, at a meeting sponsored by the Indian Council for Africa on April 26, 1962.

FROM A REVIEW of the last few decades' happenings one cannot but be impressed by the tremendous changes that have taken place for the benefit of mankind. Progress made in the realm of science could contribute decisively to make all people live in peace and prosperity. But unfortunately tension in all its manifestations prevails and there is hardly any significant progress for a large sector of mankind.

Arms race is a real obstacle in the way of a genuine world understanding and economic progress. The refusal to accept the principle of peoples' right to self-determination—the refusal which actually emanates from a feeling of racial superiority and the desire for domination—is at the roots of all national liberation movements.

However, the victory over fascism won by the democratic forces during the Second World War, the growth of progressive and socialist forces throughout the world and the adoption of the Atlantic as well as the United Nations Charters, all foreshadowed better prospects for the colonial people. But for the people of Algeria, who really believed that freedom had been once for all won for everybody, there were 45,000 deaths three days after the end of the Second World War.

Algeria, conquered by an army of immense experience, in the course of a merciless war lasting from 1830 to 1857, has not ceased since then to claim her liberty. After each uprising under the guidance of the nationalist movements (amongst others in 1870, 1901, 1919), terrible repression took place against the "natives": they were deprived of their lands, were made to pay very heavy taxes and were usurped of even the most elementary liberties. On the other hand, colonisation by Europeans was encouraged by granting all sorts of privileges—economic, political and cultural—to immigrants into Algeria from France, Spain, Italy, Malta etc. (Today it can be said that only a third of the European population of Algeria is of purely French origin).

Moreover, Algerians have been recruited and set out to fight for France in various battle-fields throughout the world, particularly in 1914-18 and 1939-45.

The organised nationalist movement in Algeria started in 1923. Gradually it succeeded in attracting towards it the largest majority of the Algerian people. Two solutions or rather two ways were open before it: (1) Solution of the problem (of liberation) by peaceful means; (2) Solution by an armed action.

Betrayal By France

Peaceful means proved futile after being tried till October, 1954. The Government of General de Gaulle failed to honour the promise made in 1943, according to which France had agreed to begin, as soon as the war was over, taking of steps to set up an Algerian Republic, in return for the mass entry of Algerians into the war against the Axis and their allies.

The *Statut de l'Algerie* of 1947, which recognised the personality of Algeria, has not been enforced. This *Statut* provided for an equal representation in the Algerian Assembly — sixty each—for nine million Algerians and one million Europeans. It also provided for elections to the French Parliament of 30 deputies (15 Europeans and 15 Algerians) from Algeria which was considered as part of France. But let us have a look at the appalling disparity of figures. France has a population of 42 million and has 600 deputies in the French National Assembly. Algeria, on the other hand, has a population of 10 million and has only 30 deputies to represent it in the French Parliament. In spite of this flagrant inequality, the delegates to the Algerian Assembly and the deputies to the French Parliament were invariably appointed by the French Administration. For the National Leaders were thrown into prison; the Nationalist Press was suppressed; foul means were officially practised in electoral rolls. (The experience under the so-called "socialist" Governor-General Naegelen is an instance).

Launching Of Armed Struggle

It would be too long to enumerate the bitter experiences undergone by the Algerian people and to recount the evolution of this peaceful struggle for the liberation of Algeria, especially from 1943 to 1954. It was due to the absolute impossibility of placing the problem before the French and "international" opinion through lawful means that the armed struggle was launched; for, in the beginning, the question was only one of *posing* the problem. The blindness, ferocity and callousness of the colonialists have made our movement gradually, but steadily, transform itself into a war of liberation—one of the most brutal wars that the history has ever witnessed.

The situation obtaining in Algeria on October 31, 1954 (the eve of the armed conflict), can be gauged from the following facts:

—The average annual income of an Algerian was \$42 and of a European more than \$ 650.

—Ninety per cent Algerians were illiterate, while no European was

there who could be termed so. The University of Algiers had 550 Algerian students and 5,000 European students on its rolls.

—There were 600,000 unemployed Algerians, while there was full employment for Europeans.

—Arabic, which is the national language of Algeria, has always been considered a foreign language.

—Matters regarding Muslim religion had been placed under the French Administration (when the principle of Separation of the Church and the State was scrupulously applied in France).

—Prisons contained hundreds of Algerian nationalist fighters.

It was under these conditions that an armed struggle had to be launched to win freedom. The aim was, *and is*, to establish in Algeria a democratic and secular Republic in which all inhabitants shall be equal and in which the principles of the French Revolution, *viz.*, liberty, equality and fraternity, shall be translated into practice.

Apparently the means were very meagre and very much limited. But it has been proved beyond doubt that no force on earth can successfully oppose or withstand a determined nation.

Gradually the entire energy of the nation was mobilised and disciplined in the National Liberation Front as well as in the Army of National Liberation. Various powerful parallel organisations were set up to enlist the entire population (General Union of Workers, National Union of Students, Union of Commerce and Industry, Union of Women, Red Crescent, etc.) under the leadership of the F.L.N. and later of the G.P.R.A. A political and military administration was established. Public and economic life was reorganised following a democratic pattern. Meanwhile, war became more and more violent, which resulted in devastation on a massive scale, collective massacres, tortures, bombarding of hundreds of villages, military operations on a still greater scale, construction of electrified fences along the Tunisian and the Moroccan frontiers in order to prevent the entering of men and arms.

The Algerian Losses

In 1955, France decided to send conscripts to Algeria, something which was not done even in the case of Indo-China. An army of 8,00,000 soldiers and police, 1,000 aeroplanes and 2/3 of the French fleet were deployed against the Algerian people. Moreover, France was, either directly or indirectly, materially or diplomatically, helped by her powerful allies.

The consequences of this war have been as follows:

- More than a million Algerians have died;
- More than five lakhs were wounded;
- Hundreds of thousands were jailed or interned;
- Three lakh refugees had to take shelter in Tunisia and Morocco;
- About 20 lakh Algerians were placed in regrouping camps.

The war continued and some efforts at finding a "solution" were made by the French Authorities. These included:

- Cease-fire first and then political negotiations—Mollet.
- Aid to counter-revolutionaries and search for a "third force."
- Unconditional surrender (peace of the brave)—de Gaulle (October, 1958).
- Lastly, self-determination without its application to Sahara and with partition of North Algeria.

All these "solutions" were in fact unacceptable to the Algerians as they were against the following principles:

- Integrity of the Algerian territory.
- Unity of the Algerian people.
- G.P.R.A. being the sole representative of the Algerian people.

(We shall presently see that all these principles have been respected in the Evian Agreement).

It is abundantly clear that the Algerian people could never have so successfully carried on the revolution had it not been for the ever-growing help that was received from outside world:

(1) **On the political plane:** from all the people, especially from those of Africa and Asia, from Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and its allies and from international organisations of workers, women, youths, students and others;

(2) **On the material side:** from brotherly Arab countries and from the friendly countries of Africa, Asia and Europe; and

(3) **On the diplomatic level:** mainly in the course of various sessions of the U.N. since 1955 and *through diplomatic recognition of the G.P.R.A.* It can be recalled that G.P.R.A. was created 46 months after the launching of the armed conflict and was *de jure* recognised by 34 countries between September, 1958, and April 17, 1962.*

The Role Of G.P.R.A.

Ever since its founding, the G.P.R.A. has played an important and growing role on the international scene:

- It has participated on equal footing in all the conferences of the League of Arab States;
- It is, along with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the U.A.R., a member of the group of countries of the African Charter of Casablanca (G.P.R.A. was one of the founders of this group in January, 1961);
- It has participated in numerous conferences of independent African

*These countries are:

Iraq; Libya; Morocco; Tunisia; Saudi Arabia; Jordan; United Arab Republic; Yemen; China (People's Republic); Sudan; Korea (People's Democratic Republic); Vietnam (Democratic Republic); Indonesia; Guinea; Mongolia (People's Republic); Lebanon; Liberia; Togo; Mali; Congo (Leopoldville); Cuba; Pakistan; Afghanistan; Cambodia; Yugoslavia; Ghana; Arab Republic of Syria; Somalia; U. S. S. R.; Czechoslovakia; Rumania; Albania; Bulgaria; Hungary.

States: Accra (1958), Monrovia (1959), Addis Ababa (1960).

The Algerian struggle was not, throughout its war of independence, confined to the objective of winning freedom for Algeria but also acted as a further shield to the total freedom and unity of Algeria.

*The Evian Agreement**

Today we have won our victory—victory for the Algerian people; also victory for the forces of peace, liberty and progress in Africa and in the world. In fact, from now on France recognises the independence of Algeria. Agreements have been entered into and signed by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on the one side and the Government of France on the other, regularising relations between Independent Algeria and France.

The actual transitional period is meant only to prepare the formal transfer of responsibilities still held in Algeria by France. This period will not be extended beyond three or four months. A Provisional Executive Body, composed of 12 Algerians (of which 3 are of European origin) has been appointed by the two Governments for this transfer. A High Commissioner represents the French Government for the same purpose.

It is, therefore, quite evident that the independence of Algeria has been recognised as a fact, since the two parties have not simply discussed the guarantees of self-determination *but also adopted agreements of co-operation between Independent Algeria and France.*

Here are the essential points of the Evian Agreement:

- (1) Independence of Algeria is recognised by France.
- (2) The principle of territorial integrity, including Sahara, is accepted. The Algerian people, whose unity is admitted, shall exercise their sovereignty over the entire country.
- (3) The recognition of the G.P.R.A. as the exclusive spokesman and the authentic representative of the Algerian people has, in fact, been forced upon France.

The *other points* of this Agreement are:

—**Economic co-operation** is to be there for the exploitation of the Saharan resources in the framework of the sovereignty of the Algerian State.

—**Guarantees to Algerians of European origin:** They shall have a period of three years at their disposal wherein they can decide between Algerian or French citizenship.

—**Military bases:** The air and naval base of Mers-el-Kebir, where France previously wanted to maintain her sovereignty, is only leased

* The reference here is to the agreement signed on March 18, 1962, at Evian between the French Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, by virtue of which a cease-fire was ordered ending the seven-year war,

out to France for a period of 15 years. France can utilise certain aerodromes and installations for a period of 5 years. It is specifically mentioned that these bases shall not be used against an African or a country friendly to Algeria.

According to the Evian Agreement, the Provisional Executive appointed by the G.P.R.A. and the French Government will:

- administer Algeria during the transitional period;
- ensure maintenance of order during the transitional period (it will have at its disposal an army of 40 to 60 thousand men, but difficulties are still there since the European settlers have not been disarmed;
- prepare the self-determination referendum.

(The High Commissioner will represent the French Government during the transitional period.)

The Agreement entered into at Evian was presented by the French Government for the approval of the people of France on April 8 and was adopted by an overwhelming majority (90 per cent of the voters). This fact means that the French people have already recognised the independence of Algeria.

Free Algeria's Policy

Soon after the self-determination vote, General Elections for electing a Constituent Assembly will take place. The Republic of Algeria will be *democratic* and *secular*. All citizens will enjoy the same rights and the same duties. The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights will be enforced.

The Republic of Algeria will be socialist—practising a socialism which will correspond to the aspirations of the people and meet national requirements. A thorough agrarian reform will be introduced (average area held by Europeans today is 275 acres and that held by Algerians 12.5 acres).

National culture derived from the Arab-Islamic culture will be developed.

And these are the constantly reaffirmed principles of our external policy:

- Non-alignment in accordance with the Bandung and Belgrade principles, keeping ourselves free from all military pacts;
- Direct and increased assistance to the peoples still under colonial rule;
- Unity of Arab Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) and strengthening and defending of the political, economic, social and cultural relations between the Arab nations, especially through the League of Arab States;
- Close co-operation with all countries of Africa, especially with the Casablanca Powers;
- Strengthening of relations and solidarity among non-aligned

countries;

—Contributing towards the establishment of a climate of peace, friendship and co-operation between all peoples and the relaxation of international tension.

Violation Of Cease-fire By O.A.S.

The cease-fire agreement was signed on March 18, 1962, between the G.P.R.A. and the French Government. But, alas! firing has not yet ceased. Since this historic date, more than 1,500 defenceless Algerians, among them numerous women and children and many patients in a clinic and many prisoners in the Oran prison, have been assassinated and thousands wounded. We believe that the Government of France has all the means necessary for a speedy liquidation of the Secret Army Organisation. *The continuation of massacres and the involvement in complicities are a menace and go against the implementation of the Evian Agreement.* The Algerian people, obedient to the orders of the G.P.R.A., have given a proof of discipline and self-control in refusing to answer provocations. But it is highly important that this organisation (O.A.S.) is totally and speedily crushed.

As soon as the cease-fire was proclaimed, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania recognised the G.P.R.A. *de jure*. Thus, 34 States now recognise the G.P.R.A. as the authentic representative of the Algerian people. World opinion must remain vigilant and strengthen its support to the people of Algeria and to their Government, the G.P.R.A. The more the G.P.R.A. is supported, the more will it feel strong to demand a loyal and rapid application of the Evian decisions, the more will it be able to realize the aspirations of the Algerian people on the basis of the same principles as those which guide the Republic of India.

It is because of the uncertainty of the situation that the people of Algeria and the G.P.R.A. ask the people and the Governments of the friendly countries for an increased political, material and diplomatic support:

Political, in order that the cause of freedom, for which more than a million Algerians have laid down their lives, may triumph;

Material, for our refugees and for our national reconstruction;

Diplomatic, by granting to the G.P.R.A. all support which it has got the right to expect from friendly countries which share its values, its struggle and its objectives.

In the name of the Algerian people and in the name of the G.P.R.A., I warmly thank the Indian people (nation), its Parliament, its Government, its national organisations, for the constant and ever-growing support it has given to the cause of Algerian independence. Be assured that the people of Algeria shall never forget the help and support which was given to them at a decisive period of their history.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN ANCIENT INDIA

by

DR. A. K. MAJUMDAR

THE GREATEST stabilizing factor in the ancient Indian political system was the village *panchayats*, or units of local self-government, which controlled all the affairs of a village. Foreign conquerors, like the Turks and the Mughuls, did not interfere with this indigenous system, and it came down to the British period. Indeed, some of the early British writers have described the contemporary Indian villages as "village republics." For, under this system, a village, after paying the government dues, enjoyed immunity from interference by the government and had to a great measure the power to adopt initiative in its own affairs. Under the impact of the centralized bureaucratic system of administration introduced by the British, the village republics gradually disappeared and the present Indian Government is now trying its best to revive them.

It is well known that one of the chief obstacles in the detailed study of Indian history is the paucity of contemporary records so that there are gaps in our knowledge regarding various important aspects of life in ancient India. Happily, however, a few records have survived to give us a picture of the actual village administration in the far south and of town administration in Gujerat. These records are engraved on copper plates to commemorate certain events.

Some of the early records which have preserved details of village administration belong to the period of the Pandya kings who ruled over the extreme portion of South India from about 765 A.D. for several centuries. In the Pandya administration, the lowest unit of administration was a village and several villages formed a *kurram* or *nadu* (sometimes also called *rashtra*). Each village, however, had its own assembly, called the *sabha* or *ur*, which played an important part. The efficiency and integrity of these assemblies were so well-known that the kings often placed permanent endowments in cash in their hands for meeting the expenses of worship in temples. Sometimes a board of trustees was created to manage the temple property, composed of some representatives of the village assembly and the temple employees. The assembly also owned lands which could be alienated with its consent.

A village assembly seemed to have powers to form its own rules, and at least on one occasion an assembly passed a rule under which

any person owning land could attend its meetings, but only those possessing a certain property qualification and moral and intellectual attainments could take part in its deliberations. The assemblies also elected executive committees, but only those committees which were called *variyaṃs*. The assemblies used to meet at a stated hour at a fixed public place.

This type of village administration was not unique, for we have similar records of village assemblies receiving endowments of gold from a queen and a rich man in the territory of the Bana kings which was adjacent to that of the Pandyas.

But the greatest development of the local self-government is seen during the administration of the Chola kings. The Cholas were an ancient dynasty and ruled for a long period with intermissions, but their period of glory covered the eleventh century A. D. when under their kings Rajaraja the Great (985-1014) and Rajendra I (1014-1044), they carved out a huge empire covering not only the greater part of South India but Ceylon and, for a time, Sumatra and the Malaya peninsula as well, and assumed the haughty title of *Chakravartigaḷ*, that is Emperor of three worlds. The basis of Chola power seems to have been located in the villages which enjoyed great powers under King Parantaka I as early as 919 A. D.

Under the Cholas the smallest or the primary units of administration were the autonomous villages of which several types are known. "The different appellations such as *ur*, *nagara*, *sabha* etc., by which the administrative bodies of villages were called show the different nature of their constitution. If the village.....(contained) families of farmers, artisans, barbers, potters, washermen, doctors etc., it had the assembly of the *ur*, the members of which body were village landlords. If the village was one of merchantmen, traders and men engaged in manufacture and industry, it was subject to the assembly of the *nagara*. And if it was a Brahmanical village, having in it mostly Brahmana landlords, with such families of farmers etc. as were necessary for the well-being of the village and the cultivation of lands in it, it had the *sabha* for its management."*

The transactions of the *nadu*, the *sabha* and the *ur* were recorded by the order of these bodies by persons designated as *madhyashthas*, who acted in the capacity of secretaries to these bodies. Sometimes it is found that a *madhyashtha* received his orders from a member instead of from the assembly as a whole and this member was designated as the *tiruvadigaḷ*, who was invariably a member of the assembly and seems to have been its president.

The detailed working of the type of the Brahmanical village assemblies, called the *sabha*, is known from two records of King Parantaka's time. They contain the resolutions passed by the local

*EI, XXV. p. 74.

sabha on the constitution of the *variya*ms or committees. The village was divided into thirty wards and each ward was to nominate persons possessing the following qualifications for selection to committees: ownership of more than 1.5 acres of land; residence in a house built on one's own land; age between thirty-five and seventy; and knowledge of at least certain specified portions of the *Vedas*. The following types of persons were disqualified: those who had been on any of the committees for the past three years; those had been on the committees but failed to submit the accounts, together with all their relations; those who had committed specified criminal offences, as well as their relations; and those who had stolen properties of others. Disqualification on account of one's relation having committed an offence may appear to be irrational, but it had a very salutary effect; a person's relations would have found it to their interest to keep him straight.

From among the eligible persons of each ward one was selected in a peculiar manner. Names of eligible persons were written on slips of palm leaf, which was the usual writing material in those days, paper having been introduced later. The slips were put into a pot and shuffled. Then a young boy was directed to take out as many tickets as there were members to be chosen. These members were, thus, selected by lottery. But as no member could serve for more than three terms, the chance of a person being selected seems to have been as fair as in a keenly contested election between several candidates. From among the thirty members selected from the thirty wards, twelve, who were advanced in age and learning and had served on garden committees, were assigned to a special committee which literally translated would mean 'annual committee,' another twelve members formed the garden committee and the remaining six the tank committee. There were also two other committees, namely, a standing committee and a gold committee. A committee looked after the village administration with the help of paid officials to detect crimes, while a judicial committee settled disputes (this has sometimes been interpreted as a jury system).

General surveys were conducted by the government, but the approval of the *sabha* was necessary for any change in the classification of the lands. The right over the communal lands vested in the *sabha*, which also controlled private lands within its jurisdiction, and, subject to the permission of the central government, exercised power over transferring the landed properties. Its functions also included reclamation of forests and wastelands and it shared with the royal officials the duty of estimating the produce of cultivated land and assessing the land revenue due from the village. Thus, the peasants were afforded protection against exactions of the royal officials.

The *sabha* collected the land revenue and in cases of default had the power to sell the land in question by public auction. Disputes about land and irrigation rights were settled by it. Where, however,

the interest of more than one village was concerned, all the interested assemblies met to arrive at a mutually satisfactory decision.

The *sabha* had powers to levy taxation for local purposes and also of remission of such taxes. Instead of paying annual land revenue, a landlord could compound all his future dues by a single payment of a determined sum to the assembly, out of which the assembly undertook to pay the government dues as well.

The other functions of the *sabha* included the maintenance of roads and irrigation works, including ponds, and supervision of charitable and religious endowments. It is apparent, therefore, that the *sabha*, a popular assembly, was responsible for the general administration and material and moral welfare of the villagers.

About the city administration, we have a very interesting record of the reign of King Sarangadeva, who reigned in Gujarat from 1274 to 1303. The record is dated 1291.

The record opens with the statement that on a previous occasion the local agency of the royal administration and the customs house had granted to the Sri Krishna temple at Pahlampur certain sums to defray the cost of worship, offerings and theatrical performances. There were also several private donations towards meeting these expenses, but all these amounts even when put together were found to be insufficient. As the expenses for worship and offerings to deity are elastic and may be decreased without any special effort, one would suspect that the real deficit was caused by the theatrical shows, which possibly, then as now, upset the budget.

However, something had to be done. Therefore, the body known as the *panch-mukha-nagara* of Pahlampur met to cover the deficit by imposing some fresh taxes. The constitution of this body is given as: it consisted of (1) the *panchakula*, which meant a board of five royal officers appointed to perform various but usually specific duties; (2) the temple priests; (3) the merchants such as bankers and money-lenders, goldsmiths and braziers; (4) corn-dealers; and (5) ship-owners. The grouping of the merchants is somewhat peculiar and hard to explain in the absence of any explanatory note or statement. The system may be called a peculiar prototype of the functional representation, for these men were in all probability selected by their guilds.

The *panch-mukha-nagara* imposed a series of taxes some of which were to be paid by the sellers and some to be paid by the buyers and the buyers both in equal proportion. Usually, a seller can pass the incidence of taxation to the buyer. But from the rigid distinction made between the sales tax and the purchase tax, it is evident that here at least that could not have been possible. We know that in those days an official superintendent was usually attached to each market to supervise it generally and to regulate the prices. Possibly it was his duty not only to collect these taxes, but to watch that the

seller paid his due share of tax.

It is apparent, however, that the town enjoyed fiscal autonomy. It is also known from other documents that it was necessary to inform the *panch-mukha-nagara* before executing a transaction, like the sale of a house. They could also take affidavits on oath, that is they could perform the function of notary public.

It will be thus seen that in the villages and in the towns non-official bodies were functioning to discharge various duties. These were indigenous institutions and had steadily developed in course of centuries. Unfortunately, there exist only few records bearing on this aspect of ancient Indian administration. But paucity of material does not mean that these systems were exceptions. For, these alone can explain the development of the sturdy village *panchayats* or the 'village republics.'

THE LEGAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

by

DR. NAGENDRA SINGH

The devastation caused by atom bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima towards the close of the Second World War shook the conscience of the world. Persistent pleas have been made since then for banning the use of nuclear weapons in war. Dr. Nagendra Singh in his book "Nuclear Weapons and International Law" has examined this question from the legal angle. Reproduced below are the concluding pages of his this work.

EVEN IF RESORT TO ANY KIND of nuclear device in war were accepted as being illegal, it is contended that there would still remain certain circumstances justifying the use of nuclear weapons which may be said to constitute "special cases."¹ These exceptions are said to exist both in the customary and the conventional law of war. Military necessity and survival, self-defence and self-preservation have already been discussed.² It remains to consider enforcement measures under the Charter of the United Nations, reprisals and punitive deterrents.

The position in respect of the plea of military necessity and similar pleas may be summarised to emphasise that they would not justify the first use of nuclear weapons in a war. If these weapons are contrary to international law, not even the supreme reason of repelling aggression nor exercising the right of individual self-defence as modified by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, let alone the plea of military survival, would appear normally to justify their initial or first use. This conclusion would be warranted, even if the war were being waged against an aggressor who had violated solemn treaties like the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 or the Charter itself. It may be possible, for certain legal purposes,³ to distinguish between just and unjust wars, but if enforcement action under the Charter of the United Nations was a lawful war, and aggression in violation of the Charter an unlawful war, rival belligerents in both cases would be required to observe the laws of war, particularly in the sphere of prohibited weapons and practices. This has the sanctity of

1. McDOUGAL AND SCHLEI in "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective", 64 Yale Law Journal, 1955, p. 688; also SCHWARZENBERGER: *The Nuclear Weapons*, 1958, p.39.
2. See Chaps. 4 and 5 of Dr. Nagendra Singh's book 'Nuclear Weapons and International Law'.
3. OPPENHEIM: *International Law*, edited by Lauterpacht, Vol.2, 7th ed., 1952, p. 218.

judicial decisions.⁴ The observations of the Military Tribunal in the case of *General Christiansen* (1948) are significant: "The rules of international law, in so far as they regulate the methods of warfare make no distinction between wars which have been started legally and those which have been started illegally."⁵ Though Lauterpacht regards *ex injuria jus non oritur* as "an inescapable principle of law,"⁶ he still comes to the conclusion that "during war all belligerents are bound to respect and are entitled to insist as among themselves on the observance of rules of warfare as generally recognised."⁷ Thus, aggression, even though a criminal violation of international law, must ultimately be subject to the laws of war, and the latter would always prohibit the initial use of illegal weapons by any belligerent in order to save humanity from degenerating into uncontrolled savagery. Thus, in the *Hostages Trial* the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the "rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a war."⁸

The doctrine of self-preservation permitting armed intervention to forestall an attack may perhaps have justified the use of these weapons according to the nature of the threat, but since Article 51 of the United Nations Charter has now restricted the exercise of the right of self-defence to occasions when an armed attack takes place, there could be no justification in customary or conventional law for the first use of these weapons."⁹

Enforcement Action Under The Charter

It would appear from the basic purpose of United Nations Charter that the use of force by air, sea or land would never be justified if excessive. Article 42 empowers the Security Council to take only such action as would be necessary for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Thus, the first use of nuclear weapons in any enforcement action taken under Article 42 would *prima facie* be unjustified. The Security Council could hardly be expected to agree to the use of a prohibited weapon of war until an armed attack had taken place and the aggressor was known to have nuclear weapons. Similarly, measures of collective action taken under regional arrangements visualised by Article 52 would not permit the first use of nuclear weapons in any kind of war, even if it were meant to curb an aggressor. Lauterpacht has very rightly brought out that there is merely "a superficial attractiveness in the notion that hostilities conducted for the purpose of collective enforcement of

4. See Chap. 4. For example, the *Hostages Trial* (1948); 8 *War Crimes Trials*, p.84, p.59.

5. *Annual Digest*, 1948, Case No. 121, Vol. 2.

6. LAUTERPACHT: *Recognition in International Law* (1947), Pp. 420-430. See also CHENG: *The General Principles of Law*, 1953, p. 187.

7. OPPENHEIM: *International Law*, edited by Lauterpacht, Vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952, p. 218.

8. *Loc. cit.*, p. 67.

9. See, however, the discussion in Chap. 5 above, with regard to the Suez operations, 1956.

peace should be governed by a code of rules different from those obtaining in ordinary wars and that efforts of international lawyers ought to be directed towards that end. The attractiveness of that idea tends to diminish in proportion as we realise that the practical scope of its application is insignificant."¹⁰ This is so because if there is a clear determination of aggression by an appropriate vote of the Security Council, the forces at the disposal of the United Nations would be so overwhelming as compared with the resistance offered by the law-breaker that it would not necessitate any departure from the existing rules. On the other hand, if there were no unanimous designation of the aggressor and there were long drawn out hostilities, it is obvious that the normal rules regulating such hostilities should apply in the interests of rival belligerents. Thus, under the Charter as it exists today, even if the provisions of Article 42 did not debar the Security Council from resorting to nuclear weapons as an initial measure, their use would not be necessary, in the event of the Council being able to take a decision when all nuclear weapons would be arrayed on one side, and, if the Council was paralysed owing to its voting procedure, the question of action under Article 42 would not arise. In any case, there is no express rule of law or customary principle which would justify a departure from the laws of war merely on the ground that a State had committed an act of aggression. It is as well to refer to Schwarzenberger's comment on the use of nuclear weapons on the ground that it is directed at preventing world domination: "This justification of the use of nuclear weapons is so remote from the generally recognised rules of international law as hardly requiring refutation As, in a divided world, each side is bound to accuse the other of this ultimate design, the function of this asserted right or duty . . . is to provide in advance, and indiscriminately, both sides with semi-legal justification for the use of the 'ultimate deterrent'."¹¹

Reprisals may be justified, but they too must be in accordance with existing customary rules. There is, however, a solitary judicial decision in the *Zuehlke* Case (1948) when the Netherlands Special Court of Cassation in 1948 expressed the view that as the Second World War was an international crime on the part of Germany, Holland "would have been authorised to answer" the aggression "with reprisals, even with regard to the normal operation of the laws of war on land, sea and in the air."¹² Lauterpacht has observed that the latter qualification is open to question inasmuch as "if conceded, it would amount to conferring upon the victim of aggression the right to disregard, by way of reprisals, the laws of war as against the guilty belligerent."¹³ Again, in the *Annual Digest*, in a foot-

10. "The Limits of Operation of the Laws of War," 30 *B.Y.I.* (1953), p. 206, p. 220. cf., however, OPPENHEIM: *International Law*, edited by Lauterpacht, Vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952, Pp. 350-351. See, also, SCHWARZENBERGER: *A Manual of International Law*, 1951, Pp. 79-80.

11. *The Legality of Nuclear Weapons*, 1958, p. 42.

12. 14 *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*, p. 139, 144.

13. *Loc. cit.*, 1953, p. 216.

note appended to the *Zuehlke* case, Professor Verzijl has admitted that the verdict of the court "though fundamentally correct...might produce serious consequences during a war."¹⁴ It is submitted that as the laws of war are meant to be applied in war, any departure from them would be inconvenient to both the belligerents.

However, if reprisals against the law-breaker could be contemplated, the quantum of force used would always have to answer the basic rule of being proportionate to the act of aggression, they are not, however, limited to "identical acts . . . Once, however, the legitimacy of non-identical reprisals is admitted, it becomes somewhat difficult to assess their proportionate character."¹⁵ A study of the principles governing reprisals would reveal that for the violation of the Pact of Paris of 1928 or Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, the appropriate retaliatory measure would be the declaration of war and not a complete departure from the laws of war or those which govern the institution of reprisals. Thus, if an armed attack with conventional weapons occurs against a member of the United Nations, the Security Council or the individual member could not by way of reprisals or in self-defence resort to the prohibited weapons of war, and the use of conventional weapons alone would be justified. Even if the aggressor was known to manufacture thermo-nuclear bombs, but commenced hostilities with conventional weapons, the law may give the necessary *locus poenitentiae* to the aggressor, who may never use the prohibited weapons and reserve them for retaliation if attacked by such weapons. This would appear to be a warranted conclusion, because the dread of nuclear weapons is keeping nations away from war and if an aggressor armed with nuclear devices chose not to make use of his prohibited weapons, the victim by resorting to nuclear arms to repel aggression would seem to court a regular nuclear war on a large scale, which may not only destroy both the belligerents but also neutrals, apart from constituting a grave threat to mankind as a whole. This would be the conclusion if both parties to the conflict had nuclear weapons. However, if the aggressor alone had nuclear weapons, the use of the latter would always be illegal in his hands.

There is, lastly, the extreme case of a victim of aggression using prohibited weapons when facing certain defeat and after fully trying out conventional or permissible weapons. This could be conceded in so far as the law had to be upheld, and the aggressor law-breaker was not encouraged by conceding him victory. It would, however, be such a hypothetical event that much would depend on the circumstances of each individual case and no precise legal conclusion could be attempted beforehand.

As nuclear arms are essentially weapons of surprise and yield maximum results when used suddenly, the chances are that, if used, they will mark

14. *Annual Digest* (1948), p. 416.

15. SCHWARZENBERGER, *op. cit.*, Pp. 40-41, 48.

the commencement of hostilities, in which event they would always appear to be illegal. In short, therefore, though the stockpile of such weapons may not be illegal, the first resort to nuclear arms would appear to contravene both customary and conventional law, since their use could only be justified as a retaliation in kind. If the latter is the intention behind the stockpile, this should be made clear in peace.

As A Deterrent Instrument Of Punishment

Again, it has been contended that a prohibited weapon could be used against a belligerent who had resorted to "gross violations of the laws of war."¹⁶ There is a difference of degree only in the approach relating to use of prohibited weapons for the purpose of "punishment" and that relating to "reprisals."

In this connection, it may be mentioned that the Final Report of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament in 1930 excluded the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons of warfare as a measure of reprisal even against such States as had themselves resorted to it.¹⁷ However, the Italian Government refused to admit in 1936 that the Gas Protocol of 1925 precluded the exercise of the right of reprisals as a punishment for flagrant or wholesale contraventions of the recognised rules of warfare.¹⁸ It may be mentioned that Italy had otherwise agreed to abide by the provisions of the Protocol of 1925. On that analogy it could be argued, as Lauterpacht has done, that the use of atomic weapons would be justified as a "deterrent instrument of punishment" "against an enemy who violates rules of the law of war on a scale so vast as to put himself altogether outside the orbit of considerations of humanity and compassion."¹⁹ He cites the example of Germany during the Second World War, since, by indulging in "a systematic plan of putting to death millions of civilians in occupied territory," it exhibited conduct which would appear to justify the use of the atomic weapon as a punishment. It is submitted that Lauterpacht's observation must be read in the light of the effects of atomic weapons in 1952 at the time of writing. Moreover, it is always dangerous to leave matters to the discretion of individual States since it would be a question of interpretation as to what constitutes "gross," "flagrant," or "wholesale" violation of the laws of war. It would be a different matter if the right of punishing such a guilty belligerent by nuclear weapons was vested in the Security Council, but owing to the voting procedure, the existing organ would almost certainly be incapable

16. See the Communication of the Italian Government to the Chairman of the League Committee of Thirteen, dated April 30, 1936, L.N., Official Journal, 1936, p. 580.

17. See League Documents C. 590, M. 289, 1930, IX, para, 221.

18. See the Communication of the Italian Government to the Chairman of the League Committee of Thirteen, dated April 30, 1936, *loc. cit.*, p. 580.

19. OPPENHEIM: *International Law*, edited by Lauterpacht, Vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952, p. 351; see, however, Schwarzenberger's comment on this, *The Legality of Nuclear Weapons*, 1958, p. 42 & 8 *Current Legal Problems*, 1955, p. 231.

of discharging such a duty. In the circumstances, it appears necessary to point out that the fundamental basis of the concept of using a prohibited weapon as a deterrent instrument of punishment is reprisals, and the recognised rules relating to the latter should throughout govern this aspect.

As the governing principle of reprisals is that they should be in proportion to the violation, the use of nuclear arms, even as a punishment, could not be resorted to unless the reason for their use was a violation of law causing as much damage as a nuclear weapon.²⁰ Since the latter is unique and no other weapon is known to cause so much damage, it would normally not be possible to justify the first use of nuclear weapons. It may be contended, as pointed out above, that if war with conventional weapons had gone on for a very long time and the sum total of the damage caused by violations of the laws of war was so large as to justify resort to a prohibited weapon, the first use of nuclear arms should be permitted, which has sometimes been put forward as one of the grounds to justify the use of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945.²¹ It is, however, submitted that as resort to nuclear weapons involves the use of poison, the nature of the corresponding violation must be equally serious. Though it is true that the international law permits reprisals of an entirely different kind from the original illegality, such as the imposition of a fine by Germans on French towns in 1915 as a reprisal for alleged illegal Allied bombardment, it must be pointed out that the gravity of the original violation must always be proportionate to the gravity of the measure of reprisals.²² On that basis, the first use of the thermo-nuclear bomb which is likely to affect neutrals' rights or might amount to reprisals against prisoners of war, apart from causing genetic effects, would hardly appear to be justified.

It may be stated that though in law there cannot be reprisals against an act of lawful reprisals, Hitler is known to have ordered the reprisal execution of Allied airmen who bombed non-military targets in reprisal for German use of the V I. Thus, if both the rival belligerents had nuclear weapons, and presuming that none had initially resorted to them, the use by one even though as a reprisal or as a deterrent instrument of punishment, would result in a regular nuclear war which would be a threat not only to neutrals but to humanity itself, for, "even if nuclear weapons as such were held illegal, the legality of reprisals and experiences gained with reprisals and counter-reprisals in wars of the past counsel against overestimating the value of the prohibition in principle of the use of nuclear weapons by international law."²³ It would thus appear that the use of such prohibited weapons cannot be permitted even as an instrument of deterrent punishment.

20. *cf.*, however, Schwarzenberger, *op. cit.*, Pp. 40-41.

21. See, for example, STONE: *Legal Controls of International Conflict*, 1954, p. 344.

22. See Schwarzenberger, *op. cit.*, Pp. 40-41.

23. Schwarzenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

Reprisals

Reprisals between belligerents are admissible for "any and every act of illegitimate warfare whether it constitutes an international delinquency or not."²⁴ The definition of "reprisals in the United States Rules of Land Warfare is similar: "Reprisals are acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which would otherwise be unlawful, resorted to by one belligerent against enemy personnel or property for acts of warfare committed by the other belligerent in violation of the law of war, for the purpose of enforcing future compliance with the recognised rules of civilised warfare. For example, the employment by a belligerent of a weapon, the use of which is normally precluded by the law of war would constitute a lawful reprisal for intentional mistreatment of prisoners of war held by the enemy."²⁵

The Manual also states when and how reprisals may be used. They "are never adopted merely for revenge, but only as an unavoidable last resort to induce the enemy to desist from illegitimate practices. They should never be employed by individual soldiers except by direct orders of a commander, and the latter should give such orders only after careful inquiry into the alleged offence. The highest accessible military authority should be consulted unless immediate action is demanded as a matter of military necessity, in which event a subordinate commander may order appropriate reprisals upon his own initiative. Ill-considered action may subsequently be found to have been wholly unjustified, and will subject the responsible officer himself to punishment for a violation of the laws of war. On the other hand, commanding officers must assume responsibility for retaliative measures when an unscrupulous enemy leaves no other recourse against the repetition of barbarous outrages. . . . Reprisals against the persons or property of prisoners of war, including the wounded and sick, and protected civilians are forbidden. Collective penalties and punishment of prisoners of war and protected civilians are likewise prohibited. However, reprisals may still be visited on enemy troops who have not yet fallen into the hands of the forces making the reprisals. . . . The taking of hostages is forbidden. The taking of prisoners by way of reprisal for acts previously committed is likewise forbidden. . . . The acts resorted to by way of reprisal need not conform to those complained of by the injured party, but should not be excessive or exceed the degree of violence committed by the enemy."²⁶

The Principle Of Proportionality

The Russian Draft Code of 1870 had stipulated that, firstly, reprisals should be admitted only in extreme cases of certain violations of the rules of legitimate warfare, and, secondly, the acts performed by way of retri-

24. OPPENHEIM, *International Law*, edited by Lauterpacht, Vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952, p. 562.

25. U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 27-10, 1956, para. 497a, p. 177.

26. *Loc. cit.*, paras. 497 a, c, f, e, Pp. 177-178.

sals should not be excessive, but in proportion to the violation.²⁷ The principle that reprisals should be proportionate is also embodied in the Manual of the Laws of War adopted by the Institute of International Law.²⁸ Thus, there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative limit on reprisals which, according to the *Hostages Trial* (1948), must on no account be excessive;²⁹ and the Tribunal regarded Keitel's order postulating the death of "50 to 100 Communists" as retaliation for the death of a German soldier as "clearly excessive. . . an order to take reprisals at an arbitrarily fixed ratio under any and all circumstances constitutes a violation of international law." Again, the Tribunal in the *Naulilaa Case* (1928)³⁰ laid down that "even if it is admitted that international law only requires relative approximation of the reprisals to the offence, reprisals out of all proportion to the act that inspired them ought certainly to be considered as excessive and illegal." Though there is no definite standard by which the qualitative and quantitative limits can be judged, it is quite clear from the effects of nuclear weapons that their use as a reprisal for any normal violation of the laws of war would be clearly excessive. One could visualise resort to nuclear arms as a measure of retaliation in the event of the enemy using chemical and bacteriological weapons of war. This would, however, amount to a measure of retaliation almost in kind and nuclear weapons have been categorised by the United States as something equivalent to chemical and bacteriological warfare. This appears to be the impression gathered from the *Finletter Report* of January, 1948, entitled "Survival in the Air Age," of which Professor Blackett has said that "this supposedly authoritative report brackets biological and atomic weapons together as comparable dangers."³¹

As reprisals have to be proportionate, Lauterpacht has, while envisaging the possibility of the use of atomic weapons in contingencies not amounting to a breach of international law, mentioned, first and foremost, the permissibility of this weapon "as a reprisal for its actual prior use by the enemy or his allies."³² This is supported by McDougal and Schlei whose appreciation of the law of reprisals is that it permits the use of "what would otherwise be lawless violence as a sanction against lawless violence."³³ In the circumstances, the first use of these prohibited weapons would appear to rank as illegal in any case. The objects of per-

27. Sections 69-71. See also OPPENHEIM: *International Law*, ed. by Lauterpacht, Vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952, p. 564; SCHWARZENBERGER: *The Legality of Nuclear Weapons*, 1958, Pp. 40-41.

28. *Annuaire*, 5, p. 174.

29. 8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, p. 34, p. 65.

30. 2 U.N. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Pp. 1012 and 1028; for English translation see GREEN: *International Law Through The Cases*, 1951, Pp. 639 and 643.

31. BLACKETT: *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, 1948, p. 65.

32. OPPENHEIM: *International Law*, edited by Lauterpacht, Vol.2, 7th ed., 1952, p. 351.

33. "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective," 64 Yale Law Journal, 1955, p. 648. See also Schwarzenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

missible reprisals as modified by the 1949 Geneva Conventions must be examined carefully to determine whether the use of nuclear weapons as retaliation in kind would be legal.

The Geneva Conventions

The four Geneva Conventions have enlarged the sphere of legal protection against reprisals to such an extent that not only the first use of nuclear weapons as a reprisal, but even the resort to nuclear arms as a retaliation in kind may contravene some of these Articles.

The Prisoners of War Convention simply retains the provision that "reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited,"³⁴ but since the category of prisoners has been widened³⁵, the sphere of protection has likewise been extended. By the Red Cross Convention an innovation has been made in that reprisals against the wounded personnel or property protected by the Convention are prohibited³⁶, and a similar Article appears in the Maritime Convention.³⁷ Since, as has already been pointed out,³⁸ the use of nuclear weapons would appear to jeopardise the safety of persons protected by these Conventions, the use of thermo-nuclear weapons would not be legitimate even as reprisals. This prohibition would appear to extend not only to the first use of nuclear weapons as a reprisal, but perhaps even to retaliation in kind, provided it was known that the use of the weapon would involve the destruction of protected personnel and buildings and thus contravene the relevant Articles. This would appear to be the strict legal interpretation, but this aspect must be measured in the light of the fundamental principles of justice and the general intention of the provisions of all the four Conventions.

Lastly, the Civilians Convention made a distinct contribution, in so far as important forms of reprisals hitherto permitted have been prohibited. In Part III, Section I, of the Convention, there are "Provisions common to the Territories of the Parties to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories," and by Article 33 no protected person may be punished for an offence that he himself has not committed. Collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited, as is pillage or reprisals against protected persons or their property. The taking of hostages is similarly prohibited by Article 34.

In the context of the use of nuclear weapons, it will be appreciated that terrorism is prohibited along with collective penalties. In view of the indiscriminate effects of thermo-nuclear bombs, the destruction which they cause can be regarded as a collective punishment imposed on the population as a whole. Moreover, the use of these weapons may quite easily result in reprisals against protected persons and their property.

34. Conv. III-Art. 13.

35. *Ibid.*, Art. 4.

36. Conv. I-Art. 46.

37. Conv. II-Art. 47.

38. Chap. 10, above.

Though the Convention by no means abolishes all forms of reprisals against civilians, the general trend and the spirit of the stipulations made in 1949 is to limit the sphere of reprisals which runs contrary to the fast-developing destructive power of nuclear weapons, for the thermo-nuclear megaton bomb by no means represents the culmination of destructive capacity.

Use And Abuse

Though Oppenheim rightly mentions that reprisals between belligerents cannot be dispensed with on account of the "effect of their use and of the fear of their being used",³⁹ there is no denying the fact that they provide a loophole or an excuse at least for the violation of the laws of war and for the perpetration of obvious excesses.⁴⁰ Spaight has, therefore, suggested that reprisals should be banned.⁴¹ It is submitted that while this would remove excuses for the evasion of the laws of war, the prohibition of reprisals as such would work to make them "much less effective."⁴² On account of the danger of abuse of reprisals, it is essential that the use of nuclear weapons should only be admitted as legitimate when resorted to as retaliation in kind to their actual prior use by the enemy, and even then it should be assured that their use would not amount to reprisals against prohibited categories of persons and property. However, if the first user of nuclear weapons destroys protected persons and property, there would appear to be justification to retaliate in kind, both as a measure of self-defence and in reprisal, even though the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were being violated. This would appear a warranted conclusion, because, short of surrender to the first user of these prohibited weapons, the victim would have retaliation in kind as the only remedy. As the first user would be clearly guilty of a crime, to allow him the laurels of victory by surrendering to him with a stockpile of nuclear weapons, which cannot be used by the victim for fear of violation of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, would be to encourage the first use of the prohibited weapon. Thus, short of destruction of the human race and the world, the only permissible use of thermo-nuclear weapons would appear to be as retaliation in kind alone.

39. OPPENHEIM: *International Law*, ed. by Lauterpacht, Vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952, Pp. 561-562.

40. SCHWARZENBERGER. *The Legality of Nuclear Weapons*, 1958, p. 41.

41. *Air Power and War Rights*, 1947, p. 54.

42. ALBRECHT: "War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949," 47 A.J.I.L., 1953, Pp. 590 and 613.

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

THE FOLLOWING is an account of the Council's activities since April 1, 1962.

Public Meeting

To give the Indian public an insight into the Algerian problem, particularly in regard to the Franco-Algerian Agreement signed on March 18, 1962, the Council invited Mr. Layashi Yaker, Representative of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in India, to address a public meeting organised in the premises of the Council on April 26, 1962. Mr. U. N. Dhebar, M. P., presided. The audience included a large number of Members of Parliament and diplomats of various Arab, African and Asian countries and Indian and foreign press representatives.

Mr. Yaker drew a vivid picture of the conditions obtaining in Algeria even after the signing of the Agreement and pointedly remarked that the Algerian people had not retaliated against the atrocities committed by the O. A. S.

Mr. Dhebar held that Algeria's uphill and costly struggle was a shining light and an inspiration to other countries which were still struggling for liberty. He assured the Algerians of the support Algeria would get from India "not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of duty."

Mr. Dinesh Singh, M. P., General Secretary of the Council, presented a vote of thanks to Mr. Yaker and Mr. Dhebar.

Felicitations

The appointments of Mr. Dinesh Singh, General Secretary of the Council, and Mr. C. R. Pattabhiraman, a member of the Council's Executive Committee, as Deputy Ministers for External Affairs and for Planning, Labour and Employment, respectively, were most gratifying for the Council and its staff. The staff arranged a tea party on May 7, 1962, to felicitate Mr. Dinesh Singh and Mr. Pattabhiraman.

The appointments of Mr. S. A. Mehdi, a member of the Council and the Associate Editor of "Africa Quarterly", and Mr. M. R. Krishna, also a member of the Council, as Parliamentary Secretaries in the Ministries of Irrigation and Power, and Education, respectively, were also received by the Council and its staff with great satisfaction.

Library

In order to meet the demands of foreigners, especially Africans, a number of books on India have been added to our collection of books on Africa. The patrons of the Council's library have found this additional facility very useful.

Information On African Affairs

The Research Section of the Council collects up-to-date information on African affairs. A large number of people have approached the Council for information regarding Africa and have availed themselves of the facilities available at the Council's secretariat.

FRAMEWORK OF THE KENYA CONSTITUTION

The dispute between Kenya's two main political parties—the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU)—over the future structure of the government has been responsible, to some extent, in delaying the new constitutional developments in the colony. To resolve this deadlock, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Kenya convened a conference, from February 14 to April 6, 1962, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Colonies, Mr. Reginald Maudling. The Conference was attended by the Governor of Kenya, Sir Patrick Renison and the delegates of the Kenya African Democratic Union Parliamentary Group, led by Mr. R. G. Ngala, the Kenya African National Union Parliamentary Group, led by Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, and other political parties in the colony. It agreed upon the framework of a new Constitution, the official text of which is reproduced below.

OBJECTIVE

1. OUR OBJECTIVE is a united Kenya nation, capable of social and economic progress in the modern world, and Kenya in which men and women have confidence in the sanctity of individual rights and liberties and in the proper safeguarding of the interests of minorities.

JUDICIARY

2. An impartial and independent judiciary is of fundamental importance. The necessary provision should be made by means of a Judicial Service Commission to ensure the appointment of impartial judges, and provision should also be made for their security of tenure once selected.

3. Provision should be entrenched in the Constitution for ultimate right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in specified classes of cases, including interpretation of the Constitution and enforcement of the Bill of Rights.

BILL OF RIGHTS

4. There should be a Bill of Rights guaranteeing the proper protection of individuals and this should be enforceable in the Courts. This Bill of Rights would be based on the Bill of Rights contained in the Uganda

(Constitution) Order in Council, 1962, adapted as necessary to render it applicable to Kenya and to take account of the specific recommendations contained in the report of the Committee on Bill of Rights.

PARLIAMENT

5. There would be two Chambers—

- (a) The Lower House would be elected by universal adult suffrage and based on single-member constituencies containing approximately equal number of voters. These constituencies should be delimited by an independent Commission with appropriate terms of reference, which would include the need to have due regard to geographical considerations, communications, population density and community of interest.
- (b) The Upper House would consist of one member from each of the existing Districts. Consideration should also be given to the inclusion in the Upper House of non-voting members representing special interests. Qualifications for electors and candidates would be those for the local government elections. The franchise needs to be determined in detail, as does the question whether members of the Upper House should be elected directly or indirectly.

6. The Upper House would have special powers in respect of Bills to amend the Constitution. As regards Bills to amend those parts of the Constitution providing for the entrenched rights of individuals, Regions, tribal authorities or Districts, the special powers of the Upper House would be reinforced; and comparable provision would be made in relation to the use of emergency powers (see paragraphs 19 and 20 below). Otherwise, the Upper House would have delaying powers similar to those in the United Kingdom Parliament Acts, but would have no delaying powers in relation to Money Bills.

THE EXECUTIVE

7. There should be a strong and effective Central Government, responsible to the Central Parliament, which would be responsible for a very wide range of activities. These would include external affairs, defence, international trade, customs, major economic development, the raising of development funds from overseas, and such other functions as may be agreed.

8. The Government would be selected by the Prime Minister who would normally be the person commanding a majority in the Lower House.

REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES

9. Subject to the foregoing, there should be the maximum possible decentralisation of the powers of Government to effective authorities

capable of a life and significance of their own, entrenched in the Constitution and drawing their being and power from the Constitution and not from the Central Government.

10. Six Regional Assemblies would be established. The regional boundaries would be decided by an independent commission and would be related to the present provincial boundaries but not determined by them. This commission should pay particular attention to the need for ensuring that those people who wish to be associated in one Region would be allowed to do so. The members of the Regional Assemblies should be elected by the Districts, each District returning an equal number of members, and the franchise would be the same as that for the local government elections.

11. A special status would be accorded to Nairobi.

12. The Regions would have administrative powers and powers of making enactments having the force of law.

13. Some administrative powers would be exclusively reserved to the Regions and entrenched in the Constitution. Other administrative powers, including administration of Central Government functions, would be delegated by agreement with the Central Government.

14. In some matters the Regional Assemblies would have exclusive powers of enactment having the force of law. In other matters they would have either concurrent powers or powers of making bye-laws.

15. A detailed list of this distribution of functions would have to be determined, but agreement has been reached on the following:—

(a) **Agricultural Land**

For this purpose agricultural land in Kenya can be divided into two categories:—

- (i) Land outside the areas now known as the Scheduled Areas, as defined in the Agriculture Ordinance, 1955; and
- (ii) Land now inside the Scheduled Areas.

As regards (i), control of land transactions outside the present Scheduled Areas should be vested in the appropriate tribal authorities, and to the extent to which legislation is required for this, it would be the exclusive responsibility of the Assembly in each Region. There remains the question what authority will succeed, when the new Constitution is introduced, to the position now held by the Crown in right of Government of Kenya in respect of such land. At present, certain areas of this land are actually owned by the Kenya Government on behalf of the Crown; in certain other areas it has the reversion when leasehold rights expire; there is also a third category of land, Trust Land, in respect of which the Kenya Government has certain limited functions although such land is vested in the Trust Land Board. The new Constitution would transfer such interests to the appropriate local or tribal authority.

As regards (ii), the Constitution would establish a Central Land Board with sole responsibility for the formulation and implementation of settlement schemes in the Scheduled Areas. The question of the composition of the Board should be a matter of negotiation, but it is envisaged that there would be one member from each Region and one from the Central Government and that the Board would be presided over by a chairman of standing whose independence would be guaranteed by the Constitution. The Constitution would lay down certain principles upon which the Central Land Board would carry out its functions: in particular, the Board would be required to pay due regard to the views and communal problems of the Region in question.

It would be the duty of the Board to purchase land in the Scheduled Areas for the purpose of settlement schemes as it becomes available. The Regional Authority would be consulted on the proposed tribal composition of the settlers; and if it raised an objection, it would be the duty of the Board to consider that objection. If the Board were unable to meet the objection to the satisfaction of the Regional Authority, the Regional Authority would be entitled to refer the case to the Supreme Court for a decision whether the Board was acting within the terms of reference laid down for it in the Constitution.

There remains the question of the reversionary titles to land in the Scheduled Areas at present held by the Crown. This is more a legal than a practical problem. It arises only in the case of leasehold land, and existing leases will in no way whatever be affected by the change of Constitution. As most of them are long or very long leases, the reversionary interests are of more theoretical than practical significance. Before independence, arrangements would have to be made for the transfer of those reversionary interests to a suitable authority.

As at present, it will be necessary to exercise control over transactions in land in the Scheduled Areas between private individuals, and this responsibility would be vested in a suitable authority in each Region. For the purposes of general agricultural administration, whether Regional or Central—e.g., pest control—Scheduled and Non-scheduled land would be treated on the same basis.

(b) Education

Education up to and including intermediate level would be one of the functions of the Regions, though the Central Government should have power to ensure uniformity of standards.

(c) Local Government

The basic organisation of local government would be entrenched in the Constitution, and the Regions should have responsibility for its practical application.

(d) Public Health

Responsibility for administering certain parts of the Public Health Service would also be vested in the Regional Assemblies.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

16. The Constitution would entrench appropriate provisions to ensure the independence of the Public Service from political control. Suitable arrangements will have to be worked out to meet the staffing needs both of the Central Government and of the Regional Authorities.

LAW AND ORDER

17. The Central Government would be responsible for the Armed Forces and the ultimate sanction of law and order, but the day-to-day responsibility for law and order within each Region would rest with the Regional Assembly.

FINANCE

18. The Regions should have adequate sources of revenue secured to them by the Constitution. An expert Commission would be appointed to study the powers required to implement this principle and the basis upon which Central Government financial assistance may be assured to the Regions.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

19. Changes in the Constitution would require a majority of 75 per cent of each House, except that, with regard to particular changes which affect the entrenched rights of individuals, Regions, tribal authorities or Districts the majority in the Upper House would have to be 90 per cent.

EMERGENCY POWER

20. The declaration of a state of emergency by the Central Government would require endorsement within a specified period by a majority of each House. The exact figure would have to be agreed, but it would be substantially more than 50 per cent. Provision should be made specifying the period for which the Central government may declare a state of emergency and a specified vote in each House would be necessary for a prolongation of the state of emergency beyond the initial period.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

21. A National Government is being formed for the following purposes—

- (a) To increase national confidence and unity.
- (b) To continue good government in these crucial times.
- (c) To settle in discussion with Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the details of a Constitution based on this agreed framework.

THE FUTURE

22. As soon as possible after these details had been so settled, and the necessary instruments for an internal self-government Constitution had been made, a general election would be held and that Constitution would be introduced. Certain steps, such as registration of voters and delimitation of the Regional boundaries, could and would be taken before these details were finally settled.

23. Thereafter, further negotiations would be needed on arrangements for full independence, which Her Majesty's Government reaffirm to be their aim for Kenya.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE AFRICAN IMAGE: By Ezekiel Mphahlele (FABER AND FABER, 24, RUSSELL SQUARE, LONDON. 1962. 21s. Pp. 250).

DIVERSE IMPRESSIONS, variously acquired, have gone into the average Indian's conception of Africa and its inhabitants. To begin with, there was the intuitive emotional sympathy of pre-Independence India for a continent suffering from the same exploitation and indignity as herself, and yearning in like manner for freedom. This emotional sympathy was matched by increasing factual understanding only during the last ten or fifteen years, when contacts with Africa grew tremendously. It is the impressions formed out of these contacts—the speech made by an African leader in India, the way of life of an African student in an Indian University, newspaper reports of political events and utterances in Africa—that have shaped “the African image” in our minds.

This image is somewhat of a distorted nature. The main cause of this has been the overwhelming pre-occupation, on both sides, with politics. The African leaders who were listened to in India were political leaders, very often in the thick of the liberatory struggle; what one read in the newspapers related only to political matters. The memories that remained longest were of the most flamboyant personalities and ideas; it was the shrillest and the most strident voice that echoed back and forth. Humanism was not sensational enough to be reported; the moderate and the tolerant made no stir.

Mr. Ezekiel Mphahlele's book, “The African Image” restores the perspective. Mr. Mphahlele is a South African, a creative writer, a sensitive artist and a balanced man. The book opens by recalling the scene at Accra in December, 1958, when Dr. Kwame Nkrumah uttered a phrase which has now become a by-word: “The African Personality.” Mr. Mphahlele “was elevated and a thrilling sensation shot up to his head,” but now he knows the idea is nothing but “a glorious myth.” Talk about “negritude” — a term coined by Aime Cesaire, the West Indian poet, and popularised by Leopold Senghor, Alioune Diop and others—is, to Mr. Mphahlele, “just so much intellectual talk, a cult.” It is obvious why Mr. Mphahlele is not attracted to this idea which, basically, springs from the feeling and notion of the separateness of the Negro from the rest of the human race. It is because, for any African, “his Negroeness is only a fraction of his humanness.” One is reminded of how President Tubman of Liberia, at a time when the slogan of “The African Personality” was being bandied about in the fervour of its first discovery, observed that he believed rather in “the human personality.” Mr. Mphahlele also makes the very perceptive observation that it is the few

Africans who have been trained overseas and have thus been greatly subjected to Western cultural influences, who shout the slogans of "Negritude" and of "The African Personality."

Mr. Mphahlele thinks that there is too much posturing in art and life in Africa today. He has little trouble in disposing of such questions as the role of the minority races in Africa, and the real meaning of such slogans as "Africa for the Africans". The conception that a citizen, regardless of his religion, race and political conviction, enjoys protection and all the amenities of modern government, by right, and not by the generosity of others, is an old one — and one that has been accepted by the liberal world for many years, and enshrined in many national Constitutions, including that of India. Yet, in the turbulent political world of Africa, the implications of this idea are not evident to all or universally accepted. Mr. Mphahlele's approach to this question too is that of the artist. The corrosive destructiveness of hate destroys the hater; the search for a privileged position *vis-a-vis* others in the country, motivated as it is by nothing nobler than the quest for personal advantage, can go on and on, with the privileged circle contracting and encompassing fewer and fewer people, until the rule of a tyrannical oligarchy or dictator is established. Therefore, he declares, "In those territories, as in Algeria, it would be plain madness to tell the Whites, Indians, Arabs, or Coloured people to quit or even to occupy a status of sufferance."

So much for "Political Images" — Part I of the book. Part II, "Literary Images" uses material from a thesis that the author had submitted for a senior degree and reviews literature with an African setting to show the diverse literary images of the African that have been drawn, whether by Whites or by Africans. Here, one gets to know more about the literature that has been produced in Africa; one sees more clearly how, in a multiracial society like that of South Africa, the cultural impact of the last one century or so cannot be disregarded; how foolish it is to ask Africans to return to tribal ways or to seek a renaissance of purely Bantu art or any other tribal art of two centuries ago.

In this book, one finds some well-chosen excerpts from poets, such as the following evocative lines of Langston Hughes (The Negro speaks of Rivers):

"I've known rivers;

I've known rivers as ancient as the world and older than the flow of
human blood in human veins.

My soul has grown deep like the rivers.

I bathed in the Euphrates when dawns were young.

I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me to sleep.

I looked upon the Nile and raised the Pyramids above it....."

That part of the book dealing with "Political Images" is more significant because it shows the resilience and endurance of the human spirit, which can receive the cruel blows of an inhuman system born of inbred fear — blows which inflict the deepest wounds on the Non-Whites — and

still emerge with the minimum of scars, still capable of objective and lucid reasoning about the Whites and the White rule, still capable of saying, "I personally cannot think of the future of my people in South Africa as something in which the white man does not feature. Whether he liked it or not, our destinies are inseparable." **N.P.A.**

AN ATLAS OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS: By Boyd And Van Rensburg (METHUEN, LONDON. 1962. 14S. PP. 133).

THE PHYSIOGRAPHY of a country, a region or a continent remains the same, but social, political and economic evolution goes on, sometimes imperceptibly and sometimes very perceptibly. The African continent is no exception to this general rule. It is drained by some of the longest rivers in the world as well as by streams and rivulets. It has vast natural water reservoirs, fertile areas, arid deserts and a profusion of flora and fauna. It is inhabited by many races with different physical characteristics ranging from the tall Masais to small Pygmies. The dense impenetrable forests, the uncrossable deserts and wide open veldts have led in the past to regional isolation amongst the various peoples of Africa as communication in such terrain was difficult. It is for this reason that, in spite of all its economic advantages, a continent like Africa fell an easy prey to the colonialism of the last century. The European powers first settled on the coastland and then gradually extended their sphere of influence into the interior. There was a mad scramble for territory in the late 1870s in which the great European powers partitioned the regions willy nilly to suit their own purposes.

This was the state of things in Africa in 1955 when only four countries, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya were free from European control. During the last six years there has been a phenomenal change and practically the whole of Africa is now on the way to full freedom, while a large number of countries have already attained it. On the economic side, communications are developing rapidly, linking hitherto unconnected territories and thus making economic growth rapid and easy. New river projects are being increasingly taken in hand. There are great social changes following political and economic emancipation. In short, Africa of today presents a picture of a dynamic march forward which is so rapid that information about it tends to become obsolete quickly.

In such circumstances, it is refreshing to find that a handy volume of barely 133 pages, including nine index pages and containing information in a readily assimilable form, has come out, in which facts and figures can be found without effort. It contains 17 general maps and 38 sectional maps covering the problems of the entire continent. Each map is accompanied by explanatory paragraphs. The book is well brought out, handy, informative and useful and deserves to be on the shelves of every library and in the hands of every student of African affairs. **G.B.**

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NOTE

In the article entitled 'Nationalism and Politics in Ghana' by Dr. Amba Prasad, published in *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 4, a footnote was inadvertently left out. It related to the population figure given on page 46, para 3. The footnote is as follows:

"According to the estimate of 1957, *Introducing Ghana* (P. 1) by the Ghana High Commission, New Delhi."

According to the 1960 census, the population of Ghana, as given by the Ghana High Commission, New Delhi, is 6,690,730.

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
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
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
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GANDHIJI AND THE AFRICAN QUESTION

by

PYARELAL

IN 1893 Gandhiji, then a struggling barrister-at-law in India, set out for South Africa as an escape from the choking atmosphere at home where he found that he could not live without compromising his moral principles of his self-respect.

Almost from the moment he reached South Africa, he began to have a foretaste of what lay in store for him. He was bundled out of a second-class compartment by a white railway official during a train journey, cuffed and pummelled and nearly maimed while travelling by a stage coach by another white man; he was pushed off the footpath because of the colour of his skin, because all men with a dark skin were to the South African whites "dirty coolies".

For a while, after his first experience, he felt tempted to throw up the sponge and return home. But he conquered that impulse. That would be cowardice, he said to himself. After a night-long inner struggle, as he sat and shivered in an unlighted waiting room at Pietermaritzburg railway station, he took a momentous decision. He would stay on in South Africa and fight with his back to the wall—not for the redress of his personal wrongs but against the deep-seated malady of which his own experience was but a symptom, viz., race prejudice. He had come on a professional engagement for a period of one year. He stayed there for twenty long years to carry on a sustained, relentless struggle against the canker of race prejudice and white superiority.

He had not the haziest idea at that time as to the struggle that lay ahead of him and how he would conduct it. It all came to him in the process—step by step. His struggle revealed to him the weapon of Satyagraha.

His long stay in South Africa brought him into intimate touch with Africa's indigenous population and gave him a deep insight into their character—their strength as well as their weakness and the nature of the problem that confronted them. He learned to understand and sympathise with them, and missed no opportunity of rendering them whatever service he was capable of. He served them during the Zulu war, when he was in charge of an ambulance corps. At a time when no white nurse was ready to take care of them, he nursed the Zulu

prisoners of war who were brought in with lacerated backs as a result of being put under the lash by the whites. He impressed on his co-workers the duty of learning the African languages and quite a number of them acquired a fair smattering of the Zulu tongue. Above all, he impressed on the Indian community the necessity of having the friendliest relations with the Africans, of never setting themselves up against their just aspirations and acting towards them on the square always. As a result, the Africans had always the most cordial relations with the members of the Phoenix Settlement who were completely surrounded by them, trusted the Indian community on the whole and preferred having dealings with them infinitely more than with the whites.

At the end of the South African Satyagraha struggle, Gandhiji returned to India to put to a wider use the weapon that he had forged, and whose efficacy he had tested and demonstrated in South Africa, for the liberation of his own country. India's non-violent struggle for freedom, he felt, held the key also to the emancipation of all the backward and oppressed peoples of the world struggling for their rights.

II

Gandhiji had not a shadow of a doubt that only through non-violent organisation could the emancipation of the coloured races come and the tragedy of a global clash of colour averted. And so when Jomo Kenyatta saw him in London during the Second Round Table Conference and asked for a message, on a leaf of his table diary Gandhiji scribbled, "Truth and Non-violence can deliver any nation from bondage."

By then, as he had anticipated, the impact of the Indian struggle had begun to be felt in South Africa and a number of Africans had begun to apply the moral of the Indian struggle to their own case. They were particularly concerned about three questions:

1. To what quarter should they look for deliverance?
2. How could they apply the lesson of the Indian struggle to their own case?
3. What help could India render them in their struggle?

A highly gifted race and physically "the most perfect", as Gandhiji put it, they were in the grip of despair. Their despair had deepened with the growth of race consciousness among them. The impact of the white civilization had first crushed and then debauched them. The Christian missionary had gone to befriend them with the Bible in one hand and the beer bottle in the other. The coloured man found the Sermon on the Mount nowhere in evidence, so far as the conduct of the whites towards the dark races was concerned, but the drink habit and the diseases that followed in the wake of the white civilization remained very much with him and had spread like a veldt fire and

worked havoc among them.

"We seem to be up against a stone wall", an educated Negro from South Africa came and said to Gandhiji in 1929. "We are crushed down by a power that is pitiless and inexorable as fate. There is nothing that can avail us. We are doomed. Instinctively we turn to India for a message of hope and deliverance." Was there no hope for them? Could not anyone show them the way?

Deeply touched, Gandhiji told him that he had often discussed that subject with the natives while he was in South Africa. They needed to have faith in themselves and their destiny, and work always in the hope that help would come somehow from somewhere when the hour for it had arrived. In the meantime they had to prepare themselves by self-purification.

Asked to explain how this inner process was to be related to the actual problem that faced them, Gandhiji presented to him the analogy of the Indian non-violent struggle. The first step was to turn the searchlight inward, he said, "to proclaim your failings to yourself and the world." The second thing would be "to purify public life." Unfortunately, a belief had sprung up that "one's private character has nothing to do with one's public activity. This superstition must go. Our public workers must set about the task of reforming society by reforming themselves first." Anticipating his visitor's difficulty, he proceeded to explain: "This spiritual weapon of self-purification, intangible as it seems: is the most potent weapon for revolutionising one's environment and for loosening external shackles...though it might often seem a weary and long-drawn out process, it is the straightest...and the quickest...What it requires is faith...that flinches from nothing."¹

He took up the question of leadership in the course of a talk with another African visitor, Rev. Tema, of the D.R. Christian Mission, Johannesburg. Himself a Negro and a member of the African Congress, Rev. Tema had come to India to attend the World Missionaries Conference that was held in the December of 1939 at Tambaram in South India. "Whenever a leader comes up in our midst", he said, "he flops down after a while. He either becomes ambitious after money or succumbs to the drink habit or some such vice and is lost to us. What is the remedy?"

The phenomenon was not peculiar to them, Gandhiji told him. The remedy was to raise a band of workers who were from the masses and of the masses, who would dedicate themselves to their unselfish service, live like them, think in their terms, enter into their minds and learn to see things through their eyes. They would then understand and respect their customs, traditions and religious convictions, not look down upon them. As it was, most of their leaders were Christians,

1. *Harijan*, March 28, 1929.

while the masses of the Bantus and Zulus are not Christians. The former had adopted European dress and manners, and had as a result, become strangers in the midst of their own people. That made it difficult for them to reach the heart of the masses. "You must not be afraid of being 'Bantuized' or ashamed of...going about with only a tiny clout about your loins. A Zulu or a Bantu is a well-built man and need not be ashamed of showing his body. He need not dress like you. You must become Africans once more." The people would then make common cause with them. "If I were in your place", he concluded, "I would not ask a single African to alter his costume ... It does not add a single inch to his moral stature."²

III

Gandhiji's faith in non-violence as the only solvent of the African question rested on strong practical grounds apart from the ethical. The whole history of the African people before the arrival of the whites has been a tragedy of internecine conflicts and violence. Tribalism has been their bane. Take the history of the Xosa-Zulu tribes. Chaka, the great Zulu chief, sometimes called the Napoleon of the Zulus, killed and conquered tribe after tribe and sent them scattering in all directions as fugitives until, it is said, one million to two million were killed. Whole tribes and leading generals fled from him across the Drakensberg mountains where they in turn killed and killed till there was not any left to kill. Mantaisi, the Batlokwa Queen, bettered Chaka's ways and did to the Bechuanas what Chaka had done to the Zulus. Her armies destroyed tribe after tribe till there was nothing left to destroy. "Also until there was nothing left for them to eat ... they ate one another."³ Chaka murdered his father, two rival half-brothers and, finally, Dingaswayo. He was himself murdered by his half-brother Dingaam, and Dingaam by his half-brother Panda, helped by the Boers. Clu-Clu killed Panda just as Panda had killed, Dingaam. The Zulus were constantly escaping from their nation because "son feared father, or brother brother, or lesser chief greater chief."⁴ In this way Chaka had himself broken away. So did the Swazis and the Matabele in their turn. Chaka's defecting general, Moselikatze, "having eaten up his enemies, murdered his royal sons."⁵ His successor, Lobengula, "continued the process of eating up enemies and murdering friends"⁶ till the power of the Zulus in that part of the Dark Continent was sapped and the land, depleted of its population,

2. *Harijan*, February 2, 1939.

3. SARAH GERTRUDE MILLIN: *The People of South Africa*, (Constable & Co., London, 1951), p. 29.

4. SARAH GERTRUDE MILLIN: *South Africa*, (William Collins, London, 1941), p. 15.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

presented an inviting vacuum into which the white man just stepped in.

If the African races took to violence in their fight against the white man, it did not need much imagination to see that, sooner or later, their violence would recoil upon themselves and they would be consumed in the flames of a fratricidal conflict. In a society torn by endless divisions as the African, with a terrific unshaken vitality and primeval passions that characterise all children of nature, this would make their last state worse than the first. What the African people needed above all was cohesion and solidarity which non-violent organisation alone could give. They would then, by their pure sacrifice and heroism, move the conscience of the civilized world and mobilise the world's sympathy on their side in their just struggle. Only the discipline of non-violence could forge their passion into power and pave the way not only for their deliverance, but also for progress and fruitful exercise of independence.

And the means thereto was constructive work. When, therefore, a Negro friend from South Africa asked Gandhiji how they could impart that discipline to their people, he unhesitatingly presented to him "the spinning wheel and all that it implies". "I go further and make you a sporting offer", he said, "I shall take six carefully selected African youths into my Ashram, undertake to give them at my expense training in the non-violent arts like spinning, weaving, dairy, agriculture and other cottage crafts and in the community way of living. They would then go back to their country to become the torch-bearers of constructive non-violence and non-violent organisation among their people." He repeated the offer to Rev. Tema also.

Contrary to the misleading current notion about the African races, the African in his Kraal is a man of mild disposition. "In a Zulu military Kraal", writes E.A. Ritter, the biographer of Chaka Zulu, "the spirit of joviality, comradeship, and *esprit de corps*, ever strong in the African nature, was at its best. While ease and freedom were enjoyed, stern discipline continuously reigned; but it was a wholly moral force, the young men being thrown entirely on their honour, without standing regulations and without supervision; and they seldom dishonoured their trust."⁷ In his natural state, the African excels in the qualities of physical courage, valour and endurance. "Their tribal religion", writes Henry Gibbs, "is based on a belief in a supreme being, *Unkulunkulu*, a being known under a variety of names,"⁸ and in the existence of an imperishable spirit within the perishable frame that survives the latter's dissolution. Truthful to a degree, and generous as only a child of nature can be, the African simply could not comprehend, we are told, "the Christian idea of land becoming personal

7. E. A. RITTER: *Chaka Zulu: The Rise of Zulu Empire*, (Longmans Green & Co., London), Pp. 8-9.

8. HENRY GIBBS: *Background to Bitterness*, (Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1954), p. 32.

property.”⁹ He is guileless and unsophisticated. When uncorrupted, he is capable of extraordinary self-control and forgiveness. It is recorded of Moselikatze, Chaka Zulu’s defecting general, whose code demanded the washing of spears in the blood of enemies, that being asked by a missionary to spare the weakest of the tribes whom he had conquered, he agreed as a matter of courtesy and kept his word. Lobengula, the champagne-loving son of Moselikatze, said of white men ‘the ama-kiwa’, “They are my guests, and you shall not touch them,” and “even while his own peace mission and his own people were being murdered by Rhodes’ men, and his own kraal was burnt down, he safeguarded his guests.”¹⁰ Then, there is the classical instance of the Basuto chief Moshesh who, when defeated Mantati’s warriors were brought before him charged with having eaten dead Basutos, simply said, “Let them go.”

“But they have eaten your own father.”

“Shall I desecrate the grave of my father? Let them go.”

Gandhiji was convinced that, like Badshakhankhan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pathan warriors of the North-West Frontier Province, the Africans had all the natural traits and qualifications for successful practice of Satyagraha. The African is a freedom-loving creature, who hates to slave for anybody. For this he is dubbed by the white man as a “loafer”. To induce him to sell his labour beyond his own needs, he is made to depend on the white settler for the satisfaction of his essential needs. Further, to deepen his dependence needs are artificially created. A bye-law requires a Zulu or a Bantu whenever he has to visit a Municipal area to wrap himself in a piece of “regulation cloth.” And this he must purchase. Initiation into the liquor habit and enforcement of the excise laws provide still another means of impounding his labour. If all other means fail, the Hut Tax and the Poll Tax are there. At an International Textile Manufacturers’ Conference held at Geneva after World War I, when there was a shortage of raw cotton, it was actually suggested by the Federation of the International Textile Manufacturers’ Association that the Poll Tax and the Hut Tax should be employed to force the reluctant African in East Africa to grow the required cotton for them. Herein lies the function of the constructive programme in the emancipation of the under-developed areas. A programme of self-sufficiency in respect of their essential needs, and of self-purification and internal reform to eradicate the liquor habit and other vices that enslave, coupled with Satyagraha, provides a means *par excellence* for their emancipation. They have only to develop an awareness of their non-violent strength and learn the secret of non-violent non-cooperation to cease to co-operate willingly or unwillingly in their own subjection. The white

9. *Ibid.*

10. SARAH GERTRUDE MILLIN: *South Africa*, (William Collins, London, 1941), p. 16.

man would not then be able to ride on their back, Gandhiji predicted, for a single day. His power would pass away and the citadel of the white supremacy tumble down like a house of cards.

IV

All through the South African struggle, Gandhiji had resolutely set his face against involving the African population in the Indian passive resistance. The reason, in the first place, was that in Satyagraha it is not the numbers that count but the purity of the struggle. He wanted the Indian community to learn to rely on its own internal strength. Secondly, the indigenous people were not at that stage sufficiently awakened or disciplined. To draw them into the struggle would have amounted to exploiting them for selfish ends. The only purpose it could have served, besides, was to embarrass the authorities. This a Satyagrahi never wishes.

So when, in 1946, some South African-born Indian students came to ask Gandhiji his views about the formation of a united anti-white front, which was very much in the air at that time, he strongly advised against it. They could best help each other, he told them, by each standing on his own legs. Otherwise they would be "pooling together not strength but weakness."

There was an even deeper reason behind this advice. He had abolished all distinction between the African and the Indian, Gandhiji remarked to Rev. Tema, but that did not mean that he did not recognise the difference between them. Similarly, in regard to their struggle against the whites, too, there was a difference which they could ignore only at their peril. The Negroes were the sons of the soil. They were fighting for much bigger stakes. They had been robbed of their inheritance which they had to regain. The Indian community, on the other hand, had no political ambition. All it wanted was to be allowed to live in the country of its adoption—which in the case of many of them was also the land of their birth—with self-respect, as free and equal citizens. Mixing the big with the small would be a cause of weakness to the big and embarrassment to the small. It would benefit neither. There was "a real moral bond" between the Asiatics and the Africans. Cooperate with each other they of course must and unite, but the uniting bond must not be that of anti-white feeling. That would bring hatred. They had to have with them all truth- and justice-loving men from among the whites also in their righteous struggle. Their fight must not be against the white man but against white tyranny and white domination. Then only would they be able to command the world's sympathy.

In 1877, Anthony Trollope, after a thorough study on the spot of the problem of South Africa, set down his observations in a book. Presenting his final conclusion, he wrote: "South Africa is a country

of black men . . . and not of white men. It has been so, it is so, and it will be so." But today the political power in South Africa is almost entirely in the hands of the white man. *Apartheid* is the only means, he feels, by which this anomaly can be sustained. The white man sees in it the only hope for himself, his children and his race. It has in consequence become to him an article of faith, "a morality, a religion, a philosophy and politics, all in one." That is why Gandhiji staked everything in his South African struggle on repudiation of statutory discrimination based on racial grounds by the South African Union and did not rest till the principle was conceded.

Vindication of his stand is provided by a declaration some time ago by Hendrik Verwoerd. "I want to bring about *apartheid* not only between the white people and the Negroes," he said, "but also between the individual racial groups of coloureds, Indians, Chinese, Malaysians and all Natives."

The reaction of the blacks to his challenge of white supremacy is best summed up in a recent utterance of Hastings Kamutzu Banda, which may be termed the "Quit Africa" slogan of the coloured races. It is an answer to the cynical determination of the whites by *apartheid* unlimited to atomise the coloured people, so that the white man can dominate them for ever, just as the historic "Quit India" resolution was Gandhiji's answer to the Cripps plan which threatened to Balkanise India. Banda said:

You whites think of yourselves as riders on a black man. But you whites are finished—here in Africa and everywhere else in the world. It is your own fault. You are being paid back now for crimes committed centuries ago. There is no more hope for you. Make your exit—Get out.¹¹

In his heart of hearts, the white man has begun to feel that the days of white supremacy are numbered, but in his desperation to cling to his illusion as long as possible, he tries vainly to banish that dread feeling from his conscious mind. But every now and then he is startled by the winds of change that are blowing hard all over Africa, and sits up suddenly, in the words of Sarah Gertrude Millin, herself a South African white, "as one awakened by the clapping of his own heart and asks if it is true; if it is really possible that this land may not be the land of the white man and the heritage of his children, if South Africa is, indeed, as Anthony Trollope said, "a land, not of white man, but of black men."¹² This has made him into a neurotic, and the African question everywhere, but particularly in South Africa, "a byword", to use Alan Paton's phrase, "for all that is hopeless, and intractable."

11. ROLF ITALIAANDER: *The New Leaders of Africa*, (Prentice-Hall International, London, 1961).

12. SARAH GERTRUDE MILLIN: *The People of South Africa*, (Constable & Co. London, 1951), p. 3.

In the last years of his life, from the signs of the times and the shape of things to come, Gandhiji had begun to have a very lively apprehension that the clash of colour that was developing in South Africa might one day imperil world peace and even white civilization itself. A wave of awakening had come over the African population. Coloured people in other parts of the world also had developed a consciousness of their rights and the injustice they were suffering. The South African whites, on the other hand, were as obdurate as ever. Disgusted by resort more and more—by the South African authorities—to hooliganism and the lynch law, the liberal section among the whites had begun furiously to think and not only to sympathise with but even to participate actively in the Indian struggle. “If this (white sympathy) becomes extensive and the hooliganism stops and anti-Asiatic laws are repealed, there is a hope of the blending of Eastern and Western cultures,” commented Gandhiji. “Otherwise South Africa may well become the grave of Western Civilization.”¹³ And again, “Unseen it (South African white man’s policy) holds the seed of a world war—a challenge to Asia and by implication to the Negro races.” Unless someone presented to them the weapon of Satyagraha, he warned, “one day the black races of the world would rise like the avenging Attila against their white oppressors.”¹⁴ That would be a bad day for the whites as well as the blacks. It was for the Indian community to take the Africans under their wing, he said, when they had themselves developed the power of non-violence:

It will be good if you fire them with the spirit of non-violence. You will be (then) their saviour, but if you allow yourselves to be overwhelmed and swept off your feet, it will be their and your ruin.

Their slogan today is not merely ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ or ‘Africa for the Africans’ but the unity of all the exploited races of the earth. On India rests the burden of pointing the way to all the exploited races . . . I have been trying to fit ourselves for that mission by giving a wider bend to our struggle. India will become a torch-bearer to the oppressed and exploited races only if she can vindicate the principle of non-violence in her own case, not jettison it as soon as independence of foreign control is achieved.¹⁵

Whether India since independence has qualified herself for that role may well be doubted. But the words of wisdom that Gandhiji addressed to the Indian and the African peoples have as much validity today as when they were uttered, and one can only hope that Providence, in some inscrutable way, may yet help us to retrace our steps and vindicate the faith of the Father of the Nation in India’s destiny.

13. *Harijan*, June 21, 1946.

14. *Harijan*, May 19, 1946.

15. *Ibid.*

AFRICA AND THE NON-VIOLENT WAY

by

U. R. RAO

With the achievement of independence by Uganda, the number of African countries with their feet firmly planted on the road of freedom and progress has risen to thirty-nine. Yet there are, in that continent, millions of people to whom the United Nations' Declaration: "All persons are born equal in human rights and dignity" has no real meaning. The recognition of the inherent right of all subject peoples to freedom is, indeed, what imparts to our age a moral tone and significance. The embodiment of that right in the Charter of the United Nations is a great act of faith. But that act would remain incomplete, and the Charter only sound hollow mockery to the peoples who are still denied political freedom and the opportunity to regulate their own lives freely. Subject peoples *will* demand and endeavour to secure that right by any means at their disposal—even by violence. But, at what price? Here is what the war of liberation—"one of the most brutal wars that history has witnessed"¹—has meant to Algeria:

"War became more and more violent, which resulted in a devastation on a massive scale, collective massacres, tortures, bombarding of hundreds of villages, military operations on a still greater scale, construction of electrified fences along the Tunisian and Moroccan frontiers in order to prevent the entering of men and arms."²

And the immediate consequences of the war have been summed up as follows:

"More than a million Algerians have died; more than five lakhs were wounded; hundreds of thousands were jailed or interned; three lakh refugees had to take shelter in Tunisia and Morocco; about 20 lakh Algerians were placed in regrouping camps."³

This, of course, does not take into account the toll on the French side.

Algeria has demonstrated then, if demonstration was needed, that a subject people will pay *any* price for its freedom. Only, the question

1. Layashi Yaker in "The Algerians' struggle for freedom", *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 36.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

is: in this age of so-called enlightenment and the United Nations, *must* they?

War, by any name or any measure, brings untold suffering and devastation; today, with the threat of nuclear weapons, a global conflict—which any war may soon mean—is very likely to involve the annihilation of mankind. The world has yet been spared the horrors of race war. Will Africa become the arena of one?

No sane person will wish for a race war. We had some idea of its implications from the tragedy of Mau Mau in Kenya:

“According to a ‘conservative estimate’, between October 1952 and October 1954, at least 11,000 Kikuyu tribesmen had been killed as a result of the Mau Mau uprising. Sir George Erskine, Commander-in-Chief in charge of operations, illustrated the toll inflicted on the terrorist organisation by stating that 260 Mau Mau had been killed for every European civilian murdered. Reference must be made to the Kenya Government which cited that, out of the 756 Africans executed by legal process, between 20 October 1952 and 12 November 1954, 508 were executed for charges less than murder, including possession of arms and ammunition. During the ‘Emergency’, over 180,000 people have been arrested for screening and of these some 40,000 detained in ‘working camps.’ ”¹

Mau Mau, thus, is a sordid chapter in Kenya’s history which does not bear repetition. It is at once a lesson in the futility of violence and of the disproportionately heavy retribution which that violence must almost inevitably provoke. Sober and sensible minds can only deplore violence, whether the comparatively unorganized violence of the people or the organized violence of the ruling power. This abhorrence of violence is keenest among those who want to see Africa free. Take, for instance, Fenner Brockway:

“We don’t want to see Mau Mau, or anything like Mau Mau, cross the frontiers of Kenya to the rest of East and Central Africa. We don’t want to see Colour war in South Africa turn to a violence which might easily go north. We don’t want to see physical conflict drown much of the continent in blood.”²

Yet violence and bloodshed have often been the lot of Africa. African awakening, by now a fact of history, has outstripped the pace of freedom; and where that freedom is denied, constitutional channels blocked and repressive measures unleashed, frustration, bitterness and violence must result. Behind the European fear of and tardiness in conceding African freedom is what Richard Wright called an “ocean of guilt.” “...And this

1. Quoted by U. R. Rao in “The Tragedy of Settler Intransigence in Kenya”, *Africa in the Modern World: United Asia*, Bombay, 1955, p. 80.

2. “Britain’s role in Africa: A Plan for Colonial liberation”, *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 4.

powerful Europe, with atom bombs in its hands, is haunted by visions of an eventual black revenge..."¹

Gandhiji once wrote of the black races one day rising like an avenging Attila... But must Africa be ravaged by violence and run with rivers of blood? We are no longer concerned with yesterday: this is a question of today and tomorrow. The answer to this question, it appears to me, can only lie in the hope that non-violence offers as *the* alternative to violence.

"It seems to me," once Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said, "that what Gandhiji put before us and the world has, perhaps, even more significance in the world today than it had previously. I say that the only way out is to accept that . . . we must realize that force is no remedy, that war is no remedy, that violence does no good, that it does not even pay apart from its moral badness."²

Apart from the terrific price in human suffering and destruction violence on either or both sides must involve, the brutalization of human nature which war inevitably must mean leaves no happy legacy for the future. Often, the means corrupts and affects the character and content of the end. As against this, there is the example of what a non-violent struggle can achieve in terms of better relations between the two sides when the transfer of power is brought about by negotiation and agreement. It was of this that Dr. Kwame Nkrumah spoke:

"We see today how much easier and friendlier are the bonds between Great Britain and her former dependencies of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. So much of the bitterness that poisoned the relations between these former Colonies and the United Kingdom has been absolved by the healing power of a better feeling, so that a new friendship has been cemented in the free association of autonomous communities."³

Gandhiji refused to take short-cuts, especially violent short-cuts, towards an ideal situation. For the achievement of India's independence, he shunned the method sanctified by history, that of violence, fraud and cunning. It was his movement of non-violence which killed the terrorist movement in India. If India could become free by resorting to non-violent methods, by clean and pure methods, it would be an object-lesson to other subject peoples.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has beautifully summed up the significance of Gandhiji's non-violence:

"Freedom from subjection should be won not by the usual methods of secret societies, armed rebellion, arson and assassination. In self-purification lies the path to freedom. Force is no remedy.... It is said that non-violence is the dream of the wise,

1. *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 15.

2. Speech in the Indian Parliament, March 31; *The Hindu*, April 1, 1955.

3. "Gold Coast's claim to immediate independence", *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 19.

while violence is the history of man. It is true that wars are obvious and dramatic and their results in changing the course of history are evident and striking. But there is a struggle which goes on in the minds of men. Its results are not recorded in the statistics of the killed and injured. It is the struggle for human decency, for the avoidance of physical strife which restricts human life, for a world without wars."¹

It was no paradox that Gandhiji believed that real non-violence could only come from the virile Negro races of Africa. For theirs would be the non-violence of the strong, not the cowardly. Those who would see the rest of Africa free and build on freedom would wish that further violence and bloodshed are avoided in the process. The non-violent way, then, is the only alternative.

It is interesting to notice, in passing, how Negro opinion outside Africa has reacted to the use of the non-violent way for the possible solution of national and international problems. There are instances of eminent friends and spokesmen of the Negro people who have strongly pleaded for their resort to the Gandhian technique of non-violence.

Dr. Ralph Bunche, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, and former Director of the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations, had once said:

"Gandhi is, in a sense, a precursor of the UN, for the end of the UN is also to secure the freedom of Colonial peoples without resort to violence."²

Eslanda G. Robeson, the Negro Press-writer and wife of Paul Robeson, had advised "the Negroes to adopt Mahatma Gandhi's technique of 'massive passive resistance' to achieve integration."³

William Faulkner, the celebrated Nobel Literature laureate, saw in Martin Luther King's famous Montgomery bus boycott a practical example of the use of the Gandhian technique, which he heartily commended to the Negroes;⁴ earlier, writing in *Ebony*, August 1956, Faulkner had observed: "...if violence and unreason come, it must not be from us (Negroes). Let us use this patience not as a passive quality, but as an active weapon."

Intellectual acceptance of non-violence apart, examples of the practical use of the technique are becoming available. Dr. Martin Luther King has himself acknowledged recently that the Negro integration movement in America owed "a great deal to the example of Mahatma Gandhi, particularly in operational technique".⁵ Comparing the situations in India

1. Address at All-Souls College, Oxford, 1948.

2. Speech at the UNESCO Seminar on Gandhian Techniques, 1953, New Delhi.

3. *Afro-American*, October 12, 1957.

4. Address to the Southern Historical Association, *The Times of India*, March 3, 1956.

5. Address to the National Press Club, Washington, July 19, 1962; *The Hindu*, July 1962.

and America, Dr. King went on to observe: "But the basic philosophy and method are the same—it is possible to stand up to an 'unjust system without stooping to violence'....The policy of non-violent resistance followed by the Negroes in the South against segregation by the whites prevented their discontent from "degenerating into morbid bitterness and hatred." Dr. King's incarceration for offences such as 'prayer vigil' and the patient way he faced a violent assault on his person are instances of his own deep conviction in practical non-violence. Dr. King has commended the wider use of non-violence: "More than ever before, the Gandhian method of non-violent direct action must be applied to international affairs. This method must not be seen as merely a method to be used in conflicts within nations."¹

So much for Negro opinion outside Africa on the policy and practice of non-violent techniques. We must now turn to Africa itself for some evidence on this score. Are there any significant indications in recent African history of a readiness in the African mind to accept the method of non-violence? Has Gandhiji's example of non-violence had some impact on African leaders? These are questions the answer to which would to some extent show the probability of the adoption of non-violent methods in Africa.

Of the African leaders, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, it is pointed out, had learned about Gandhiji's use of non-violence when he studied at Lincoln University in the United States. "He used it in his country's struggle against British political control. As you know, that struggle was successful. He is eager to have the idea used by many other African people to help them to win their freedom."² In his autobiography, *Ghana*, Dr. Nkrumah wrote: "I began to see that, when backed by strong political organization, it (the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence) could be the solution of the Colonial problem."³ Many years later he wrote: "...We repudiate war and violence. Our battles shall be against the old ideas that men keep trammelled in their own greed; against the crass stupidities that breed hatred, fear and inhumanity."⁴

Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, the Indian Sarvodaya leader, had, some months ago, meetings with Mr. Kenneth Kaunda and Mr. Julius Nyerere. According to an interview he gave on his return home, "his discussions with the two leaders had convinced him that the freedom struggle was based on the Gandhian principle of non-violence. Mr. Kaunda had told him that he had been deeply impressed by some booklets on the works of Gandhi published in his mother tongue by an Indian many years ago. Mr. Kaunda also told the Indian leader that his people in their tribal life were essentially non-violent and non-criminal. The crime and violence

1. *Gandhi Marg*, January 1962, p. 24.

2. Richard Gregg, "Ahimsa gains ground the World over", *The Sunday Standard*, April 13, 1958.

3. Quoted by Homer A. Jack in *Gandhi Marg*, April, 1959 p.92

4. *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 19.

in their social life was implanted by the Europeans and the Arab slave traders."¹

In an interview to M. V. Kamath of *The Times of India*, Mr. Patrice Lumumba had observed, "We have wrought our freedom by applying the principle of non-violent action in our fight against Colonialism. This we owe to Mahatma Gandhi."²

Fenner Brockway has borne testimony to the influence of the non-violent technique on Africa's leaders:

"I would have wished that the Gandhian method had been followed by the popular movements for independence in all the colonial territories. In fact, it has been followed only by Kenneth Kaunda, whom I sometimes call the African Gandhi, in Northern Rhodesia; by Chief Luthuli and the African National Congress in South Africa; and to a considerable extent by Joshua Nkomo in Southern Rhodesia."³

There are other instances, too, of adequate appreciation in African circles of the futility of violence. George Houser, going over his impressions of the crisis in South Africa, believed that there was definitely nothing in the strategy of the responsible non-European organizations calling for violence. The leaders recognized the complete futility of such a course of action.⁴ During the Sharpeville massacre, the Africans were praised by *The Daily Herald* "for refusing to be provoked into abandoning non-violence. There is tremendous moral strength in their present form of protest and world opinion is on their side."⁵ Dr. W.E.B. du Bois believed that only if the world is determined to rule mankind by force, then, Africans *as a last resort* might have to appeal to force, in order to achieve freedom, even if force destroyed them and the world.⁶

Spokesmen of the Istiqlal Party in Morocco have deplored violence, such as that which occurred at Petitjean.⁷

Organized African political opinion has also supported non-violence, though not quite categorically. Its attitude has been qualified by a realistic consideration that freedom fighters might have no choice of means left to them if the Colonial powers resorted to suppression of legitimate political methods. The Fifth Pan-African Congress at Manchester, in 1945, had supported peaceful methods but with the same qualification. The All-African People's Conference in Ghana, in December, 1958, adopted a resolution which was frankly dual in its approach to the problem of means: "Recognizing that national independence can be gained by peaceful means in territories where democratic means are available, it

1. *The Times of India*, June 20, 1962.

2. *The Times of India*, January 29, 1960.

3. "Gandhi and the World Crisis", *Gandhi Marg*, January 1962, p. 27.

4. *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 31.

5. Sundar Kabadi in *The Sunday Standard*, April 17, 1960.

6. *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 28.

7. Jean Rous in "The Outlook in French North Africa," *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 71.

guarantees its full support to all forms of peaceful action. This support is pledged equally to those who, in order to meet the violent means by which they are subjected and exploited, are obliged to retaliate."¹ In Uganda, in 1949, the the Bataka and the Uganda African Farmers Union had peacefully agitated for an elected Assembly, and demonstrated outside the Kabaka's Palace; it was only the opening of fire by the troops that led to a wave of violence and arson over the country.² Peter Wright has likewise observed that "many of the younger Africans, bitter and disillusioned and seeing no peaceful or constitutional way out, have come to the conclusion that, violence—and a violence that has to be secretly organised—is the last desperate solution... The decision to resort to violence is no doubt deplorable, even when men are goaded beyond endurance, but only those who have themselves forsworn violence as Gandhi and the Quakers) have any right to condemn."³

A new school of thought in South Africa, as yet in a minority, has begun to believe that violence can never be avoided. Since official violence was already there and their people's blood was being daily shed, they would accept violence and use it for the attainment of their freedom.⁴

Contemporary events in parts of Africa indicate disturbing trends, and the hold of violence on some sections of people. There have been acts of terrorism in Ghana; there is a report that the Kikuyu-dominated Kenya Land Freedom Army "seemed to be preparing for a civil war after independence",⁵ and that Mr. Jomo Kenyatta had found it necessary to issue a strong warning against lawlessness and violence;⁶ also that he had criticized the Land Army by saying that "those who go to the forests and make guns would do no service to their country".⁷ Likewise we have the report about the timely scotching of a secret plot to overthrow government in Nigeria,⁸ and of serious crisis brewing over the outlawing of the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) in Southern Rhodesia. These developments do not augur well for non-violence. And the tragedy of the situation is that whenever repressive policies of the powers that be provoke acts of popular violence, the riots, bloodshed and civil war are used by them and their supporters as an argument to go slow with colonial independence.

What, then, is the future for non-violent techniques in Africa? Fenner Brockway is rather pessimistic when he says:

"It was too much to expect, however, that the non-violent technique would be adopted in all Colonial territories. Their peoples have not had

1. Quoted by Homer A. Jack, in *Gandhi Marg*, April 1959, p. 91.

2. Abu Mayanza, in "The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda", *Africa in the Modern World*, p. 58.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 62-3.

4. A. Verkaria in, "The Place of Non-violence in South Africa", *The Hindustan Times*, October 5, 1960.

5. *The Hindu*, September 9, 1962.

6. *The Hindu*, September 9, 1962.

7. *The Hindu*, September 16, 1962.

8. *The Hindu*, September 25, 1962.

the background of India's spiritual teaching nor the leadership and example of a Gandhi."¹ Perhaps, he is partly right.

As to the comparative unfamiliarity of the African peoples with, the theory and techniques of non-violence, there is clearly room for education. The move for establishing an international Institute of Non-Violence at Dar-es-Salaam would appear to be a the step in the right direction.

On the whole, there is little doubt that among African circles, if the choice is between violence and non-violence, there would hardly be any vote for the former. It might be safe to assume that violence is confined to pockets of no considerable dimensions or influence as yet. Even those who are in favour of non-violence on practical, and not altruistic, grounds would probably say: "By non-violence, if we can; by violence, only if we must". The world would be a better place if those who fight for the redress of injustice are left the choice of weapons and not driven to violence. We must learn to do without it.

1. *Gandhi Marg*, January 1962, p. 27.

MAHATMA GANDHI AND SOUTH AFRICA

by

SAILEN CHATTERJEE

GANDHIJI'S twentyone years' stay in South Africa made what the Mahatma really was—a genius of manifold qualities.

His activities there had such a tremendous impact on his life that even during his last days South Africa was uppermost in his mind.

His greatest weapon of Satyagraha—force born out of Truth and Love—was evolved by him in South Africa with a view to fighting the oppression of the Europeans. He had described Satyagraha as “a priceless and matchless weapon”. “The accumulated experience of the last thirty eight years,” said the Mahatma in July 1943, “the first eight of which were in South Africa, fills me with the greatest hope that in the adoption of non-violence lies the future of India and the world. It is the most harmless and equally effective way of dealing with the political and economic wrongs of the down-trodden portions of humanity.”¹

Gandhiji went to South Africa in 1893 as a barrister. Moved by the inhuman sufferings of Indian indentured labourers at the hands of the Europeans, particularly Englishmen who called them “coolies” and Gandhiji a “coolie barrister,” he decided to work there to ameliorate their lot. He suffered greatly in the course of work for their cause, was abused by Europeans and had stones, brickbats and rotten eggs thrown at him. But his sufferings enhanced the prestige of the Indian community and made the Whites ashamed of their conduct.

Gandhiji's Satyagraha movement originated and took practical form when the Indian community became agitated over the Black Act. This was aimed at preventing fresh Indian immigrants from entering the Transvaal and rendering the position of the old Indian settlers so uncomfortable that they would feel compelled to leave the country in sheer disgust, and even if they did not leave it, they would be reduced to a state bordering on serfdom. Large numbers of Indians pledged themselves to resist this degrading Ordinance.

But Gandhiji, while welcoming their pledges, warned them of the dire consequences that might await them in this struggle. He told a crowded meeting: “We may have to go to jail, where we may be insulted.

1. D.G. TENDULKAR (ed.): *Gandhiji—His Life and Work* (Karnatak Printing Press, Bombay, 1944), p.80.

We may have to go hungry and suffer extreme heat or cold. Hard labour may be imposed upon us. We may be flogged by rude warders. We may be fined heavily and our property may be attached and held up to auction if there were only a few resisters left. Opulent today, we may be reduced to abject poverty tomorrow. We may be deported suffering from starvation and similar hardships in jail, some of us may fall ill and even die. In short, therefore, it is not at all impossible that we may have to endure every hardship that we can imagine, and wisdom lies in pledging ourselves on the understanding that we shall have to suffer all that and worse. If someone asks me when and how the struggle may end, I may say that if the entire community manfully stands the test, the end will be near. If many of us fall back under storm and stress, the struggle will be prolonged. But I can boldly declare, and with certainty, that so long as there is even a handful of men true to their pledge, there can only be one end to the struggle and that is victory.”²

Gandhiji himself pledged to carry on his shoulders the full responsibility of the struggle. He would rather die but would not submit to the unjust laws. The struggle began. The Indian community resolved to fill up jails. This was followed by arrests and deportations. Gandhiji was arrested and sentenced to two years, for the first time in his life. This incarceration, one of several he had to suffer in South Africa, set the seal on Satyagraha as a technique of non-violent agitation.

The struggle continued. With a view to training the Satyagrahis and their families to live a simple Ashram life and to preparing themselves for a greater struggle, Gandhiji established the Tolstoy Farm on a 1,100 acre farm-land given to him by his German friend, Mr. Kallenbach, in 1910. On the farm there were no servants. Everything from cooking to scavenging was done by the settlers by their own hands. Water had to be fetched carried on poles from a spring about 500 yards from the quarters. There was a school, a workshop for carpentry and shoemaking, etc. The settlers on the farm came from different communities and different parts of India. Houses were built in two separate blocks for men and women to live separately.

The inmates had no cots and all had to sleep on the floor. Members were vegetarian by choice. Drinking and smoking were totally prohibited. Handicrafts kept the inmates busy. With a view to protecting their feet from thorns, stones, etc., the inmates, including Gandhiji, decided to learn to make their own sandals. At the farm school children were taught different languages. Indians and Englishmen lived together, rising above racial differences and living the simplest life, as advocated by Tolstoy and Ruskin. The inmates

2. M.K.GANDHI : *Satyagraha in South Africa* (Navajivan Publishing House Ahmedabad, 1928), p. 106.

received religious training. During prayers, Hindu, Muslim and Christian hymns were recited. The lessons they learnt were not only in living together but also in mutual service, courtesy and industry.

Gandhiji's intense study of the Gita, the Bible, the Upanishads, the Koran and the sayings of Zarathustra, as well as his reading of Tolstoy's *Kingdom of God is Within You*, Max Muller's *India—What Can it Teach Us?* and Ruskin's *Unto This Last*, had resulted in revolutionary changes in his outlook. He had made up his mind to change his life according to their teachings. He began to live a simple life, started washing his clothes, began to cut his own hair and work for a few hours in a hospital to do some humanitarian work.

During his Ashram life at the Tolstoy Farm, Gandhiji had developed his faith in nature cure and himself practised it there. Several of the inmates had been treated through nature cure by Gandhiji himself. They had experience of earth-poultices, sun and steam baths, acid fruit cures, fasts and many different types of dietetic and other experiments. It is significant that always Gandhiji carried out these experiments first on himself and members of his family.

"The home treatment of diseases and the simplicity of our life on the Tolstoy Farm," wrote the Mahatma, "were responsible for saving of at least two or three lakhs of public money." The settlers learned to look upon one another as members of the same family, the Satyagrahis secured a pure place of refuge, and little scope was left for dishonesty or hypocrisy..."³

The inhabitants of the Farm prepared themselves to renew the Satyagraha struggle with the main objective of abolishing the annual £ 3 poll tax levied on Indians.

After offering prayers at 6.30 a.m. on November 6, 1913, the Great March commenced in the name of God. The Indian pilgrims marched like disciplined soldiers, singing hymns. They took their ration of bread and sugar with them and passed nights in the open air. Gandhiji was arrested thrice during four days of the March. But his arrests did not dishearten the pilgrims. On the fifth day of the March, the Satyagrahis were arrested, asked to get into three special trains and deported to Natal.

The Government had no resources—either material or psychological—to keep thousands of persons in jail. Following a number of meetings between General Smuts and Gandhiji, a provisional agreement was arrived at and the Satyagraha movement was suspended. The Indians Relief Act was passed, abolishing the £ 3 tax, legalising in South Africa all marriages deemed legal in India and making a domicile certificate bearing the holder's thumb-print sufficient evidence of his right to enter the Union.

3. *Ibid*, p. 256.

About the conclusion of his epic South African Satyagraha, Gandhiji wrote in 1927: "Had it not been for this great struggle and for the untold sufferings which many Indians invited upon their devoted heads, the Indians today would have been hounded out of South Africa. Nay, the victory achieved by Indians in South Africa more or less served as a shield for Indian emigrants in other parts of the British Empire, who, if they are suppressed, will be suppressed, thanks to the absence of Satyagraha among themselves, and to India's inability to protect them, and not because of any flaw in the weapon of Satyagraha. Indians in South Africa can ensure their safety today if they can wield the weapon of Satyagraha."⁴

Thus, not only was his unique non-violent weapon of Satyagraha, which largely helped India achieve Independence, evolved in South Africa, but the principles which he propounded and practised till the last day of his life and many of his activities in India had their origin in South Africa. His Sevagram Ashram was modelled more or less on the lines of the Tolstoy Farm. His nature cure programme, his historic Satyagraha marches in India, the last one being the "one-night one-village" pilgrimage in Noakhali in East Bengal, his basic education, his daily prayers, his work for unity among different people, races, castes and creeds, his stress on manual labour and his love of villages and farms, as well as his experiences in prisons and his political and other self-purifying fasts—in all these Gandhiji had made his early experiments in South Africa and many he had originally practised and perfected there.

With a view to educating public opinion about the problems and the sufferings of Indians under unjust South African laws, Gandhiji founded his paper *Indian Opinion* in 1903, and accepted the responsibility of editing it. He himself used to attend to the press in his spare time. The first number of *Indian Opinion* to be issued from the Phoenix Settlement was printed by hand-power as the engine did not work. Here Gandhiji worked as a journalist, writing editorials, guiding Mr. Henry S. L. Polak, his English friend, in his writings for the paper and making efforts for increasing its circulation. The paper was published first in English, Gujarati, Hindi and Tamil. After some time, the Hindi and Tamil sections were discontinued as the burden became excessive and no Tamil and Hindi writers were willing to settle on the Farm. Among its editors were Shri Mansukhlal Nazar, Mr. Herbert Kitchin, Mr. Henry Polak and Shri Manilal Gandhi. For some time, the Rev. Joseph Doke also acted as its editor. I had the privilege of working as the Special Correspondent of *Indian Opinion* from New Delhi from 1948 till recently, when the paper closed down for financial reasons.

In my tours with Gandhiji all over India during the eventful

4. *Ibid*, p. 339.

period of the last phase of his life, I had often the privilege of hearing from him reminiscences of his historic mission to South Africa, how he suffered along with Indians there; how he established the Tolstoy Farm; how he practised nature cure; how Satyagraha—for which he desired to live and for which he was equally prepared to die—originated and how this unique non-violent weapon was used on a large scale; how he founded his paper, *Indian Opinion*, and worked in various capacities for its success; how he and his wife worked as household servants and sweepers cleaning the room and chamber pots, how he spent one whole night reading John Ruskin's *Unto This Last*, which became a great turning point in his life and because of which he immediately changed his entire outlook and adopted simple life; how he fell in love with Tolstoy's writings although he had never met him; how he read the *Gita* and remembered all its Slokas by heart and devoted himself to prayers, and many such interesting references to his activities there.

And even two days before his death, the 79-year-old Mahatma made a pointed reference to another kind of Satyagraha launched by the Indian community in South Africa. Indians in South Africa were not permitted free entry into the various provinces. In defence of their honour as men and women, the Satyagrahis had marched to Volksrust and then motored to Johannesburg where they held a meeting. This, said Gandhiji, was a courageous step and if the people as a whole became Satyagrahis in the right spirit, victory was sure to crown their efforts. In regard to the question of the march, the Government had shown a degree of tolerance and not effected any arrests. But with the progress of the movement, it was feared that arrests would follow. So long, however, as the movement was conducted peacefully, Gandhiji added, there was no reason for the Government to resort to persecution. Why should the Whites consider it *infra dig* to talk matters over with the non-Whites? Gandhiji suggested that the authorities should contact the Satyagraha leaders and satisfy their reasonable demands. Today, India and Pakistan, just become new Dominions, were entitled to expect friendly treatment from the sister-Dominions of the Commonwealth. But if the South African Government still treated Indians as inferiors on the score of colour, Gandhiji said that he had no hesitation in declaring that they would be putting themselves in the wrong. It was unthinkable that Dominions should quarrel among themselves.

GANDHI AND THOREAU'S "CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE"

HENRY DAVID THOREAU (1817-1862), the famous American natural philosopher and friend of Emerson, had suffered arrest and imprisonment for a night for objecting to the poll tax. He had not paid it for six years, denying his obligation to pay it "so long as it went to the support of the Mexican War and the extension of slavery."¹ He considered that war to be "the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing Government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure."²

Reflections on his experience of refusal to pay the poll tax and its sequel led to Thoreau's famous essay on "Civil Disobedience". It was first published in 1849, under the title "Resistance to Civil Government", in *Aesthetic Papers*, a collection of contemporary writings edited by Elizabeth Peabody. "This essay is possibly the most momentous ever penned by an American," writes Oscar Cargill, "if its effect on mere numbers of mankind is any gauge. Embodying Thoreau's idea that a tyrannous government can best be withstood by the tactic of withholding one's taxes, it attracted the attention of Mohandas Gandhi while he was a student at Cambridge. He translated it and issued it as a tract while he was still champion of the rights of Asiatics in South Africa. Returning to India in 1914, he employed its tactic five years later when he used it to resist the Rowlatt Act and thereafter enlisted hundreds of Indians to try it to combat successfully the abuses of English rule. Besides its spirited exposition of the tactic of pacific resistance, the essay embodies Thoreau's theory that all government should be displaced by a kind of evolutionary individualism . . ."³

Gandhi's resort to Civil Disobedience on a mass scale in the struggle for India's freedom is a unique and historic example of the practical application of Thoreau's original doctrine.

The three articles which follow here are the earliest Gandhi wrote on the subject in the course of his stay and work in South Africa. They appeared in his weekly *Indian Opinion*, founded

¹ OSCAR CARGILL, (ed): *Henry D. Thoreau : Selected Writings on Nature and Liberty*, (The Liberty Arts Press, New York, 1952), p.xiii.

² *Ibid.*, p.10.

³ *Ibid.*, p.xiii-xiv.

in Durban, in 1903, as a mouth-piece of the movement led by him for securing basic civil rights and freedom from oppressive and discriminatory racial legislation for the considerable population of Indian indentured labourers and settlers in South Africa. The first of the articles appeared in the English section of the weekly issue of September 7, 1907; while the other two—largely quotations from Thoreau's essay—in the Gujarati section in the issues of September 7 and 14, 1907.

The articles are reproduced here from The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1962, Vol. VII, pp. 211-2, 217-8, and 228-30; by courtesy of the Navajivan Trust, Ahmedabad.
(—ED.)

I

ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

It would seem as if the action of both Houses of Parliament in passing the Bill to legalise the marriage with a deceased wife's sister will convert the clergy of the Established Church into passive resisters of sorts. The Archbishop of Canterbury today issued a message in which he requested the clergy not to celebrate marriages with a deceased wife's sister although such unions are now recognised as legal by the law of the land.
—The Daily Press

WE HAVE no desire to enter into the controversy as to whether marriage with a deceased wife's sister is a reform in the right direction or not. We have quoted the above-mentioned cablegram in order to show that passive resistance is one of the most approved methods of securing redress in given circumstances, and that it is the only course law-abiding and peaceful men can adopt without doing violence to their conscience. Indeed, it would appear that it is a method they must adopt if they have a conscience, and it revolts against particular legislation. It may be retorted that, between the passive resistance offered by British Indians in the Transvaal and that advised by the Archbishop of Canterbury, there is no resemblance. We demur and claim that, if it is lawful for the Archbishop of Canterbury to disregard the deceased wife's sister relief legislation, it is much more so for British Indians to withhold submission to the Asiatic Registration Act. If there is no penalty provided by law to punish the clergy who may not recognise it, by refusing to perform a marriage ceremony, it should be doubly their duty to accept the law. But the Archbishop, in deliberately giving contrary advice, has brought into play a higher law, and that is the law dictated by conscience. Rightly or wrongly, His Grace believes that there is no warrant for such unions in the Bible and

that, therefore, the Legislature has committed a breach of God's law; which it would be irreligious for the clergy to countenance. In other words, he has recognised what Thoreau has said, that we should be men before we are subjects, and that there is no obligation imposed upon us by our conscience to give blind submission to any law, no matter what force or majority backs it.

Such is also the position of British Indians in the Transvaal. Law-abiding they are, and it will take away nothing from the certificate they have enjoyed so long by their now refusing to accept registration under the Asiatic Law, which their conscience rejects as degrading to their manhood and offensive to their religion. It is possible to carry the doctrine of passive resistance too far, but it is equally so with reference to the doctrine of obedience to law. We cannot give the dividing line in words more appropriate than those of Thoreau when, speaking of the American Government, he says:

“If one were to tell me that this was a bad Government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probable that I should not make any ado about it, for I can do without them. All machines have friction, and possibly this does enough good to counterbalance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But, when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are paramount, I say let us not have any such machine any longer.”

In the Asiatic Registration Act, British Indians have not only a law which has some evil in it, that is to say, using Thoreau's words, a machine with friction in it, but it is evil legalised, or it represents friction with machinery provided for it. Resistance to such an evil is a divine duty which no human being can with impunity disregard, and, as in the case of the Archbishop of Canterbury, so in that of British Indians, it is their conscience that must decide, as it has already decided, whether to submit to the Asiatic Act or not, cost what it may.

II

DUTY OF DISOBEYING LAWS

Many years ago there lived in America a great man named Henry David Thoreau. His writings are read and pondered over by millions of people. Some of them put his ideas into practice. Much importance is attached to his writings because Thoreau himself was a man who practised what he preached. Impelled by a sense of duty, he wrote much against his own country, America. He considered it a great sin that the Americans held many persons in the bonds of slavery. He did not rest content with saying this, but took all other necessary steps to put a stop to this trade. One of those steps consisted in not paying

any taxes to the State in which the slave trade was being carried on. He was imprisoned when he stopped paying the taxes due from him. The thoughts which occurred to him during this imprisonment were boldly original and were published in the form of a book. The title of this article conveys the general sense of the English title of his book. Historians say that the chief cause of the abolition of slavery in America was Thoreau's imprisonment and the publication by him of the above-mentioned book after his release. Both his example and writings are at present exactly applicable to the Indians in the Transvaal. We, therefore, give below a summary of these (writings):

I accept that that government is best which governs least. That is, government is a kind of disease and the greater the freedom the people enjoy from it, the more admirable is the government.

Many persons say that it would be good if America had no (standing) army or had only a small one. What they say is quite right (as far as it goes), but those who hold such a view base it on a false premise. They say that the State is beneficial; it is only the army that is harmful. These eminent men do not realize that an army is but the arm of the State and without it the State cannot exist for a moment. But we cannot see this because we are ourselves intoxicated with the power of the State. Really speaking, it is we, the subjects, who are responsible for the existence of both the State and the army.

Thus we see that we are deceiving ourselves. It is not the government of America that keeps the people free, or educates them. The (achievements of) government that we observe are, in small measure, the result of the inherent character of the American people. In other words, though we are educated and intelligent, we are somewhat less so than we could have been if it were not for the government.

But, I do not ask for no government at once, but at once for a better government. This is the duty of every citizen. It is a great error to believe that nothing but justice prevails in a country in which everything is decided by a majority vote. Much injustice continues to be perpetrated because this error is not recognized. It is a mere superstition to believe that what is done by a multitude is bound to be right. Can there not be a government in which majorities do not decide right and wrong, but conscience? Must the citizen always resign his conscience to the legislators? I would say that we are men first and subjects afterwards. It is not necessary to cultivate a respect for the law so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. Law never made man a whit more just. But I have seen and I do see that even ordinarily well-disposed persons become, through their simplicity, the instruments of injustice. One result of an undue respect for law is that we may see people taking to soldiering and, like monkeys, mechanically carrying out the orders of their superiors unquestioningly.

Many people thus take to it (soldiering) as their profession. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are concerned; yet they rush to join it. Are they men, or axes in the hands of butchers? Such men are on a level with wood and earth and stones. How can that kind of men command any respect? How can they be valued better than dogs or cats? Then some others become advocates, ambassadors or lawyers. They imagine that they serve the State with their heads. But I find that, unintentionally and unconsciously, they also serve Satan. Those who obey their sense of justice while holding the reins of government are always found to be in conflict with the State.

III

DUTY OF DISOBEYING LAWS

We have already given some portion of Thoreau's essay on this subject. The rest is given below.

A wise person will only be useful as a man, and will not submit himself to be (treated as) clay. He who associates himself with the America of today is as good as a coward. I cannot recognise that government to be my government which is the slave's government also. Mankind has the right to refuse allegiance to and resist the government when its tyranny becomes unendurable. Some people say that such is not the case now. That is, the attack is not on them; if others are attacked, those who hold this opinion are unconcerned with it.

All machines have their friction, and the same is true of every State. Perhaps it may not be necessary to oppose (the State) in order to free it of such friction. But when the friction comes to have its machine, when tyranny takes the form of law, such a State cannot be tolerated by true men.

One must do justice and maintain truth, cost what it may. If I have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I should restore it to him though I may be drowned myself. In the same way, we must cease to hold slaves though it cost the existence of the American State.

We are not accustomed to say that the mass of men are unprepared; but improvement is slow because the few who desire do not have enough courage. It is not so important that many should be as good as you as that there be some absolute goodness somewhere; for that will leaven the whole lump. There are thousands who in opinion are opposed to slavery, but act contrary to their view. They, esteeming themselves children of Washington, sit down with their hands in their pockets and say that they know not what to do, and do nothing. At the most they give lectures and send petitions.

There are nine hundred and ninety-nine persons who profess virtue to one virtuous man. Yet he who acts virtuously, though he be

the only one, is of far greater worth than those who only profess it. There may be many warders of a treasure, but none of them can give away a single farthing from it. The owner of the treasure may be only one, yet he can give away everything from it.

Voting for the right is not the same thing as doing the right. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because there is but little slavery left to be abolished. That is, the foundation for the (formal) abolition was (already) laid by the men who abolished it in practice.

I do not say that it is a man's duty, as a matter of course, to eradicate a wrong wherever he finds it; but it is his duty, at least, not to give it practically his support. How can a man be satisfied to entertain an opinion merely, and enjoy it?

If someone steals my goods, I do not rest satisfied with saying that it was not a good thing that I was robbed, but I take effectual steps to recover what was stolen, and see that I am not robbed again. He who acts on his principles becomes a different kind of man. Such a man cares neither for his country nor for his relatives nor his friends. But, serving truth, he serves all of them.

We admit that unjust laws exist. Do we transgress them at once? Men generally say that these laws will be repealed when a majority of people disapprove them. They think that if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil, not of those who resist it.

I do not hesitate to say that even if there is only one man in Massachusetts who is opposed to slavery, he should effectually withdraw his support from the government, both in person and property, without waiting till there is a majority on his side. For, he is not alone. God is ever on his side. Any man more right than his neighbours constitutes a majority of one already. I meet the American government directly and face to face once a year in the person of its tax-gatherer. At that time, I must definitely refuse to pay the tax.

I know this well that even if only one *honest* man in this State of Massachusetts refuses to pay taxes in order to oppose slavery, and is locked up in gaol therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. What is once well done is done for ever. But we love better to talk about it; that we say is our mission. There are many newspapers in the service of the movement for abolition of slavery, but not one man.

Under a government which imprisons anyone unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. Hence, the proper place today for good people in Massachusetts is in her prisons. In a slave State prison is the only house in which a free man can abide with honour. If they think that in that case their influence will be lost and none will be left to fight injustice, they do not know how to fight evil. They

do not know how much stronger truth is than error. Those who are in gaol, suffering the tyranny of injustice, can combat injustice more effectively from there than from outside. So long as a minority conforms to the majority, it is not even a majority. They must throw in their whole weight in the opposite direction.

When talking with my neighbours, I find that they dread the consequences of disobedience to the government to their property and family. For my own part, I would find it depressing to think that I ever rely on the protection of the State.

I think it is disgraceful to submit to a tyrannical State. It is easy and good to oppose it. I have not paid poll-tax for six years. I was put into gaol once on this account for one night. As I stood considering the walls of the prison and its iron gates, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of the State. For, those who had imprisoned me must have thought that I was made of flesh and bones only. Those fools did not know that though confined within walls, I was freer than others. I did not feel that I was in a prison. Rather, I thought that those who were outside were the real prisoners. As they could not reach me, they punished my body. In consequence, I became more free, and my ideas in regard to the State became more dangerous. I have seen that, when small children can do nothing to a person, they abuse his dog. In the same way, the State hurts my body as it can do nothing to me.

I also found that the State was afraid of hurting my body. So I lost all my remaining respect for it.

FLAME OF AFRO-ASIA

(For JAWAHARLAL NEHRU)

Like a wee little flame
flickering in a sea of darkness
of slavery, ignorance, appalling squalor
imposed on man by man
in Afro-Asia where today a million dawns break
and Jove's planet rises serenely, proudly
you shine on steadfastly and fearlessly;
in your soul
you've nursed the very core
of the primordial fire,
the fire of eternal hope
and eternal peace for all mankind;
'tis the fire that like a robust flame
will one day .
set the whole world alight and laughing
even as in aeons past
Buddha and Jesus did
and in our own day
Gandhi, Pilgrim of Eternity, too,
carried forth the self-same torch
of peace, non-violence, love.

Your life is the song of a New World
which some men hear not,
but like the silent music of the spheres
it casts its eerie spell
on all troubled or toiling hearts
and soothes them ever and ever.

Sing on, you singer of a New World,
harbinger of a new sun-kissed dawn,
for tomorrow our words and attitudes,
our very language
will suffer a sea-change
into something transcendent,
beautiful,
everlasting.

P. R. KAIKINI

THE CONGO AND SUB-SAHARAN COLONIAL AFRICA

by

DR. VED PRAKASH LUTHERA

THE EXPRESSION 'Colonial Africa' in the title needs clarification. It refers to those of the African territories south of the Sahara which have not yet gained independence and are under foreign rule. The object of this article is to examine an important question: Do the events in the Congo, on the eve of her independence and after it, have any bearing on the political future of the rest of colonial Africa? Is it legitimate to draw conclusions from the chaos which the world witnessed in the Congo and apply these to other territories which are yet struggling for their independence? Such an examination becomes necessary because already the Congo has become a "sensational" illustration of the well-known theory of the inferiority of black races and the necessity of the presence of "civilized" white men in Africa as masters, tutors and guardians.¹ It has been argued that the one lesson which the Congo teaches is that the pace of the political progress towards independence of the remaining colonies, which has recently been accelerated, should be slowed down. They are, as yet, not fit for independence and an early transfer of power will lead to chaos. The argument emanates mainly from the European settler circles in Africa though they have been backed by certain quarters in the West also. In this connection it is interesting to observe that, only a few years ago, these very settlers, being disturbed at the nationalist demands for independence in the territories of their settlement used to look upon the then calm and quiet Congo, where any organised nationalist demands for independence were conspicuous by their absence, as a "model European colony with many useful lessons for a blundering Whitehall on how to keep the native successfully in his place".² The very settlers have now been in the forefront to advance this *reverse* argument. The argument was summed up by a writer thus: "The Congo", he wrote, "is the key to Africa. If after July 1 the transition from Belgium to home rule is peaceful and efficient, the nationalist demands all over the continent will rise to fever pitch. If, on the

1. *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XI, p. 253 (1960), p. 4.
2. *Times of India*, Delhi, 1.2.1960, p. 6.

other hand, freedom comes into a background of riots, bloodshed and war, every colonial power in Africa will argue that the case for going slowly has been proved and the South African government will grimly justify *apartheid*.³ The same view has off and on been expressed by certain other individuals and journals.⁴ The argument, it seems, has already successfully influenced the thinking of some of those who had been pleading for the early disappearance of colonialism from the face of the whole of Africa.⁵ That is not surprising because, on account of, among other factors, the "common colonial status" and the common colour of the inhabitants of Africa south of the Sahara, popular conception tends to consider Africa as one.

I

Actually, however, this argument is a brilliant example of what Dr. Robert Thouless calls "crooked thinking,"⁶ and there is a need to guard against it. It is fallacious to treat the Congo, or for that matter any other territory in Africa, as the *key* to the fate of other territories. It is fallacious because the political, economic and social conditions in various African territories, though similar in some respects, are nonetheless essentially different. Consequently, it would be spurious to draw conclusions from the developments in one territory and apply these to others. An eminent scholar of African Studies has rightly warned against similar approach in the case of research work on Africa: "There is a great danger," he says, "of doing a disservice to scholarly

3. *Sunday Post*, Nairobi, 8.5.1960, p. 6. It is obvious that South Africa cannot justify *apartheid* because of the Congo developments for the reason that she practises it not only against the Africans but also against the Indians. This part of the argument, therefore, does not need any treatment.
4. Thus, to quote a few more instances, *East African Standard*, Nairobi, (7.7.1960), wrote editorially: "... there is no doubt the pace of constitutional advance (in Kenya) must be slowed down if it is apparent to the British and American opinion, that there are such attendant dangers to life and to property ... To-day the chaos in Congo is a warning against heedless and headlong advance." *The Economist*, London, in its June 25, 1960 issue said: "If the Congo does survive as a recognizable entity in the coming months, Black Africa will consider that it has justified beyond question its capability for self-government elsewhere. If it disintegrates ... the resistance to African emancipation in Africa's remaining colonial or semi-colonial territories could stiffen into horrified rigidity." *Kenya Weekly News* in its May 6, 1960 issue commented, "If independence is followed by bloodshed and disintegration, then settlers in other parts of Africa will find yet another and a strong argument for going slow." Mr. M. Raymond Scheyven, Belgian Minister for the Congo, before independence remarked that: "If the Congo succeeded in becoming a fullfledged sovereign state on June 30 in an atmosphere of calm, other colonies might soon rapidly become independent. But if you fail, they may still rest colonies many more years." *National Guardian*, Nairobi, (18.5.1960), p. 1. Mr. Blundell of Kenya commented after the Congo's independence: "It is an abject lesson on how not to hand over independence." *East African Standard*, (22.7.1960), p. 7. Such instances can be multiplied.
5. Some of the Indian journals, it seems, have been influenced by this argument. Thus, to quote one instance among several, the *Indian Express*, Delhi, (13.12.1960) editorially wrote: "Tragic though it seems, there is every evidence that the events in the Congo will now slow the pace of the freedom movement throughout the continent and strengthen the hands of the European settlers."
6. *Straight and Crooked Thinking*, Pan Books, London.

research in Africa if one generalises on the basis of observations made and data assembled in one territory.”⁷ This is also *mutatis mutandis* true regarding the political conditions. There is so much of diversity in the content and degree of political development in various former or present colonies that it is wrong to make conditions prevalent in any country the *key* to the understanding of conditions elsewhere.

Various factors—indigenous, metropolitan, international—been: account for this diversity. But the two most important factors have (1) the objectives of the colonial policy and (2) the character of the colonial rule inasmuch as whether it has been liberal or despotic⁸. The objectives of the colonial policies and the character of the colonial rules, it may be noted, have been different. This difference has led to immense diversity at least up to a certain stage in the course of political progress made by the various countries in Africa.

The first instance of this glaring diversity is the difference in the very content and direction of the African national movements in British-ruled Africa and French-ruled⁹ Africa arising from a difference between the objectives of the British colonial policy and the French colonial policy. British colonialism and French colonialism have, no doubt, a common characteristic also and that is that both of them being liberal and democratic at home, their rules in their colonies have, howsoever blurred, been reflections of their metropolitan traditions.¹⁰ Further, this common characteristic has, no doubt, led to the common result that because of the liberal colonial rules, and the consequent availability of avenues for development and expression, it has been possible for the national movements and political parties to grow up and become highly organised and institutionalised.

7. James, S. Coleman, ‘Nationalism in Tropical Africa,’ *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 48, (1954), p. 418.

8. Walter Goldschmidt (Ed.), *The United States and Africa*, (Columbia University, N.Y., 1958), p. 35.

9. The terms ‘British-ruled’ and ‘French-ruled’ are used in this article so as to include territories which were ruled or are being ruled by either of these Powers. The argument (that Congo is the key) is not directed against French-ruled Africa or that part of Africa which was formerly under British rule. But nonetheless their study reveals the African diversity.

10. The writer wishes to make it sufficiently clear that it is not intended here to justify or praise British or French colonialism. All varieties of colonialism, liberal or despotic, are condemnable in principle. Here the various colonial rules are being studied in a comparative sense. The writer is fully conscious of the departures which these Powers have made from the liberal rule in some of the territories which suffered their domination. It is, however, true that their rules have been liberal as compared with the rules of other colonial powers. This fact has been recognised even by the African writers and statesmen. Thus, an African writer after pointing out the grave injustices which the Africans have suffered in East and Central Africa, comments: “But, of course, these anomalies must not be taken to mean that British policy is the worst in Africa. Far from it, we have already indicated that it is the best of all European policies, though this is not to say it should continue as it is. We have already noted that it is only in British-controlled Africa that the Africans have a certain measure of franchise.” (Ndabaningi Sithole, *African Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1959, pp. 43-44). Another African writer remarks: “Dr. Banda has repeatedly poured glowing praises on the Colonial Secretary.” (N. M. Shamyarira, ‘Show-down in Central Africa,’ *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 39, 1961, p. 297.)

But they differ radically in the objectives of their colonial policies which, as we have already observed, have resulted in a striking diversity between the very content and direction of African national movements in countries ruled by Britain and in those ruled by France.

The stated objective of the British colonial policy, which is above party politics,¹¹ has been to help her colonies attain eventually independence within the Commonwealth with a right to quit it. This objective owes its origin to the doctrine of Free Trade and the writings of the Liberals of the Manchester school in the early 19th century. In recent times this has been reiterated on various occasions by appropriate British authorities. Thus, the Colonial Secretary said in 1951 in the House of Commons that the U.K. aimed at "helping the colonial territories to attain self-government within the Commonwealth."¹² Similarly, the Secretary of State stated in 1956 that the "declared object of British policy... is the progressive transfer of power to local democratic institutions, culminating in full self-government for all territories... within... the British Commonwealth of Nations."¹³ The British colonial policy, therefore, recognized the separate entity of British colonies which were destined to become eventually sovereign states distinct from the metropolitan country. The French colonial policy, on the other hand, did not aim at helping her colonies attain eventual independence. Instead, originally the basic idea underlying the French policy was the unity between the metropolitan country and the colonies, i.e., their cultural and political integration, as is symbolized in the phrase 'Franced Outre-Mer'.¹⁴ The main instrument for achieving that end was the policy of *assimilation*. In accordance with this policy, the French culture was to be exported to the colonies and was to be absorbed by their people, so that they became Frenchmen and French citizens.¹⁵ The colonies were considered as "overseas parts" of France.¹⁶ The colonial people could attain a status equal to that of the Frenchmen by fulfilling certain laid-down standards. Later, the policy of *assimilation* was replaced by the policy of *association*, in accordance with which the colonies became *associated States* rather than "overseas parts" of France. But neither *assimilation* nor *association* contemplated eventual independence of the colonies.¹⁷ Nor did the change in the policy mean the abandonment of the aim of the creation of a common culture.¹⁸ Both *assimilation* and *association*, therefore, implied inequality between the Frenchmen

11. *Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs*, No. 1,6.2.1952, p. 5.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Commonwealth Survey*, Vol. 2, (1956), p. 396.

14. Goldschmidt (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 53.

15. Eric A. Walker, *Colonies*, Cambridge, 1945, p. 101.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

18. Thomas R. Adams, *Modern Colonialism*, (Doubleday & Co., N. Y., 1955), p. 9.

and the Africans of the colonies and the stated colonial objective was to remove this inequality and to make Africans the equals of metropolitan Frenchmen.

Corresponding to this difference in the colonial objectives, we find a fundamental difference between the objectives of African national movements in British-ruled Africa and French-ruled Africa. And this difference, it is necessary to emphasize again, is a good indication of African diversity, making the drawing of analogous conclusions, or making any territory a *key*, spurious. In British-controlled Africa, where the objective of colonial policy is the eventual independence of the colonies, the African national movements have also been directed at the attainment of independence. In several former British-ruled territories like Ghana, Nigeria, the Sudan, and Tanganyika, the demands of these nationalist movements have been conceded and they have become independent separate states. Uganda is about to become one. In Kenya, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia also, the national movements are directed towards the attainment of independence. French-ruled Africa, on the other hand, presents in this respect an entirely different picture. Here the objective of the African national movements was, originally, not the attainment of independence but the removal of *inequality* implicit in the concept of *assimilation*. So much so that "until recently", as a writer has remarked, "many and, perhaps, the majority of the present African leaders have not only supported some form of continued connection with France, but, on occasion, have even denounced separatist nationalism as archaic and retrograde."¹⁹ An illuminating illustration bringing out this striking difference is a conversation which is reported to have taken place in 1958 between Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana, a country which was under British rule, and Mr. M. Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, a country which was under French rule. The two statesmen had met and during the course of their talk, Dr. Nkrumah expressed his conviction that ultimately all African people would achieve *full independence*. To this, Mr. M. Houphouët-Boigny replied: "Your experiment is in many ways attractive . . . but in the light of human relationships that exist between France and ourselves, and of this century's imperative demand for the interdependence of nations and peoples, we have thought it right to be of greater interest to attempt something different—a unique experiment of its kind: to establish a Franco-African community based on the concepts of *equality* and *fraternity*."²⁰ It is not without significance that, when in 1958, General de Gaulle in a referendum gave Madagascar and twelve other territories in French-ruled West and Equatorial Africa the freedom to choose between complete independence and membership of the French Commu-

19. Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

20. Cited by Maurice Schumann, 'French Policy Towards African Nationalism,' *Optima*, Vol. 8, (1958), pp. 16-17.

nity, which falls much short of sovereign status or even the Dominion Status, all but one, Guinea, opted for membership in the French Community.²¹ They, thus, voluntarily rejected complete independence at a time when their counterparts in British-ruled Africa were struggling hard for independence but were being denied the same.²²

II

Not only is there diversity in the very content and direction of the various African national movements, but there are also significant differences among the African countries as regards the degree of their political progress and maturity, depending, at least initially, upon the character of the colonial rule they have been subjected to. It has already been noted that the characters of the colonial rules have been different. Some have been in general liberal, while others have been despotic and authoritarian. Further, it has also been noted that the British and French colonialisms have been, in their own different ways, comparatively liberal. Consequently, British-ruled Africa and French-ruled Africa present a striking contrast, as regards the degree of their political progress, with the African countries ruled by Belgium and Portugal, whose rules have been, as we shall indicate later, despotic and authoritarian. It is not our intention here to go into the details of the history of political progress made before their independence by countries in Western and Equatorial Africa, which were formerly under British rule but are now independent. Interested readers will find that in these countries mature and experienced political leadership, well organised national movements and political parties had come into existence very long ago. We shall here confine ourselves to sub-saharan Africa.

Turning to British-ruled Africa south of the Sahara, one finds that the territories comprising East and Central Africa are far more advanced, in respect of African political progress, than was the Congo at the time of her independence. These territories can boast of statesmen like Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, Hastings Banda, Kenneth Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo, who are mature and seasoned leaders. In all these territories, political consciousness grew among the Africans long ago and began to manifest itself through a variety of organisations. In Kenya, African political organisations began to emerge as early as 1920 when Harry Thuku, with the active help of

21. Smith Hampstone, *The New Africa*, (Faber and Faber, London, 1961), p. 158.

22. Since 1958 some members have opted for complete independence and have left the French Community. They have been apparently influenced by extraneous factors. It is hoped that this process will continue and the remaining members will also opt for independence. But the results of the 1958 referendum and the fact that many African countries still continue to cling to the French Community reveal the influence of colonial objectives on the objectives of the African national movements.

some Indians,²³ formed the Kikuyu Association. Even the Europeans were impressed by his ability and performance.²⁴ Later, when Thuku was expelled, there were riots in Nairobi,²⁵ indicating the political consciousness that had come to the African masses even at that time. In 1946, the Kenya African Union (KAU) had come into existence. Then came the Mau Mau. Mau Mau has often been described as a barbarous, violent movement indicative of extreme backwardness. But it is possible that its violent aspect has been magnified. And, in spite of Mr. F. D. Corfield's government-sponsored report, *The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau*, further unbiased researches may be necessary to determine its character. The "sepoy mutiny" in India in 1857 is, on re-examination, being looked upon as India's first war of independence. Well organised political parties have again emerged in Kenya since the end of the Emergency.²⁶ In Uganda, the Uganda National Congress, and in Tanganyika, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), are of long standing. In Nyasaland, the African National Congress was formed long ago and its successor the Nyasaland Malawi Congress, like TANU, is a highly organised party with a nation-wide following. In Southern Rhodesia, in spite of the suppression by the white settlers, the African National Congress came into existence in 1921 and by 1948 the African political aspirations had begun to pose a challenge to the "white oligarchy."²⁷ Today there is the well-organised Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which is the successor to the banned National Democratic Party (NDP) which, in turn, was the successor to the African National Congress. In Northern Rhodesia, too, the African National Congress was formed many years ago and is still there though the comparatively younger party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), led by Kenneth Kaunda, seems to have stolen the march over the former. Similarly, all the three High Commission Territories have well-organised parties with a nation-wide following. Basutoland has the Basutoland Congress Party, Bechuanaland has the Bechuanaland People's Party and Swaziland has the Swaziland Progressive Party.²⁸

23. George Bennett, 'The Development of Political Organisations in Kenya,' *Political Studies*, Vol. V, (1957), p. 119.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. In Kenya—with its too many politicians—the situation is, no doubt, at present much confused. There is the KANU-KADU conflict. Then there are the personality conflicts. But this confusion cannot surely be made a ground for delaying her independence. As a writer has remarked, "It is not a peculiarly African phenomenon that, during a period of struggle for independence from foreign rule, the shape of nations should remain somewhat cloudy and undefined, or that various competing or co-existing nationalisms, appealing to wider or narrower loyalties, should be thrown up in the process... In contemporary Africa, as in the Balkans and the Middle East at an earlier stage, national movements have their particularist and universalist aspects." Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, Frederick Muller, London, 1956, pp. 21-22.

27. Robert Rotberg, 'The Rise of Joshua Nkomo and Southern Rhodesian Nationalism,' *African Report*, March 1962, p. 3.

28. *Hindustan Times*, 9.9.1961, p. 7.

Even in the knowledge and experience of the art of modern government, these countries are far ahead of the Congo at the time of its independence. Since the stated objective of the British colonial policy, it may be recalled, is to help her colonies attain independence, its inevitable consequence is the establishment of governmental institutions in the colonies *themselves* and the progressive transfer of power to the people of the colonies. Consequently, institutions like the executive council, legislative council and the judiciary were established in these colonies long ago. Progressive transfer of power to the colonial peoples implies their progressive association with the governmental machinery. It is true that initially these institutions were the show of the white settlers and the government-appointed members only and the Africans were completely excluded. It is further true that even now the Africans are not represented in proportion to their numbers and in the white-dominated Southern Rhodesia they are even now not given any representation. But the very existence of these institutions in the colonies and the African struggle to gain representation in these institutions provided an indirect source for Africans through which they gained much knowledge of the working of these institutions. They thus came to be acquainted with the democratic processes and concepts very early. It is said that there was a general recognition in the Legislative Council of the ability of Mr. E. W. Mathu, who became the first African member of the Council in 1944.²⁹ Similarly, the people of these countries have had a few experiences of electing their representatives, though the suffrage was qualitative.

III

The Congo, however, was placed in an entirely different situation at the time of her independence from the one in which East and Central Africa are. This situation was mainly the product of the colonial policy pursued by Belgium during the half century of its rule. The policy is "summed up in the word 'paternalism.'"³⁰ Like other colonial policies, *paternalism* also had its roots in *metropolitan* traditions. John Strachey in one of his works refers to Leon Trotsky as saying that the Belgians were the "archetype of a totally commercialised people: of a people worthy, industrious, stable, indeed, but of a people who had renounced all national visions, dreams, ideals: of a people whose almost universal ambition had become individual wealth and comfort ... Even its boldest and most energetic spirits are apt to opt for personal comfort and security at all costs."³¹ *Paternalism*,

29. George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p. 5.

30. Pierre Wigny, 'The Belgian Plan for Democracy,' *Optima*, Vol. 8, (1958), p. 27.

31. *The End of Empire*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959, p. 218. The quotation is from John Strachey.

therefore, aimed neither at preparing the Congo for independence nor for its *assimilation*³² but, instead, its aim was economic development and prosperity with no corresponding political progress. *Paternalism* meant "bread but no votes, good government but no opposition, the best Negro housing in Africa, but no real freedom of movement."³³ As late as 1955, the Belgian Governor-General in the Congo could say that the "fascination of becoming a skilled worker handling precision machinery drives out of the Negro's mind the need for politics."³⁴ And a former Belgian Minister for Colonies could write in 1958 that the Congolese had first of all to "learn what to eat, so that they would have strength enough for a sustained effort."³⁵

Consistent with this policy of economic development but no political training, the Belgians made no efforts whatsoever to train the Congolese in the art of modern government.³⁶ Through a deliberate policy of denying opportunities for higher education, they prevented the emergence of an educated Congolese *elite*.³⁷ The Congolese were not associated with the governmental machinery above the level of villages and small towns.³⁸ They had no political rights.³⁹ Popular elections were never held till December 1957 when they were held at the municipal level in the three cities, Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Jadotville.⁴⁰ No political party was allowed to develop till 1959.⁴¹ As late as 1955, there were no legislative assemblies or councils of a representative character and acting as a check on the authority of the Governor-General.⁴² Colonial legislation was framed in Brussels and the Governor-General received his directives from the Minister of Colonies.⁴³ The Government Council in Leopoldville was purely a consultative and advisory body.⁴⁴ The country was ruled by officials trained in Belgium and responsible only to the metropolitan authorities.⁴⁵

However, it is obvious that the Congo, situated as it was in the heart of Africa, could have not remained an island unaffected by events around it. The emergence of independent African states, the vital changes in French-ruled Africa, the rapid constitutional changes in the

32. H.A. Wieschoff, *Colonial Policies in Africa*, University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 106.

33. *Time*, N.Y., May 16, 1955, p. 23.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Wigny. *op. cit.*, p. 27.

36. *The Nation*, Nairobi, 26.6.1960, p. 6.

37. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1960, pp. 46-66.

38. George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* Dennis Dobson, London, 1956, p. 213.

39. Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

40. Gwendolen M. Carter, 'Multi-Racialism in Africa,' *International Affairs*, Vol. 36, 1960, p. 460.

41. *Kenya Weekly News*, 6.5.1960, p. 11.

42. John Gunther, *Inside Africa*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1955, p. 646.

43. C. Grove Haines (Ed.), *Africa Today*, The John Hopkin Press, Baltimore, 1955, p. 355.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

British colonies and the declarations of the All-African Peoples Conference (1958) held at Accra had their impact on the Congo,⁴⁶ and its people, in the absence of any constitutional avenues, expressed their disgust and frustration in the form of the Leopoldville riots of 1959. These riots put an end to the Belgian hopes that the Congolese would live for ever on bread and butter alone.

Belgium then decided to change its policy. The aim was now to be *partnership* between Belgium and the Congo and not *paternalism*. The Belgian Government issued a declaration on 13th January, 1959, saying that its intention was "to organise a democracy in the Congo which will be capable of exercising the prerogatives of sovereignty and of deciding upon its independence". The declaration also provided for the establishment in the Congo, for the first time, of political institutions which were to be vested with real power. However, these steps were not acceptable to the Congolese leaders, who had suddenly sprung up. They demanded immediate full independence. Belgium, thereupon, played what the London *Times* editorially called a "gamble" and decided that "twelve million Africans shall rule themselves with virtually no preparations either in politics or in public administration and very little in local government."⁴⁷ After a few Round Table Conferences between the Belgian Government and the Congolese leaders, the Congo was given independence on 30th June, 1960.

It is, thus, apparent that the Congo became independent without having any experience of the art of modern government or education in modern political concepts. There was no educated Congolese *elite* to take over the reigns of government. There was no national figure who could hold the nation together. The sense of nationhood was still "rudimentary".⁴⁸ The national movement was yet in an incipient stage as contrasted with the mature and organised national movements as are to be found in East and Central Africa. There was no political party of the standing of TANU, KANU, ZAPU or the Malawi Congress. There was not even a disciplined army or police force to maintain law and order. The governmental structure, therefore, crumbled, leading to chaos. The foreign intervention, on which Dr. O'Brien has thrown much light in articles in *The Observer*, London, made the confusion worse confounded.

IV

There now remains Portuguese-ruled Africa comprising Angola and Mozambique and South-West Africa ruled by the Union of South Africa. Theoretically, Portuguese colonial policy has the

46. Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

47. Dated 9th March, 1960.

48. Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

same objective as the French, i.e., *assimilation*,⁴⁹ though the origins are different. But whereas the French colonial objective was coupled with liberal metropolitan traditions, the Portuguese objective is combined with despotic metropolitan traditions. Consequently, there is a big gap between theory and practice. Any manifestations of nationalist aspirations in Angola and Mozambique have been ruthlessly crushed. In South-West Africa, the suppression is all the more complete and nationalist political activity has not been allowed to grow at all. In Angola and Mozambique, too, *organised*⁵⁰ political activity in the constitutional sense has not been able to move beyond the stage of pressure groups. Opportunities for higher education have been extremely limited.⁵¹ Africans have not in general been associated with the governmental machinery. In 1961, there were only two African members in the Legislative Council in Mozambique consisting of 52 members.⁵²

There are thus some obvious similarities between the Congo situation at the time of its independence and Angola, Mozambique and South-West Africa. Yet even in this case, it would be wrong to apply to these countries any conclusions drawn from the Congo. Whereas there are similarities, there are dissimilarities also which may lead to different results. Moreover, if any intelligent lesson is to be learnt from the chaos in the Congo, it is not that the independence of the rest of the colonies should be delayed. Rather, it is the reverse. The lesson is that like the Congo, the remaining colonies will not remain unaffected by events in the rest of Africa. What is necessary is that before the suppressed nationalist sentiment bursts out leading to bloodshed, as in Angola, the process of attainment of independence by these colonies is hastened. It seems too late in the day for anyone to tell a people that they are not fit for independence. Dr. Hastings Banda has given a suitable reply to this. Asked at a press conference in London about his ability to run the government of his country, he cried: "Why not? Let me make my own mess."⁵³

49. Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

50. Haines, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

51. *Loc. cit.*

52. *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 4. 3. 1961, p. 3.

53. *The Hyphen*, Vol. IV, 1960.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NIGERIA*

by

SANJIVA NAYAK

A COUPLE of centuries ago when European statesmen discussed the utility of having an overseas empire, many argued against the acquisition of colonies on the ground that colonies were like fruits which dropped off as they ripened, while some others considered them as millstones round their necks. But by the end of the nineteenth century, the western nations, after eagerly seeking new pastures, settled down to put off the day of deliverance for the colonies, which they knew to be the inevitable Nemesis of imperialism. They have succeeded to a large extent, but not as much as they thought they would. The first anti-colonial war, in modern times, was fought in the New World. The love of liberty slowly spread across the Atlantic and first allured Asia and then, Africa—the “Dark Continent”, only so-called because of our ignorance of it. Africa is the last continent in the world to be brought into relationship with the rest of the human world and to join the race for freedom.

It is trite to observe that Africa today is in a revolutionary ferment, threatening to explode at any time. “It can no longer be neglected, dominated or exploited.”¹ A revolution is going on in Africa on an immense scale. Within the last few years, “it has burst its bonds a dozen times and eluded a definition”. It is on this dark horizon that there comes a rising star—Nigeria. “The gestation of new Nigeria was hard, its parturition miraculous, its growth into adolescence a thing all intelligent Africa surveys with fascination.”² That is because “Nigeria,—named after its great river Niger, which means ‘Black’—may well be the governing factor influencing the future of all Black Africa; the fulcrum of the lever of nationalism.”³ It is quite natural, therefore, for Mr. O’Hara⁴ to describe Nigeria as the “hope of Africa”.

* This article was written before the recent Lagos Conference.

1. E. Longyel, *Africa in Ferment*; (New York: Oxford Book Company, 1959), p. 92.
2. J. Cameroon, *The African Revolution*; (London: Thames Hudson, 1961), p. 94.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
4. Mr. B. O’Hara, the Chairman of the sub-committee of the House of Representatives for Foreign Affairs Committee, quoted in *The West African Pilot*, Dec. 30, 1960.

The Nigerians accept such compliments with obvious satisfaction for they would seem to have assigned to themselves the role of the leader of African nations.⁵ Sir Abubakar's statement that all African states, regardless of size, should regard themselves as equals in the interests of peace on the Continent is obviously a diplomatic sop. It is not evident if this view is generally shared by Nigerians. All over Nigeria today there is an unconcealed awareness of her high destiny. "We are humble and it is with humility that we solemnly declare that there can be no Africa without Nigeria."⁶ The belief appears to be that, before the birth of Nigeria, Africa was a continent drifting on an uncharted ocean. "Nigeria's responsibility to Africa and to the world is to find the destination of the drifting continent."⁷

Aspiration is one thing, and its achievement another. Many a time the gap between the two is unbridgeable. That is because a foreign policy depends largely upon the internal situation of a country. In Nigeria internal dissension posed a serious threat. As yet, the nascent nationalism there is weak. A few years ago Awolowo said, "Nigeria is not a nation; it is a mere geographical expression."⁸ Even Sir Abubakar admitted that "Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country."⁹ Dr. Azikiwe echoed similar thoughts when he exclaimed that the Hauza, Fulani, Yoruba and other nationalities (*sic*), asserting their right of self-determination, are like separate fingers, united with others as a part of the body. But, later he asserted that "Nigeria is no longer a mere geographical expression but a nation in the emergence."¹⁰

Such statements are no longer in fashion. These leaders, whatever their differences, no longer doubt that the country is one and will stay one. The reasons for this metamorphosis are none too clear. Some attribute it to the ability and alertness of the leaders.¹¹ Others tend to credit the sensitive and sensible public opinion. "Today the parties face a challenge to make themselves national instead of regional . . . New ideas are in the air; above all, a demand for new ideas. These pressures for change—going inevitably towards a greater sense of unity and stronger central government—are already quite strong and may soon grow stronger."¹² Thus, there appears to be a reasonable possibility of Nigeria holding together and marching together.

In such an eventuality, Nigeria will play a great role both in African and international affairs in the days to come. In a statement

5. The Nigerians have made no secret of their refusal to accept Dr. Nkrumah as a messiah in African politics.

6. Editorial, *The West African Pilot*, Lagos, Oct. 13, 1960.

7. *Ibid.*

8. P. Ritner, *The Death of Africa*; (New York: Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 207.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

10. R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*; (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 454.

11. "With their (leaders') hands on the controls, Nigeria moves into freedom with the calm majesty of a great liner putting into sea." *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 6, 1960.

12. B. Davidson, "And Now Nigeria" in *The New Statesman*, Oct. 1, 1960.

to the House of Representatives, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa laid down the cardinal principles of his foreign policy as promotion of national interest; remaining within the Commonwealth, because "all its members are autonomous communities equal in status" and would greatly benefit from their interchange of ideas; not associating, as a matter of routine, with any of the Power blocs, lest freedom of action, an essential feature of his policy, be curtailed; feeding and fostering understanding and forging cultural and economic links among the African States; and by being the member of the United Nations directing her energy to influence the course of events in world affairs towards peace.¹³

This is non-alignment *par excellence*. Sir Abubakar once said that Nigeria is "not going to join any bloc, including neutrals".¹⁴ "We are going to follow the path of truth," he uttered rather rhetorically, "no matter who is involved, bearing in mind the overall interest of the Federation."¹⁵ Dr. Azikiwe too has expressed similar views. The foreign policy should be based upon "an independent and not a neutral attitude especially with particular reference to issues which affect the destiny of Africa or the people of African descent no matter where they live."¹⁶

Nigeria, however, to keep in step with the feelings of the African *elite* everywhere, has to embrace non-alignment, but she is "not likely to overdo neutralism."¹⁷ That is because of her internal situation. The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar, has always seemed to have more in common with Chief Awolowo (leader of the Opposition) than with some of the members of NCNC, with whom he is in coalition. Awolowo's policy is one of acting in cooperation with the West "when-ever Nigeria can do so without prejudicing her own interests".¹⁸ Further, Nigeria also believes that "it is the only policy that could keep Nigeria out of the senseless war—hot or cold—which at present plagues the western world."¹⁹ Aligning with any of the power blocs would ultimately mean subscribing to all or most of its prejudices. Sir Abubakar, during the foreign policy debate in the Parliament, said that "to join any of the existing blocs was to close one's eyes to the good of the other bloc."²⁰ He then came to the conclusion that "Nigeria is not going right, left, middle, backward or forward,"²¹ but

13. Statement by Sir Abubakar in the Nigerian Parliament on Aug. 20, 1960.

14. Sir Abubakar at a press conference on his return from New York after attending the General Assembly session. *The West African Pilot*, Oct. 13, 1960.

15. *Ibid.*

16. N. Azikiwe, *Nigeria in World Politics*; (London: The Office of the High Commissioner for Nigeria, 1959), p. 11.

17. *The Economist*, Oct. 1, 1960.

18. It is reasonable to suppose that no Northerner will think along similar lines (allowing always for the likelihood of a strong attraction from the Arab countries), but this is not a policy which the NCNC would advocate in public. *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Oct. 6, 1960.

19. Editorial, *The West African Pilot*, Aug. 22, 1960.

20. *Ibid.*, Nov. 25, 1960.

21. *Ibid.*

would endeavour to follow an independent policy.²²

The Nigerian leaders, nevertheless, are united in their stand to remain in the Commonwealth. That is because "Britain's principal legacy to the peoples of the Commonwealth and the colonies has hitherto been her social democratic system and her concept of law and justice."²³

Nigeria has a strong faith in this system. She also believes that "the Commonwealth is an institution which buttresses the crusade for peace and international cooperation."²⁴ In his maiden speech, immediately following his country's admission to the United Nations, Sir Abubakar gave an assurance that Nigeria would never forget her old friends and, also that she was proud to be a member of the Commonwealth.

In spite of this great fund of goodwill, the country found itself divided when the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact was signed. The pro-Western Awolowo criticised the pact bitterly because Nigeria might have to go to Britain's assistance in case the latter became an actual or self-imposed victim of aggression;²⁵ it hurts the self-respect of Nigeria as she would become more or less a mediocre and contemptible satellite of Britain; Nigeria would be committing an unfriendly act against those countries not favourably disposed to Britain; it is against the declared policy of non-alignment and it is one-sided as Britain alone stands to gain by it. He insisted that by the acceptance of the Defence Pact, the new nation had been "disgraced, deceived and swindled out of its sovereignty".²⁶ Riots broke out in Ibadan, where the students protested against the Pact. The Defence Minister cleared the earlier misunderstanding. He gave the assurance that no bases had been given to Britain; Nigeria was still free to enter into treaty with anyone; only normal airport services at Kano and Lagos would be made available to the United Kingdom; the soldiers of both the countries would enjoy similar facilities; the right of overflying was no more than what international law permitted; Nigeria too would benefit from the tropicalization tests of British aircraft, as results would be available to Nigeria, and many a clause, especially the annexe which was criticised by the Opposition, was added at the instance of Nigeria. He thus asserted that the Pact

22. The NCNC's mouthpiece, *The West African Pilot*, gleefully noted: "Even the Action Group which once advocated the policy of adjustment with the Western Bloc has staged a dramatic comeback to support the NCNC policy of non-alignment". *Ibid.*, (editorial).

23. Ezera Kalu, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria*; (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 259.

24. Azikiwe, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

25. Mr. Duncan Sandys, during his recent visit to Lagos, upheld the assurance given by the Nigerian Government that Nigeria was not obliged to go to war on the side of Britain, in the event of the latter finding herself involved in any such conflict. *The West African Pilot*, April 17, 1960.

26. *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1960.

"was in the national interest".²⁷

Nigeria is also aware that, for many years to come, she needs "the West, its capital, skill, political experience and industrial know-how in exploiting her resources".²⁸ Yet many factors like the existence of colonies, racial discrimination and nuclear tests in the Sahara prevent Nigeria from overtly expressing her pro-Western sympathies. Both Sir Abubakar and Azikiwe are opposed to nuclear tests in the Sahara. The latter once uttered a warning: "I feel deeply concerned with the calculated attempt of the European State, which rules millions of African people as colonial people, to seek to endanger the lives of millions of African people in its mad attempt to ape the Atom powers... We will regard this Sahara test not only as an unfriendly act, but also as a crime against humanity".²⁹ It is no wonder that Nigeria has broken off diplomatic relations with France when the latter carried out the third successive test. Even at the recent Monrovia Conference, Sir Abubakar came out with a strong resolution against the tests but failed to persuade his neighbours to accept it. This is likely to remain a sore spot in Nigeria's relations with the West.

No state, not even Nigeria, can hope to lead the African states unless it is prepared to fight colonialism. Nigeria too makes her contribution to make the demise of dying colonialism peaceful and painless. "The existence of colonies in Africa," said Dr. Azikiwe in an address, "can no longer be justified in the light of science and history. It should be the manifest destiny of Nigeria to join hands with other progressive forces in the world in order to emancipate... the people to Africa... a free Nigeria cannot be satisfied until Africa is free from foreign rule." One of the corner-stones of Nigerian foreign policy is the liberation of all African states. At the XVth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Nigerian delegation spearheaded a resolution to end colonialism.

Nigerians, true to their salt, bitterly feel and fight racialism. No community can accept the principle that the colour of the skin should be the basis for deciding the acceptance of a people into civilised community. "Science has demonstrated that no race is superior to another. History has shown that no race is culturally naked."³⁰ The relationship between Europeans and Africans is confused by fear, suspicion, and misunderstanding. The European settlers have often "mistaken ignorance for stupidity; paganism for barbarity; the inertia

27. Three additional aspects of military policy deserve attention,—they are:—

- (i) negligible chances of military dictatorship;
- (ii) assurances proclaiming lack of any intention to expand despite large population; and
- (iii) she has not stationed any troops on the borders of Dahomey, Chad and Niger.

This pact has recently been abrogated.

28. Ezeru Kalu, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

29. Azikiwe, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

born out of steaming climate for sloth; a difference in ethical standards for deceitfulness . . ."³¹ Sir Abubakar did not mince words at the last Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference and expressed the view that withdrawal of South Africa had strengthened the Commonwealth.

In the United Nations Nigeria has already started taking profound interest. She is the ninety-ninth member of the United Nations, but certainly not in the order of importance. In the confused conflict of the Congo she has played a useful role. Nigerian troops have helped the United Nations; Mr. Jaja Wachuku, then the Education Minister, has acted as Chairman of the Reconciliation Commission, whose report presents a lucid picture of the Congo trouble. Arguing in the Political Committee, she has also pleaded for an "effective voice" in the Economic and Social Council. In demanding the expansion of the Economic and Social Council and the reorganization of the Security Council, Mr. Wachuku asserted that it is a "farce" if Africa were not to have a seat in both these councils. He pointed out that the entire group of Afro-Asian States had only one seat (and not an effective one) allotted to it. However, in the controversy about the office of the Secretary-General, Nigeria had supported Mr. Hammarskjöld and had recorded her appreciation of his work in the Congo.

Public opinion in the country has shown concern about the failure of the United Nations policy towards South-West Africa. "The United Nations," it insists, "must bark as well as bite. Only force can bring South Africa to senses . . . African States have, in particular, an obligation in this respect. They must protect this piece of African soil either through the United Nations, or when that fails, by themselves".³² This, they believe, is necessary to safeguard peace and human dignity in Africa.

Pan-Africanism has been dangled too long as a cherished goal before the expectant masses. Nigeria too subscribes to it. She wants to cooperate with other independent States with a view to establishing unity of outlook and purpose in foreign policy. While supporting non-alignment, it was suggested that "Nigeria must not be neutral in matters affecting the destiny of Africa". Nigeria, however, is cautious in asserting her leadership to which her position entitles her. Despite this claim, Sir Abubakar once remarked that, if other African countries found that Nigeria was really working in their interest, that Nigeria was constructive, they might regard her more or less as their spokesman; but she would never impose herself on any African nation.

Nigeria is also committed to the creation of a United States of Africa. Unlike Dr. Nkrumah, she realizes that this could come only in due course because there are innumerable obstacles to surmount. She is moving steadily, though cautiously, in this direction. By virtue of

31. J. C. Maclean, *The Africa: The Racial Issue* (Ed); (New York: H. W. Wilson & Company, 1954), p. 5.

32. *The West African Pilot*, April 14, 1960.

her population, Nigeria will be able "not only to collaborate with other African states to nurture the growth of African personality but also to speak for Africans in the counsels of the world with a weight far beyond the expectations of other smaller African territories".

The foreign policy of Nigeria, though still in the formative stage, has already developed a soft turf to tread upon. Perhaps this is the most positive aspect of the current African revolution. If divided Nigeria was the sign of yesterday, a 'United Nigeria' is hope of tomorrow.

INDIA AND NIGERIA

(Excerpts from the speech of Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, at Lagos on September 24, 1962.)

Nations of the world should live in a co-operative Commonwealth, without interfering in each other's affairs. India seeks the friendship of all countries and I am happy that she enjoys this in good measure. But we have deliberately decided not to tie ourselves with any power blocs.

The world is living in an atmosphere of tensions and war because of the old antagonism between the East and the West, but the presence of the non-aligned nations acts as a buffer between them. I am happy to note that Nigeria's foreign policy is also moving along non-aligned lines.

India has taken the advice of many countries belonging to both blocs on her development plans. But the final decision on these remains solely with India.

India cannot ask all the countries in the world to follow her policy of non-alignment because other factors, especially geographical conditions, have to be taken into consideration.

There are similarities in the problems facing India and Nigeria as both have gone through a period of colonial rule, but it is now upto each country to tackle its specific problems taking into account local conditions.

(Based on a Reuter report in *The Hindu*, September 25, 1962.)

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

AN ACCOUNT of the activities of the Council for the quarter ending September 30, 1962:

Felicitations

A dinner was held on June 21, 1962 in the Office premises of the Council to felicitate Mr. Dinesh Singh, Mr. C. R. Pattabhi Raman and Mr. S. A. Mehdi on their appointment to the posts of Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Deputy Minister for Labour, Employment and Planning and Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Irrigation and Power, respectively. Mr. Balvantray G. Mehta, President, and members of the Council were hosts at the dinner. Those who attended included Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Patron-in-Chief of the Council; H. E. Daniel Mafinanga, High Commissioner for Tanganyika; H. E. Mr. S. K. Anthony, High Commissioner for Ghana; Mr. Layashi Yaker, Representative of the Provisional Government of Algeria; Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister of Home Affairs; Dr. Ram Subhag Singh, Minister of State for Agriculture; Mr. Jaisukhbhai Hathi, Minister for Labour and Employment; and high officials of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

Distinguished Visitor from Uganda

Dr. Prince Nyabango, a distinguished scholar and leader from Uganda, was a guest of the Council in the middle of July, 1962. As he was interested in finding out the possibilities of vocational and technical training for the students of Uganda in India, he was taken round by the Council to related institutions. He also visited the All-India Radio, the Government of India Press, the All-India Handicrafts Board, the Okhla Industrial Estate and the Social Welfare Centres run by the Bharat Sevak Samaj. Dr. Nyabango had, during this visit, an opportunity to discuss the scheme of scholarships for Uganda students with the office-bearers of the Council and the Ministry of External Affairs. During his stay in the capital, he met the Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Defence Minister, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh and Dr. D. S. Kothari, Chairman of the University Grants Commission.

Dinner Party

The Council gave a dinner on July 24, 1962 in honour of Mr. Y. K. Lule, Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission, and Dr. R. J. Onyango, a high official in the Ministry of Health, Uganda. Those present on the occasion included distinguished diplomats.

President of Congo Parliament

Mr. Kimpiobi Yvon, President of the Parliament of the Congo Republic, visited the Council on August 31, 1962. He was accompanied by his Economic Adviser, Dr. John L. Brom, and Mr. I. P. Camplimbare, a Member of the Congolese Parliament. They were received by Mr. Dinesh Singh, General Secretary of the Council. A number of prominent people present on the occasion participated in an informal and informative discussion on the constitutional and other aspects of the current Congolese affairs.

Scholarships and Students

The Council has awarded scholarships to two young Africans from Kenya for training in leather technology at the Central Leather Research Institute, Madras. The Scholarships and Students Welfare Committee has been re-constituted and now functions from Bombay and Delhi.

FRAMEWORK OF UGANDA CONSTITUTION

Uganda is scheduled to receive her independence on October 9, 1962. During the last six months, she has been enjoying self-government on the lines drawn up by the Uganda Constitutional Conference held in London from September 18 to October 9, 1962. The Conference was attended by a delegation from Uganda including ministers, elected members of the legislature, district representatives and representatives of the four kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro. The framework of the Constitution is important as it will be the basis of Uganda's government till a final Constitution is evolved and adopted by independent Uganda. It is also likely that most of the provisions contained in the framework will be incorporated in the final Constitution. Some of these important provisions are reproduced below:

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The Governor

The Governor of Uganda will be appointed by and hold office at the pleasure of Her Majesty. There will be a Deputy Governor, who will be appointed by the Governor on Her Majesty's instructions. Under provisions on the same lines as those in the existing instruments, the Deputy Governor will assist the Governor in the discharge of his functions and will administer the government if the Governor is unable to do so.

THE LEGISLATURE

The Legislature of Uganda will comprise a single chamber, styled the National Assembly.

Composition

The National Assembly (subject to the provisions of the paragraph concerning 'The Speaker' below) will be composed of a Speaker, 82 Elected Members and 9 Specially Elected Members.

Qualifications for Election

A person will be qualified for election as an Elected or Specially Elected Member of the National Assembly if he is a British subject or a British protected person of the age of 21 years or more, and can speak English well enough to take part in the proceedings of the Assembly. Persons who are under allegiance to a foreign State, undischarged bankrupts, of unsound mind, under sentence of death, or serving a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months without the option of a fine will be disqualified for election. The Legislature of Uganda will be enabled to disqualify persons holding judicial or other office or appointment, members of the armed forces, members of the police force, persons convicted of election offences and officers who conduct elections to the National Assembly.

Method of Election

The Elected Members of the National Assembly will be directly elected. The Specially Elected Members of the National Assembly will be elected by the Assembly in accordance with the system of proportional voting at present in use, which will be included in the Constitution.

Franchise for Direct Elections

Every person of the age of 21 years or more (unless any other lower age is substituted by the National Assembly)—

- (a) who is a British subject or a British protected person or who has been resident in Uganda for five years out of the eight years immediately preceding his application for registration; and
- (b) who has been resident in Uganda for the six months immediately preceding his application, will, unless he is disqualified under the electoral law, be entitled to be registered as a voter and to vote.

Delimitation of Constituencies

Uganda will be divided into single-member constituencies for the purposes of direct elections to the National Assembly. The boundaries of the constituencies will be arranged on the same principles as the existing constituencies. There will be an Electoral Boundary Commission; the functions of the Commission will be to carry out periodic reviews of the boundaries of the constituencies and, after considering representations, to make recommendations as to any alterations it considers necessary to ensure that the principles for division of the constituencies are complied with. The Governor will give effect to all such recommendations. The members of the Commission will be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Prime Minister and the

Leader of the Opposition. The existing constituencies will continue until the Commission recommend new boundaries.

Election Law

The law governing elections of Elected Members of the National Assembly will, subject to the Constitution, be made by the Legislature of Uganda.

The Speaker

The Speaker will be elected by the National Assembly from amongst its own Members or from outside the Assembly. If the Speaker is elected from inside the Assembly, he will not vacate his seat as a member. The Speaker will have neither a vote nor a casting vote. There will be a Deputy Speaker who will be elected by the Assembly from amongst its own Members. Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries will not be eligible to hold the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker.

Provision for Assent, Reservation and Disallowance

Bills passed by the National Assembly will be submitted to the Governor for assent. The Governor will be required to reserve for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure any Bill that appears to him in his discretion—

- (a) to be inconsistent with any of Her Majesty's obligations under Treaties, Conventions or other international agreements;
- (b) to be likely to prejudice the Royal prerogative; or
- (c) to be repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution.

Power will be reserved to Her Majesty to disallow laws of the Uganda Legislature which alter to the injury of stockholders of Uganda Government Stock provisions of the law relating to that Stock. The Governor will be given sufficient powers under the Constitution to ensure that the obligations of Her Majesty's Government under the Agreements with the Kingdoms are carried out.

Dissolution of the National Assembly

The Governor will have power to dissolve the National Assembly. The Assembly will continue for five years unless it is dissolved earlier by the Governor. The Governor will exercise the power to dissolve the Assembly on the advice of the Prime Minister, except that—

- (a) if the Prime Minister recommends a dissolution and the Governor considers that the Government of Uganda can be carried on without a dissolution, and that dissolution would not be in the interests of Uganda, he may refuse to dissolve the Assembly;
- (b) if the Assembly passes a resolution that it has no confidence in the Government of Uganda, and the Prime Minister does

- not, within three days, either resign or advise a dissolution, the Governor may dissolve the Assembly; and
- (c) if the office of Prime Minister is vacant and the Governor considers that there is no prospect of his being able to appoint a person who can command the support of the majority of the Members of the Assembly within a reasonable time, the Governor shall dissolve the Assembly.

In the three cases specified above, the Governor will act in his discretion.

Validity of Elections and other Questions of Membership

Questions as to the validity of elections and other questions of membership of the National Assembly will be determined by the High Court of Uganda.

The Leader of the Opposition

Provision will be made for recognition, as Leader of the Opposition, of the Member of the National Assembly whom the Governor in his discretion considers to be the leader of the largest party of Members in the Assembly opposed to the Government.

THE EXECUTIVE

The Prime Minister

The Governor in his discretion will be required to invite the Member of the National Assembly who appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of the Members of the Assembly, to form a Government and to serve in the office of Prime Minister. The other Ministers will be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Prime Minister from among the Members of the National Assembly.

The Cabinet

There will be a Cabinet, which will consist of a Prime Minister and the other Ministers. The Cabinet may include the Attorney-General as a Minister if the Prime Minister so desires. The Cabinet will have the general direction and control of the Government of Uganda, and be collectively responsible to the National Assembly.

The Prime Minister will be removable by the Governor, but only if a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister has been passed by the National Assembly; the other Ministers will be removable by the Governor on the advice of the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister vacates his office, all other Ministers will also vacate their offices. The Prime Minister or a Minister will vacate office if he ceases to be a Member of the National Assembly (except upon a dissolution), or if he

resigns. After a dissolution, a Minister who is not re-elected will vacate office when the House first sits.

The Governor will be required to act on the advice of the Cabinet in the exercise of his functions, except—

- (a) functions conferred upon him in his discretion;
- (b) functions he is authorised by law to exercise without the advice of the Cabinet; or
- (c) functions exercisable on the advice or recommendation of, or after consultation with, persons or authorities other than the Cabinet.

The Cabinet will be summoned by the Prime Minister, who will preside at its meetings or appoint some other Minister to do so.

Portfolios will be assigned to Ministers by the Governor on the advice of the Prime Minister (except in relation to matters responsibility for which is assigned by the Constitution to some other person or authority).

The Governor in his discretion will have special responsibility for—

- (a) external affairs, except where authority has been delegated by Her Majesty's Government to the Uganda Government;
- (b) defence;
- (c) military forces;
- (d) internal security; and
- (e) operational control of the police force.

The Governor will have power to delegate his responsibility under the above paragraphs (d) and (e) to a Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, and will normally do so. The Governor may at any time revoke the delegation and resume full responsibility.

The Governor will be entitled to receive Cabinet papers and to be kept informed concerning the government of Uganda.

Parliamentary Secretaries

The Governor, on the advice of the Prime Minister, will have power to appoint Parliamentary Secretaries to assist Ministers.

The Attorney-General

There will be an Attorney-General, who will be the principal legal adviser to the Government; he will be appointed and removed by the Governor on the advice of the Prime Minister.

The Director of Public Prosecutions

There will be a Director of Public Prosecutions, who will be a public officer. The Director of Public Prosecutions will have power to institute criminal proceedings, and exclusive power to take over and to discontinue criminal proceedings instituted by any person; the Director's powers will extend to criminal proceedings before all

Courts. The Attorney-General will cease to have responsibility for criminal prosecutions.

Permanent Secretaries

There will be Permanent Secretaries who will supervise Departments of Government that are assigned to Ministers. The functions of the office of Permanent Secretary will be discharged by a public officer.

Prerogative of Mercy

The exercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy will be entrusted to the Governor. In capital cases, the Governor will be advised by a Committee of the Cabinet, but he will act in his own judgment in deciding whether the prerogative should be exercised in such cases.

Finance

The authority for expenditure from public funds will be an appropriation or supplementary appropriation law which, when submitted to the National Assembly, will be supported by estimates.

Provision will be made for authorising the withdrawal of money from the public funds to meet expenditure to carry on the government services if the appropriation law for a financial year is not passed before the beginning of the year.

There will be a Director of Audit, who will be a public officer. The Director of Audit will audit and report on the public accounts of the Government of Uganda, and will have access to all accounts and records for that purpose. The Director of Audit will be independent in the discharge of his functions.

The Public Service Commission

The Constitution will provide for the establishment of a Public Service Commission with executive powers; the power of appointment (including appointment on a substantive or acting basis, promotion, transfer and confirmation in appointment) and of disciplinary control (including removal from office) will be vested in the Governor acting in accordance with the recommendations of the Public Service Commission in respect of public officers other than those subject to the Judicial Service Commission or to special constitutional provisions.

There will be the following provisions for the Public Service Commission:—

- (a) the Chairman and members will be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Prime Minister;
- (b) the tenure of office of each member will be four years;
- (c) a member will be removable by the Governor after consultation with the Prime Minister only—

- (i) for inability to perform his functions by reason of infirmity of body or mind or other cause;
- (ii) for misbehaviour; or
- (iii) if circumstances arise which, if he were not already a member, would disqualify him from membership;
- (d) the pay and allowances of members will be charged on the public funds and the pay and conditions of service other than allowances will not be altered to the disadvantage of a member during his term of office;
- (e) public officers and members of the legislature will be disqualified from membership;
- (f) the Governor will, after consultation with the Public Service Commission, make regulations for giving effect to their powers, including regulations concerning the Commission's procedure, the protection and privileges of members and the privilege of communications to and from the Commission and its members.

The Constitution will provide for appointments to any office of *Permanent Secretary* to be made by the Governor after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Public Service Commission. Appointments on transfer from another office of Permanent Secretary carrying the same emoluments will be made by the Governor on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

The Constitution will provide for the *Director of Public Prosecutions* to be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. The officer appointed must have been either a barrister or solicitor or an advocate of the High Court of Uganda or of a superior court in some other part of the Commonwealth for a period of not less than ten years. The salary and allowances of the Director will be charged on the public funds and his salary and conditions of service, other than allowances, will not be altered to his disadvantage during his continuance in office. It will be open to the Governor to remove him from office if his removal has been recommended by a Tribunal of Inquiry for inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misbehaviour. There will be provision that the Governor shall be able to appoint a Tribunal of Inquiry on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. It will be open to the Prime Minister to request the Public Service Commission to make such a recommendation.

The *Director of Audit* will be appointed by the Governor and removable by him in accordance with the procedure proposed in the above paragraph for the Director of Public Prosecutions. The tenure of office and the emoluments of office of the Director of Audit will also be protected in the same way as those of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The *Inspector-General of Police* will be appointed by the Governor and removable by him in accordance with the procedure proposed

above for the Director of Public Prosecutions. The tenure of office and the emoluments of office of the Inspector-General of Police will also be protected in the same way as those of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

There will be no provision for a separate Police Service Commission. Instead the power of appointment and disciplinary control over all police officers, other than the Inspector-General of Police, will be vested in the Governor acting on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, save insofar as such powers are by law vested in the Inspector-General of Police in relation to non-gazetted ranks.

There will be provision for the Inspector-General of Police to be consulted by the Public Service Commission in connection with the exercise of its powers under above paragraph.

Conditions of Service of Public Officers

Compensation. A general scheme of compensation (the terms of which will be agreed between the United Kingdom and Uganda Governments) for permanent and pensionable expatriate officers who are members of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service or designated under the Overseas Service (Uganda) Agreement, 1961, will be introduced at the time when the Public and Judicial Service Commissions assume executive powers and the Secretary of State relinquishes his ultimate responsibility for the Public Service.

Separate proposals are already under discussion between the two Governments to provide for other overseas officers who will not be eligible for compensation on the normal basis but whose careers may be affected by the measures of localisation of the Public Service which the Uganda Government have in mind.

Pension rights. There will be provision in the Constitution for the protection of the pensions of public officers. This will ensure that the provisions governing the pensions of public officers, whether former officers, existing officers or future officers, are not altered to their disadvantage.

The appropriate Service Commission will be made responsible for all questions concerning the grant, withholding, reducing or suspending of the pension of a public officer. These provisions will apply to all pensions, compensation, and other retirement benefits due either to public officers or to the widows, dependants or legal personal representatives of deceased public officers.

There will be provision for the establishment of an Appeals Board with power to hear and determine appeals by a public officer who is an entitled officer under the compensation scheme against any decision of a Service Commission which has the effect of withholding, suspending or reducing any pension, compensation, or other retirement benefit. The Appeals Board will consist of three members, one

selected by the Prime Minister, one selected by an Association representing public officers or a professional body nominated by the officer concerned, and one selected by the two other members jointly to be Chairman of the Board.

A *Public Officer's Agreement* safeguarding the pensions and other conditions of service of overseas officers for whom the Secretary of State has a special responsibility will be concluded between the United Kingdom and Uganda Governments.

Police

There will be established by the Constitution a Uganda Police Force whose responsibilities will cover the whole of Uganda. In addition, the Uganda Legislature will have power to establish Police Forces in any of the Kingdoms or Districts, to be administered by the local Administrations.

The Uganda Police Force or any Police Force established by the Uganda Legislature will be organised and administered under a law of the Uganda Legislature and will have such powers and duties as are conferred by Uganda laws.

The Inspector-General will have the command and direction of the Uganda Police Force; he will have power to give directions to the officer in charge of any other Police Force established in Uganda as to the use and operational control of that force.

The Conference noted with approval certain detailed proposals for the establishment of an interlocking and integrated police system under which the Uganda Police Force and a number of local police forces would share joint statutory responsibility for policing the territory.

Provincial and District Administration

The Conference discussed the desirability of modifying the structure of the provincial and district administration as Uganda moves towards independence. There was general agreement that the post of Provincial Commissioner should be abolished. It was recognised that this might give rise to a need for some redefinition of administrative areas. Any proposals for such a redefinition would be a matter for discussion between the Central Government and the administrations concerned.

The Conference foresaw a continuing need for the Central Government to be represented in the area of each administration and was therefore of the opinion that the post of District Commissioner should be retained although with reduced powers and possibly under some other title. (The exact details would require further detailed consideration.) The Conference hoped that consideration would be given to a reduction in the establishment of District Officers as opportunity arose.

Emergency Powers

The Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, as amended, will continue to apply to Uganda and the powers of the Governor thereunder will be exercised by him in his discretion.

The Judiciary

There will be a High Court of Uganda consisting of the Chief Justice and such number of other judges of the court as may be fixed by law of the Uganda Legislature. The retiring age of judges will be 62 or such other age as the Uganda Legislature may determine.

The following persons will be qualified for appointment as judges of the High Court—

- (a) judges, or former judges, of courts of unlimited jurisdiction in Uganda or other parts of the Commonwealth (or of courts hearing appeals from such courts);
- (b) persons entitled to practise as advocates before a court of unlimited jurisdiction in Uganda or other parts of the Commonwealth and who have been qualified so to practise for not less than ten years.

The High Court of Uganda will have full original jurisdiction throughout Uganda, as at present, and such appellate jurisdiction as is conferred on it by law of the Uganda Legislature. It will have exclusive original jurisdiction in disputes arising under the agreements between Her Majesty's Government and the Kingdoms and also in relation to the interpretation of the Constitution; the subordinate courts will be required to refer any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution to the High Court.

Appeals from the High Court of Uganda will be to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa as at present, except that appeals on questions of interpretation of the Constitution will lie direct to the Privy Council.

Other Courts. The Legislature of Uganda may establish courts of justice in addition to the High Court for any part of Uganda and these will have the jurisdiction given to them by law.

The Uganda Government submitted to the Conference certain proposals designed to bring all persons in Uganda of whatever race under the same system of law and courts. The Conference, after studying these proposals, was of the opinion that they were a matter for consideration and decision by the Uganda Legislature.

The Constitution will provide for the establishment of a *Judicial Service Commission* with executive powers. The power of appointment (including appointment on a substantive or acting basis, promotion, transfer and confirmation in appointment) and of disciplinary control (including removal from office) will be vested in the Governor acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission (except in the

case of the removal of a Judge of the High Court) in respect of Judges, Resident Magistrates, persons presiding over any court having jurisdiction over all races, African Courts Advisers having power to inspect the working of courts, the Registrar and Deputy Registrar of the High Court, and any other officers connected with Courts prescribed by the Legislature.

The Commission will consist of :—

Chairman: The Chief Justice.

Members: A judge of the High Court appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Justice.

The Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

One other member, being a person eligible for appointment as a High Court Judge, appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Justice.

The last-mentioned member will serve for a fixed term of four years.

The Chief Justice will be appointed by the Governor in his discretion after consultation with the Prime Minister and the President of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa.

There will be provision for the Governor to remove a Judge of the High Court from his office for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehaviour. A Judge will be removable only in accordance with the following procedure which should be initiated by the Governor in his discretion or on receipt by him of representations either from the Prime Minister or from the Chief Justice. The Governor will first appoint a Tribunal consisting of three persons who hold or have held office as Judges of a Court having unlimited jurisdiction in one of Her Majesty's Dominions. If this Tribunal recommends that the question of the Judge's removal should be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and if the Judicial Committee advise that the Judge should be removed from office, the Governor shall act accordingly.

The Capital

The Capital of Uganda will be Kampala.

Official Language

The official language will be English.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

A. Buganda : The existing Buganda Agreements (except the Clan Cases Agreement, 1924) will be replaced by a new Agreement covering the period of internal self-government and a draft agreement was initialled on 9th October by the Secretary of State, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, and by the Katikiro of Buganda, on behalf of the Kabaka's Government. The principal provisions about the relationship between Uganda and Buganda will be given constitutional force in the Constitution of Uganda. Other provisions governing the relationship between the two Governments will be provided for in the Agreement. The following are the main provisions in the draft agreement:—

- (i) *Status :* Buganda's relationship with Uganda will be federal.
- (ii) *Representation in the National Assembly :* Buganda will be represented by twenty-one members elected in Buganda by direct elections unless the option of indirect elections described below is applicable. Three members will be directly elected from the constituencies in Kampala.
- (iii) *The Lukiko* will be reconstituted as follows:

Directly elected members	68
Nominees of H. H. the Kabaka	6
<i>Ex-Officio</i> members:	
(a) (Saza) Chiefs	20
(b) Ministers (elected by the Lukiko)	6
TOTAL	100

NOTE 1: The number of Ministers, at present six, will be increased but the total number of Lukiko members will remain at one hundred, i.e., any additional Ministers will be drawn from one of the other three groups of members.

NOTE 2: The directly elected members will be elected by universal adult suffrage from numerically equal constituencies and by secret ballot.

- (iv) *The option of indirect elections:* The six nominees of the Kabaka in the Lukiko, the six Ministers who are *ex-officio*

members of the Lukiko, and the directly elected members will decide by resolution whether Buganda representatives in the National Assembly will be directly elected, as elsewhere in Uganda, or whether they themselves should elect twenty-one persons to represent Buganda in the National Assembly.

- (v) *Legislative powers:* There will be lists of exclusive legislative powers for the central legislature and the Lukiko. Matters not covered in either list will be concurrent and in case of conflict central laws will prevail.
- (vi) *Courts:* There will be a Buganda High Court. It will administer the same law and be staffed by the same judges as the High Court of Uganda with which it will have concurrent jurisdiction, save in constitutional matters. The Kabaka will signify his consent to the appointment of the Judges of this Court by the new Agreement. Detailed arrangements for the lower courts in Buganda were also agreed upon.
- (vii) *Administration of services in Buganda:* Responsibility of the administration of additional services will be transferred to Buganda.
- (viii) *The towns in Buganda:* KAMPALA will be a municipality with its own Council as at present. In exercising his responsibilities in relation to Kampala, the Central Government Minister concerned will be obliged to consult a joint advisory council on which the Kabaka's Government will be represented.

ENTEBBE AND NJERU: Special arrangements will be made for these towns.

MUBENDE: The present arrangements for the urban local government of Mubende will continue, pending further discussion between the Uganda Government and the Kabaka's Government.

OTHER TOWNS: The Central Government's responsibility for urban local government in other towns in Buganda will pass to the Buganda Government. Until Buganda creates its own urban authority legislation, the present law will continue to apply.

- (ix) *Police:* In addition to the Uganda police force, there will be a Buganda police force which will have its own commander under the overall command of the Inspector-General of Police. The Governor will make no delegation of his responsibilities in respect of the operational control of the Buganda police force.

The Uganda police force will operate in Buganda.

- (x) *Finance:* Buganda will continue to receive grants from the Central Government. It will also have its own sources of revenue. There will be consultation between the two Governments about Buganda's annual estimates of revenue and expenditure. The public accounts of the Kabaka's Government will be audited by the Director of Audit and the Lukiko will establish a Public Accounts Committee.

B. The Kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro

It was agreed that the following arrangements, which will bring the Kingdoms into line with the constitutional arrangements for the rest of the country, should be made:

- (i) New Agreements between Her Majesty's Government and the Kingdoms will be negotiated.
- (ii) The provisions in these Agreements about the Rulers, the Ministers, the establishment of the Council, and the appointment of the officers and chiefs will be included in the Constitution of Uganda, and the Ruler and his Council will have exclusive power to pass measures on these matters.
- (iii) Justice in the Kingdoms will be administered in the name of the Ruler.
- (iv) The functions of the Administrations in the Kingdoms will be defined in the new Agreements and will be similar to those of the Administrations in the Districts (see below).

During internal self-government, the Governor would have powers to ensure that Her Majesty's Government's obligations under the Agreements are carried out. When the time came, he would propose that the independence constitution should provide that:

- (1) the initiative for any change in entrenched provisions about the Kingdoms must come from the Kingdom Council, and be supported by two-thirds of the Kingdom Council;
- (2) the proposal should require the support of a two-thirds majority in a referendum in the Kingdom; and
- (3) it should not take effect until confirmed by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.

C. The Local Administrations

The following arrangements were agreed upon:

- (a) The Constitution will recognise existing District Constitutional Heads, including the Kyabazinga of Busoga, and the

- right of other Districts, subject to the Governor's approval, to create similar posts,
- (b) the Constitution will provide for an Administration Council in each District, nine-tenths of whose members will be directly elected by universal suffrage, and for the Council to decide the method of selection for the other members and certain related matters,
 - (c) the Uganda Government will introduce legislation,
 - (i) permitting Councils which wish to do so to elect up to four Ministers, provided that in the opinion of the Central Government the Administration concerned is capable of supporting the expense,
 - (ii) transferring additional services to the Local Administrations, and making appropriate financial arrangements,
 - (iii) conferring certain legislative powers on the Local Administrations and providing for independent Appointments Boards.

D. Financial Relationships

It is intended that a Fiscal Commission should be established to advise the Uganda Government, particularly on its financial relationships with the other authorities. Meanwhile certain changes will be made in the tax structure to give them additional revenue and the grants structure will be adjusted to take account of this, of the transfer to the other authorities of additional services and of certain other factors. It is recognised that no authority should receive less assistance than at present, after allowance has been made for additional revenue and commitments.

E. Urban Local Government

Apart from Kampala and the other towns in Buganda mentioned in paragraph A above, there will be two classes of towns—fifteen major municipalities and towns including Jinja and Mbale, which will remain under Central Government control, and 76 smaller towns which will pass to the control of the Local Administration in whose area they are situated.

The larger towns will have their own Councils and direct elections for these Councils will be introduced as soon as is practicable. They will be given responsibility for primary and junior secondary education and certain medical services in their areas in addition to the present township services. They will also receive additional revenue.

The Central Government will decide which of the smaller towns should have Town Boards. These Boards will administer services and levy rates as agents of the Administration concerned. They will come under the Urban Authorities Ordinance.

F. Land

The greater part of the land in Uganda is Crown Land. It will be divided as follows:

- (a) the freehold of Crown Land in use by the Central Government will be transferred to a Uganda Land Commission;
- (b) the freehold of Crown Land in the larger towns will be transferred to a Land Board for the District in which the town lies, which will grant it to the urban authority on a 199-year lease;
- (c) the freehold of land in use by Government agencies such as the East African Railways and the Uganda Electricity Board will be transferred to the agency, subject, where appropriate, to financial adjustments;
- (d) the remainder will be transferred to District Land Boards to be held on behalf of the people of the district. This will include national parks, which will, however, retain their special status.

NOTE 1: Similar arrangements will be made in Buganda and the Kingdoms.

NOTE 2: Existing titles and rights of occupancy will not be affected. The 'mailo' system in Buganda will continue.

NOTE 3: The Central Government will retain the mineral rights which it holds at present (the Central Government does not own the mineral rights in 'mailo' land in Buganda).

G. Internal Boundary Disputes

- (a) *General*: The National Assembly will have power to appoint a Commission to investigate boundary disputes and make recommendations.
- (b) *The Buganda/Bunyoro Boundary*: The Secretary of State will ask the Prime Minister to appoint a Commissioner of Privy Councillors to investigate this important dispute.

H. Constitutional Amendment

It will not be possible to amend the Constitution except by an Order-in-Council.

BOOK REVIEWS

THROUGH AFRICAN DOORS : By Janheinz Jahn (Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1962, Pp. 232, 30 s.).

Even though the world is shrinking fast for those that are able to travel, a good travelogue is always of vivid interest to the vast majority who are not. *Through African Doors* is, however, more than a travelogue; it is a racy account of the author's journeys in Nigeria and Togo. Despite the fact that the comforts of modern civilization are in evidence in many parts of this area, Mr. Jahn seems to have preferred the hard way of travelling—by hired bicycles, on jam-packed buses, hiking in the hot sun, sleeping on floors—without the benefit of a mosquito net—eating African food prepared local fashion, drinking palm wine—in short, doing everything that a European traveller in this region is not supposed to do. But it has given him an opportunity of getting behind the facade that westernized Africa presents. He has moved amongst peasants and princes and learnt something of the age-old traditions and customs which were derided by westerners only a few years ago. Those very traditions and customs have now been proved to have been firmly founded on certain evolutionary factors which, of necessity, have become surrounded by an aura of religious belief.

This region still has its 'chiefs', but most of them are elected. The system also prevailed, it might be remembered, in India of the past when kings used to be elected. The author's description of his visits to various African monarchs may well apply, with certain changes in names and places, to similar scenes in the capitals of the Indian States in the latter half of the nineteenth century. There is a fine description of the elaborate funeral ceremonies which are reminiscent of the old customs based on the ancestor cult where death was only a door to a new world.

The author, from time to time, has mentioned the economic independence of Yoruba women; but he has not touched on their matrilineal society which makes it possible. There is no dearth of schools, and even a small village with some 15,000 inhabitants can boast of as many as nine. In the schools in West Africa there are two systems of education followed—the French and the English. Neither of them is a mere carbon copy of the European systems, but is so devised as to fit in with "the requirements of modern life and traditions of African culture".

As in India, society is sharply divided into two sections; the smaller highly westernized one; and the other just emancipated from its agelong superstition and penury. The people are religious but not sectarian. The author's host, for instance, suggested his going to the Christian Mission Society where the service was in English; to the Baptist church where it is in 'Ibo' and then to the Assemblies of God where they could have dancing. The host also told him that he had gone to early mass in a Roman Catholic church. By way of explanation, the host said, "We are good Christians. And all churches are good." "African religion," says the author, "knows many gods." The way the simple mind of the African works in matters of faith is well illustrated in the author's description of the 'Holy Chapel of Wisdom' and the 'Dancing of Jehovah's Witnesses.' Says the author, "From the full churches of the European Missions stations more and more 'African' churches are splitting off. The object of worship may be Christ or the Lord, but the style is highly reminiscent of the worship of the old African gods. The numerous Protestant sects are becoming more and more splintered, more and more Africanised, and they are the ones which enjoy most popularity." The author quotes Balandier reporting on the break-down of a Roman Catholic mission in which he says, "In their ceremonies they mix up everything together, their fetishes, their fits of possession and then the prayers they have stolen from us, the gestures picked up from the priests, their processions imitating ours. They no longer want to hear anything of us as God's interpreters; they say that we alone reap the fruits of our intercession. You can feel the will to isolate us and weaken us. It is the voice of the troublesome which says, 'The missionaries have killed our religion. We must make ourselves a new one. The Catholic religion does not fit us. It has made us give up all our customs. We no longer know whether we are Bakongos, Basundis, or Balaris.' They have now got new messiah chiefs amongst them. They are Matewa Andre and Simon Kimbangu, who they say have suffered for the blacks, while Jesus suffered only for the whites. The new formula is 'In the name of the Father and of Matewa Andre and of Simon Kimbangu.'"

From the author's description it must now be obvious that Africa has changed and is changing, the change is only superficial and confined to economic and political matters; but the eternal Africa with its centuries-old traditions, customs and beliefs still remains formidably firm. The African has only found in science a hand-maiden and an aid for material development but the author feels he has not given himself up to Christianity except on the surface.

Though the author has given a lucid expose of the impact of Christianity on the African in the Western region, he has not touched on the impact of Islam. Over a half of the total population of Nigeria is in Northern Nigeria and follows Islam. It would have been of

interest to the reader if the author had touched upon it.

However, the book will prove interesting to those who need a first introduction to Western Africa and its people.

G. B.

THE KENYATTA ELECTION: By George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg (Oxford University Press, London, Pp. 230).

The year 1960 was the 'year of Africa'. In this year several African countries shook off the yoke of colonialism and emerged as independent States. Kenya, like other East and Central African territories, did not gain independence in 1960. Nor has it gained it even now. But the year 1960 marked a turning point in the course of the future political development of Kenya. Hitherto, there had been talk of Kenya being an area of white dominance or being ultimately a multi-racial State. The white settlers in Kenya still had a lingering hope that the supremacy and dominance which they had enjoyed for long would continue. But in the year 1960 all these hopes were shattered. The Constitution of Kenya which emerged from the Lancaster House Conference pointed towards new horizons over the Kenyan political scene. Kenya was not to remain an area of white dominance. Nor was it to be a multi-racial State. Instead, it was now clear that Kenya was to become a State where the Africans would rule.

The Kenyatta Election is a study of the elections held in pursuance of this Constitution and is the result of a combined effort of a British historian and an American political scientist. The title is likely to give the impression that the book deals with the election of Jomo Kenyatta. Actually Jomo Kenyatta was under detention and not among the candidates contesting the elections. The authors seem to have chosen this title because the release of Jomo Kenyatta was one of the two major election cries, the other being freedom, of both the African political parties, KANU and KADU. Both the parties demanded the release of Kenyatta and both went to the electorate with a pledge that if they were installed in power they would strive for the release of Kenyatta. Much of the election activity and issues, therefore, revolved round Kenyatta.

The book is divided into three parts, followed by appendices, bibliography, index, two maps and a number of photographs. Part I consists of three chapters which deal with the background. Chapters I and II give an interesting account of the evolution of African political organisations, beginning from the first political organisation ever established by the Africans, to the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference held in early 1960. Chapter III deals with the developments during the period between the return of the delegates from the Lancaster House Conference and the holding of elections. It is mainly devoted to the study of the establishment of the election machinery

and covers subjects like the constituencies, absentee voting, registration of voters, methods of voting and the primary percentage—the percentage of votes which the candidates contesting the reserved seats had to obtain from their own community before they could qualify to contest on the common roll. Part II which consists of two chapters deals with the election campaigns for the various classes of seats like the Reserved Seats, European Seats, Asian Seats, Unopposed Seats, etc. Part III is devoted to the analysis of the post-election period till the formation of the Government by KADU, which had emerged in the elections as a minority party.

The election solved no problems and the political situation in Kenya has become even more complicated. KADU, contrary to its election pledges to the electorate, has disowned the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta and has even become his opponent. Yet the election, combined with the Lancaster House Constitution (1960), heralded an era of African dominance in Kenya. An exhaustive and scientific study of the election was much needed; the book under review, containing an excellent analysis of the elections, fulfils this need.

V. P. LUTHERA

INDIA AND AFRICA

“India can give you good ideas. It can give you books of universal worth. The Commerce between India and Africa will be of ideas and services, not of manufactured goods against raw materials after the fashion of Western exploiters. Then, India can offer you the spinning wheel. If I had discovered it when I was in South Africa, I would have introduced it among the Africans who were my neighbours in Phoenix. You can grow cotton, you have ample leisure and plenty of manual skill. You should study and adopt the lesson of the village crafts we are trying to revive. Therein lies the key to your salvation.”

(Gandhi to West Africans, *Harijan*, 24.2.1946.)

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This feature is presented, every quarter, by the Research Section, Indian Council for Africa, with the object of providing a list of recent publications on Africa. It is hoped that this will be helpful to those who are specially interested in the study of African affairs. Most of this literature is available in the Council's library.

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MASKS AND MASTER RACES

by

ROGER McHUGH

The tapestry of Irish history, like that of Africa, is shot through with the red thread of imperialism. "Charity begins at home," wrote Casement of the Congo; "imperialism begins in other men's homes. Both may cover a multitude of sins."

For us the real impact of imperialism began at the end of the seventeenth century when the loose Irish clan system, divided against itself, went down before the organised feudal system of England. In the eighteenth century, conquest, expropriation and settlement imposed the domination of an English faction and Ireland was governed by an 'Irish Parliament' consisting solely of colonists. The growth of liberal and humanitarian principles in that body was frustrated by its enforced incorporation into the Imperial Parliament in 1801. The nineteenth century saw the rise of an Irish democracy and the increased influence of the Irish parliamentary members elected to Westminster, but the frustration of the first by coercion and of the second by the overthrow of Parnell strengthened the Irish movement for complete independence. Our final revolution of 1916 swung the people behind it and our present degree of freedom resulted from it.

I mention these facts not in order to sentimentalise about them, as our politicians sometimes tend to do, but because they help explain certain attitudes of mind which link us with Africans and so help introduce my theme. Having been on the receiving end of colonialism, the Irish people as a whole are against it. They know the hates it arouses, the barriers it erects, the glib justifications it advances; for example, the argument that the subject race is not fit for self-government and will not know what to do with independence if and when it gets it. I have seen many English pamphlets and articles advancing this argument against Ireland in the nineteenth century, as it has been and still is being advanced in this century by various colonial powers in Africa. One pamphlet which I have in mind contained a drawing of three heads: that of an African, that of an Englishman and that of an Irishman. The Englishman had calm, classic, regular features shining with intelligence. The African and the Irishman were both depicted with stupid, ape-like features; the only difference between them was that one was coloured black, the other white. This was supposed to point the moral that neither of these sub-human types belonged to the Master Race whose eternal destiny was to rule over them. For me it pointed in another direction: clearly the idea of the Master Race was not invented by Hitler; it is the mask assumed by all colonial powers.

In this connection, I recall reading about the same time a book on India by an English conservative writer, in which the same argument was advanced on the grounds that only one per cent of the Indian population was literate. The idea that this could be a reflection on the rulers, not on the ruled, never seemed to have entered the writer's mind. Yet today one hears similar arguments advanced in Rhodesia or in South Africa and another behaviour-pattern of colonialism is discerned. The native race or races which you are exploiting must not be allowed full access to education, for education means power. Having refused to educate them, you then refuse them access to political power, on the ground that they are not sufficiently educated to exercise it.

Of all forms of education, the Master Race, be it English, Portuguese or Belgian, fears education in law most of all. For, knowledge of the law often leads to the challenge of arbitrary power. In his famous speech on Conciliation with America, Burke ranks the American education in law as being among the important components of the American spirit of liberty in 1775. Their lawyers, he wrote, "augur misgovernment at a distance and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze." The foundation of Irish republican thinking was laid by Wolfe Tone, a barrister, about the same time, and successive Irish independence movements up to the 1916 Rising, which was led by Patrick Pearse, also a barrister, have owed much to this form of education. It is true that such leaders were often executed by the English or transported to some far-off country just as if they had no education in law at all, but as one observes the repetition of such a procedure in Africa, another pattern becomes clear. It is the pretence that such leaders are a variety of things: agitators, trouble-makers, fanatics, anything but men who have studied law that they may assert their own people's rights. This pretence may be called the mask of the Educated Gaoler.

Perhaps to an African, as to an Irishman, the most irritating mask of the Master Race is that of the Peace Preserver: an unctuous mask, whose lofty expression and resolute air betoken that its wearer, bravely shouldering the White Man's Burden, is remaining in the occupied country mainly to preserve it from civil strife. "Once depart," it seems to proclaim, "and the natives will be at one another's throats." Ireland has seen this mask, too; indeed, when she won part of her freedom, six of her counties were partitioned on this basis and have remained governed by *colons* ever since. In the Common Market, I do not think that this partition will last, but its prototype may be seen in Africa in the senseless federation of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias and in the cooperation of Sir Roy Welensky and Mr. Tshombe; of which curious pair it may be said that "Black is black and white is white, and never the twain shall meet, except in opposition to majority rule."

Lastly, we may notice another mask: the mask of Artificial Prosperity. Ireland saw it in the eighteenth century, when the majority of her people, devoid of any political power and exploited by a ruthless landlord class,

lived at starvation level. The landlords and their parliamentary representatives boasted that Ireland was prosperous because rents were high and land was dear. In Ireland at that time lived Jonathan Swift, Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin. Swift was of colonial stock but he had a sense of values and knew the wretched condition of the people. "There is not one argument used to prove the riches of Ireland," he wrote, "which is not a logical demonstration of its poverty. The rise of our rents is squeezed out of the very blood and vitals and clothes and dwellings of the tenants, who live worse than English beggars." To him the state of the people was the true index of prosperity.

I have not far to go for an African analogy. The September number of the series 'Report on the State of South Africa,' prepared by the Department of Information, South African Embassy, London, begins with the following words:

An Expanding Economy

South Africa has entered her second year as a republic with her economy as strong and resilient as ever. Buoyancy has returned after the setback of 18 months ago and the rate of growth is quickening in most sections. So much so, that there is talk of a new boom. Gold and foreign reserves have reached their highest level for 15 years. Exports are setting new records. So is the balance of payments on current account. . .

Doubtless, buoyancy has also returned to the police-force, arrests are setting new records and a new boom in apartheid may be expected, but there is no mention of such progress. Truly, as Wilde observed, a cynic is one who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.

Today these masks are wearing thin. Like tissue paper over a skull, they cannot disguise the lineaments of death. Liberal opinion in England and all over the world is seeing through them and the patient and persistent pressure of the free African peoples and of their supporters in the United Nations must have its effect. Some years ago, I heard Professor Arnold Toynbee say in Rome that the colonial powers had now no alternative but to resign gracefully from a situation which is no longer tenable. The English, an adaptable and expedient race, appear to have begun to act on this principle. Let us hope that the other colonial powers in Africa will do likewise.

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA UNDER THE MANDATORY SYSTEM

by

ANSU KUMAR DATTA

I

In discussing the present impasse over the question of South-West Africa, one often tends to forget its background. It is easy, for instance, to overlook the fact that although the Union Government has consistently refused to place the Territory under the Trusteeship System, it is the same Government which administered it as a mandate for more than two decades. We awake, so to say, to the fact that one fine morning late in 1946, General Smuts put forward to the United Nations the South African Government's demand for incorporation of the Territory as the fifth province of the Union. A look at the mandatory period of South-West Africa's history shows conclusively that this demand was neither sudden nor premature, but was rather the climax of a long-drawn-out process. It also indicates at the same time why such a process, without having been intercepted earlier, was allowed to continue and gather momentum. From another angle, the study of the mandatory period throws light on the extent to which the Union Government fulfilled its obligations under the Covenant and other international agreements—a consideration which will naturally introduce the question of the supervisory role of the League Council and the Permanent Mandates Commission over such an administration. To put it briefly, the mandatory regime of South-West Africa may usefully be treated to give us an insight into the following matters:

- (i) the state of affairs between the defeat of the annexationists at the Paris Peace Conference and the 1946 request for incorporation;
- (ii) the Union Government's international obligations and the so-called 'native policy' pursued by it to fulfil such obligations; and
- (iii) international supervision over the mandatory administration.

In the present essay, however, attention will mainly be focussed on the first item.

II

Everybody knows that the arrangement for C class mandate status for South-West Africa was a compromise between the extension of the principle of self-determination to the colonial peoples and the claims for

outright annexation.

Lloyd George asserted the principle of self-determination at Glasgow as early as June 29, 1917. It was reaffirmed in the House of Commons in December the same year and on January 5, 1918. On the latter occasion, he said, *inter alia*,

"With regard to the German colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a Conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. None of these territories are inhabited by Europeans. The governing consideration, therefore, in all these cases must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or governments. . . The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of occupied European territories."¹

However, the leading Dominions had little interest in the principle of self-determination and clamoured for the *de jure* recognition of the ex-German colonies as their possessions: Australia for New Guinea, New Zealand for Western Samoa and the Union of South Africa for South-West Africa. Smuts, who is said to be the father of the Mandates System, in his Draft for the League Constitution expected the League to become the reversionary in the broadest sense of the liquidated empires.² As a general rule, his preference was for mandatory administration rather than annexation. But he was careful to add, "the application of this principle varies considerably according to the stage of civilisation or capacity for government at which the particular countries are arrived."³

Smuts was more specific elsewhere. Lloyd George very succinctly remarks, "As the time approached for deciding whether the Mandate principle should be incorporated in the Treaty, and if so in what form . . . General Smuts, one of the authors of the project, would have none of it in so far as the German colony adjacent to the territory of the South African Union (i.e., South-West Africa) was concerned. In this attitude, he had the whole-hearted support of General Botha."⁴

Smuts did not think that South-West Africa was in the same category as the other German possessions in Africa. Being a desert country suitable for stock-raising, it could only be developed from within the Union itself.⁵

Faced with similar demands voiced earlier, the Imperial War Cabinet had unanimously recommended in March 1917 that the Dominions should be allowed to annex the adjacent German territories as compensation for

1. Temperley, H.W.V. (ed), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. II: The Settlement with Germany (London-1920), P. 227.

2. Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London-1938), Pp. 622-23.

3. *Ibid.*, P. 623.

4. *Ibid.*, P. 515. See also Temperley, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, Pp. 350-61.

5. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, P. 520.

their sacrifices during the war. The result was that Lloyd George, in his private conversations with President Wilson's personal representative, Colonel House, supported the claims of the Union of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, maintaining as an argument of last resort that "unless this was done, Great Britain would be confronted by a revolution in these dominions".⁶ Later, at the Peace Conference, when the question of the German Colonies was being considered, Lloyd George came out with a new argument. In his own words, "German South-West Africa was contiguous to the territories of the Union. There was no real boundary, and unless the Dutch and British population of South Africa undertook the colonisation of this area, it would remain in wilderness. If the Union were given the charge of German South-West Africa in the capacity of a mandatory, there would be in a territory, geographically one, two forms of administration. It was questionable whether any advantage would be derived from this division capable of outweighing its practical difficulties."⁷

Stripped of non-essentials, the arguments advocated for the annexation of South-West Africa by the Union statesmen and their friends may be summed up as follows:

(i) The Union of South Africa was in actual possession of the Territory.

(ii) South-West Africa should be given as a compensation for the sacrifices made by the Union of South Africa during the war.

(iii) The Territory is contiguous to the Union and there is no natural boundary between them. The two countries, so to say, constitute one geographical entity.

(iv) South-West Africa is poor in natural resources and can be developed only with outside assistance. The Union of South Africa is most favourably placed to perform this job. But this could not be done under a mandate administration because that would introduce 'two forms of administration' in a country (that is, comprising South-West Africa and the Union of South Africa) which is 'geographically one'.

(v) One more argument for the British support of the annexation proposal was that the European opinion in South Africa was so much convinced of the justification of the merger, that its non-fulfilment would have led to a "revolution" in the Union.

A closer look at the above arguments will expose their sterile logic.

(i) In the first place, all former colonies of Germany and Turkey were under the actual possession of the Allied Powers. If such a state of affairs did not concede acquisitive rights to other countries, there is no reason why it should in the case of the Union of South Africa alone.

6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Department of State Publications, 1942-1947, Washington), Vol. 1, Pp. 407-08, Quoted by R. N. Chowdhuri, *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff-1955), P. 46.

7. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, P. 517.

(ii) & (iv) How can a poor country like South-West Africa be a compensation? Since the Territory was claimed as compensation there was actually no guarantee that the Union Government would spend money on its development. This suspicion was well confirmed later.

(iii) Contiguity is undoubted. This does not, however, make the two countries one unit. Even if they are geographically one, political and geographical boundaries have rarely coincided in Africa. And European Powers are themselves guilty of a callous disregard of its necessity.

(v) One cannot expect the whole world to sacrifice a much publicized and valuable principle simply because its implementation may lead to a 'revolution' in one country.

However, despite the sterility of the logic, it remains an undisputed fact that South Africa did want to grab the Territory. What made the Union interested in South-West Africa, a barren and semi-desert country with limited natural resources? In the first place, some areas in the Territory had already under the German rule proved suitable for Europeans colonisation. For a country believing in the necessity and desirability of permanent European settlement, this was an attraction of no mean importance. But above all, South Africa's colour-conscious leaders probably thought that the larger the area under the direct control of the Europeans in Africa, the greater was their chance of maintaining a privileged existence. Hence the all-out bid for the incorporation of the Territory.

But the anti-annexationists, on the other hand, were ill-prepared to yield. They found their champion in President Wilson for whom "no sacrifice was too great" for ensuring the introduction of a genuine mandatory principle. A backward march to the *status quo ante*, he argued, would make the League 'a laughing stock'.

After long deliberations, the annexationists were ultimately defeated and Germany renounced all her rights in her former colonies to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers⁸ on whom devolved the task of selecting mandatories. It is not generally known that a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers attended by representatives of the U.K., France, Italy, Japan and the U.S.A., decided on May 7, 1919, that South-West Africa was to be administered as a 'B' Mandate by the Union of South Africa.⁹ This was vigorously opposed by Smuts and other South African statesmen. After some bargaining by both sides, the formula for 'C' Mandates was accepted as a compromise.

III

A look at the Covenant provisions for 'C' Mandates reveals that the

8. Hence the transfer of German rights was not to the League of Nations.

9. The same meeting also recommended the status of 'B' Mandate for Samoa to be administered by New Zealand.
Temperley, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, P. 503. See also Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, P. 550.

defeat of the annexationists was far from decisive—a fact which is corroborated by the later history of South-West Africa. As is well known, compared to 'A' and 'B' Mandates, the administering authorities of 'C' Mandates were provided with much wider powers under the Covenant. An examination of the peculiar features of the Mandate of South-West Africa emanating from the Covenant (under Articles 22 and 23) as well as the Mandate Agreement (between His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Union Government, and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers) may not be altogether out of place here.

In the first place, Art. 22 of the Covenant empowered the Union to govern the mandated Territory as an 'integral portion' of the Union. Likewise, Art. 2 of the Mandate Agreement very clearly laid down: "The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may require." It is significant that at the Peace Conference an amendment was moved to change the above phrase into 'as if an integral portion of the mandatory Power'. But the Conference ultimately rejected the amendment. It is on the basis of this that Smuts later argued in the South African Parliament: "We, therefore, have the power to govern South-West Africa actually as an integral portion of the Union. Under these circumstances, I maintain . . . that it will never be necessary for us . . . to annex South-West Africa." And earlier, "The Mandate for me is enough, and it should be enough for the Union. It gives the Union such complete power of sovereignty, not only administrative but legislative, that we need not ask for anything more."¹⁰

The Covenant also modified the original Smuts-Wilson proposals under which the League would have had the right of allocating mandates as also the right of changing a mandatory power in case of a breach of mandate. But, as we have noted earlier, the right of allocation was vested finally in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, while the right to change a mandatory power was not even mentioned in the Covenant. According to Quincy Wright, this modification was due to "the insistence of the British Dominions that their *de facto* possession be immediately legitimized."¹¹

Again, a rudiment of the right to self-determination is discernible in Art. 22 where it is said that, in the selection of administering authorities of 'A' Mandates, the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants will be taken into consideration. But no such principle was extended to 'C' Mandates. It may be argued that the inhabitants of the latter were not capable of expres-

10. Quoted by Van Rees in the Permanent Mandates Commission. *Minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission* (hereafter referred to as PMC): 9th Session (1926), 5th Meeting, P. 34.

11. Wright, *Q. Mandates under the League of Nations* (The University of Chicago Press-1930), P. 34.

sing their opinion on the subject. The relative backwardness of these territories was indeed a fact. But this did not prevent Mr. Lloyd George from remarking, "The natives (of the former German Colonies) live in their various tribal organisations under Chiefs and Councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal. The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of occupied European territories."¹²

Another modification of the original Smuts-Wilson proposals was the failure of the Covenant to recommend the 'open door' policy for 'C' Mandates. It seems rather odd that such a provision should have been made for 'B' Mandates alone to the exclusion of the other two types. It has been argued, however, that as far as South-West Africa was concerned, given the existing set-up in the Union, the application of the principle of equality of commercial treatment would have raised certain practical difficulties. South Africa along with the High Commission Territories (i.e., Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland) and a large part of Rhodesia were included in a customs union which gave preferential treatment to British products. The introduction of the 'open door' would have necessitated the establishment of a separate customs system for South-West Africa alone. Some have pointed out that this course would have been difficult and wasteful: difficult because of the long uninhabited boundary zone, and wasteful because, purely in terms of economic benefit, the profits from such a system would not have been commensurate with the expenditure involved. Again, the non-inclusion of South-West Africa in the existing customs union was opposed on the ground that the slight economic interests of the other nations in a poor and backward country like South-West Africa did not warrant a revolutionisation of the fiscal system of the Union as a whole.¹³ As a matter of fact, even when the War was in progress, the majority of the British and Dominion statesmen at the War Conference (March 21—April 27, 1917) "insisted on striking while the preferential iron was heating after these many years, and resolved that having due regard to the interests of our Allies, the Empire must make itself self-supporting in the matter of food supplies, raw materials, and essential industries, and encourage Empire migration."¹⁴

The adoption of the 'open door' would in addition have meant the opening of the door of immigration impartially to all nations. This would imply permitting immigration of non-Europeans in South-West Africa, now for administrative purposes 'an integral portion' of the Union

12. Temperley, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, P. 227.

13. See Temperley, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Pp. 235-26.

14. Papers regarding Imperial War Conference, Parl. Pap. 1917-18, XXIII (Cd. 8566), (Cd. 8673), P. 114.
Quoted by Eric A. Walker, "South Africa and the Empire", in *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. VIII (Cambridge at the University Press-1936), P. 752.

Appellate Division) had the opportunity of examining the relations between the Union and the Mandated Territory in the case of *Rex vs. Christian*.

The case arose out of the Bondelzwart rebellion of 1923 and the question placed before the Court was whether the degree of the Union authority in South-West Africa was such as to justify a prosecution for treason. The Court held that inhabitants of South-West Africa were supposed to owe a certain allegiance to the Mandatory Power, and were, therefore, liable for high treason under the Roman-Dutch common law. This verdict in itself is no support for the view that the Union Government possessed sovereignty over South-West Africa, as, other States too may prosecute non-nationals for high treason. In the U.S.A., for instance, treason laws are applicable to domiciled aliens.¹⁹ The judges actually differed on this point. Chief Justice Innis, Judge Solomon and Judge Kotze were of opinion that the mandatory government was not sovereign but had the power to punish treason, while Justices De Villiers and Wessels seemed to have attributed limited sovereignty to the Union Government.²⁰

The South African annexationists, however, claimed that the Court's verdict had vindicated their standpoint. During the parliamentary debate over the boundary agreement between the Union and Portugal, the Prime Minister referred to the above verdict. According to him, it laid down that the majesty or sovereignty over South-West Africa resided neither in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, nor in the League of Nations, nor in the British Empire, but in the Government of the Union of South Africa which had full powers of administration and legislation (only limited in certain definite respects by the Mandate).²¹

Later, the Cape Court, in affirming the above verdict, said that the conviction could not be treated as a foreign judgment. Neither could it be disregarded by the other South African Courts in view of the close relations existing between the Union and South-West Africa by virtue of the Mandate and because of the fact that the conviction had been in respect of a matter which was also considered to be a crime in the Union.²²

In another case, *Jacobus vs. Rex*, arising out of the same Bondelzwart revolt, the Supreme Court extended its qualified support to the view that the locus of sovereignty over South-West Africa was the Mandatory Power. "The Government of South Africa," said the Court, "did not possess sovereignty, the League of Nations is not a state, owns no terri-

19. Wright, *op. cit.*, P. 524.

20. *Ibid.*, Pp. 425-27.

21. May, *op. cit.*, P. 401.

22. See the Prime Minister's Speech in the South African House of the Assembly on March 11, 1927. *Union of South Africa: Debates of the House of Assembly*, Vol. VIII, (Cape Town), Col. 1324.

The case has been summarized by Mackenzie in *British Yearbook of International Law*, 1925, Pp. 211-29 and in *Annual Digest*, 1923-24, case No. 12.

See also Mathews in *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, 3rd Series, 6(1924), Pp. 245-54, and Emmet, *Ibid.* 9 (1927), P. 117.

tory, governs no subjects, and is not endowed with the attribute of sovereignty and since Germany did not cede to all or any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, none could claim sovereignty. . . The Union of South Africa did, however, possess internal sovereignty which permitted it to exercise jurisdiction over Christians."²³

The matter came conspicuously to the notice of the League, after the Union Government had concluded a boundary agreement with Portugal in 1926. The Preamble (2nd para) of the Treaty included the following passage: "And whereas under a mandate issued by the Council of the League of Nations in pursuance of Art. 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Government of the Union of South Africa, subject to the terms of the said mandate (South-West Africa), possesses sovereignty over the territory of South-West Africa (hereinafter referred to as the Territory) lately under the sovereignty of Germany; . . ."²⁴

The publication of this agreement led very naturally to a heated controversy. The Permanent Mandates Commission in its 11th report to the League Council sought clarification on this point as to whether the term "possesses sovereignty" meant only the right to exercise full powers of administration and legislation in the Territory under the terms of the Mandate and the Covenant, or whether it implied that the Union Government regarded itself as being sovereign over the Territory itself. To this the Union Government sent a reply which, in the words of Mr. Van Rees, was, "to say the least of it, enigmatic".²⁵ Repeated requests were made to explain the use of the term. The Council of the League exchanged notes with the Union Government with this end in view. But no satisfactory answer was available. The Permanent Mandates Commission, in its Report to the League Council on the work of the 15th session of the Commission, noted "with regret that, in spite of all its previous discussions on this subject, and all the correspondence exchanged between the Council of the League of Nations and the Government of the Union of South Africa in 1927 and 1928, it has never received an explicit answer to its repeated question on the meaning attached by that Government to the term 'full sovereignty' used to define the legal relations existing between the mandatory power and the territory under its mandate."²⁶

Legally and logically, it is difficult to accept the view that the sovereignty over a mandate is vested in the Mandatory Power. Historically speaking, the former sovereign authority, Germany, renounced her rights in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. It is they who

23. Quoted from *Journal of International Law*, Vol. XVIII, Pp. 306-08, by Logan, R.W., "The Operation of the Mandate System in Africa," in *Journal of Negro History*, XIII, Oct. 1928. P. 433.

24. Agreement between the Government of the Union of the South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Portugal in relation to the Boundary between the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa and Angola (A. 38, 1926, VI), P. 2.

25. Minutes of the PMC, 15th Session (1929), 9th Meeting. P. 77.

26. Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the work of the 15th Session of the PMC (Annex. 20 of Minutes), P. 294.

allocated the ex-German colonies for being administered under mandatory rule. The nature of such rule is, on its part, determined by the Covenant and the Mandate Agreement which lay down certain conditions to be observed by the mandatory power under the supervision of the League Council and Permanent Mandates Commission. The logical inconsistency of the South African claim can best be shown by quoting Van Rees, the Dutch Vice-Chairman of the PMC. "If," said the eminent jurist, "the theory that the mandatory state is the holder of sovereignty is accepted, a very surprising conclusion would then be reached. For, in this case, we must inevitably conclude that the mandatory Power will be governing a part of its own territory, not by its own sovereign right but rather on behalf of the League of Nations."²⁷

The question, who then is sovereign, has been variously answered. Van Rees and Rappard were of opinion that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were sovereign. Lauterpacht held that the League had the ultimate sovereignty. Some argued that the inhabitants of the mandated territory retained their sovereign rights. Corbett advocated a subtler idea of divided sovereignty between the mandatory and the League Council. A more sophisticated theory was advanced by Campbell Lee, according to whom the sovereignty of a mandated area was in suspense pending the creation of a new state.

In the present paper, no attempt has been made to find out the loci of sovereignty in mandates. This is an academic headache of jurists, academic because subsequent events have made the legal aspect of the question less relevant. Today, all 'A' and most 'B' Mandates are independent States. And even, Western Samoa, a 'C' Mandate like South-West Africa, has emerged free. The Union Government, in face of almost universal opposition outside, is proceeding with its plan of closer integration between the Union and South-West Africa, although the International Court of Justice clearly has said that it has no power to change unilaterally the mandated status of the Territory. However, in the League period, the sovereignty question did raise some lively controversy. But even then in the atmosphere of ambiguity and confusion created by the Covenant and so many divergent theories, Beelaerts Van Blokland, the Dutch delegate, in his report to the League Council in 1927, raised the matter from legal hair-splitting and observed that the relationship between the administering Powers and the mandated territories was something new in international law. Hence the use of the current term "sovereignty" would be inappropriate to denote such a relationship. More or less the same view was expressed by Sir Arnold McNair of the International Court of Justice in 1950. "The doctrine of sovereignty has no application to this new system (Trusteeship) . . . What matters . . . is not where sovereignty lies, but what are the rights and duties of the Man-

27. Minutes of the PMC, III Session 1922, Annex. 2, P. 200. Quoted by Chowdhuri, *op. cit.*, P. 232.

datory in regard to the territory being administered by it. The answer to that question depends on the international agreement creating the system and the rule of law they attract."²⁸

All the same, the fact remains that the Union Government did claim sovereign rights over South-West Africa. And in view of the earlier annexation move and its virtual achievement in the post-World War II period, the sovereignty claim can hardly be taken as an isolated instance of the Union Government's interest in abstract legal debates.

V

A question related to sovereignty is the status of the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory in international as also in the constitutional law of the mandatory Power. The South-West African Advisory Council in 1922 suggested the grant of Union nationality to all European residents who desired it. This was implemented in 1924 by the South-West African Naturalization of Aliens Act which extended the South African Naturalization Act of 1910 to the European population of the Territory. But the status of the indigenous population was never precisely defined.

- (i) The terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the Covenant and the Mandate suggested that inhabitants of "B" & "C" Mandates were not permitted to take part in military service outside the mandated territories for purposes other than necessary defence;
- (ii) they were assured of freedom of conscience and religion, protection from slave, arms, and liquor trade;
- (iii) they were entitled to diplomatic protection of the mandatory Power while abroad;
- (iv) protection of life and property was guaranteed to them;
- (v) they had the right to petition the League for redress of grievances.

The distinctive nature of the status of indigenous populations was, however, emphasised by the League Council in its resolution of April 23, 1923. The resolution said *inter alia*:

- (a) the status of indigenous people of a mandate was distinct from that of the nationals of the administering country;
- (b) they were not necessarily invested with the nationality of the mandatory Power merely by virtue of the protection extended to them;
- (c) it would be desirable to designate those who received such protection by some kind of descriptive title, indicating their status in the mandate;
- (d) individuals might voluntarily obtain naturalization from the administering power.²⁹

As far as the European residents of South-West Africa were concerned,

28. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on South-West Africa, 1950, Pp. 148-49.

29. Wright, *op. cit.*, P. 527.

the fourth recommendation (d) was, as mentioned earlier, provided by the South-West African Naturalization of Aliens Act (1924). Henceforth, the Union Government consistently asserted that any inhabitant of the mandated Territory who wanted to take part in its administration, must be a Union national, maintaining, in addition, that Union naturalization laws were open to them.³⁰ Whatever the logic behind this statement, it had obviously two ends in view:

- i. to establish some kind of identity between the status of the inhabitants of South-West Africa and that of the Union citizens;
- ii. to deny the legal basis (under the existing set-up) of any demand to associate Africans with the administration of the Territory. This was subtly done by making the naturalization laws applicable only to the European residents.

Such an attitude was criticised by Rappard and Van Asbeck among others. The former remarked that the above arrangement "would culminate, not in the self-government of the territory as an independent unit, but in annexation pure and simple".³¹ Van Asbeck suggested the consideration of mandate citizenship when Africans would sufficiently advance for active participation in the administration. If even at that stage the existing arrangement continued, it would lead to a curious result. "The Council resolution of 1923 would forbid making acquisition of the nationality of the mandatory Power, in this case the South African Union, a pre-requisite for the exercise of political rights by the native population. The aim of the 1923 resolution would thereby be wholly defeated."³²

The doubts and fears expressed by them came true in 1946, when Smuts requested UN recognition of South-West Africa as the fifth province of the Union. One of his arguments was that his suggestion had the unanimous support of the South-West African Assembly. Now, such a thing could take place because due to the applicability of the naturalization laws exclusively to the European population, only they could take part in elections, a fact that resulted in the constitution of an all-European Assembly. Measures for defining the status of the inhabitants of the Territory were thus geared to the ultimate goal of territorial incorporation.

VI

The legal questions of sovereignty and the status of the indigenous inhabitants did not altogether monopolise the attention of the Permanent Mandates Commission. In its third session, the operation of the railways and ports in the Territory and the South-West African Railways and Harbours Act, 1922 came to be reviewed. The Act laid down that the railways and harbours of the Territory had been vested in the Union "in full dominium". In reply to a question put by Van Rees, the spokes-

30. Minutes of the PMC, 36th Session, 2nd Meeting, Pp. 17-18.

31. *Ibid.*, P. 19.

32. *Ibid.*, P. 18.

man of the Union, Major Herbst, said that the railways and ports of the mandated Territory "had become the property of the Union".³³ When the Chairman asked whether the Union Government owned them as the Government of South Africa or as a mandatory Power, it was pointed out that "the mandatory Power could not carry on unless it owned the railways. The railways required money which would have to be found by the mandatory Power . . . If the railways were not the property of the mandatory Power, the latter would have to be compensated for out-of-pocket expenses on resigning the mandate."³⁴ When the Chairman enquired whether separate accounts were kept for the South-West African Railways, so that it might be ascertained whether there was a deficit or a surplus, Major Herbst replied that the accounts were kept separately upto the moment of transfer, but he did not know what had since been done in the matter. The Chairman commented that this was the first time when an act of appropriation of the property of the mandated Territory by an Act of Parliament of the mandatory Power had come to the knowledge of the PMC. According to him, the said Act "was in contradiction with Art. 25 of the Versailles Treaty".³⁵

The issue was raised once again in the 6th Session (1925). This time Mr. Smit, South African representative, admitted that "the Union Government could not claim full ownership. The railways should, of course, revert to the mandated territory in the event of a transfer of the mandate."³⁶ But he did not think it would be possible for his Government, for the time being, to describe the South-West African Administration as the owner. Then followed an interesting discussion which should be quoted in full even if this account becomes too long. Van Rees pointed out that other mandatory Powers had recognised that the mandated Territory was the owner of all the properties and assets mentioned in Articles 120 and 257 of the Treaty of Versailles.³⁷ Smit agreed that South-West Africa was the undoubted owner of all such properties as existed before the War. But some construction had been made later. And the Union Government asserted ownership in order to avoid legal difficulties, e.g., in making any claims for theft, damage, etc.³⁸ To this Rappard rejoined that a trustee could always institute an action for damage or theft committed against his ward's property. It was not necessary to have the benefit of a proprietary right for doing that.³⁹ Smit submitted that the existing Union Government considered Clause 1 of the South-West African Railways and Harbours Act passed by a former Government as being contrary to the mandate and that the Union Government was merely a trustee. But since its entry into the statute book,

33. Minutes of the PMC, 3rd Session, 1923, 17th Meeting, P. 106.

34. *Ibid.*, P. 106.

35. Minutes of the PMC, 3rd Session, 1923, 17th Meeting, P. 107.

36. Minutes of the PMC, 6th Session, 1925, 7th Meeting, P. 63.

37. *Ibid.*, P. 63.

38. *Ibid.*, P. 63.

39. *Ibid.*, P. 64.

certain interests had been created and certain rights vested and, therefore, it would be difficult to change the law. Rappard was not convinced. The Union Government, he said, "would undoubtedly feel obliged to repeal a law passed by a previous Government if that law appeared to be contrary to constitution and an international obligation."⁴⁰ Smit promised to bring the matter to the notice of his Government.

Unfortunately, no immediate action was taken and the disappointed PMC regretfully recorded in its report on the 9th Session (1926): "The Commission has not been able to get a clear idea of the financial position and management of the railways and harbours in South-West Africa. It asks for a complete statement regarding these matters, particularly as to whether any profits from the operation of the railways and harbours have been credited to the mandated territory and whether the latter has been called upon to subscribe to the capital cost."⁴¹ All the same, the PMC continued to exert its moral pressure. And ultimately, after 8 years, the South-West African Railways and Harbours Act was amended by the Union Government and brought into conformity with its international obligations.

VII

In addition to the controversies over sovereignty, status of inhabitants, and appropriation of property like the railways, the PMC had on many occasions to deal directly with proposals of outright incorporation of the mandated Territory into the Union. Such debates conclusively show how little impact Wilsonian idealism had on the mandatory Power.

At the 4th Session, Mr. Hofmeyr, accredited representative of the Union Government, frankly stated: "The Union has assumed the burden of administration of South-West Africa as much in the interests of the natives and the old European inhabitants as in the interests of its own future safety and happiness. Any suggestion of surrender will, therefore, be seriously disputed by the Union which will hold on to it as an integral part of its own country."⁴²

The matter came up for lengthy discussion at the 7th meeting of the 6th session. Mr. Smit, High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, actually gave a rough idea as to how the proposed incorporation could be achieved. "The first step in this direction," he said, "was to grant the territory a certain measure of self-government. When the Government of South-West Africa became entirely responsible for its own affairs, the question of its incorporation within the Union would inevitably arise. . . (Then) it would be for the people of South-West Africa themselves to declare whether they desired to join the Union or not."⁴³

40. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

41. Report on the Work of the 9th Session of the PMC, 1926; Annex 9 of the Minutes of the 9th Session of the PMC, p. 220.

42. Minutes of the PMC, 4th Session, 1924, 6th Meeting, pp. 49-50.

43. Minutes of the PMC, 6th Session, 1925, 7th Meeting, pp. 59-60.

It seems that when referring to self-government, Mr. Smit and perhaps some members of the PMC had only the European residents of South-West Africa in mind. This is, to say the least, strange, inasmuch as the basis of the entire Mandates System was a concern for people "who were not able to stand by themselves under the strenuous condition of the modern world". Rappard made the issue clear by pointing out, "It was not for the white minority in a mandated territory to declare when this moment (i.e., of independence and merger with the Union) had arrived. The Mandate system was designed to secure the welfare of the natives and this was the object which the authors of this system had kept in view." Marquis Theodoli, the Italian Chairman, supported his stand.⁴⁴

The issue was raised again in the 9th Session with Rappard repeating his opposition. Smit once more elaborated the procedure of incorporation. "The procedure would probably be for South Africa to come to the League with a request for the termination of the mandate when South-West Africa was sufficiently advanced to govern itself. He thought that annexation was a rather unfortunate word in this connection."⁴⁵ Earlier, he had also rejected the term "incorporation", since, according to him, if the Territory joined the Union, it would "do so as an independent state".⁴⁶

On all these occasions, the South African representative refrained from referring to the wishes of the indigenous people of the mandated Territory as regards the proposed incorporation. At the 22nd Session, however, the PMC obtained an unambiguous statement about what the Union Government thought of the role of the indigenous people in the incorporation question. Mr. Te Water, representative of the mandatory power, stated, "The way in which closer association affected the native population was a question which could not be answered specifically, because, to his knowledge, the place of the native in the Constitution of South-West Africa had never been publicly discussed."⁴⁷ Te Water referred to the statement of his Prime Minister that the matter "was in the first instance one for the determination of the people of South-West Africa". He added that the Prime Minister had not interpreted his own words. . . . Personally, he would say that when a South African spoke of self-determination, he generally regarded the native as being in tutelage, and would not consider the native point of view as closely as the white point of view. . . . No doubt when the Prime Minister spoke of the future of South-West Africa as being in the hands of its own population, he had in mind the thinking part of the population—the white population."⁴⁸

At the 26th Session, Rappard was more critical. He warned about a situation when Europeans would be ready for independence, while Africans

44. *Ibid.*, P. 60.

45. Minutes of the PMC, 9th Session (1926), 5th Meeting, P. 34.

46. Minutes of the PMC, 6th Session (1925), 7th Meeting, P. 60.

47. Minutes of the PMC, 22nd Session (1932), 2nd Meeting, P. 23.

48. *Ibid.*, P. 24.

would not. "The white population is eminently able to do so (i.e., stand by itself), but it was clearly not to that population that Article 22 of the Covenant referred." Rappard alleged that he had watched developments for the previous 14 years but "could not find any evidence that progress had been made in that direction". "Of all the native populations," remarked Rappard, "with which the Commission had to deal, that of South-West Africa seemed the most backward; its position was static and static on a deplorably low level. Only the evolution of the natives would justify a change in the regime. Their interests were of paramount importance, because the mandate system was justified by their lack of civilisation."⁴⁹

Obviously, these debates had their effect in sobering down South African enthusiasm for annexation. Despite the best efforts of the Union representative supported by Mr. Ormsby-Gore⁵⁰ and Lord Lugard⁵¹, both representing the British Empire, it was clear by the 26th Session that except for the British member, none else was prepared to support incorporation. This no doubt restrained the Union Government.

Another contributing factor might have been the deplorable state of South-West African finances. The world-wide depression jeopardized for several years any attempt to develop the territory. On top of it, certain natural calamities adversely affected the economy. It may be that all these considerations made the Union Government have second thought about the merger. Pretexts, as a matter of fact, were not lacking. After Hitler's rise to power, when the Nazi influence in the Territory became more pronounced, several requests were made by non-German Europeans of the Territory for complete union. One such request by the United National South-West Party came before the Permanent Mandates Commission for information.⁵² And when in the election of 1935 the Party could obtain a two-thirds majority, once more a deputation was sent to the Union Government for immediate incorporation. The Van Zyl Commission, too, reported that the existing form of government in South-West Africa had been a failure and recommended the incorporation of the mandate in the Union.

But, for reasons stated above, the Union Government did not venture to take the decisive step. The South African Government's Report for 1936 draws, so to say, the curtain on the pre-War phase of the annexation struggle. Although the Union Government considered that it could administer the Mandated Territory as a fifth province of the Union, subject to the terms of the Mandate itself, "it feels that sufficient grounds have not been adduced for taking such a step".⁵³

49. Minutes of the PMC, 26th Session, 1954, 7th Meeting, P. 52.

50. Minutes of the PMC, 1st Session, 1921, 7th Meeting, P. 34.

51. Minutes of the PMC, 26th Session, 19th Meeting, P. 163.

52. Minutes of the PMC, 23rd Session, 11th Meeting, P. 82.

53. Report presented by the Government of the Union of South Africa to the Council

Within a decade, however, the Union Government was to assert vigorously that such a thing had indeed taken place.

VIII

Thus, we see that the Smuts move in 1946 for incorporation of South-West Africa in the Union was not an isolated or unexpected phenomenon and that actually there is a certain continuity beginning from the annexation proposals during and at the close of World War I down to the post-Second War period.

It is also clear that, apart from proposals of outright annexation, the merger controversy can best be studied through debates on issues like the question of sovereignty over the mandated Territory, the status of its inhabitants and the operation of the South-West African Railways. In each of these cases, the stand taken by the South African Government was logically consistent with the goal of eventual territorial incorporation which it set before itself. And, considered in its entirety, the mandatory period becomes a hyphen that links the annexationists of 1919 with those of 1946.

INDEPENDENCE : A CHALLENGE TO UGANDA

by

MADAN M. SAULDIE

"Uganda is a fairy tale. You climb up a railway instead of a beanstalk and at the end there is a wonderful new world. The scenery is different, the climate is different, and most of all, the people are different from anything elsewhere to be seen in the whole range of Africa."¹ This was how Sir Winston Churchill described Uganda some years ago. Uganda, resting in the lap of the tropics astride the Equator, quite unexpectedly offers a perpetually pleasant climate—the tropical heat being tempered with high altitudinous coolness. The territory is essentially an inland country cut off from the sea-coast by a stretch of plain extending to over 900 miles. It is bordered by Sudan in the North, the Congo in the West, Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika in the South and Kenya in the East.

Uganda is, by far, the richest of the East African territories and being endowed with a fairly wide spread annual rainfall averaging 50 inches, its land is very fertile and productive.

The population of Uganda, with no settlers of whatever origin, comprises over 98 per cent of Africans belonging to Bantu, Nilotic and Hamitic stock and are the descendants of various tribal immigrations over a thousand years. African population being mostly spread out in villages, cities are the creations of European and Asian peoples who poured into Uganda, either to man the administration or to manage the trading centres. But there is no trace of their influence on the African population. And colour discrimination and racial conflict have no place in Uganda.

The only persistent conflict arises out of rivalries among the tribal monarchies which have successfully stood the efflux of time. But despite this unrelieved internal confusion, the dichotomous political structure, with the Protectorate and the traditional systems of Government going together, has lived through the years.

Among the four provinces of Uganda—the Buganda, Eastern, Western and Northern—the Kingdom of Buganda is the most prosperous and

1. *Uganda*: Pamphlet issued by the Department of Information, Kampala, Uganda; January, 1962.

advanced in culture. It has also greatly influenced the body-politic of Uganda. The Buganda monarchy came into prominence only during the 19th century after two centuries of dominance by the Kingdom of Bunyoro.

II

Peeping into the rugged past of Uganda, we find that before any European explorer could penetrate into Uganda, there lived Arab and Swahili traders in Buganda, having entered the kingdom about 1850. It was only one hundred years ago, in 1862, that an English explorer, John Hanning Speke, accompanied by one James Augustus Grant, made a landfall on the territory, approaching it through the southern end—the origin of the Nile. They found Uganda not as a single united country but one split up into small principalities. Beyond Buganda, to the north, they came upon another large kingdom, Bunyoro. People at that time were organized in small village and clan communities, particularly in the north and the east. In 1864, explorer Samuel Baker landed in Uganda from the north and discovered Lake Albert. Eleven years later, Henry Stanley, a missionary-spirited Englishman, reached Buganda and opened the way for both the Protestant and Roman Catholic mission stations to start functioning there. On his return to England, he made a passionate appeal to the “practical Christians” to go to Buganda and spread the gospel of Christ among the people there. Alexander Mackay was the first to respond to the call, and as manager of the settlement for freed slaves, he went there to work under the auspices of the Church Missionary Society.

Since the Moslems, as also the other religious groups, were already actively propagating their own religious philosophies, the entry of Christianity into the body-religious of Uganda, led to a religious warfare. Tragedy followed tragedy. The Baganda rulers (Baganda are the people of Buganda with Luanda as their language) found it opportune to activate their exploitative adventurism. And this was followed by civil wars, revolutions and religious persecution.

With some of the East African territories assigned by Royal Charter to the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888 and its confirmation two years later through the Anglo-German Agreement, Captain Frederick Lugard (afterwards Lord Lugard) was appointed the Company's representative for Uganda. After two years of administration, the Company found itself heavily involved in the costs of maintaining British interests in the colony and gave notice of its intention to relinquish the responsibilities of administration in Uganda. But Lugard was not a man to succumb to the circumstances so easily. With firm determination and self-confidence, he impressed upon the British Government that her interests were deeply involved in Uganda, and was thus successful in reversing the decision. The Protectorate was formally

established in June 1894 over the Kingdom of Buganda but later extended to the rest of the country. Separate agreements were also signed between the British Government and the Kingdoms of Buganda and Toro (in 1900), Ankole (in 1901) and Bunyoro (in 1933) and the Protectorate's affairs were transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in 1905.

III

Political consciousness was awakened earlier in Buganda than in any of the other provinces. The Kingdom was culturally more advanced and even under the Protectorate, it progressed unhampered. In the economic and political fields too it had stolen a march over its neighbouring kingdoms. But as the Baganda were outnumbered by at least four to one by the rest of Uganda's population, their advantages of political democracy seemed restricted like the Creoles of Sierra Leone. But that does not seem to be a realistic approach. The attitude of the British Government towards the Kingdom of Buganda has never been step-motherly. Rather, it has always been the honest desire of the British Government to grant Buganda a greater degree of autonomy than the other Provinces. Notwithstanding this generous approach, the British Government has all the time been committed to develop Uganda as a single political unit. But the mistrust among the Baganda grew deeper every day and a number of them violently demonstrated their preference for complete separation of Buganda from the rest of the country. But to the British, this appeared as committing economic suicide, for in their view, "only a united Uganda could ever hope to stand on its own feet as a self-governing state."² How far Buganda has been responsible for the prevailing crisis in Uganda can be evidenced by a chain of untoward instances in Uganda's constitutional history circumstanced by Buganda's non-cooperation and boycott of the constitutional and political developments.

The Central Government in Uganda being modelled on the British traditional colonial patterns, the Executive and Legislative Councils were for the first time introduced in 1921 to assist the Governor. Initially, these were mainly represented by official members. While the Executive Council till 1946 consisted entirely of official members, the Legislative Council had been composed of partly official and partly nominated non-official members from the early days of its institution. African representation in the Executive Council was introduced in 1952 when two Africans were included in the Council as unofficial members, one of them being later appointed an official member. After 1954, the Council was raised to be the principal instrument of policy.

In the Legislative Council, however, the Africans made their first

2. George H. T. Kimble, *Tropical Africa*, Vol. II, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1960, p. 245.

entry in 1945 as Government nominees. And when the membership of the Council rose, equality was maintained between the number of Africans and that of the Europeans and Asians counted together. Since provincial nominated representation in the Legislative Council provided for, besides two African members, one each from the Eastern and Northern Provinces, one from the Western Provincial Council and one in rotation from the Agreement areas of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, two had to be nominated from Buganda. But the Lukiko, the traditional Council of Buganda, refused to forward any names, reiterating their firm determination to keep aloof from the central institutions of the Protectorate. This policy of detachment and disillusion prevailed for a long time and the Governor had often to use his discretion to nominate directly members from Buganda Province. But the crisis was further aggravated when, in 1953, the Kabaka (the king) of Buganda preferred his withdrawal of the recognition of the Central Government and superseded his earlier Agreements with the Protectorate Government.

Another Agreement, therefore, had to be drawn up afresh which redefined the status of the Province of Buganda. With the signing of this Agreement, further changes in the Executive and Legislative Councils were proposed and by August 1955, the Legislative Council was enlarged and the ministerial system was introduced. The Council was remodelled so as to raise the African membership to half the total—30 out of a Council of 60, excluding the Governor. The deadlock in the Protectorate's relations with the Buganda Government being temporarily resolved after the new Agreement, the Buganda electoral college elected five Buganda representatives to the Legislative Council. In order to preserve harmony and peace and maintain stability in the Government's structure, further constitutional proposals and reforms were postponed at least for a period of six years, i.e., up to 1961. An interjection into this frozen period was, however, the Protectorate's bid to hold direct elections in October 1958, on the basis of a qualified franchise, to elect African representatives. It was no mean introduction. On the other hand, it was commendable. The elections were held in 18 constituencies of Uganda. With Buganda's Lukiko dissociating itself from these elections, the districts of Ankole and Bugisu also toed the Buganda line and did not allow any elections in their territories. It is noteworthy here that this insistence of the Lukiko to disengage itself from the obligations and responsibilities of the Central Government and to avoid elections was born out of two deep-rooted evils: the growing element in Buganda—forming a majority in the Lukiko—always appealing to the secessionist sentiments and pressing for a separate State of Buganda with a distinctive political personality; and the impending fear among the overlords of the land lest they be outvoted and eventually dominated by the people of other Provinces.

The Second General Elections, on common rolls and with a broadened qualified franchise, held throughout Uganda in 1961 in 76 rural and 6 urban constituencies, brought a substantial elected majority of repre-

sentatives to the Legislative Council. The Executive Council was transformed into a Cabinet of Ministers of which the majority were non-official members. The Governor's powers were also categorically delimited.

Buganda fared no better even this time. The registration of voters had been boycotted by the Buganda Government and although throughout Uganda about 80 per cent of the electorate exercised their right of franchise, only 3 per cent turned up in Buganda to vote in 21 rural constituencies there. This was eventuated by the Buganda Government's resolute boycott of the Central Legislature and its claim to be an independent State free from British protection.

These elections, however, resulted in a narrow win for the Democratic Party led by Mr. Benedicto Kiwanuka with 43 seats over Mr. Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress, which won 35 seats. Mr. Kiwanuka thus became the leader of the party in the Central Legislature and also the first Chief Minister, and Mr. Obote was recognized as the Leader of the Opposition.

But, all along, efforts had not slackened to hammer out a formula on which to base the future relationship between various provinces and the Central Government, particularly in the case of Buganda. A Constitutional Relationship Commission was, therefore, appointed in November 1960, under the chairmanship of the Earl of Munster shortly after the publication of the Wild Committee's Report introducing some constitutional changes strongly opposed by Buganda.

The Munster Report published in June, 1961, recommended a strong central democratic government for Uganda, with Buganda in a federal relationship and the three Agreement Kingdoms (Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro) in a semi-federal relationship with the Central Government. The Commission also proposed an all-elected National Assembly and universal adult suffrage with a common electoral roll. For Buganda the Report recommended direct elections to the Lukiko and a division of powers between it and the National Assembly on certain affairs. The Report further elucidated that it should be constitutionally required to provide such representation, but that the Lukiko be free to decide whether representatives should be chosen by direct or indirect elections.

The Munster Report and the constitutional proposals embodied in it, designed to carry the country through to independence, were received with apathy in Buganda. The Report, however, prominently figured in the September 1961 Constitutional Conference held in London, which decided upon granting self-government to Uganda on March 1, 1962 and a General Election in the month of April. The provisional date for independence was also fixed as October 9, 1962 in that Conference. Held under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, the Conference was attended, besides Uganda's Cabinet Ministers, by the elected members of the Legislature and district representatives of the four kingdoms.

The April 1962 elections quite unexpectedly resulted in the debacle

of Mr. Benedicto Kiwanuka's Democratic Party and the spectacular victory of the Uganda People's Congress. But the UPC could not form a Government of its own since it had only 43 seats in a House of 91 and had to enter into alliance with the Kabaka Yekka Party of Buganda which claimed a substantial 24 seats. But the coalition government has always been an uneasy affair, since the two parties are poles apart both in emphasis and in objectives. Whereas the UPC is a militantly nationalist organisation and an exponent of Pan-Africanism and regards tribalism as the greatest curse of the African continent, the Kabaka Yekka Party, on the contrary, is essentially a tribalist and traditionalist party which has no knack for Pan-Africanism and is wedded solely to an unswerving loyalty to the King of Buganda.

Besides these diverse party interests, there are other factors responsible for the uneasiness in the alliance. There is, for instance, the 36-year-old Mr. Obote's aggressive determination not to tolerate any disruption in the country and his untiring efforts to establish a strong Central Government. Whereas there could be some ground for a weak-minded policy at the instance of the Central Government, especially so for the Kabaka Yekka Party's Buganda interests, Mr. Obote's braving the fury of the storms courageously is really commendable. With him expediency gave place to resolution. And often overlooking his obligations toward the alliance, he kept the flame of nationalism burning high and was occasionally successful in persuading the contending parties to a compromise.

The greatest problem and perhaps one short of an easy solution, however, has been the 68-year-old conflict between the kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro over 6 counties lost by the latter to the former. The British Government has always been anxious to resolve this crucial issue and end the crisis caused by the conflict which involves the return of these counties to Bunyoro. But, on the other hand, it cannot ignore the resentment and aggressive resistance posed by Buganda in case any encroachment were made on these territories. Therefore, a high-powered Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Molson was appointed to go into the details of the dispute and make recommendations. The Molson Report suggested that four of the six counties be retained with Buganda and the people of the two, through a referendum, be allowed to decide among themselves as to which kingdom they would prefer to join. This did not at all satisfy Bunyoro, rather, it invited added antagonism on the part of Buganda. A booklet published by the Buganda Government declared "Molson is wrong" and warned that, if Bunyoro marched on Buganda to recover the lost counties, "Buganda will have no alternative but to repel the aggressor and protect its people and defend its territories."

Equally strong protests came from Bunyoro at the Constitutional Conference in London in June this year. It was only at the instance of Mr. Reginald Maudling, Colonial Secretary, that some pliable formula

could be thrashed out, with the proviso that after Uganda's independence in October, the two counties of Buyaga and Bugangazzi, as listed in the Report, be handed over to the Central Government for a period of two years, after which a referendum would be held. Even this compromise was utterly unacceptable to Buganda, and the Buganda delegation to the Conference returned to Uganda to wage a war against it. Since this would have only delayed further the independence of the country, the Lukiko diplomatically shelved the issue for the moment. Rejecting outright, on the one hand, the Maudling formula, it expressed, on the other, intention of opening talks afresh with the Central Government after independence. Thus the crisis was temporarily averted.

In the circumstances in which Uganda becomes independent, it seems there will be some issues—some more challenging and some of them insurmountable—crying for early solution. And because Uganda has decided not to become a Republic and to continue in allegiance to the Queen as the Queen of Uganda, and also to become the 16th member of the Commonwealth, the U.K. may have to play a still greater part in helping resolve her tangles even after independence.

Though there are good reasons to believe that Uganda will be able to consolidate itself into a strong independent nation, yet if the present rivalries continue unmitigated, a dangerous situation may ensue when Uganda may become another Congo—a victim of its own sharp divisions.

IV

Economically speaking, the country is the wealthiest of all the East African territories and has a marked rate of economic growth. There being no European settlers to help them exploit the natural resources more efficiently, whatever achievement is theirs is mostly their own toil and hardwork.

The actual era of economic prosperity dawned in 1901 when railways from Mombasa on the Coast of Kenya reached Kisumu on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria and opened the lakeside and the immediate hinter-land of goods brought eminent relief to those incurring heavy costs and wasting ample time on portage of goods to markets and the coast. Alongside the railway system, feeder road and water transport systems also developed, thus, providing opportunity to all sectors of economy to flourish.

The people of Uganda are primarily agriculturists, foresters and fishermen. The first agricultural crop grown in Uganda was cotton, which even today remains one of the most important cash crops. With transport facilities expanded and extensive research carried on by the British experts as to the type of cotton that could be best produced in Uganda, the production of cotton rose sharply. From only 9 tons produced in 1904-5, it shot up to 2,500 tons in 1910-11. This excellent

increase in cotton production earned enough of export revenue and she could dispense with the British grants-in-aid in 1915, so far given in order to balance her budgets.

Cotton held its own till 1930, when due to fluctuations in the commodity prices, as an aftermath of the First World War, the Government thought of diversifying the economy, and coffee, then cultivated entirely by the Europeans in small plantations, came to be patronized by the Africans. The very first lot of production showed a marked improvement in yield and soon coffee was established as the second important cash crop, and African coffee acreage exceeded the plantation acreage. Rubber, tea and tobacco were also tried on an experimental basis but, being less suited, did not claim much importance. Sugar production, however, showed promising results and by 1924, an Indian had already set up a sugar refinery.

An investigation into the mineral wealth in Uganda discovered tin at Ankole in 1925. Substantial copper reserves were also known to be available in the Ruwenzori Mountains.

In the beginning there were no industries worth recognition in the country except a few ginneries.

During the Second World War, Uganda intensified her efforts at developing her economic resources and reaching maximum exports of cotton and coffee, and making the country self-sufficient in food. The result was a substantial rise in production both of agricultural and mineral products. And cotton, till then the dominating export crop and the country's principal asset, could not match the steep rise in coffee production. (Uganda today is the largest producer of coffee in the Commonwealth).

Agriculture, all crops taken together, forms 60 per cent of the total domestic product. Most of the export trade, therefore, rests on the agricultural economy of Uganda. Nearly all cultivation is undertaken by African farmers—small-scale farmers holding mostly less than a dozen acres each. There are a few European estates in Uganda.

The average revenue from foreign trade for three years before the outbreak of the Second World War was £7,000,000. By 1955, the figure rose to a new high of £76,000,000. But that has remained the peak year so far, since, with a fall in the prices of cotton and coffee, foreign trade declined to £69,000,000 in 1960 (excluding the East African territorial trade which, in 1960, amounted to £13,000,000). Besides cotton, the quantities of all the other export commodities have increased: Coffee exports rose from 14,000 tons in 1938 to 116,000 tons in 1960; tea exports from 1,000 cwt. to over 77,000 cwt., hides and skins from 32,000 cwt. to 79,000 cwt. and animal feeding-stuffs from 319,000 cwt. to 1,453,000 cwt.

Although predominantly a landlocked country, the cattle industry has also grown rapidly in Uganda, producing an income of more than £12 million per year. The fishing industry has turned out to be a very profitable

vocation on the Lakes of Western Uganda.

Financial and technical aid from the U.K. and other foreign countries has been constantly flowing into Uganda. Between 1946 and 1961, the United Kingdom supplied finances in the form of loans or grants under various Colonial Development and Welfare (C. D. & W.) Acts to the tune of £6,782,362. She has also been sharing the funds under the general East African commitment totalling nearly £16,000,000. Britain's Colonial Development Corporation has also invested over a million pounds in the Kilembe Copper Mines. Further loans amounting to £8,500,000 have been approved for Uganda.

But despite a rapid economic growth, the national *per capita* income has not increased significantly and even today stands low. In 1957, it was £20 and in 1960 it was round about £23. This however compares favourably with India's *per capita* income which is a little over Rs. 300.

Uganda had also resorted to planning as a means of development. In 1947, the first ten-year plan for economic and social development was launched. But with priorities and prices changing, it had to be revised from time to time and in 1955, at the time of post-War boom, a new five-year development plan was drawn up providing for an expenditure of over £30 million mainly on developing productive capacity. But the plan, though proceeding satisfactorily, involved recurrent expenditure which increased faster than the revenue, and had to be abandoned in 1959, when a three-year capital expenditure forecast scheme was undertaken. The reports covering the three years ending 1963 estimate the probable capital resources for development at about £17,000,000.

But even the process of planning could not do anything substantial in the field of industrialization which remained an underdeveloped sector of Uganda's economy. The major handicap in the flourishing of industry has been the non-availability of cheap power. But with the opening in April 1954 of the Owen Falls Hydro-electric Scheme on the Nile, the hope grew stronger for vast industrialization in the country. The Project—the largest source of electric power in East Africa—will be the hub of Uganda's industrial growth, and the day is not far when industrial beehives will dot the countryside. At present, there are only a few sparsely located industrial units. There are, for instance, a cement factory, a copper mine and smelter and a cotton textile factory. Besides these, there are some smaller industrial units which include cigarette factories, sugar factories and coffee hulleries.

Alongside economic development, there has been a marked development in the social services. Education, health, communications, etc., have all been expanded. From 1920, the Protectorate Government took an increasing share both in financing the medical work of the missions and in establishing its own hospitals. By 1938, there were 23 Government hospitals for Africans and 102 Government dispensaries. A Government Medical College was also established at Mulago Hospital,

built at a cost of £2.3 million and accommodating 900 patients. At present Uganda has 27 Government hospitals with over 4,000 beds and there are nearly 1,500 in mission hospitals and about 2,500 in dispensaries.

In the educational field, whereas there were only 359 primary schools and 2 senior secondary schools in 1939, in 1945 the figures rose to 569 and 6, respectively. After 1950, however, educational programmes were speeded up. The expenditure of the Uganda Government (recurrent and capital) on education has risen from £715,000 to £5 million, representing 18.5 per cent of the entire budget. At the end of 1960, there were 2,249 grant-aided primary schools attended by African children, 11 Government and 82 grant-aided primary schools with mainly Asian enrolment and 5 Government and 7 grant-aided schools with mainly European enrolment. The number of children attending these schools was approximately 346,000 Africans (108,000 girls), 16,000 Asians and 1,100 Europeans. Junior secondary schools numbered about 251 (Government and grant-aided schools) and were attended by over 21,000 pupils. Enrolment in the 29 senior secondary schools in 1960 totalled 6,457 (1,375 girls).

Thus, we see that Uganda is marching ahead with determination and planning—on all aspects of development—and, equipped with a better training, for which the country is earnestly working, there is no reason to doubt a proud and bright future for this land of 7,000,000 after independence on October 9, 1962. The “fairy tale” of Churchill’s conception, one is confident, is taking realistic and concrete shape—the foundation for sustained progress and prosperity.

UGANDA'S ECONOMY—ITS PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

by

R. R. RAMCHANDANI

Uganda is a small country in East Africa, with an area of 93,981 square miles and a population of 6.5 million. In size it is roughly equal to Ghana in West Africa or the State of Jammu and Kashmir in India, but is smaller than either Kenya or Tanganyika, its two neighbouring countries with whom it forms a common market and cooperates in several other common fields like communications, currency, tariffs, etc., through the East African Common Services Organisation.

It is one of the most thickly populated countries of Africa with a population density of 86 per square mile, the same as that of Nigeria in 1952-53. It out-paces both Tanganyika and Kenya in population density and in rate of growth of population which was returned as 2.5 per cent in the 1959 census. The racial composition of its people is 6.4 million Africans, 73,000 Asians—mostly Indians and Pakistanis—11,000 Europeans and the rest members of other ethnic groups. The Africans constitute 98.5 per cent of the total. The non-African content in the population of Uganda is thus insignificant. It is much less than that in the Union of South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Kenya. Even Tanganyika has a larger number of non-Africans.

The per capita income of the people was \$ 57 in 1957—it is less than that of India, Nigeria or Kenya but more than Tanganyika's which is \$ 48.¹ It, therefore, belongs to the group of poor and underdeveloped countries of the world.

Again, like all the underdeveloped countries of tropical Africa, it is essentially an agricultural country with dual economy, having two broad sectors—the subsistence sector and the exchange sector. "The line of evolution has been from an almost complete dependence upon subsistence activities to activities which are concerned with the earning of money either by wage labour or by producing goods for sales in the market."²

1. For comparative figures of per capita income of some countries of Africa, see United Nations, *Economic Survey of Africa since 1950*, New York, 1959. Tables I—II, p. 15.

2. See East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-55 Report, London, H. M. S. O. Cmd. 9475, p. 46.

Uganda's economic progress upto the Second World War could be described as steady but slow. In the post-war years, the country witnessed really booming conditions, when all sectors of the economy thrived because of a sharp rise in the prices of its primary export commodities, cotton and coffee. The country marched at a much faster pace than anyone could ever imagine before the War.

On the eve of independence, however, Uganda's economy is not in that happy position it was during the first decade after the War. The subsequent fall in the world prices of cotton and coffee has struck a note of caution. But, the picture of the economy as it emerges is not at all so dull as to warrant a pessimistic outlook. On the whole, the economic structure is sound enough to carry forward a properly worked-out programme of economic development. This is revealed from the following account of the different sectors of the economy.

I

BALANCE-SHEET OF ECONOMY

A. AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is the mainstay of Uganda's economy. The African agricultural sector alone contributes about 65 per cent to the total domestic income¹ of the country. The contribution from estate cultivation is small, as almost all land remains in the hands of African farmers and alienation of land to non-Africans is discouraged as a matter of policy.² The subsistence sector still dominates agricultural production with three-fifths of the cultivated area so occupied.³

The growth of the exchange sector is essentially due to those farmers who took to cultivation of cash crops like cotton and coffee. These two crops are the chief contributors to Uganda's expanding economy. They together earn 80 per cent of the country's foreign exchange and account for 55 per cent of all production entering the market.

In the post-war era, remarkable progress has been made in the agricultural sector—in respect of both food crops and cash crops. The acreages under the main subsistence crops like plantains, maize, millets,

1. In 1959, incomes from African enterprises, both cash and subsistence, were £ 78 m. out of the total geographical income of £ 121.3 m. See Uganda Protectorate, Background to the Budget 1960-61, Table 1, p. 13.
2. From the early 1920's, the Government pursued the policy of maintaining African paramountcy as regards rights in land. In the statement made by the Governor of Uganda in 1950, it was reiterated that "Alienations to non-Africans, apart from small areas for residential purposes, would not be made except for undertakings which would promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory." It was also stated that Crown land, outside towns and trading centres, was held in trust for the African population. See Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, 1956, p. 725.
3. The total land under cultivation in 1958 was 8,840,189 acres, of which 6,262,189 acres were given to subsistence crops and 2,578,000 acres to cash crops.

groundnuts, beans, sweet potatoes and cassava, have all increased as shown in the table below:

TABLE 1
ACREAGES OF CROPS—(AFRICAN GROWERS)

(Thousand Acres)

Year	Plantains	Maize	Millet	Ground-nuts	Beans	Sweet potatoes	Cassava
1945	837	159	1,471	357	398	483	477
1950	872	267	1,629	345	480	518	528
1955	1,415	379	1,796	425	641	580	556
1960*	1,546	349	1,846	428	577	599	606

SOURCE : Uganda Protectorate, 1958 Statistical Abstract, p. 47.

*The figures for 1960 have been taken from the I.B.R.D. Mission's The Economic Development of Uganda, 1961. Table 10, p. 101.

The figures for cash crops as given below are even more encouraging. They show the growing interest of Africans in money incomes as against production for more subsistence.

TABLE 2
ACREAGES OF MAIN CASH CROPS

(Thousand Acres)

Year	COFFEE African Growers	ARABICA Estate Prod.	COFFEE African Growers	ROBUSTA Estate Prod.	COTTON African Growers	TOBACCO African Growers	TEA Estate Prod.	SUGAR Estate Prod.
1945	14	3	129	8	1,147	5	5	28
1950	18	—	162	21 ¹	1,534	8	7	27
1955	25	3	291	18	1,586	7	10	28
1960 ²	35	3	448	30	1,516	11	17	37

1. The figure includes estate productions under Coffee Arabica.

2. Figures for this year have been taken from the I.B.R.D. Mission's The Economic Development of Uganda 1961, Accounts on Crops.

Source : Uganda Protectorate, 1958 Statistical Abstract, pp. 50-51.

The table particularly reveals that the acreage under coffee, tea, sugar and tobacco has very rapidly increased. One factor responsible for boosting up the economy in the years after the war was the high prices of cotton and coffee which increased the value of these commodities a great deal more than their output. This is seen in the following table relating to export volume and value of these commodities.

TABLE 3
DOMESTIC EXPORTS—COTTON AND COFFEE
BY QUANTITY AND VALUE

Commodity	Unit or Qty.	1952		1954		1956		1958	
		Qty. '000	Value £ '000	Qty. '000	Value £ '000	Qty. '000	Value £ '000	Qty. '000	Value £ '000
Coffee (not roasted)	Cwt.	789	12,345	693	13,478	1,233	15,721	1,574	20,827
Raw cotton	100 Lbs.	1,512	29,954	1,573	20,877	1,506	19,285	1,550	18,141

SOURCE : Uganda Protectorate, 1958 Statistical Abstract, p. 19.


NOTE : Figures for 1958 are taken from the I. B. R. D. Mission's The Economic Development of Uganda, 1961. Statistical Appendix, Tables S-7 and S-9.

The price of cotton soared sharply after the war. Whereas in 1938, exports of cotton lint touched a peak of 71,821 tons valued at £ 3.4 m., the corresponding figure for the year 1952 was 67,507 tons valued at £ 30 m. Thus, although the volume of exports declined, the value went up by more than eight times. Similarly, the volume of coffee exports rose from 14,040 tons in 1938 to 39,424 tons in 1952. The corresponding value figures were £ 324,000 and £ 12,345,000. This shows the rise in the volume of exports to be less than three times but the rise in the value of exports to be as much as 40 times.¹ This phenomenal rise in the prices of Uganda's two chief export commodities was a great blessing for the country. Unfortunately, the recent decline in the prices of these two commodities has served as a warning. The chart below traces the movement of prices of cotton and coffee for a decade and a half, i.e., 1946-1960. Cotton prices rose from 25 cents per lb. in 1946 to 55 cents per lb. in 1951. They subsequently started declining and, in 1960, reached almost the level of the 1946 prices. Coffee prices were about 18 U.S. cents per lb. in 1947, reaching 63 U.S. cents per lb. in 1954 and subsequently declining to about 25 U.S. cents in 1960.

1. For these figures, see Colonial Office, An Economic Survey of the Colonial Territories, 1951, Vol. II. The East African Territories, pp. 86-87.

CHART I

ANNUAL AVERAGE PRICES OF COFFEE & COTTON
PER Lb., 1946-1960.



Source : I.B.R.D. Mission. Economic Development of Uganda, 1961.
Charts 2 & 3 (combined)

This fall in prices is the greatest source of anxiety to Uganda's economy today. This will be discussed further when specific economic problems of the country are studied. Here it must suffice to say that agriculture will continue to remain the backbone of the country's economy for quite some time to come. Fortunately, Uganda has good land, climate and rainfall which will stand the country in good stead and is expected to respond generously to an earnest effort. It is only when agriculture flourishes that industry will have a sound base for building up its super-structure.

B. INDUSTRY

Industry in Uganda has been mostly confined to the processing of primary products, e.g., cotton-ginning, soap-making, oil-extraction and preparation of coffee, tea and sugar. The last three items are essentially estate products and are processed on their respective estates. Most of the other industries can be included in the light industry category. These will include the manufacture of bricks, tiles, aluminiumware, beverages, tobacco, furniture-making, etc. Then there are establishments engaged in printing works or making cloth. The firms dealing in these industries are usually small, "showing very little tendency to increase in size". They are mostly owned by Asians. The Africans have recently started taking interest in this activity but they have not as yet recorded a vigorous march in this direction as they have done in the political field.

In the post-war years, earnest efforts have been made to boost up the industrial sector. The Uganda Development Corporation was established by Ordinance in June 1952, with an initial equity capital of £5 m. Its interests lie both in the industrial and agricultural fields. By 1961, its equity capital rose to £8 m. "It is the only producer in Uganda of cement, textile and enamelled metalware; through other subsidiaries, it controls a number of tea estates, a cattle ranch, a chain of modern hotels and National Park lodges, and several leasehold properties; and, in association with overseas firms, participates as a minority shareholder in hire-purchase, banking, mining ventures, food processing companies, and production of specialised building materials."¹ Industrial development on the whole is still in its infancy. U.D.C. has, of course, explored a wide range of industrial products, but the prospects of factory production are not very bright for the present, because the country is not very rich in mineral resources and its size of home market is small, which is an important limiting factor. Some of the large-scale industries in the country are Uganda Cement Industries Ltd., Tororo, Universal Asbestos Manufacturing Coy. (E.A.) Ltd., Nyanza Textile Industries Ltd., Jinja, Tororo Industrial Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd., the Uganda Metal

1. I.B.R.D. Mission, *The Economic Development of Uganda*, 1961, p. 215.

Products and Enamelling Coy. Ltd., etc. The heavy industry is largely European-or Asian-inspired and, "in every case, except tobacco and brewing, U.D.C. capital has participated in them".


The balance-sheet of the other sectors of Uganda's economy records the following important readings.

C. TRADE

The external trade showed a remarkable upward trend after the war. It jumped from £11.3 m. in 1946 to £47.2 m. in 1952. Since then this steep rise in curve has taken a downward course and in 1960 the value of exports was only £41.6 m., i.e., £5.6 m. less than the figure for 1952.

The volume of exports, however, has been rising steadily all through this period. The diagram below shows that except for the years 1953 and 1956, the rise has been continuous and, on the whole, there was more than a 100 per cent rise between 1950 and 1960.

CHART 2



D. MONEY MARKET

The money market is also on a sounder footing today. The banking system is well entrenched with seven banks in the private sector and two government savings institutions, the Post Office Savings Bank and the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank. The banks essentially engage in financing the import and export trade, but the volume of loans for domestic purposes has also grown.

E. PUBLIC FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

As a result of rise in incomes and a favourable balance of trade during the war and after, the governmental revenues continued to rise.

They jumped from £ 3.4 m. in 1945 to £ 20.8 m. in 1954/55, a sevenfold rise in just a decade, but the fall in the prices of coffee and cotton in recent years also affected the revenue receipts. During the last five years, there was virtually no rise, the figure for the 1960/61 revenues being only £ 21.2 m.

There has been, besides, an overall deficit since 1954-55. This was so far met from the adequate resources collected during the surplus years prior to 1954. By the end of 1960/61, the Capital Development Fund was left with only £ 1.3 m. and the export taxes made no contribution to the capital budget, even the coffee and cotton assistance funds¹ having drained off from £ 37 m. in 1954 to just £ 16 m. by 1961. This would, therefore, mean finding new sources of finance for the capital and development budget.²

On the whole, however, the fiscal position is quite sound. The combined budgets of the central and local Governments, currently, are equivalent to more than one-quarter of the country's monetary domestic product. Government spending during the period 1946-1960 has increased from £ 3.6 m. in 1946 to £ 24.9 m. in 1960, a rise of more than seven times.

F. INFRA-STRUCTURE

The most healthy element in Uganda's economy, taking into consideration its present stage of development, has been its infra-structure. It is quite adequate to meet the present needs of its economy. Uganda has one of the best networks of roads in Africa comprising 13,000 miles, of which about 25 per cent are in the category of main roads. The railway links Uganda with Kenya and its port of Mombasa. It now stands extended to the western province, thereby meeting the needs of a new copper mine at Kilembe. A further branch line will connect the important cotton-growing area of the northern province. There is a good steamer service on the lakes and the Nile. There is also an internationally well-equipped airport at Entebbe which provides up-to-date passenger and freight services.

The education and health services have also made reasonable progress during the 'fifties, with the result, that more and more trained people are now becoming available to man them. Likewise, the base of the economy has been broadened. Although the manufacturing industry does not play an important role, a number of new industries have been established.

1. In 1948, the coffee and cotton assistance funds were created with a sum of £4.4 m. being savings from the controlled marketing of cotton and coffee during the war and after. With a steep rise in the prices of these commodities, the balances rose to £ 37 m. in 1954, but the subsequent fall in the prices has adversely affected the funds. The funds have meant useful contributors to the economic development projects, but with little scope for any increase in them, their utility in this respect is rather insignificant at present.

2. For suggestions in this regard, see I.B.R.D. Mission's Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-55.

The Large Owen Falls hydro-power project was opened in 1954 and a basic electric power grid built in the southern part of Uganda.

The following pages deal with some specific economic problems which face the country and which need its prompt attention, while its human and material resources are being deployed for purposes of economic development.

II

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Uganda's economic problems as discussed here are:

1. Problems of diversifying the economy;
2. Problems of capital;
3. Problems of skilled labour.

I. PROBLEMS OF DIVERSIFYING THE ECONOMY

As seen above, Uganda's exchange sector is mainly dependent upon two agricultural commodities, cotton and coffee. This is not a satisfactory state for the country's economy. The recent fall in the prices of the two commodities has demonstrated beyond doubt that attaching the expanding sector of economy to a couple of crops can give rise to an extremely harmful situation when the country is obliged to depend increasingly on foreign aid or loans for its non-recurrent expenditure. This is seen from the table given below.

TABLE 4
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL BUDGET REVENUES¹

	1947	% of total	1950	% of total	1953	% of total	1956/57	% of total	1959/60	% of total	1960 ² /61	% of total
1. Export taxes	—	—	167	9.5	45	1.0	3,106	50.0	53	3.5	—	—
2. Earnings of deposits	35	6.9	177	10.5	943	21.0	615	10.0	540	37.5	123	6.2
3. Public debt ³ Reimbursement & Amortization	11	2.2	825	49.0	11	0.25	131	2.0	142	10.0	142	7.1
4. Contributions from local funds	406	80.4	322	19.5	3,411	76.0	2,334	38.0	23	2.0	19	0.9
5. Foreign grants	53	10.5	195	11.5	85	1.75	—	—	678	47.0	1,712	85.8
Total:	505	100.0	1,686	100.0	4,495	100.0	6,186	100.0	1,436	100.0	1,996	100.0

1. The Uganda fiscal year starts on July 1; prior to 1954 it coincided with the calendar year.
2. Approved estimates.
3. Mostly transfer items which also appear on the expenditure side.

Source: I.B.R.D. Mission, The Economic Development of Uganda, 1961, Table 16. The percentages for the years 1950, 1953, 1956/57 & 1959/60 have been worked out by the author.

The table reveals that with the drying up of the two internal sources, namely, export taxes and local funds, not only have the total capital budget revenues dwindled but also the contribution of 'Foreign Grants' has increased from just 1.75 per cent in 1953 to 85 per cent in 1960-61. It may be noted that both important sources of financing capital budget—export taxes and local funds—were essentially made up from the incomes of coffee and cotton during the period of their high prices. Chart No. 1, relating to the prices of cotton and coffee, has brought out the unreliable nature of these prices in the world market. Moreover, although the prospect of cotton is still good, the same is not true of coffee. Uganda, as a member of the International Coffee Agreement, has to restrict its exports of coffee to traditional markets. Besides, with the formation of the European Common Market, the French associated territories in Africa, Uganda's competitors in the export of coffee, will be in an advantageous position in the European Economic Community. Hence, Uganda's opportunities in Europe will be relatively small. All this is a pointer to an imbalance in Uganda's growing exchange sector which calls for urgent attention. The problem of diversifying the economy is, therefore, one of the most important economic problems of the country.

After the war, with growing incomes from cotton and coffee, some steps were taken to encourage industrial development. A number of new industries were established. A textile mill, a cement factory, the Large Owen Falls hydro-power project and several other small industries came into being. It has, however, been observed that there are various limiting factors in the growth of manufacturing industries in Uganda. These may be summed up as follows:

1. The size of the home market which includes Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya is small.
2. The pace of development of the African entrepreneur has been very slow; it is slower than Kenya's, although it is faster than Tanganyika's.
3. The character of labour force is still very much different from that of other industrialized countries. Most of the labour is migratory who leave their families back on the fields and go back to farms after they have earned enough cash to meet the tax obligations and their limited needs.
4. In East Africa, compared with Uganda, Kenya has had an early start in the industrial field; hence the latter has the advantage of initial push which results in greater concentration of industry in that country as the three countries of East Africa form the common market. Also, Kenya has a larger non-African population, so far the main agency financing the industry in the private sector.
5. Uganda is a land-locked country with no direct access to sea, the nearest port, Mombasa, being hundreds of miles away from Kampala, the commercial capital of Uganda. This means extra cost of transporting imported capital goods.

The above negative points would not, of course, mean that the country

should do nothing to encourage the industry. On the other hand, that will be certainly necessary. What is obvious is the fact pointed out by the I.B.R.D. Mission that "the main opportunities for economic growth in Uganda in the next five years are in agriculture".¹ What is needed is a thorough overhaul of the agrarian structure. In the tropical countries of Africa, the agricultural revolution must precede the industrial revolution and Uganda is no exception to this.

The immediate prospect of diversifying the economy, without forgetting the long-term objective of industrialising the country, thus lies in diversifying agricultural produce and developing the livestock industry. Let us examine this.

(a) Diversifying Agricultural Produce

The position of other cash crops *vis-a-vis* cotton and coffee is shown in Table 2 above which gives estimated acreages under important cash crops.

A study of the table reveals that whereas increase in acreage under cotton during the period 1949-60 was of little significance, there was substantial increase in the acreages under coffee, tea, sugar and tobacco. As pointed out earlier, coffee does not offer rich rewards in the near future. The prospect for tea and sugar seems bright and should be properly explored. As a free country, Uganda can now take bold measures to encourage estate or plantation cultivation. The peasants cannot be burdened with new ventures, as any failure may be disastrous for them. Their productivity is also much lower than the productivity of estate farms. Most of the increase in the volume of produce on African farms has been mainly due to increase in acreage under cultivation and not because of improvement in productivity per acre on a peasant farm. Moreover, certain crops like sugar and tea are essentially estate crops. The total investment of all tea estates was placed in 1960 around £ 3 m. and two sugar estates invested £ 2.3 m. in 1961/62. The increased investment in these tea and sugar estates is indeed a healthy growth. The main difficulty here has been the existing land tenure regulations which make expansion of estates very difficult, if not impossible. The I.B.R.D. Mission rightly holds that, "this is hindering the flow of capital into areas where capital and labour are used most productively to increase output."² With Independence, the Africans should realize this. They should also understand that the Ugandans of non-African origin cannot now snatch away from them the leadership of their country and, that it is in the interest of Uganda to modify the tenancy laws to encourage production through plantations and "peasant outgrower schemes". Under the latter, peasant-cultivators adjoining the estates will be assisted materially

1. The I.B.R.D. Mission, *opp. cit.*, p. 32.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

to grow the same crops as on the neighbouring estates. This may prove a very useful move. Its progress should be carefully watched and its results compared with those of estate production. Maybe that plantation cultivation offers greater internal and external economies, yet, under the existing social and economic structure, "peasant outgrower schemes" can be more easily acceptable to Uganda farmers. It is likely to provide one of the media for the cooperation of Ugandans of African and non-African origin. This will go a long way in bridging the gulf between the two racial groups in the country. Its success in the field of agriculture will pave the way for broadening the scope of such cooperation even in the spheres of trade and industry.

(b) Livestock

A further way of diversifying agricultural produce is to develop the livestock industry. The International Bank Mission has laid great stress on this. It reports, "In our view, the development of livestock industry offers the best promise of diversification."¹

Uganda has a fairly good-sized market for meat. During the 1950's, meat consumption increased at the rate of 2 per cent a year. But the production of both meat and milk is very low in the country. The three local breeds, namely, Zebu, Nganda and Ankole, have low milk yields and slow growth rates. Compared with western standards, even the highest yield is unsatisfactory. As for the growth rates of the Ugandan cattle, they take five years in maturing for the market as against three years in the more advanced stock-raising countries. On the one hand, therefore, there is a strong demand for meat in the markets Uganda can reach, with even a possibility of exporting poor-quality meat; on the other, the country is handicapped in this by the nature of its cattle population as far as its yield and growth rates are concerned. Yet the industry has great possibilities of development.

The ratio of livestock to population exceeds one to one. The cash income of the African enterprises from livestock and products has gone up from £ 6 m. in 1951 to about £ 9 m. in 1957, i.e., about 20 per cent of the total cash income of the African enterprises and only slightly less than the income from coffee-growing. Every opportunity should, therefore, be seized to develop this industry. The main problem in improvement of livestock is to keep it healthy and strong, although, to improve the breed, selective breeding within the local breeds and cross-breeding of local with foreign breeds will be another useful method in developing this industry.

2. CAPITAL

The problems relating to capital in African countries in general, and to that in Uganda in particular, are not the problems of paucity of funds

1. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

for development purposes. During the next few years, the volume of development funds as well as technical assistance from the advanced countries and international agencies, etc., is likely to increase rapidly. The problem would rather be to what extent funds could be raised externally in order that they might be profitably employed, keeping in mind the national interests of a sovereign people and also the present economic and social structure of the country. The first important need would be to generate demand for capital within the country which will enable people to gauge in a proper light the case for and against dependence on foreign aid. This way external aid would be canalised in the most productive sectors of economy. As G. M. Meir and R. E. Baldwin point out, "Development will falter if incomes are increased through external aid without internal motivation."¹ The country should establish its capital base on its own soil and should look for foreign aid, as far as possible, only to the extent of its requirements for such development projects which are considered important, which could not be wholly financed from internal resources or which by their very nature require a kind of technical competence not available locally and/or which require huge investments which cannot be easily raised within the country.

Uganda, today, is passing through financial stringency because of a fall in its income from its two major export commodities, cotton and coffee. This State is likely to continue for a number of years. The capital budget may be raised to the 1957 level,² as is suggested by the International Bank Mission, but it will have to be replenished mainly with foreign grants. There is no escape from that. The Governments in the underdeveloped countries have to play increasingly an important role in the economic progress of their countries. In the light of that, more and more funds are to be raised both internally and externally. Uganda will have to do the same. However, because of financial stringency, the Government of independent Uganda should see to it that the private sector also contributes its utmost towards the development of the country. The economy of Uganda is mostly dependent upon private individuals and it is likely to remain so for a foreseeable future. Essentially an agricultural economy, it has more than one million peasant-farmers, working on small 6- to 8-acre plots of land, who provide more than 60 per cent of the gross domestic produce. Then there is private estate cultivation contributing a valuable addition to agricultural incomes.

In commerce and industry, too, the importance of the private sector is most significant. The processing of cotton and coffee is in private hands. Almost the entire domestic and foreign trade, leaving aside a small fraction of foreign commerce, is controlled privately. The entire

1. G. M. Meir and R. E. Baldwin, *Economic Development Theory, History, Policy*, p. 335.

2. The Mission has suggested a Central Government capital and development expenditure of £ 33.8 m. over the period 1961/62 to 1965/66, i.e., £ 6.8 m. per year; i.e., slightly more than the 1956/57 capital budget revenue of £ 6.2 m. See table above on page 191.

commercial banking system and most of the manufacturing concerns are privately owned. In 1960, there were 28,000 workers employed by the privately-owned manufacturing and mining industries. The corresponding figure for public-owned manufacturing and mining industries was only 5,000. The sectors of this magnitude and importance, therefore, cannot be ignored or spared. In this sector, a good portion of the investment and skilled labour is supplied by the Asian and European communities of Uganda, particularly in trade and industry. In the recent past, the political scene in the country has generated intense heat, resulting in fear and uncertainty in the minds of these communities. This has caused flight of capital from the country. The Ugandan Africans have come to believe that most of their poverty is due to their exploitation by the non-African communities. In their struggle for independence, the African political leaders had made a slogan of this, pointing out the differences in the standard of living of the two racial groups. The argument had a sound base as, till the end of World War II, hardly any conscious effort was made by the Government to improve the lot of the African people. It was left entirely to the forces of "market", the mechanism of which helped enterprising Asians and Europeans to become far richer than their African brethren who were left behind to work their primitive subsistence economy. No attention was paid to the requirements of fairplay, social justice and equity. Even though Uganda was repeatedly declared as an African State, where the interests of the Africans were supposed to dominate as against the interests of the other communities, the free enterprise, in the days of its glory, resulted, as could be expected, in the prosperity of those who possessed capital resources and business acumen and who had known the modern techniques of production and working of "markets". This placed illiterate and unsophisticated Africans at their mercy. No wonder they resented this most when they became conscious of it. But the position is altogether different today. Uganda has already advanced to a stage where the market incentives with some amount of check and direction will not only be conducive to economic growth but will not ride roughshod over the interests of Africans. At the present stage of its development, Uganda needs its people of non-African origin¹ more than, in a way, they need Uganda. Any loss of capital and enterprise will adversely affect the tempo of development. The International Bank is correct when it maintains, "It is an elementary truth that, over the next decade or two, prospects of growth will be greatly influenced by how successfully present sources of private investment and management are sustained . . ."²

Since 1954, there has been a net outflow of capital from Uganda. No published work so far has given a correct picture of the extent of this

1. These are the people who have capital, skills and business acumen.

2. I.B.R.D., *op. cit.*, p. 64.

outflow but it seems to be substantial. This is one of the factors responsible for declining trends in the process of capital formation within the country in the last few years. The following table shows the fall in capital formation since 1958.

TABLE 5
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION BY SECTOR

(in million £)

Sector	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
1. Central Government	4.9	4.8	5.9	6.2	6.4	5.3
2. Local Governments	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.9
3. East African High Commission	2.4	3.5	1.1	0.9	0.5	1.0
4. Uganda Development Corp. Associated Cos., & Uganda Electricity Board	6.1	6.5	4.9	3.6	3.5	2.8
5. Others	7.6	10.6	13.9	16.8	12.3	9.6
Total :	22.0	26.8	27.2	29.3	24.4	20.6

Source : I. B. R. D. Mission, *The Economic Development of Uganda*, 1961. Table S. 6 Statistical Appendix.

The table shows that the gross capital formation was highest in 1957—£ 29.3 m. The contributions of the two sectors, viz., the public sector and the private sector, were £ 12.5 m. and £ 16.8 m., respectively. In the year 1959, the two corresponding figures were £ 11 m. and £ 9.6 m., i.e., a reduction of only £ 1.5 m. in the public sector and as much as £ 7.1 m. in the private sector.¹ This, apart from other reasons, is due to lack of confidence in non-African Ugandans who have preferred to transfer their funds either to England or India or elsewhere rather than invest them within the country. This does not augur well for a developing country. Its Government must understand its responsibility to restore that confidence in the Ugandans of non-African origin. It should shape the framework of the economic structure in such a way that all possible incentives like tariff protection, tax incentives, mine and factory regulations, research, etc., are offered to private investment and enterprise.

3. SKILLED LABOUR

Skilled labour is of prime importance in the process of economic development. An important portion of Uganda's skilled labour comes

1. For the sake of simplicity I have included the first four items in the public sector although the 4th item, U.D.C. Associated Coys. and U.E.B. would include part of the contribution from the private collaborators.

from its non-African communities. The Africans are increasingly joining these ranks and there is greater awareness in them of the importance of skills. It will, however, take quite some time before the Africans can man all the services, including the commercial activities, of Uganda. The Africans fear that the non-African communities of Uganda stand as a hurdle in their economic progress. This, I believe, is not true today. The Asian and European communities can actually be a useful source in training up the Africans. With independence, such scope will be greatly widened, as the non-African communities know well that the rulers will be none else than the Ugandan Africans.

One of the urgent needs of planned development is to assess and effectively utilize the skills within the country in which effort the skills of Ugandans of non-African origin ought to be taken into account. It will be better for the country if its African population sheds its memory of past exploitation. The whole political, social and economic situation in the country is different today from what it was even a decade ago. Uganda should grasp the opportunity and make best use of all its manpower resources, whatever their colour or origin.

There are 3.7 million people in the age-group of 16 years and above. Of this number, only 240,000 work outside peasant agriculture and domestic service. In this, the number of Africans is 225,000 and the remaining 15,000 consist of 10,000 people of Asian origin and 5,000 people of European stock. The top skilled, administrative, managerial and technical personnel are mainly Asians and Europeans. The table below gives the occupational pattern of the different races in Uganda.

TABLE 6
OCCUPATION AND RACE (Adult Men)
UGANDA 1955

	Europeans	Asians	Africans
1. Managerial and professional	1,470	1,140	10,870
2. Clerks, shopkeepers and shop assistants	190	2,730	7,040
3. Supervisors	380	710	2,330
4. Skilled	460	2,280	21,100
5. Labourers	—	—	1,14,780
6. All others	220	410	29,340
Total :	2,720	7,270	185,460

Source : Elkan, Walter, *Migrants and Proletarians*, 1960, p. 49.

From the table, it can be deduced that the bulk of Africans, i.e., 144,780 men, come under the category of unskilled workers. Under

other heads, too, as Dr. Elkan points out, "... most of the jobs held by non-Africans are different from those in the same category held by Africans. Even where both are described as "clerks", the one may be a very responsible cashier, whilst the other is a copy typist. Amongst the Africans shown in the category of "Managerial and Professional", a large number are probably elementary school teachers, some of them not even with a school certificate."¹ The table further indicates the relative importance of Uganda's non-African population in the economy of the country. On this section of the population now falls the responsibility of training up the Africans at an accelerated pace. The non-African community will also do well to withdraw from such economic activities where the Africans have learned the tools of the trade. This is in reference to retail trade² where the Asian community is considered by the Africans as a major hindrance to their progress. It would be wiser for the Asian small trader to encourage the African in this field and where African trader could replace him, he should voluntarily allow that and avoid unnecessary clash.

One thing which emerges out of this discussion is the need for technical and other education for Africans. The Government is not blind to such a necessity. As a matter of fact, technical and other education has been receiving the necessary attention. All sections of education have made good progress during the 1950's. In the Government-aided primary schools, enrolment went up from 163,300 in 1950 to 346,000 in 1960. In the junior secondary schools there were, in 1960, 25,450 students and in the same year in 22 Government-aided academic secondary schools in rural areas, the number of pupils was 3,700.

Technical and vocational training has also been considerably strengthened. In 1959, there were 79 trade, homecraft and farm schools, with an enrolment of 2,763 pupils. The number of apprenticeships for boys from technical schools was 339 in 1957-58. In addition, many were being trained for specific jobs in Government departments.

The position with regard to educational facilities in the country is not, however, altogether satisfactory. Much remains to be done. But, keeping in mind the financial resources of the country and the demand upon these of all sectors of economy, progress in the post-war years has been very encouraging.

III

CONCLUSION

To sum up, it may be said that Uganda is on the crossroads in its economic history. The booming days of the post-war years upto 1954

1. Elkan, Walter, *Migrants and Proletarians*, 1960. p. 49.
2. "African traders entered business in large numbers after the Second World War, and now constitute more than two-thirds of the total number of traders in the Protectorate." See U. P., *The Advancement of Africans in Trade*, 1955, p. 1.

are not likely to return in the near future. The falling incomes from cotton and coffee and increasing expenditures on financing the development projects may worsen the financial position as the years roll by. The low incomes of the Africans, comprising 98.5 per cent of the total population, reduce the scope for direct taxation. The subsistence sector of the economy still contributes one-third to the total domestic production, which means little prospect of land revenue in rural areas. The accumulated savings of the past have almost been exhausted. The country is thus left with no alternative in choosing whether or not it should lean heavily on foreign grants, but foreign aid without creating internal motivation for it may not flow in the most productive channels. Recourse to deficit financing may become necessary but there is a danger that it may reach a point where the upward rise in prices may constitute a vicious spiral. The position is difficult all round.

The solution lies in producing more, maybe, with little or no substantial addition to the material comforts of the people for some time, so that additional incomes thus generated are ploughed back in the form of investment. Uganda has fortunately a sound infra-structure for a country of its size and at its stage of development. This should enable it to make fruitful use of such foreign aid as it receives. And yet as every cent will matter to the country, its use will have to be carefully worked out and its expenditure scrupulously supervised.

The private sector, particularly Uganda's non-African peoples, with its technical know-how, skills and finance, is a source of tremendous value to the country. It should be put to its best use. This should not jeopardise African interests in any way. On the contrary, the non-African community should be fully utilised in training Africans in the arts of business and industry. "Peasant outgrower schemes" are a practical way of launching partnership ventures whereby both the communities stand gain. More avenues of such kind should be discovered in the fields of commerce and industry.

Ultimately, it will be toil and tears of the people of Uganda which alone will push up the economy to a stage of self-sustained growth. Much will depend on their ability to adapt themselves to new ideas and techniques, to new forces and frictions. They must intelligently seize the opportunity when it comes their way and resist everything that hinders their progress. What Uganda needs most today is vigorous and imaginative leadership both in the field of politics and that of economics.

INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY

by

DR. K. GOPALACHARI

THE 2,400-mile India-China border, which runs in a wide arc from the tri-junction of Afghanistan, China and India in the west to the tri-junction of Burma, China and India in the east, is one of the longest in the world. The Indian alignment of the India-China boundary is a traditional and historical one, determined along a majestic and unchanging natural feature, that is, a watershed, sanctified by treaties, and reinforced by the exercise of continuous administrative jurisdiction. It has been well known and respected by both sides for centuries. According to international law and usage, an international boundary based on tradition and custom and running along distinctive and unchanging natural features stands defined, and needs no further or formal definition, not to mention demarcation.

A striking feature of the Indian alignment of the India-China boundary is that it lies along high and continuous watersheds ranging in height from 14,000 to 25,000 feet, and forming a majestic wall of nature. A watershed is a mountain range dividing two river-systems or basins. The fact that a river breaks through here and there does not vitiate a watershed. In the west, the boundary lies along the watershed between the Indus system in India, and the Yarkhand and Yurung Qash systems in China. Further south, it follows the watershed between the Sutlej in Tibet and the Ganges in India. East of Nepal, it is the crest of the Himalayan range forming the watershed between the northern tributaries of the Brahmaputra and the southern tributaries of the Tsangpo. There is no break or fault in the watershed, a fact implicit in the Rig Vedic utterance, "The Himalayas symbolise all mountains."

This watershed forms the Himalayan buttress to the plateau of Tibet, also called "the roof of the world". It is the crest of the Main Himalayan Range in the eastern region, while in the western and middle sectors it is the Lesser Himalayan Range lying to the north and east of the Main Himalayan Range. The ranges along which the boundary runs are also known locally as the Mustagh, Aghil, Kuen Lun, Zaskar, and Main Himalayan Ranges.

The Chinese alignment, made known for the first time at the meeting of the officials of the two countries in 1960, lacks unity and consistency,

jumps from range to range, which are unconnected by even spurs, and zigzags across rivers, lakes, minor watersheds, etc. Above all, the Chinese frontier is a shifting one, marching with their advancing armies.

The broad belt of the Indian frontier territory was once the seat of the kingdoms of Ladakh, Spiti, Bashahr, Brahmapura, Garhwal and Kama-rupa and the present Indian alignment represents the boundaries of these early Indian kingdoms.

It will be convenient to discuss this boundary sector by sector :

(a) *The Western Sector*.—The Indian alignment of the boundary from the tri-junction of India, China and Afghanistan to the Karakoram Pass represents the traditional boundary of Hunza and Baltistan with Sinkiang; and the people of Hunza have exercised various rights including agricultural cultivation, pasturage and grazing rights in this area. The Shimshalis, in particular, used the entire area up to the Shaksgam for grazing and extracted salt at various places in the valley. On the other hand, no one from China ever used this area. The Mirs of Hunza exercised authority in this region, maintained posts and collected revenue. Official Chinese maps published in 1917, 1919 and 1931 showed this area as a part of India.

The Indian alignment of Ladakh's boundary with Tibet and Sinkiang is also a traditional one, dating back by at least 10 centuries; it has been well known and accepted by both sides for centuries. Chronicles, travellers' accounts and Chinese and other maps prove that Aksai Chin was always included in India and that further south the traditional boundary lay along the Lanak La, the Niagzu stream, and between Demchok and Tashigong through the Imis Pass, which is in accordance with the Indian alignment. The Royal Chronicle of the Kings of Ladakh written in the 17th century speaks of a family partition of the kingdom by which the eldest son got Ladakh proper whose boundaries were fixed at Demchok and the Imis Pass. The same Chronicle states that, as late as the 17th century, Demchok continued to be in Ladakh. Ippolito Desideri, a Jesuit priest who travelled from Leh to Lhasa in 1715-16, stated that Tashigong was on the frontier of Ladakh, thus showing that Demchok lying further north was part of Ladakh. James Baillie Fraser, who visited the area in 1820, says that Demchok was on the frontier of Ladakh while Tashigong was in Tibet. That the boundary further north lay along the Chumesang stream is attested to by the Indian traveller Nain Singh (1873) and the European traveller Wellby. That further north it ran across the Lanak Pass is testified by several travellers in the region, such as Carey (1885-87), Bower (1891), and Deasey (1900).

Chinese maps show that, before the 20th century, Sinkiang province did not extend even as far south as the Kuen Lun, not to speak of its not having included Aksai Chin further south. A map drawn towards the end of the 6th century A.D. showed clearly that the Kuen Lun mountains formed the southern limits of Sinkiang. *The Annals and*

Maps of the Western Territories of the Empire published in 1762 had a number of maps, all of which showed that Sinkiang did not extend even up to where the Indian alignment was being shown, that is, along the Kuen Lun mountains. The map published by the Peking University in 1925 and showing the maximum extent of China under the Ching dynasty, that is, before 1911, shows that Sinkiang did not include the Aksai Chin area. *The Map of Western Tibet in the New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China*, drawn on the basis of authoritative official surveys, showed the northern and eastern boundaries of Ladakh more or less in accordance with the Indian alignment. So does the map of *Central Asien* compiled from the latest sources by Dr. Joseph Chavanne and published at Leipzig in 1890.

The inhabitants of the neighbouring villages in Ladakh regularly collected salt from the lakes in Aksai Chin, Lingzitang and areas further south. These areas now claimed by the Chinese were the traditional pasture grounds for Indian villagers. Permits for hunting expeditions in the areas were issued by the Kashmir authorities.

In addition to delimitation by historic process, the Ladakh-Tibet boundary received, at least twice in 1684 and 1842, the further sanction or confirmation by treaty. The treaty of peace concluded between Ladakh and Tibet in 1684 stated: "The boundaries fixed in the beginning, when Skyid-Ida-ngeemagon gave a kingdom to each of his three sons, (10th cen. A.D.) shall still be maintained." That the treaty was a valid agreement was shown by the fact that from 1684, through the 18th and 19th centuries right up to our own times, the other articles of the treaty such as those relating to trade and exchange of missions, were in operation. The second confirmation by treaty of the traditional Ladakh-Tibet boundary was in 1842. It was between Kashmir and Ladakh on the one hand and Tibet and China on the other, and one of its articles stipulated: "We shall remain in possession of the limits of the boundaries of Ladakh and surrounding dependencies, in accordance with the old custom, and there shall be no transgression beyond the old, established frontiers." The two treaties of 1684 and 1842, therefore, confirmed the traditional boundary of Ladakh. Tibet was a party to the 1684 treaty and Tibet and China were parties to the 1842 treaty. In January 1847, the Chinese Imperial Commissioner at Canton wrote to the British Government as follows: "Respecting the frontiers, I beg to remark that the borders of these territories have been sufficiently and distinctly fixed, so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them." An agreement between the local authorities in 1852 stipulated that "the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet shall remain as before". In 1899, the British Government gave a description of the traditional boundaries as running along the Kuen Lun Range to a point east of 80° Longitude, thus making it clear that the whole of the

Aksai Chin area lay in Indian territory.

The areas of Ladakh claimed by the Chinese side besides being part of India by tradition and treaty were regularly and effectively administered right up to the Indian alignment by the Indian authorities. Till 1901, these areas were part of the Wazarat of the frontier district comprising Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh, when it was divided into the Gilgit and Ladakh Wazarats. The latter comprised the three Tehsils of Skardu, Kargil and Ladakh. Aksai Chin, Lingzitang and Chang Chenmo, and areas further south claimed by the Chinese formed part of the Ladakh Tehsil and the first three to the Tanktse *ilaqua* of the Ladakh Tehsil. There is considerable evidence of Indian administration of these areas in the revenue records. Regular assessments and settlements of revenue were made from time to time, and revenue collected from all inhabited places up to the boundary. Those areas which were not inhabited were, however, also shown in the revenue maps and control was exercised over them through the levy of duties on flocks and pastures, maintenance of caravan routes and rest houses, and supervision and control over trading routes. A systematic settlement of revenue up to the traditional alignment was made in 1860-65 and revised from time to time. The lists of villages in the Revenue Assessment Reports of 1902 and 1908 mentioned 110 villages including Tanktse, Demchok and Chushul. The Report of 1908 made it clear that "the existing boundary seems to be well understood by subjects of both the State (that is Kashmir) and the Lhasa Governments." A Kashmir Government Statute of 1941 declared certain areas in the Demchok, Spanggur, Pangong and Chang Chenmo areas as Game Sanctuaries, Game Reserves and Reserve areas. Officials and parties toured the areas in the north and east right up to the traditional boundary, especially during 1911-1949. In recent years, reconnaissance parties had been visiting this area. The official reports and accounts prepared by explorers and surveyors sent by the Government of India to different parts of Ladakh at various times, and official maps, provided conclusive evidence, showing that the jurisdiction of the Indian Government extended over these regions. In fact, the quantum of evidence of this category is so overwhelming that at the meeting of officials in 1960, only illustrative and select evidence was provided.

(b) *The Middle Sector*.—The Spiti valley, which at present forms part of the Kulu Tehsil of the Kangra District of the Punjab, was ruled in early times by a Hindu dynasty and later formed part of Ladakh. That the present Indian alignment lying along the Spiti-Pare watershed is traditional is attested to by travellers such as Moorcroft (1819), Gerard (1821) and Thomas Hutton (1838).

That the Shipki Pass lay on the traditional boundary between Bashahr and Tibet is proved by the old saying: "The territory above Pimala (Shipki Pass) belongs to the Raja of Tibet and below to the

Raja of Bashahr."

Literary and historical sources show that the Sulej-Ganges watershed has been the traditional boundary between India and Tibet in the Garhwal area. The *Skanda Purana* mentions that all the tributaries of the Ganges lay in *Kedar Kshetra*. We have it also on the testimony of Hieun Tsang, who visited India about 640 A. D., and the copper plate inscriptions of the Katyuri kings of Garhwal and Kumaon, that the Hindu kingdom of Garhwal extended right up to the Sulej-Ganges watershed.

Writing about the State of Garhwal in the 16th century, the historian Ferishta said that "the sources of the Jumna and the Ganges are to be found within this territory". The two Lamas who had been commissioned by the Chinese Emperor Kang-hsi in the early years of the 18th century to survey Western Tibet found that "the Ganges took its rise on the opposite side of that chain of mountains". James Baillie Fraser who explored the Ganges Valley in 1815, the year of the British conquest of Garhwal, found that "many of the larger rivers of Upper India, and all those which form the origin of the Ganges have their rise in its mountains and hold their courses through its territory." The famous map of Central Asia published by Jules Klaproth in Paris in 1836 and the map *Central Asien*, compiled from the latest sources by Joseph Chavanne show the boundary along the watershed.

In Spiti, the area right up to the watershed was included in British-Indian revenue settlements from 1851 and the area was topographically surveyed in 1850, 1879, etc. Further south, the area up to the Shipki Pass has always been included in the Indian village of Namgia and had been surveyed in 1882, 1897, 1917 and 1920. The Government of India have, for long, maintained the Hindustan-Tibet Road right up to the pass.

The frontier areas of Garhwal up to the Sulej-Ganges watershed were subjected to the Revenue Settlements of 1815, 1842, 1856, 1896 and 1920. They were also topographically surveyed by official survey parties.

(c) *The Eastern Sector*.—The boundary of Sikkim runs along the northern and eastern watershed of the Teesta and the Bhutan-Tibet boundary runs along the watershed crest of the Himalayan Range. The McMahon Line delimits the traditional North-East boundary of India with Tibet. The Line derives its name from Sir Henry McMahon, the British Plenipotentiary to the Tripartite Simla Conference in 1913-14, at which the boundary was formalised.

It runs in a wide arc with bulges for 650 miles from the tri-junction of Bhutan, India and Tibet at Teygala (91° 40' East Longitude and 27° 48' North Latitude) to the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, Burma, and Tibet at Peak 15,283 (97° 23' East Longitude and 28° 13' North Latitude). The boundary follows the crest of the

Himalayan Range, which here forms the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra except where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri and Nyamjang rivers break through. This watershed range is higher and more majestic than the India-China watershed boundary in the Middle and Western Sectors.

There is also a Burmese section of the McMahon Line. When the Indo-Tibetan Agreement on the North-East boundary was concluded in 1914 at the Simla Conference, Burma was a part of India, and had at its northern extremity an undefined boundary with Tibet. This gap was bridged by extending the line from the present tri-junction of Burma, India and Tibet, in horse-shoe fashion, along the northern watershed of the Irrawaddy to the Isu Razi Pass, where it met the northern extremity of the previously settled boundary between Burma and China.

While the Chinese have accepted the Burmese section of McMahon Line without the slightest modification, and as the traditional and customary line, they have branded the India-China section of the McMahon Line as illegal and imperialist, and claim a vast area of 33,000 square miles south of the Line. They also accuse India of having advanced the McMahon Line, in certain sectors, at the expense of Tibet.

The historical and legal validity of the McMahon Line is beyond doubt. It represents not only the geographical and ethnic, but also the historical and political dividing line between India and Tibet. The area south of the Line, known at present as the North-East Frontier Agency, is a sub-montane belt, while that to the north is the plateau region of Tibet. The area south of the Line is inhabited by tribes, such as, Monpas, Akas, Daflas, Miris, Abors and Mishmis, who are totally different from the Tibetans.

The traditional Indo-Tibetan boundary in the north-east was formalised at the Simla Conference by the Indo-Tibetan Agreement of March 24-25, 1914, and the Indo-Tibetan Convention of July 1914. The line was delineated on two sheets of a map drawn to a scale of 1" : 8 miles; and in the map attached to the Convention and in his letter to the British Plenipotentiary, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary conveyed the acceptance of the Line by the Government of Tibet.

The McMahon Line was not arbitrarily drawn by the British and Tibetan representatives behind the back of the Chinese representative. It was shown in a map placed before the Conference by the British Representative on February 17, 1914, as the "historic Tibetan frontiers". It was also shown by a red line on the map attached to the Convention, initialled by the Plenipotentiaries of India, Tibet and China on April 27, 1914, and signed by the Plenipotentiaries of India and Tibet on July 3, 1914.

Even so, Chinese adherence to the Indo-Tibetan Agreement of March 1954 was not necessary. Tibet had, in the past, entered into

a number of treaties which were not only considered as valid by the parties concerned, but were in actual operation for decades. The Treaty of 1842, which Tibet signed with Ladakh and Kashmir, confirmed Tibetan traditional boundaries in the west and regulated trade relations, and it had been in operation right up to our own times. Similarly, the Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856 was in actual operation until abrogated by the Sino-Nepalese Treaty of 1956. It is thus clear that the McMahon Line is valid and legal.

The McMahon Line thus merely formalised the traditional boundary between India and Tibet. According to international law and usage, a customary and traditional boundary, following unchanging and distinctive natural features, stands defined, and needs no further or formal definition.

That the traditional boundary lay along the Himalayas is proved by various sources. The *Vishnu Purana's* description of the Hindu kingdom of Kamarupa would place its northern limits along the Himalayas. The *Yogini Purana* of the eighth century states that the kingdom of Kamarupa extended up to the Kanja Hills, i.e., the Himalayan Range. In the thirteenth century, the tribal area south of the Himalayas came under the political authority of the Ahoms. A work written in the seventeenth century entitled *The Political Geography of the Assam Valley* mentions Akas, Daflas and Bhutias as tributaries of the Ahom kings.

Desideri, an Italian traveller in Tibet (1716-29), stated that Tibetans had no dealings with the tribal people. Horace Della Penna, another traveller, who visited Tibet in 1730, wrote that Tibet was bounded in the south by Lhoba (tribal territory). In 1883, Michell, in his *Report on the North-East Frontier of India*, said that the northern boundary of the Abor territory was the Nainphala, i.e., the Himalayas.

These accounts are confirmed by Chinese works. According to the *Wei Tsang Tu Chih*, Loyu (tribal territory) is to the south of the Tibetan territory. Another Chinese work, *Hsi-tsang Tu Kao* (1886), states that Loyu belongs to the British.

Unofficial maps, both Chinese and others, prove the traditional basis of the Indian alignment. A map compiled by certain Jesuit missionaries and Lamas under the orders of Emperor Kang-hsi between 1711 & 1717 shows the southern boundary of Tibet along the Himalayan Range. The map published by the Peking University in November 1925, depicting the maximum extent of China in the days of the Ching dynasty (that is, before 1911) shows the frontier of India as lying where the present Indian alignment lies.

The entire tribal area up to the McMahon Line has been under continuous Ahom and later British administration. Under the latter, from the outset, the tribal areas were under the jurisdiction of Political Agents or Deputy Commissioners of the adjoining districts. In 1912, the area was divided into three Frontier Tracts each under a Political Officer. In 1919, they were divided into two Frontier Tracts and

became Excluded Areas under the Constitution of 1935. Political Officers toured the areas, submitted annual and census reports, preserved law and order, exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction, constructed roads, conducted surveys and settled inter-tribal disputes.

The Chinese charge that we have advanced the McMahon Line at its two extremities is totally unwarranted. At both, the Agreement Line lies along the highest watershed ridge and the Indian alignment strictly follows these features. As observed by Sir Henry McMahon in his Memorandum: "It will be seen that the boundary line agreed to by the Tibet Government, as shown by the red line on the map, follows, except where it crosses the valleys of the Taron, Lohit, Tsangpo, Subansiri and Nyamjang rivers, and for a short distance near Tsari, the northern watershed of the Irrawaddy and Brahmaputra rivers. It is to be seen that the boundary line on the west follows the crest of the mountain range which runs from Peak (21,431') through Tulungla to the Bhutan border. This is the highest mountain range in this tract of the country. To the north of it are the people of Tibetan descent. To the south, the inhabitants are of Bhutanese extraction. It is unquestionably the correct boundary."

It is, thus, clear that the McMahon Line represents the traditional boundary between India and Tibet. It has also acquired further validity in a treaty and by regular Indian administration up to the Line.

DOCUMENTATION

THE SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY

**PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE RULER OF JAMMU ON THE ONE
HAND, THE EMPEROR OF CHINA AND THE LAMA GURU
OF LHASA ON THE OTHER (1842)**

This treaty reaffirmed the traditional boundary between Ladakh and Tibet which had earlier been affirmed in the treaty of 1684.

As on this auspicious day, the 2nd of Assuj, Sambat 1899 (16th or 17th September, 1842 A.D.), we, the officers of the Lhasa (Government), Kalon of Soka and Bakshi Shajpuh, Commander of the Forces and two officers on behalf of the most resplendent Sri Khalsaji Sahib, the asylum of the world, King Sher Singhji and Sri Maharaj Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singhji, i.e., the Muktar-ud-Daula Diwan Hari Chand and the asylum of vizirs, Vizir Ratnun, in a meeting called together for the promotion of peace and unity, and by professions and vows of friendship, unity and sincerity of heart and by taking oaths like those of Kunjak Sahib, have arranged and agreed that relations of peace, friendship and unity between Sri Khalsaji and Sri Maharaj Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singhji, and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will henceforward remain firmly established for ever; and we declare in the presence of the Kunjak Sahib that on no account whatsoever will there be any deviation, difference or departure (from this agreement). We shall neither at present nor in future have anything to do or interfere at all with the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings as fixed from ancient times and will allow the annual export of wool, shawls and tea by way of Ladakh according to the old established custom.

Should any of the opponents of Sri Sarkar Khalsaji and Sri Raja Sahib Bahadur at any time enter our territories, we shall not pay any heed to his words or allow him to remain in our country.

We shall offer no hindrance to traders of Ladakh who visit our territories. We shall not even to the extent of a hair's breadth act in contravention of the terms that we have agreed to above regarding firm friendship, unity, the fixed boundaries of Ladakh and the keeping open of the route for wool, shawls and tea. We call Kunjak Sahib, Kairi, Lassi, Zhoh Mahan, and Khushal Choh as witnesses to this treaty.

The treaty was concluded on the 2nd of the month of Assuj, Sambat 1899 (16th or 17th September, 1842 A.D.).

AGREEMENT BETWEEN TIBET AND KASHMIR (1852)

The Agreement reaffirmed the traditional boundary between Ladakh and Tibet.

This is dated the third day of the month of the Water Bull Year (apparently 1852).

The Ladakhis refusing to supply the Tibetan Government trader Ke-Sang Gyurme with the usual transport animals on account of the

decreased tea trade, the Nyer-pass of the Garpons were deputed to enquire about this matter and to investigate the boundary dispute between Ladak and Tibet. A meeting was accordingly arranged between Ladak Thanadar Sahib Bastiram and Kalon Rinzin accompanied by his servant Yeshe Wangyal and an agreement was made as follows:

In future the Ladakis will supply the Tibetan Government traders with the usual transport requirements without any demur. The joint Te-Jis¹ will request their Government to appoint only intelligent and capable men to take the annual tribute to Tibet. The Ladakis shall provide the Tibetan Government traders with accommodation and servants as usual and render them any further assistance according to the old-established custom. The Garpons will issue orders to the effect that tea and woollen goods arriving at Nagari shall only be sent to Ladak and not to any other place. The boundary between Ladak and Tibet will remain the same as before. No restriction shall be laid by the people of Rudok on the export of salt and woollen goods and the import of barley flour and barley. Neither party shall contravene the existing rules and the rates of customs duties and market supplies shall be fixed by both parties concerned. The above rules shall apply also to the Rongpas², who export salt. The travellers from North and West who come through Rong are given passports by the Thanadar. They are liable to custom duties as prescribed in their passports. Should any of them be unable to produce his passport, he shall be made to pay fifty times the amount ordinarily recoverable from him. No case will be heard against such recoveries made by the Customs Officer. In deciding all important matters the ruler shall take into consideration the manners and customs of both sides and observe the old-established rules regarding supply of transport, etc. There shall be no restriction in grazing animals in the pasture reserved for the animals of the Government traders, but the people shall not be allowed to abuse this privilege by bringing animals from outside to graze on it. Both parties shall adhere strictly to the agreement thus arrived at between Tibet and Singpas (Kashmiris), and the two frontier officers shall act in perfect accord and co-operation.

Drawn in duplicate and sealed by Thanadar Sahib Bastiram and Kalon Rinzin Two Nyer-pass of the Garpons. Witness Yeshe Wangyal, private servant of Kalon Rinzin.

INDIA-TIBET FRONTIER (1914)

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND TIBETAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES

This Agreement, concluded through an exchange of letters on 24th and 25th March, 1914, between the British and Tibetan Plenipo-

1. *i.e.*, the Garpons of Sartok. 'Teji' is a Tibetan title which the then Garpons might have held.

2. *i.e.*, people inhabiting the valley countries.

tentiaries and the subsequent Convention of July 1914 formalised the traditional north-eastern boundary of India with Tibet.

To

Lonchen Shatra,
Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your Government and the following conditions:—

- (a) The Tibetan ownership in private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.
- (b) If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day's march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.

I understand that your Government have now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions. I shall be glad to learn definitely from you that this is the case.

You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Jong and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr. Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished to him the further information, which you have promised.

The final settlement of this India-Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.

Delhi,
24th March, 1914.

A. H. McMAHON,
British Plenipotentiary.

TRANSLATION

To

Sir Henry McMahon,
British Plenipotentiary to the China-Tibet Conference.

As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the conditions, mentioned in your letter, dated the 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.

Sent on the 29th day of the 1st Month of the Wood-Tiger Year (25th March, 1914) by Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary.
(Seal of Lonchen Shatra).

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE

Compiled by K. H. PATEL

Prime Minister Nehru was accorded a tumultuous welcome by the people of Nigeria when he arrived in Lagos on September 23, 1962 on a five-day State visit. An influential English daily of Lagos, *The West African Pilot*, commented editorially: "The visit of Mr. Nehru to Nigeria is one of the greatest events of our lifetime. To all Nigerian true nationalists, it is an occasion for joy to see one of those who inspired us in our battle for country's independence and freedom."

**Nigeria Welcomes
Nehru**

Mr. Nehru's visit was of special interest to the people of Nigeria because of marked similarity of situations in India and Nigeria. Both Nigeria and India "graduated" to freedom through the crucible of imperialism. Both have followed the policy of non-alignment since independence. Nigerian nationalist leaders have often proclaimed openly that they drew inspiration from India. With the achievement of Independence by India fifteen years ago, the struggle for freedom and the dignity of man in Nigeria took new dimensions inspired by an added zest. Lastly, India's co-operation with and assistance to Nigeria since her independence in the fields of education, technology and engineering proves conclusively that the Indian sub-continent genuinely stretches the hand of fellowship to Nigeria.

Addressing a joint session of the Parliament on the day following his arrival in Lagos, Mr. Nehru told the legislators: "The world is living in an atmosphere of tension and war because of the old antagonism between the East and the West, but the presence of the non-aligned nations acts as a buffer between them. I am happy to note that Nigeria's foreign policy is also moving along non-aligned lines."

Speaking on the occasion of the State banquet arranged in his honour, Mr. Nehru said that he was excited at his visit to Nigeria—real Africa—and it was exciting to see the turn of events in Africa towards independence after a long period of agony and suffering. Replying to the toast, the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, said that India had given Nigeria a lead in pursuing the policy of non-alignment in the international sphere and "we find it suits us". Sir Abubakar added: "We have a lot of inspiration from you and the Indian people and will be always grateful to you."

At a press conference on September 26, 1962, Mr. Nehru affirmed India's moral support to "every movement for freedom in Africa".

That this moral support is not a negligible force is evident from the common stand against colonialism in the United Nations by the Afro-Asian nations.

In a joint communique, the two Prime Ministers stated that "colonialism in all its forms and racial oppression are a threat to peace." The communique also noted with satisfaction that there was co-operation in many fields between India and Nigeria. They expressed the hope that friendly relations and co-operation between the two countries would continue to grow.

As part of this friendly co-operation, the Indian Airlines Corporation has already loaned to the Nigerian Government the services of ten of its pilots, one planning engineer, one chief inspector and three aircraft-maintenance engineers. An Economic Adviser to the Government of Nigeria and the general managers of the Nigerian Railways and Airways are also Indians.

In the economic field, there are immense possibilities of boosting the trade between the two countries. There is considerable scope for Indian products such as textiles, cinema films, vegetable oils and iron ore in Nigeria. The Indian Prime Minister's visit should, therefore, give an impetus to closer political and economic ties between the two countries.

After sixty-eight years of British rule, Uganda became the 33rd independent African country on 9th October, 1962. With an area of 2,43,000 square kilometres and about seven million people, it is the wealthiest of the three East African territories. It is rich in coffee, cotton and copper.

On the occasion of independence, the Government of Uganda declared that "it will pay due heed to the traditional beliefs and customs of the diverse peoples of Uganda. It will, under the constitution, recognize the special status and dignity of the hereditary rulers of the (four) kingdoms." Such a declaration was perhaps necessary to assuage tribal loyalties and tribal bonds among the peoples of the four kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole.

The Government of Uganda has avowedly stated that the close links which already bind the East African territories will be further strengthened.

The relations between the peoples of Uganda and India have been friendly. Greeting Mr. Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda, on the occasion of his country's independence, Prime Minister Nehru said, "We greatly look forward to increased friendship and co-operation between our two countries and peoples." A statement issued by the Central Council of Indian Associations on the occasion of Uganda's Independence said : "We are proud of playing our part in the development of this country and we pledge our loyalty and support with all our might and means to the Government."

Tanganyika became a Republic on December 9, 1962, exactly after one year of its Independence. A forty-three-year old direct link with the British Crown was broken on that day, though Tanganyika continues to remain in the British Commonwealth.

Tanganyika Becomes a Republic

Mr. Julius Nyerere, who was the first Prime Minister of Tanganyika and who shortly thereafter resigned to attend to organisational work in the Party, has assumed charge as President of the Republic.

Mr. Nyerere's election as President was a foregone conclusion as he is the most popular leader of the country and is regarded as the Father of the Nation. He defeated his only rival, Mr. Zuberi Mtemvu, President of the African National Congress, by securing 1,127,978 votes against Mr. Mtemvu's 21,276. Mr. Mtemvu has now dissolved his party and joined the TANU. He has urged his supporters also to do likewise.

Under the new constitution of the Republic, the President will have power to summon, prorogue and dissolve the National Assembly and will have power to nominate up to 10 members of the Assembly. He will appoint the Vice-President and Ministers from among members of the Parliament and they will form the cabinet with the President presiding. He will not be a member of the Parliament but will be entitled to address it either personally or by message.

The President will appoint judges of the High Court and also have power to appoint resident magistrates and other judicial officers working under the High Court's jurisdiction. The Judicial Service Commission will only act in an advisory capacity to him.

As regards the civil service, the ultimate authority will rest with the President. He will have the power to appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over the members of the civil service.

Thus, the President will have virtually supreme powers over the judiciary, the civil service and the National Assembly. He will be the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and will be invested with full executive authority. With Mr. Nyerere, who is a statesman of the highest calibre, and with a united party behind him to ensure a stable government, it is possible to look forward to Tanganyika's steady progress in all directions.

It is great satisfaction to note that Tanganyika's affairs have been organized on a non-racial basis, and that the relations among the different sections of the people have been, on the whole, cordial. Tanganyika's 1,20,000 Asians, the majority of whom are Indians, have been co-operating with the Government. On the eve of the establishment of the Republic, the Asians have decided to dissolve the Asian Association and have called upon Asians living in Tanganyika to join the ruling party TANU, which has announced the opening of its doors to non-Africans. Other racial groups, including Europeans, have also been equally appreciative of African aspirations.

The Republic of Tanganyika has announced its adherence to the policy.

of non-alignment with any of the power blocs. "We have no desire to allow any country to pick up enemies for us," said Mr. Nyerere just after he became President.

The relations between Tanganyika and India have always been very cordial. The Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, in his letter to the President of Tanganyika, Mr. Julius Nyerere, reaffirmed: "I am confident that with the emergence of Tanganyika as a Republic, the friendly relations already existing between our two countries will be strengthened still further to our mutual benefit."

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has proved to be a major problem for Britain which has to find a compromise between the rigid attitudes both of the white-dominated minority governments of the three territories and the nationalist aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Africans.

**Political Moves in
the Central African
Federation**

In the general elections held in Northern Rhodesia in October, 1962, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party and Mr. Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress have jointly emerged stronger than Sir Roy Welensky's ruling United Federal Party. Mr. Kaunda and Mr. Nkumbula have agreed to form a coalition government. Now it is to be seen how the ruling party bows to the will of the people, expressed through the general elections.

As regards Southern Rhodesia, the events there are quite disturbing. The ban imposed on the nationalist African party, Zimbabwe African People's Union, on September 20, 1962, was followed by frequent and serious cases of violence, arson and sabotage. About 2,000 leading members of the ZAPU were arrested and put under restrictive orders.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has voted through a resolution on October 12, calling upon Britain to obtain the removal of restrictions imposed by the South Rhodesian Government on the ZAPU and its leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo. The resolution expressed the 109 member-nations' deep concern over the "deplorable, crucial and explosive" situation in South Rhodesia.

Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, is prepared to make insignificant concessions to Africans. Under the Colony's new constitution, one per cent of the African population is presently to be enfranchized. Through a second class 'lower voters' roll, they will be able to elect 15 out of 65 members of the Parliament and exercise a small influence on the election of the other 50.

The luckiest among the three territories of the Federation is Nyasaland. The Constitutional Conference held in London in November decided that Nyasaland would have African home rule early in 1963. Dr. Hastings K. Banda, President of the Malwai Congress Party, will in all probability be the first Prime Minister of the country.

Thus, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are stealing a march over Southern Rhodesia in their race to achieve independence at the earliest.

The Government of the Republic of South Africa was once again the focus of a severe attack in the United Nations for its apartheid policy.

**U.N. Votes Sanctions
Against South
Africa**

India and twenty-four other Afro-Asian nations had tabled a resolution to this effect in the Special Political Committee of the U. N., which was approved by a two-third majority and the General Assembly voted, on November 6, 1962, a formal request to member-States to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa and a mandate to the Security Council to consider the expulsion, under Article 6 of the Charter, of the South African Government from the United Nations by a vote of 67 to 17 with 23 absentions, four members being absent.

The Assembly also decided to establish a special committee consisting of the representatives of member-States nominated by the President of the General Assembly with the following terms of reference: (a) to keep the racial policies of the Republic under review when the Assembly is not in session, and (b) to report either to the Assembly or the Security Council or both as may be appropriate from time to time. It requested all member-States to: (a) do everything in their power to help the Special Committee to accomplish its task, and (b) to refrain from any act likely to delay or hinder the implementation of the present resolution.

It invited member-States to inform the next session of the General Assembly on actions taken separately or collectively in dissuading the South African Government from pursuing its policies of racial discrimination.

The resolution is a clear indication of the intensity of world public opinion against the abhorrent racial policies of the Government of South Africa. However, the success of the economic sanctions will depend mainly on Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands, which voted against the resolution, and which have the closest trade ties with South Africa. Thus, the United Nations appeal may be taken as an appeal to the Powers who have opposed sanctions. It is a question of whether they will abide by the majority decision or not.

African countries have been naturally shocked to see one of the most eloquent supporters of their struggle for freedom subjected to ruthless

**Africa is concerned
over Chinese
Aggression on India**

aggression by Communist China. Since her independence, India has been supporting the freedom of the African peoples both in the United Nations and elsewhere. India's involvement in her border dispute, it is feared, may distract her, at least temporarily, from her

cherished desire to help the African peoples in their struggle for freedom and their tasks of national reconstruction. It is, therefore, not surprising that the whole of Africa has expressed concern and dismay over the Chinese aggression on India.

The African countries which have offered their sympathy and support to India and condemned the Chinese aggression include Ethiopia, Libya, the Congo, Uganda, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, Kenya, Liberia, Mali and many of the other former French Colonies of West Africa. From Cairo to Capetown and from Lagos to Dar-er-Salaam, China's attack has evoked African criticism and created disillusionment over Peking's talk of "brotherhood" and peaceful co-existence.

Speaking in Nairobi on October 29, 1962, Mr. Peter Koinange, General Secretary of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for Eastern, Central and Southern Africa, categorically said that the Chinese by their refusal to consider all avenues of reconciliation and by launching a large-scale attack, had broken the centuries-old relationship between the two countries which had become a model of good neighbourliness for other countries, particularly those in Africa. Mr. Koinange condemned China for its "wanton attack on India which has shocked the conscience of the world".

The important political parties of Kenya have also come forward with their support to India. The President of the Kenya African Democratic Union has contributed 200 shillings to India's National Defence Fund and has offered to donate blood for the benefit of Indian troops fighting the Chinese. The Secretary-General of the KADU, Mr. Martin Shikuku, has volunteered to fight the Chinese invaders on India's frontiers. Mr. Tom Mboya, Labour Minister of Kenya and General Secretary of the Kenya African National Union, said in a statement: "The KANU has expressed concern directly to the Prime Minister of China for the attack against India and has also expressed sympathy and solidarity with the people of India in a cable to the Prime Minister of India."

In Nairobi, 190 persons have volunteered to fight for India. They include 110 Africans, 79 Indians from Kenya's sizable Asian community and a former British major who once served in India. Three African nurses from Kenya have also offered to go to the fighting zone in India to help the wounded troops. The donations from Kenya to India's National Defence Fund have already exceeded £36,500.

The General Secretary of the African Shirazi Party of Zanzibar, in a message to Prime Minister Nehru, said: "The African Shirazi Party of Zanzibar condemns outright aggression anywhere in any form. We send warm sympathy and support to India in its struggle against China. We pray for your glorious victory over aggressive forces." The Director of the External Bureau of the African National Congress of South Africa, Mr. Mziwandie Piliso, the Deputy Chairman of the Northern Rhodesia United National Independence Party, Mr. Chitandika Kamanga, the national Chairman of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, now in exile

in Dar-es-Salaam, Revd. Ndabaningi Sithole, and leaders of other major political parties have issued statements unequivocally condemning the Chinese invasion.

The African Press also has lashed out at the Chinese aggressors. While describing the Chinese advance into Indian territory as a threat to world peace, Afro-Asian solidarity and the Bandung principles, it has called for a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the positions occupied before the hostilities. For instance, the *Daily Telegraph* of Lagos, in an editorial dated October 23, declared that "the trouble in India is a trouble not only for India but for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the world as a whole".

The First International Congress of Africanists held its first session in the University of Ghana, Accra, during the period 12-18 December, 1962. The Conference was well attended by delegates and observers from all parts of the world who are scholars in various fields of African Studies in the Universities, Research Institutes, Libraries, etc. It was heartening to see a large number of African scholars from almost all parts of Africa participating in the deliberations of the Plenary Congress and its Sectional Committees. The University of Delhi, which has a Department of African Studies, deputed the Head of the Department to participate in this Congress as a delegate.

The discussions on papers presented at the Congress covered a variety of subjects relating to the educational, political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields in which the emergent countries of Africa are deeply interested. The level of discussion was academic but not rigidly theoretical. The participants, who included experienced and renowned scholars in their subjects and men of affairs, brought theoretical knowledge and practical experience to bear on their discussions.

The decision of the Congress to set up a Permanent Council and a Bureau to continue the good work done at this first meeting and meet every three years should be welcome to all those interested in the study of Africa and its problems. The next venue of the Congress has been fixed three years from hence in Senegal at the University of Dakar under the presidentship of M. Allioune Diop, a noted African scholar whose learned writings have contributed immensely to the projection of the "African Personality", and the spirit of Presence Africaine.

The credit for the success of the Conference goes to Dr. K. O. Dike, Principal, University of Nigeria at Ibadan, who sponsored the meet and to the University of Ghana, Accra, who offered to hold the First Session at Legon. The Governments and organisations which provided the funds to make the Conference a success, and in particular, the Government of Ghana, which made the stay of the participants most comfortable also deserve special mention.

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the previous quarter :

Goodwill Mission from Cameroon

A tea-party was given on October 1, 1962, by Shri Dinesh Singh, General Secretary, and other members of the Council in honour of a goodwill mission from Cameroon, led by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nzo Ekhah Nhaky. Members of foreign missions, particularly from Africa, and other distinguished Indian guests were present on the occasion. Shri Dinesh Singh, welcoming them, expressed the hope that the visit would strengthen the existing friendly relations between India and the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Mr. Nhaky complimented the Indian Council for Africa on the work they were doing in promoting closer relations between the peoples of India and Africa.

Uganda

Shri Dinesh Singh, Deputy Minister of External Affairs and General Secretary of the Council, represented India at the Independence celebrations of Uganda on 9th October, 1962. Later he paid a four-day official visit to Sudan also.

Shri Balvantray G. Mehta, President of the Council, sent a message of greetings to the Prime Minister of Uganda, Mr. Milton Obote. He wrote : "On the happy occasion of Uganda's Independence, please accept our congratulations and good wishes for your country's peace and progress. We hope and trust that the existing friendship between the peoples of India and Uganda will be further strengthened."

Chinese Aggression

On account of the national emergency created by the Chinese aggression on the northern borders of India, the Council had to postpone the proposed Seminar on North Africa.

The Council, however, sent literature to social, political, educational, cultural and other institutions, libraries and numerous individuals explaining the Indian stand on the Sino-Indian Border Problem. The

Council has under preparation a pamphlet on the Sino-Indian dispute and Chinese aggression.

The staff of the Council have decided to contribute one day's salary to the National Defence Fund.

Nigerian Official visits the Council

Alhaji Isa S. Wali, Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Nigeria, visited the Council on December 22, 1962. He was received on behalf of the Council by Shri S. A. Mehdi, M. P., Associate Editor of *Africa Quarterly*. The visitor exchanged views with the representatives of the Council on the problems facing Nigeria and India. Alhaji Wali expressed his appreciation of the work of the Council and hoped that it would help bring Nigeria and India closer.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE TANGANYIKA WAY : By Sophia Mustafa (Oxford University Press, London, 1962, Pp. 129)

The attainment of UHURU KAIMILI—complete independence—by Tanganyika last year was yet another step in the direction of the collapse of colonialism. Between 1958 and 1961, developments in Tanganyika were so significant and they took place at such a rapid pace that they can be termed as unique in the annals of colonial history. A student of world affairs would, therefore, be naturally interested in a proper appraisal of the events that furthered the political and constitutional advance of Tanganyika during this period. There are many ways of facilitating this. One of them is to read the personal accounts of those whose active participation contributed to the developments themselves. The book under review is one of such personal accounts of Mrs. Sophia Mustafa, who was elected a member of the Legislative Council of Tanganyika in September, 1958 and re-elected in July, 1960.

Nearly half of the book describes how Mrs. Mustafa changed herself from a housewife into a politician, how she came into contact with the Tanu leader, Julius Nyerere, how her electioneering programme was conducted, and what were the factors leading to her success in elections. The entire description which has a bearing on these aspects is interesting. The author narrates the significant events connected with her election and records some of her conversations with Nyerere and some other political leaders of Tanganyika. In doing so, the character, the personality and the views of those political leaders are also revealed. Thus, Mrs. Mustafa's description of her election is something more than a personal tale.

The other half of the book is less personal. It includes chapters on the constitutional history of Tanganyika—right from the time when it was a German-occupied territory to the achievement of independence—, on the programmes and objectives of the different political parties of Tanganyika, and on its struggle for responsible government and, finally, for complete independence. But even in these chapters a touch of the author's personal involvement is always discernible. The account of the pre-1957 period, however, is brief.

Perhaps the most important thing about which the reader learns from this book is the position of political parties in Tanganyika. Mrs. Mustafa not only presents in her little volume the policies and objectives of the various political parties of Tanganyika but also brings out the unique feature of those parties, a feature which distinguishes Tanganyikan politics

from the politics of the other countries of Africa. That feature is that intimidation is not used in Tanganyika by the major party against minor parties.

As has been observed earlier, the book on the whole is a personal account. It is in no way a history of Tanganyika. Its scope is also limited to the northern province of Tanganyika and Dar-es-Salaam. The author claims that the pattern of the northern province was reflected in the other nine provinces of Tanganyika as well. This will probably be too big a generalization. Nevertheless, the book gives a picture of at least one part of the country and to that extent it cannot be dismissed as an entirely fruitless publication, even though the superficiality of the narrative of the constitutional and political advance of Tanganyika and defects of language and style cannot go unnoticed.

MAHENDRA KUMAR

SOUTH AFRICA AND WORLD OPINION : By Peter Calvocoressi (Oxford University Press, London, Pp. 68, 6s.)

The day dawned the grimmest in South Africa when on March 21, 1960, a crowd of 3000 to 4000 (according to European eye-witnesses) and 15,000 or 20,000 (according to the calculations of the Union Government) Africans courageously moved into the Police Station at Sharpeville to protest against the Pass Laws and became unfortunate victims of the police bullets which pierced through their backs. A similar scene was witnessed at Langa in the Cape Province. The toll that that day took was horrible : 72 Africans killed and 180 wounded.

Shocked, the world seethed with indignation, disgust and horror. Sharp protests were registered all over the world against the apartheid policy of the Union Government. Categorically speaking, British Prime Minister Macmillan, who in February the same year had paid a historic visit to the Union and had observed a 'wind of change' and denounced racial discrimination, also expressed his 'deep regret' over the Sharpeville happenings.

The avowed purpose of Peter Calvocoressi in *South Africa and World Opinion* is to tell how this incident at Sharpeville and Langa caught world attention and what the consequences of the bloodshed and the deaths it caused were. The author has divided this study of various opinions into five different chapters and has analysed in some detail the situation prevailing in 1960—and what happened thereafter does not seem to be the author's concern. The study, though conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, does not necessarily represent the views of the Institute.

The Union of South Africa being a member of two international organisations—the United Nations and the Commonwealth—was naturally exposed to incrimination by fellow-nations after Sharpeville. She was also open to economic jeopardy which could be inflicted by such

nations as were having bilateral commercial relations with the Union Government. But she was all the time fully alive to such reactions and was determined to meet the situation.

In the Commonwealth, she had the obvious advantage of the support of Great Britain, since the latter had military bases in the Union territory and imported large quantities of gold from there. Both these factors were very important for Great Britain. She was, therefore, in no mood to stake the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth as demanded by many members. Nevertheless, the application by South Africa for continued membership of the Commonwealth after it became a republic was held up, since no referendum had been held to the form of government for the Union.

In the United Nations, the opinions mostly revolved round the applicability of Art. 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations which specifies that the U.N. cannot discuss subjects falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a member-State, except when they endanger international peace and security. To establish that racial discrimination could injure world peace involved much discussion and debate. And, ultimately on April 1, 1960, the Security Council approved by nine votes to nil, with two abstentions (Britain and France), Ecuador's resolution declaring, *inter alia*, that the situation in South Africa "had led to international friction and might, if continued, endanger peace and security". It also deplored in strong terms the Sharpeville happenings and the deaths and bloodshed they had caused.

But neither in the U.N. nor in the Commonwealth was moral force workable on the Union Government, which received the world opinion with only ill-disguised arrogance.

Then, there was the only weapon left: economic pressure. But the prospects of such pressure also seemed bleak, since those nations which could afford both to suffer economic damage and a severance of relations with the Union mattered very little for South Africa as far as international trade was concerned. Many others were reluctant to use the economic weapons or were encountering obstacles in the way of doing so.

Therefore, the task became all the more difficult for Peter Calvocoressi to be faithful in the description, although to a large extent the account is an unprejudiced interpretation of the various opinions limited, however, to the situation after Sharpeville in 1960. Things have changed a lot and, therefore, a revised and up-to-date edition of the book is overdue.

An added merit of this book is the appendices and the facts and figures given at the end.

MADAN M. SAULDIE

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON AFRICA

This feature is presented every quarter by the Research Section, Indian Council for Africa, with the object of providing a list of recent publications on Africa. It is hoped that this will be helpful to those who are specially interested in the study of African affairs. Most of this literature is available in the Council's library.

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MUKAND IS STEEL


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RACE-RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

by

JOHN FERGUSON

I

In order to understand the background to race relations in Nigeria, it is important to bear in mind a number of facts and features of Nigeria's history.

First, West Africa has by tradition been the White Man's Grave. The combination of the malarial mosquito and the yellow fever bug saved Nigeria from the problems of the East or South of the Continent. During Macgregor Laird's expedition up the Niger in 1932-4, 38 out of the 48 Europeans died. Less than ten years later, there was a larger expedition sponsored by the British Government; of the 145 Europeans, 48 were dead within two months. In conditions like these, there was little temptation to settle. Europeans who came, either for trade and got out as soon as possible or as missionaries, to serve, or, later, as administrators, having, within their limits, a high sense of duty. This accident of history was reinforced by deliberate policy on the part of Lugard, one of Britain's greater proconsuls, who checked by law any attempt by Europeans to acquire land. Nigeria has no settler problem. Problems of race relations become acute when they are aggravated by economic conflict, especially over the basis of any economy, land ownership and land tenure.

Second, Nigeria was never a characteristic colony; if the British imperial power was a dragon, she was a reluctant dragon. After the Portuguese explorers established contact with the area in late 15th century, intercourse was for centuries with the coast alone. From the end of the 18th century, explorers Mungo Park, Hugo Clapperton, Richard Lander, John Beecroft and others began to push inland. From 1807, the British navy was engaged in suppressing the slave trade. In 1842, the missionaries arrived at Badagry, and from the middle of the century consuls were appointed to look after the interests of British traders at Lagos and in the Niger delta. Not till 1861 was any part of Nigeria brought under British rule; in that year the island of Lagos, the future capital, was annexed. Even so four years later, a Select Committee of the House of Commons recommended withdrawal from all parts of West Africa except Sierra Leone. This was not a practical possibility, but the administration of Lagos was actually placed in the hands of the governor of Sierra Leone, and the British Government announced as a matter of official policy that it had no further territorial ambitions in Africa. So it was

the trading concerns, associated in the United Africa Company in 1879 and given a charter as the Royal Niger Company in 1886, which exercised such administrative responsibilities as the European undertook. Meantime British interests along the coast were protected by the proclamation of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885, and its subsequent extension inland. The year 1900 saw the proclamation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the transfer to the Colonial Office of responsibility for the Oil Rivers Protectorate, which was amalgamated with Lagos in 1906. In 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated into a single Colony and Protectorate. The flag had followed trade, *magno intervallo*. The Colony of Nigeria is a 20-century creation. Nigeria has no long history of colonial oppression. The whole tale of British rule, from its inception to its renunciation, is contained within the span of a not-too-long life.

Third, Northern Nigeria was the scene of Lugard's famous experiment in "indirect rule." Lugard believed passionately in what he called "the dual mandate in Africa." Europe was to supply Africa with the benefits of Western civilization; Africa was to supply Europe (and the colonizing power in particular) with raw materials and resources. But how was the responsibility of government to be exercised? Lugard was faced with a vast area and scanty resources. He conceived the idea of governing through the existing institutions of government in North Nigeria through the Fulani Emirates. This inevitably made in some way for conservatism, for British authority was committed to buttressing the existing institutions, provided they were not flagrantly unjust. But it also made for a new relationship between the representatives of the Colony and those of the colonial power; it was not a simple relationship of governed and governor, for the governed were themselves sharing in the government.

Fourth, Britain never had very much of a policy in her colonial administration. The Portuguese were frankly tyrannical; they sought to keep down the indigenous peoples by all means available. The Belgians were subtler. They tried to divorce economics from politics, and hoped by giving economic security to cut away the demand for political rights. Man shall not live by bread alone, and the Congo is the memorial to their failure; South Africans, who draw all manner of morals from the Congo, would do well to draw the right one, for it affects their own future. The French were subtler still. Their policy was to separate the leaders from the rest of the community and turn them into Frenchmen by education in France, acceptance into French society, honour from French institutions, to admit potential revolutionaries into the Establishment. There have been no better poets writing in French in recent years than Leopold Senghor and David Diop. Britain muddled along, indolently, indifferently. If there was not much (as there was with the French) to build creative relationships between the British and the Nigerians (except for the devotion of individual missionaries and administrators, Ethel Millet, John

Mellor, Rex Niven, Llyn Chubb and the like), there was equally not much (as there was with the Portuguese) to create tensions and conflicts.

Fifth, the passage to independence was relatively smooth, far smoother than in Ghana, for example, and caused comparatively little friction. Nigeria has few political "prison graduates"—Tony Enahoro and F. U. Anyiam are exceptional in this. On the British side, this smooth passage was due in no small measure to the work of Alan Lennox-Boyd, that rare phenomenon of a politician whose supreme ambition was the Colonial Office, and a great Governor-General, Sir James Robertson. Even more important was the contribution of the Nigerian leaders, in their willingness to bury party and tribal differences for the common good, in making demands which combined moderation and firmness, in accepting reasonable decisions which opened the way forward. In all this, the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, has played a notable part, expressing his appreciation of the British not merely in private on the eve of independence but actually in public on the day of independence.

Sixth, though there were elements of primitive savagery to be found in Nigeria, it was impossible to dismiss the whole country as primitive and savage. From the 1900's negro art had begun to make its impact upon the Paris studios, through Vlaminck, Derain, Picasso and others. At Ife and Benin sculpture had reached a point of technique and expressive integrity which could not be ignored by the rest of the world. Men of artistic sensibility can hardly fail to approach Nigeria with respect. So contemporary sculptors like Ben Enwonwu have won world recognition. In music, too, Stravinsky was influenced decades ago by the stirring rhythms of African drumming. Fela Sowande is the doyen of Nigerian musicians with a reputation in Europe and America. Less widely influential, but not less important ultimately, has been the awareness that Nigerian dancing offers a highly complex and sophisticated art-form, a creative expression demanding a combination of imaginative power and physical endurance; Geoffrey Gorer's *Africa Dances* dates from 1935, but those who knew Nigeria had shared in the experience long before. Furthermore, those who came to know Nigerian society could not fail to respect much of what they found—"rhythm, courtesy, respect of elders, and a stable philosophy of an ordered world", writes Dr. Ajayi, and one may add the sacrificial sense of family solidarity. Again, from about 1926 the world of Talbot, Farrow and Meek, and, later, Lucas, Parrinder and Idowu has familiarized us with the basic religious beliefs of the Yorubas and others, and it was made clear by Durkheim that such beliefs could not be merely dismissed as primitive. To put it differently, they ceased to be the object of anthropological curiosity and became the object of existential respect. All this makes for a meeting of minds of people.

Seventh, long before Lugard Nigeria had been an area of African responsibility. This was partly due to the tremendous work of the missions, especially in the field of education. As you drive through Nig-

eria to-day, even quite small villages often have one, two or three mission schools. The Christian Missionary Society actually opened a teacher-training institution in Abeokuta in 1849, and by 1895 had 50 schools east of the Niger. The Catholics founded the St. Gregory's College in Lagos in 1876. The Methodists opened their high schools for girls and boys in 1878. It was partly due to a deliberately Christian policy. It is sometimes forgotten that from 1756 to 1816 the chaplain at Cape Coast castle, in modern Ghana, was an ordained Fante, Rev. Philip Quacoe, and that there was an African bishop on the Niger just under a century ago, Samuel Ajayi Crowther being consecrated in 1864, and holding office for 27 years. That Crowther was not the best of administrators and too gentle to insist on needful standards of discipline was unfortunate, but, as Dr. Dike has said, "Looking back the historian is impressed not by the Bishop's failures but by his successes: had Crowther been given the tools required for the job, most of the shortcomings of his Mission could have been avoided. I am convinced that the great things he achieved for God in the Niger basin are triumphs for his own saintly character." The Missions pioneered but the administration followed: just under 60 years ago, there was an African Medical Officer of Health in Lagos. No doubt shortage of European personnel helped the process, as it helped Lugard's indirect rule. No doubt also too little was done, and that too slowly. But something was achieved.

Eighth, the language of education, or at least of post-primary education, has been English. The motives of this were no doubt mixed, and laziness on the part of expatriates confronted with the difficult local tonal languages was a factor. Another factor was the assumed superiority of British culture expressed in the English language. But in any event, the multiplicity of Nigerian languages was bound to be a stumbling-block. A *lingua franca* was needed, and in the use of English British West Africa acquired an immeasurable advantage in education and in communication over the East of the continent, where Swahili prevailed. It is true that this was partially offset by the development of "pidgin"; even in 1957 on the University site we had a night-watchman greet us with the words "Watchnightee! Na wattee?" But, this apart, the use of English among educated Nigerians made for entry into European civilization, and ease of communication; not enough. Europeans have made the reverse entry into African civilization.

Finally, recent years have seen increasing numbers of men and women, who without turning their backs on their own traditions and their own society, have been able to enter on equal terms with its leading members into any society in the world. There are the three medical knights, Sir Samuel Manuwa, Sir Kofo Abayomi and Sir Francis Ibiam, who stormed their way forward in the 'twenties and 'thirties. Ibiam is one of the six Presidents of the World Council of Churches. There is Dr. Kenneth Dike, first Nigerian Principal of Nigeria's first University institution, honoured by historians and educationists all over the globe.

There is Simeon Adebo, head of the civil service in the Western Region, who would be a most distinguished head of any civil service in the world. There is Christopher Oyesiku, bass singer with a love of Bach and exacting standards of criticism for himself and others. And, of course, there is the Prime Minister; it was one of Dr. Verwoerd's principal advisers who, at the Premiers' Conference at which South Africa left the Commonwealth, ranked Balewa as the outstanding person present.

II

It must not be imagined from this that everything has been easy. European prejudices were hard to break through. Majekodunmi, the present Minister of Health, went in 1935 to Trinity College, Dublin, where he had a distinguished academic career; his M. D. thesis on a new form of treatment for premature infants remains a classic. He returned to Nigeria in 1943—less than 20 years ago. Despite his academic distinction, he was offered appointment only as Junior Medical Officer, a clear example of racial discrimination. Majekodunmi stuck his jaw out and his toes in, and the wrong was rectified, but it was a black mark against him in the official mind, and he had an uphill career.

The main centres of population had clubs, which, even into the 1950's, were exclusively for Europeans. The breaking of the barriers was nervous, hesitant, but once the Rubicon was crossed, there was no further trouble.

The change was breath-taking and caught some people unawares. A new generation of expatriates came out after the war. They were not imbued with the old colonial mentality; they were in the mood of the Labour election victory. They were willing for change, though by the time it came they did not always relish it, for they had tasted power. The old guard, even in the missions, with a few notable exceptions, did not accept the change so easily. Witness the principal of a mission school, who had been out before the war, and outstanding person in many ways, who found it impossible to accept Nigerians as colleagues rather than subordinates. Such people were wise to leave if they could not adapt themselves, and few of them now remain.

Barriers like these are gone for good. There remain less tangible barriers, frighteningly easy to establish without knowing it, and accentuated by the vast increase of expatriate commercial personnel, while educated Nigerians are still swelling the civil service. These are barriers of culture and habit. English people like doing things together in which Nigerians may not want to share. The flannelled fool of an Englishman cannot do without his cricket; the Nigerian prefers his football. The insular Englishman thinks nostalgically of England, home and beauty; the Nigerian is not specially interested in England, the Englishman's home, or the Englishman's beauty. The conservative Englishman confines his dancing to the waltz, foxtrot and quickstep and clasps his partner

to him; the Nigerian dances an interminable series of highlifes in which his partner and he form an independent duet. Hence it is easy for the English to hunt in packs, not because they are racially prejudiced, but because they are socially conservative. This is especially true in the commercial communities; an English friend of ours recently spent three months in the commercial community at Lagos without once meeting a Nigerian socially.

But the same is true of the Nigerians. For, in the first place, there was counter-prejudice arising by reaction to overcome. Of this there was astonishingly little, but some remained. There were, and are, Nigerian magistrates who were liable to demand of European defendants in court higher standards of neatness than they exacted from Nigerian lorry-drivers. Occasionally in schools or colleges where the staff is still predominantly European, student protests against discipline is liable to get mixed up with racialism. More serious, because more subtle, is the intellectual exaltation of the "African personality" or "negritude." It is a myth, but a potent myth, and a dangerous myth, because it hands Dr. Verwoerd an argument on a platter: he believes in the African personality as distinct from the European personality, and bases the public case for apartheid upon this distinction. More popularly, the same mood is seen in the demand that Nigeria's sports teams shall be the blackest possible rather than the best possible, or, that the N. B. C. shall play Nigerian music, however bad, rather than European music, however good.

And there is the pepper bar. Kenneth Mellanby has suggested that pepper is a far more serious bar than colour to the establishment of fully uninhibited social relationships. The Nigerian spices his food with strong red pepper which brings tears to the eyes of the unwary European. Trivial in one sense, but potent as well.

These barriers are not to be exaggerated. They are almost totally unconnected with colour, and not radically different from that which, for example, would be found between the English and the French in the south of France. Where they exist, the tremendous traditional hospitality of Nigeria goes far to break them down. There can be few countries with a richer practice of hospitality—whether in the warmth of welcome to colleagues or in the waving villagers as you drive through the remoter parts.

III

There has been a considerable change in the past 10 years. The change may be exemplified in social life, political administration and education.

In social life the transformation of the clubs might provide a telling story. I prefer to take a body with which I have been closely associated, the Ibadan Operatic Society. This was started in 1954 by a Gilbert and Sullivan enthusiast. It was until as late as 1954 for Europeans only, partly because the Gilbert and Sullivan habit is singularly British (though the

operas are popular in Nigeria, where the satire finds its targets), partly because it was assumed, wrongly, that there would be something incongruous in seeing black and white faces on the stage together, partly, one suspects, from racial prejudice. After three productions, the founder was translated elsewhere, and the next production, *The Mikado*, saw a mixed chorus. *Ruddigore* in 1957 had a Nigerian soloist for the first time. The chorus of peers in *Iolanthe* in 1958 was a glorious mixture of Nigerian Obas and English Earls. *The Gondoliers* in 1961 had five Nigerian soloists; the men's chorus nowadays is mainly Nigerian, though Nigerian women are not quite as ready to come forward. Soloists are chosen entirely on their merits; neither in participating nor in watching is there any sense that there is more than one colour of the stage; we are simply a group of friends doing a job together, enjoying ourselves and seeking to give enjoyment to others.

Political administration is a more complex field. All authority had for a long time been in the hands of expatriates, and those who complain about giving considerable authority to relatively inexperienced Nigerians will do well to reflect on the amount of authority that was given to relatively inexperienced English District Officers. So much so, that with the advent of responsible ministerial government, Simeon Adebó, the superbly talented Nigerian who is head of the civil service in the Western Region, found that he had to explain to his British colleagues how the British Civil Service worked, and the whole concept of the responsibility of the civil servant *vis-a-vis* his minister. No independent nation is going to have its policy-making posts staffed by the nationals of another country and those expatriates who did not realize this were simply living in a fool's paradise. Official Nigerian policy in government circles was that no expatriate should hold a senior post if there was a Nigerian capable of holding it; the expatriate was not sacked, he was only relieved of particular responsibilities, and offered generous compensation if he elected to go altogether. The standing-down of officers from particular jobs was sometimes tactlessly carried out; this was a pity, but the action was obvious and inevitable. Expatriates who continued in positions of responsibility were inevitably the object of criticism in the Press. There has been a certain amount of hard feeling about all this; there have also been very sincere and generous tributes to their British colleagues on the part of the Nigerians. Those who have stayed, knowing that promotion is barred to them, but ready to serve where needed in the thrilling work of helping to build a new nation, are welcomed and honoured; they sometimes find they have more authority than before. One of the finest and most self-effacing friends of Nigeria has been sent in to reorganize and administer an area where local government has broken down. He is doing the work of seven local councils.

The University was founded in 1948 as University College, Ibadan, and was for a long time the target of Press attacks as a centre of racial discrimination. Greater responsibility on the part of the Press, and the

University's established reputation have done much to mitigate these, which never had much justification in fact. The policy of the University has been different from the policy of the Government. Whereas in Government no expatriate may hold a senior post if there is a Nigerian capable of holding it, in the University all posts are advertised for open world-wide competition, and the best person appointed, though of two equal candidates preference will naturally be given to a Nigerian. Dr. Parry when he was Principal rightly and neatly turned criticism of this policy. "It is a disrespect to our Nigerian colleagues," he said, "to suggest that they are here because they are Nigerians and not because they are the best men for the job." When Sir Francis Ibiam, on his first appearance as Chairman of the College Council, declared, "We are obviously delighted when a Nigerian shows himself a fit and proper member of a University staff, but we do not intend to pursue Nigerianization at the cost of efficiency, and we want the best people, no matter what their racial origin or the colour of their skin," he received something like a thumping ovation from the students. There is, practically speaking, no colour prejudice in the University. We have a Nigerian Principal, a Welsh Vice-Principal, a Nigerian Registrar, an English Bursar, a Nigerian Dean of Science and a Scottish Dean of Medicine. There are good relations among colleagues on the staff, and between students and staff from overseas; it is ironical that the only time there has been serious trouble in a hall of residence was over the action of a Nigerian master.

IV

A word or two about mixed marriages. It does not need arguing in this generation that there is no biological objection to miscegenation. In a country in which the shades of colour already vary from light tan (not counting albinos) to dark ebony, the children of mixed marriages are in no sense out of place. More impressive is the general social acceptance of mixed marriages generally between Nigerian men and English girls whom they have met in England, occasionally between an English husband and a Nigerian wife, still more occasionally between other groups, a West Indian and a Swede, for instance. There is no feeling at all against such marriages; if tension arises, it is usually "mother-in-law palaver." It is worthy of comment that in a society such as that of the University, where there are already half a dozen or more happy mixed marriages, where there is free social intercourse, and where there are a dozen or so unmarried European women, there have in fact been no new mixed marriages contracted. It does not seem that free social intercourse between the races leads to promiscuous physical intercourse between the sexes.

V

One incident is worth recording in some little detail. The American Peace Corps sent 37 young Americans to Ibadan for a term's training

before going out into the schools to serve Nigeria. They were welcomed warmly and settled happily into the halls of residence with the Nigerian undergraduates. They had come to serve, and though there was some suspicion of the motives of those who sent them, there was none of them.

Then the storm broke. A pleasant but feather-headed American girl wrote home an ill-considered, insulting account of Nigeria. She had no idea, she said, what an underdeveloped country was like (I could show her some back streets in St. Louis!); everyone went to the bathroom in the street. That she was feather-headed is shown in that she (a) wrote it on a postcard and (b) dropped the postcard. The postcard was found, read and published. There was a storm of protest, worked up by the student politicians, and sometimes intensified by a slightly guilty feeling that, although she was looking at the bad and not the good, although she was failing in imaginative understanding, although she was tactless beyond belief, there was some foundation to some of the things she had said. It is significant that the really intelligent Nigerians were more hurt by a further remark of hers which her defenders quoted in extenuation, that life at the University was fun because, being white, they had such a warm welcome. The Nigerians insisted that she was welcome not because she was white but because she was a visitor, and they extended the same welcome to Ghanaians, Indians and people from all parts of the world.

Against this hubbub the Student Christian Movement spoke, candidly, unsentimentally, Christianly. They condemned the girl's act without reservation, and went on: "The S. C. M., notwithstanding its clear awareness of the facts stated above, would like, in exercise of the spirit which gives it birth, that is, the Spirit of Christ, to look only at the evidence before it; and judge the action of Miss—on that evidence before it. Therefore, it would not wish to take Miss—'s thoughtless 'scrawl' as the 'voice of America'. It sees her action as the sin of an individual person, which, in a way, is a symptom of the racial sin which dictates the attitude of the 'white races' of the world towards the 'black races'. But since the S. C. M. in its own context is included within the corporate body of sinful humanity, and therefore, needing God's forgiveness, and in consequence of what it stands for, and because of the love of Christ 'which constrains us' not to return evil for evil, but to overcome evil with good, declares, in all sincerity, that, painful and disturbing though Miss—'s act may be to us, *we forgive her.*" It went on to call for continued friendship and goodwill, or rather **CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP AND GOODWILL**, towards the members of the Peace Corps.

The offender was whisked out of the country, though many Nigerians, including some schoolgirls who wrote to her to that effect, wanted her to stay and get to know the country better. For the rest, there was tension perhaps for 24 hours, after which personal relations were fully restored, and the Peace Corps is now scattered round the country doing useful jobs in the schools.

The interesting features of this unfortunate incident are: (a) the protest was directed *neither* at the individual herself *nor* at all whites but at the Peace Corps as a piece of neo-colonialism; (b) the more sensitive and intelligent resented the suggestion that the girl was welcome because of her race and not as an individual; (c) the remarkable statement by the S.C.M. sees racialism as a sin in which all are involved, and at the same time refuses to condemn a group because of the action of an individual, and finally proffers forgiveness even to that individual; (d) the outburst was momentary, and normal personal relations were swiftly restored.

VI

When we were in South Africa in 1961, there was much interest in Nigeria. We were able to assure the South Africans that here was a country, governed by Africans in a stable and progressive manner, in which the Nigerians themselves were the foremost upholders of a culture which should include all the best that Europe had to offer, and in which Europeans were not swamped, but, if they had come to help and serve, treated as friends and colleagues in a common enterprise. And when we were asked, "What about race relations in Nigeria?", we replied, "We don't have race relations; only people."

PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN UGANDA

by

DR. AMBA PRASAD

Uganda has a number of problems—economic, social, political; one such problem in which India is interested is the future of Indians in Uganda. In fact, it is one of the countries of Africa where Indians show utmost promise of integration with the African people.

Uganda has an area of 93,981 sq. miles. Its total population is about $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions, out of which the Indian population is in the neighbourhood of 60,000. There are about 8,400 Europeans.

I. History of Indian Settlement in Uganda

It is erroneously supposed that the first and largest Indian emigration to East Africa took place in 1896 for the construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railway or that the surplus Indian labour was provided employment in that way or that the present Indian population of Uganda consists entirely of the descendants of these. In fact, sometimes the charge is made against the present Indian population that they are the descendants of coolies, which indeed constitutes an aspersion. This is not correct, as the available historical evidence shows.

There is ample evidence to prove that India's connection with East Africa existed from ancient times and that, even in the pre-European period there were Indian settlements at various places on the East Coast of Africa. Indians came to Zanzibar and other coastal towns independently, or while working for firms in Kutch and Bombay. When the Europeans, both Germans and Englishmen, started their activities in this part of Africa they found that the entire coastal trade was in the hands of Indians. Sir John Kirk, Consul-General at Zanzibar from 1866 to 1867, has testified to the warmth with which Indians were received by the Sultan and others in those days. Bagamoyo and Mombasa were the ports on the coast and Indian merchants also established themselves there. The main caravan route to the interior started from Bagamoyo. There is no doubt that some Indian traders had gone into the interior also for purposes of trade, although the Arabs were the first in the field. About 1860, the Indian population of East Africa numbered nearly six thousand.

Captain (later Lord) Lugard brought with him a company of

Indian soldiers when he came to Uganda in 1890. He also brought some Indian artisans and some employees of Alidina Visram. Then traders followed gradually and started opening branches in the interior reaching upto Nimule, Gondoro and Wadelai (which formed part of Uganda).

Indian immigration increased with the establishment of the Imperial British East India Company in 1888. In 1890 came up the question of recruitment of Indian labour for the construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railway. The following was advanced as an argument by the Agents of the British East India Company to induce the Government of India to agree to the recruitment of Indian labour for the Railway:

"You are aware that a large number of natives of India already reside in British East Africa, for the advantages in the way of good government and kind treatment under the company's administration, combined with the fine soil and good climate of the country, are attracting new settlers from British India."¹

But this had no effect on the Government of India, as there was Section 105 of the Emigration Act XXI of 1883 which penalized inducement of natives, whether under contract or not, to leave British India for the purpose of labouring out of India. Under this Act, therefore, Indian labour could not be recruited to serve on the Kenya-Uganda Railway. For want of Indian labour, construction work could not make much head way. Africans did not provide an adequate labour supply; in fact, the preliminary survey report of 1892 expressed the view that no large number of Africans labour would be forthcoming. Nor were Europeans willing to oblige. Actually, attempts were made in the beginning to recruit labour from Great Britain but these attempts failed. The work faced such serious difficulties owing to the shortage of labour that it was feared that the construction would have to be stopped.

At this juncture, India came to the rescue of Africa. In October 1895, the Secretary of State for India's assistance was sought by the Foreign Office which had taken over responsibility for the Company's territories a few months earlier in order to press the Government of India to amend the Emigration Act in such a way that the penalizing clause might be dispensed with whenever labourers were engaged by the British Government for Government work². Here Her Majesty's Government wanted Indian labourers for employment in a railway which, it was explained, was under no company but was under a "committee of officers appointed by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to be called Uganda Railway Committee."³

It was estimated by this Committee that a total of 31,983 Indian

1. Letter No. 406 dated 20th August, 1890, from Messrs Mackinon Mackenzie & Co., Agents, British East Africa Co., to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

2. Telegram from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 23rd October, 1895.

3. Hill, M. F., *The Permanent Way*, p. 147.

labourers were imported. When the work of construction was completed in 1903, 86,312 of the Indian indentured labourers were repatriated at their own desire, 6,454 had been invalidated, 2,493 had died in East Africa, the rest (6,724) settled on the land as agriculturists while some found work as artisans and traders. Besides, the services of about 2,000 Indian overseers and clerks were retained by the Railway Administration.⁴ Thus, only a small proportion of those who had come as indentured labour settled down in East Africa.

From this time until 1922, Indians had to struggle hard to establish their position as an honourable community. There was racial discrimination on the part of the European-minded Government but Indians at last succeeded in securing their rightful place in the life of Uganda. Entebbe was the chief town of Uganda at this time. It was here that the first attempt was made in 1907 to allot plots to Indians in a new Indian township, one and a half miles away from the town proper, where Europeans were settled. This was a measure of segregation against Indians. However, Indians, after much agitation, succeeded in having their request for land for an Indian Club, close to the Goan Club in Entebbe proper, accepted. After a few years they moved to Kampala, Jinja and other places and so the Indian township in Entebbe later became an African township. Similarly, Indians were allotted land in the older part of Kampala but they refused to accept it there and demanded that it should be allotted to them on the Nakasero Hill. At last they succeeded in the struggle. In Jinja, Indian settlement on a considerable scale began after 1914. The Colonial Government wanted to allot plots to Indians three miles from the main town. The Indian Association of Jinja was a strong body and its agitation led to the grant of land in the main street. Europeans had taken lands in Kyagwe, Basuga and Toro but soon discovered that Uganda was not suitable for European settlement. So they sold their lands to the Indians.

Thus, the Indian community was subjected to a policy of segregation from 1903 to 1922. Its agitation succeeded in bringing this policy to an end in 1922. However, conditions relating to non-residence of non-Europeans on European-owned plots remained in force till about 1945. From these important towns of Uganda, Indian traders gradually went to the bush and opened *dukas* there. The density of Indian population was greatest in the coffee and cotton-growing provinces of Buganda and Busoga.

The growth of Indian population in Uganda is shown in the following table:—

1911	1921	1931	1948	1959	
1,904	5,032	13,026	13,767	63,130	(Indians)
				5,973	(Pakistanis)

4. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

The Indian population has grown both by immigration and by natural causes. It is estimated that 4 per cent of it is locally born. There was an upsurge of immigration during and after World War II. During the decade between 1938-39 and 1948-49, the growth was nearly a hundred per cent. During this period, a large number of Indian artisans immigrated into Uganda. According to one estimate, 5,000 Indian artisans and technicians went to East Africa during the War at the express invitation of the Government to further the war effort⁵. Moreover, greater openings for traders and middlemen sprang up on account of the growth of commercial crops, which naturally increased the purchasing power of the people of Uganda.

From 1919 to 1925, the white population throughout East Africa strongly demanded control on Indian immigration. For 18 years from 1925 to 1943, this demand was not pressed. Control of immigration was first introduced in February 1944 in Kenya as a war measure. In 1946, the East African Government published for information a bill to control immigration—the qualifications required for residential certificate were so fantastic that no Indian of average means and ability could enter the territories, while sufficient safeguards for new European immigrants were assured by state bounty. On account of the protests of Indians in East Africa, as well as those in India and the efforts of the Government of India, the Immigration Bill was withdrawn early in 1947. In 1949 and again in 1957, Uganda passed immigration legislation along the lines of the Kenya Government legislation, restricting the entry of Indians. East Africa has, however, continued to receive Indian immigrants for technical and skilled labour on a contract basis. They are compelled to return after the period of contract is over. Only a few are allowed to remain with a permanent residence certificate.

II. A few sociological aspects of Indian Community in Uganda⁶

The people of Indian origin are not homogeneous in language or religious affiliations. The largest number is Gujarati-speaking and the second large group is Punjabi-speaking. Urdu and Hindi are also spoken as a second or third language by them.

The major division comes on the basis of religion—the Hindus and Muslims. Before the partition of India, they were all called Indians; after the partition, they have begun to regard themselves as belonging to India or Pakistan according to their respective religious affiliations. This came as a result of some Pakistani propaganda that all Muslims should regard themselves as Pakistanis. The census of 1948 did not

5. *The Hindu*, Madras, July 13, 1946.

6. Besides the personal observation of the author in the course of a tour of Uganda in 1959, this section is based on two papers by Mr. H. S. Morris entitled "The structure of the Indian Community in Kampala" and "Communal rivalry among Indians in Uganda."

make a division between Indians and Pakistanis but the census of 1959 did do so.

Of the Muslim population, the Khoja Ismailia sect, the followers of the Agha Khan, is numerically the most important group in Uganda. There are also some Shia Muslims and include a variant of the Khoja community known as the Ithnashri sect. There are not many Indians of the Sunni sect of Islam. The main thing about the Khojas is that they are mostly converts from Hinduism, having been converted to Islam several centuries ago in their ancestral homeland of Gujarat, Kutch and Kathiawar. As such they have retained some customs and beliefs and ceremonials, which are not strictly in accordance with the teachings of Islam. They have been close to the Hindus in their social habits. But since 1952, following the advice of the Agha Khan, they have shown an increasing tendency to cut themselves off from their Indian origins and to identify themselves with the Western way of life. The Agha Khan's advice that they should abandon the Gujarati language and adopt English in their homes is being faithfully followed. The Khoja community is also having inter-marriages with Africans on an increasing scale.

Another strong Indian community is the Sikh community. The Sikhs have immigrated into Uganda in large numbers since World War II. They are mostly artisans and have formed a close and well-organised community of their own. They speak Punjabi, Urdu or Hindi. They have their own ritual and recreational organisations and limit their social action with the rest of the Hindus to business and a minimum of social ceremonies.

The largest Indian group consists of Gujarati and Punjabi Hindus. A few are in Government service or hold private jobs but most of them are in trade or industry. When a people migrate to different lands and have to live under different social and economic conditions, a new kind of social relationship based on economic status is expected to develop in course of time. Under this principle, one could expect caste ties to become insignificant. But this has only partially happened in Uganda. It is true that traditional hierarchy denoted by the caste system did not get established in Uganda but, whenever the members of a particular caste or sect grow large enough to consort with one another, it is not long before they begin to emerge as a distinct group. As Morris, after a careful survey has said, what has in fact so far emerged is a number of separate communities, each one of them more significant in the everyday lives of its members than the Indian community as a whole. It is true that hierarchy has disappeared but exclusiveness and rivalry remain⁷.

Historically, several factors have played their part in the preservation of the exclusive groupings of the Indian community. The closeness of East Africa to India and the relative ease of communication make it

7. H. S. Morris, "Communal rivalry among Indians in Uganda," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, December, 1957, p. 309.

possible to have frequent intercourse with people at home. Indians visit India for education or in search of suitable bridegrooms or brides or to meet older relations. Marriage ceremonies are performed in the traditional way. Moreover, the Indian community has grown steadily by influx at different times as the population figures given above show and this has encouraged separate groupings. At the same time, the Ismailis have set an example of exclusiveness *vis-a-vis* other Indian groups from an early stage and this could not but influence other sections of the Indian community. Finally, the leaders have a vested interest in the maintenance of separate groups, for thereby they gain a position of influence and prestige.

There is no doubt that economic factors tend to break this sectionalism among Indians. The Indian Chamber of Commerce includes members of all communities who act together in mutual interest. They also form a social group. The artisan class is also beginning to organise itself and is finding a community of interest with urbanised African labourers. But effective and all-embracing economic organisation at lower levels has yet to come.

III. Role of the Indian Community in the Economy of Uganda

Johnston, who was Commissioner in Uganda from 1899 to 1901, was a great admirer of Indian traders and encouraged them in their activity to forestall German commercial activity in all directions. He says that Indians were willing to start shops at places "where even a German hesitated to penetrate". So they introduced trade where it did not exist before.⁸ This opinion is further strengthened by the view of the East African Royal Commission of 1953-55.⁹ They also brought down prices by their economical and frugal methods. The census report of 1931 officially admitted this fact and found a great margin between the prices charged by Europeans and those charged by Indians. Indians are able to do so because their wants are limited, they are satisfied with a smaller margin of profit and they are hard-working and save on labour. The Indian shop was called *duka* which was stocked with all kinds of provisions, accessories and goods of everyday use. It was reported in an official report as early as 1903 that Indian traders had taken all the retail trade out of the hands of the Arab and Swahili traders who had enjoyed the monopoly of trade upto that time.¹⁰ The recent trade boycott of Indians has greatly affected the smaller *dukawala* in the countryside of

8. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, Vol. I, p. 294.

9. The Commission explained the role of the Indian trader in these words: "Indeed, the remarkable tenacity and courage of Indian traders had been mainly responsible for stimulating the wants of the indigenous peoples, even in the remotest areas, by opening to them a shop window on the modern world and for collecting for sale elsewhere whatever small surpluses were available for disposal." *Report of the East African Royal Commission, 1953-55*, p. 65.

10. *General Report on the Uganda Protectorate, 1903*, Vol. I, p. 1904.

Uganda but before 1959 the Indian played the most important part in this small trade:

Let us briefly review the role of Indians in respect of the various industries of Uganda.

Cotton industry is by far the most important industry of Uganda and forms over 80 per cent of the total value of its exports. Cotton cultivation and spinning were not known in Uganda before the establishment of British rule. Lugard had, however, discovered a species of wild cotton growing in Uganda when he was there in 1891-92. Cotton cultivation started in 1903 and in the following year, Mr. K. E. Bosup, who had formed the Uganda Company, distributed two tons of imported seed among the peasants of the Buganda province. The Company set up a hand-worked ginnery in Kampala in 1905 and the next year the first power-worked ginnery was installed. There were before 1911 two European-owned ginneries at Kampala and a third at Kisumu. The first Indian-owned ginnery was built at Entebbe by Alidina Visram in 1911 and another was set up at Kampala in 1912. In 1914, he formed the Alidina Visram Cotton Ginning and Trading Co. Ltd., whose shares were sold to Indians. It was this company which exported the first consignment of Uganda cotton to Bombay. In 1916, the Bombay firm of Messrs. Narain Das Rajaram Ltd. purchased the ginnery of Hansing Co. (a German concern, declared enemy property) and built another ginnery at Kawempe near Kampala.

As cotton came increasingly to be exported to India after 1918.¹¹ Indians took greater interest in its ginning and marketing. By 1924, Indians had come to own about 100 to 164 ginneries which had been established and by 1930, 68 per cent of the cotton crop was handled for export by Indian firms, as compared with 8 per cent by European firms.¹² The total number of ginneries now owned by Indians is about 138 out of a total of 163 ginneries.

In 1928, the African grower was much exercised over the price he was being paid for the cotton he sold to the ginneries. He suspected that the ginneries had made an agreement to keep down prices. The Uganda Government appointed a commission in 1929 under the chairmanship of Sir William Morris Carter to enquire into the grievances of the cotton growers. Its finding was that, with a few exceptions, the prices paid for seed cotton by the ginning combines was fair. The Commission also recommended the setting up of the Cotton Price Control Board with power to fix minimum price for seed cotton.¹³

It is true that Indians first participated in the cotton industry as middlemen between European ginnery-owners and African cultivators buying seed cotton from the African growers and carrying it to the gin-

11. It is estimated that by 1932 India was buying nearly 90 per cent of the crop.

12. L. W. Hollingsworth, *The Asians of East Africa*, (London, 1960), p. 71.

13. Carter, W. M., *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Cotton Industry of Uganda*, (1929).

neries owned by Europeans. They bought at low prices from the African cultivators and sold at high prices to the ginneries and in this way earned good profit. In fact, several Indian families made fortunes with little or no capital in the post-World War I boom period.¹⁴ The middleman became less important in course of time when it was found economical to buy direct from the African grower and when the grower discovered that by selling direct to ginneries, he could save for himself the middleman's profits. The Indian middleman, however, stayed as *dukawala* in the countryside.

Coffee and tea plantations were also first owned by Europeans. As the European planters started leaving Uganda, these plantations were purchased by Indians. Except for two or three European plantations, all the large coffee plantations are now owned by Indians and Africans.

Indians have been pioneers in setting up oil mills for producing cotton seed, groundnut oil and sugar. The sugarcane plantation and the making of jaggery was started by Alidina Visram at Entebbe, at Kampala and at Buundu (near Jinja) at the beginning of the present century. The first khandsari white sugar was produced at Buundu in 1920 and was exhibited at the agricultural show at Kampala in that year. The first modern sugar factory was, however, set up by Mr. Nanji Kalidas Mehta in 1923 at Lugazi, followed by the factory at Kakira in Busoga in 1931 by Messrs Vithaldas Haridas and Co. The sugar produced¹⁵ is consumed either by people of Uganda or exported to other East African territories, the proportion being about half and half. The two largest sugar plantations in Uganda are at Lugazi and Kakira and both are owned by Indians.

Indians have also introduced several modern skills and crafts into Uganda and have thereby trained quite a large body of Africans in craftsmanship. Starting with a small capital, they are now manufacturing commodities of everyday use such as electric appliances, washing soap, glassware, etc., and have developed the crafts of shoe-making and boot-making and the manufacture of wood and cork. Saw-milling is an important industry promoted by small Indian enterprisers, though there is a large concern also called, the Sikh Saw Mills Ltd. It is in these small industries that the Indians and Africans have better chances of co-operative enterprise.

IV. Relations between Indians and Africans

The relations between Indians and Africans in Uganda were quite happy before 1948. Mr. C. F. Andrews, after meeting a number of young nationalist leaders of Uganda in 1921, bore testimony to that in these words:—

“The people of Uganda, who are the most intelligent, enlightened

14. *Ibid.*

15. In 1950 the production of sugar was 53,000 tons.

and progressive Africans, whom I met in my tour, are already in favour of the retention of Indians in their country. They would have been the very first to cry out against any invasion of their rights and privileges, but they have found out by their own experience that Indians materially help them, and for this reason they wish them to remain."¹⁶

Indian and African stands were common in respect of some vital political questions, such as the common roll question and the question of the closer union of the East African territories. Mr. V.P. Mehd, representing Indians in Uganda, in his memorandum to the Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa in 1931, stated, "We submit that the elective system be introduced provided it is on common roll basis."¹⁷ Mr. V. V. Phadke, another representative Indian, pointed out, "We submit that whatever may be the conclusions arrived at by His Majesty's Government on the question of Closer Union, the demand of a common roll should now be granted."¹⁸

On the question of the closer union of East African territories, Mr. Mehd's Memorandum stated that "the idea of political closer union is not liked by any community in Uganda, we have all along opposed such a closer union."¹⁹

Later still, in 1946, Sir Maharaj Singh Delegation to East Africa reported that, in political controversies, Africans and Indians had found themselves on the same side.

In 1958, one of the terms of reference of the Constitutional Committee appointed by the Government of Uganda was to devise ways and means of giving adequate representation to minorities. These terms of reference were strongly opposed by the leaders of Uganda and this was one of their grievances during the trade boycott of 1959. Indians made it clear that what they wanted was that they should be recognized as full citizens of Uganda with the same rights as were enjoyed by African citizens. They disavowed publicly any claims to further privileges or to constitutional safe-guards.²⁰ The Government of Uganda did not modify the terms of reference in spite of this disavowal. A new organisation called the Action Group consisting of young and progressive-minded Indians was formed in Uganda, with Dr. M. M. Patel as chief, with the object of "educating Indians in the current political realities of the country and to ask and aspire for nothing more than the individual equality with the Africans."²¹ On the political front, therefore, Indians and Africans have thought alike.

On the economic plane, however, the relations between the two

16. C.F. Andrews, *Indian Question in East Africa*, 1921, p. 81.

17. Memo. of Mr. V. P. Mehd, *Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa*, 1931, V. III, App. 21.

18. Memo. of Mr. V. V. Phadke, *Ibid.*, App. 22.

19. Mr. V. P. Mehd, *op. cit.*

20. *Colonial Times*, Nairobi, June 18, 1959.

21. Policy statement of the Uganda Action Group.

communities were not always very happy and can be said to have been bad since World War II. Sir Maharaj Singh Delegation in 1946 said that though the Africans were anxious to enter trade, they found the *dukawalas* in the native reserve a stumbling block and consequently there was considerable feeling against them. This feeling expressed itself through a boycott of Indian *dukawalas* in 1948 which led to considerable trouble and disturbance for several months. A good deal of Indian property was destroyed. But the feeling was equally strong against the African upper classes whose houses were also burnt.²² Thus, in this disturbance a number of complex factors were involved: the deep-seated feeling against the over-privileged, land-owning class; the anger against the advisers of the Kabaka and grievances against the cotton cess were mixed up with the discontent with the cotton prices paid by Indian ginnery-owners and alleged malpractices of cotton weighing in their own favour. The Farmers Union, which had organised the boycott, was interested in having its own stores in place of the Indian *dukawalas*.

A few years later, in 1956, the Uganda National Congress started another trade boycott of European and Indian shops, with the idea that Africans must buy only from Africans. This had a definite political motivation. The greatest sufferers, however, were the Indian *dukawalas*.²³

Trouble started again in April, 1959. Although the Uganda National Movement denied antagonism towards the Indian "sahebs"—an ironic twist for an old word—it did maintain that the boycott was intended partly to persuade Asians to "disavow their privileged political and economic position as a minority in Uganda." The terms of reference of the Constitution Committee made the Africans suspect that the Indians also wanted reservation of seats. The Action Group had made the Indian position absolutely clear that they did not want any special safeguards but the Government did not modify its terms of reference. Hence the main and real reason for the boycott was economic. The boycott very adversely affected Indian traders numbering 1,300 in the rural areas of Buganda, one of the four provinces of Uganda. The middle class, which had emerged in Uganda, wanted to capture all trade from Indians with whom they could not stand open competition and demanded facilities to obtain credit. This class was in the forefront of this trade boycott. Thus, the desire to squeeze the Indian traders in the countryside out of their business was the main cause, though the political motivation could not be entirely ruled out. Sir Amar Maini, the then Minister for Commerce and Industry in the Uganda Government, however, went so far as to say that the reason for the boycott was neither economic nor social but purely political.²⁴

22. M. Macmillan, *Introducing East Africa*, London, 1952.

23. *The Times*, London, April 30, 1956.

24. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, Oct. 30, 1959.

Some violence was also reported and some Africans raised the cry of "get out Asians". It was reported that, as a result, Indian capital began flowing out of Uganda and small traders left Uganda and began to settle down as *dukawalas* in parts of Tanganyika²⁵ or returned to India. But important leaders of Uganda have never advocated that Indians should leave Uganda. In fact, they reprimanded those who thought that independence would mean disappearance of Asians from Uganda.²⁶

Several solutions were thought of for the problem which so frequently led to trade boycott. Mr. L.B. Ntambi, Chairman of the Uganda African Traders Association, said that unless Asians organized themselves quickly in a big way and with very nominal profits to finance small African traders, they would lose the market completely.²⁷ This was addressed to Indian businessmen and some have followed this advice. Some Indians have started joint concerns with Africans and are carrying on their business in partnership with them. Co-operative credit societies have been formed which are advancing loans to Africans on easy terms, thus establishing conditions of equal competition with Indians.

Now Uganda is independent and, no doubt, these relations are finding their normal moorings. There is in evidence a great deal of integration between skilled and semi-skilled workers in both communities. Indians have no consideration for colour; in fact, they have consistently fought for the abolition of the colour bar in any form. As the trade union movement is growing day by day, a good basis of integration is being found. Inter-marriages will also grow in course of time and already signs of social co-operation are there. Thus, there is a hopeful future for the integration and harmonious relationship between Indians and Africans in Uganda.

25. TAIFA reported that Asians were selling out their business in Uganda and were buying plantation estates with £ 100,000 to £ 500,000 in Tanganyika. *The Times of India*, Delhi, Feb. 15, 1960.

26. Mr. G. Oda, Member, Legislative Council, held that such a demand was entirely wrong. *The Times of India*, Delhi, Feb. 15, 1960. More recently, Mr. Kanya, Chairman of the Uganda African National Farmers and Traders Movement, threatened a boycott of Indians—both in respect of buying from them and selling to them. But the independent Uganda Government has come heavily down upon any boycott movement. The Uganda Co-operative Alliance is also against such action. The Alliance has issued a warning to African farmers against "enemies and exploiters whose senseless promises will lead you to poverty." *The Sunday Statesman*, Jan. 20, 1963.

27. *The Times*, London, Feb. 3, 1960.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

by

SANJEEVA NAYAK

"This is the history of 'a landless, voiceless people threatened with moral and physical disintegration by a force over which they have no control, whose appeal is appeal of all the African people against the oppression and bad faith of a State whose present standards are a menace to Western or Christian civilization'."

Freda Troup

In the Face of Fear

"Ignorance is a painless vice." It corrodes slowly, steadily and stealthily, leaving deep scars all over. The rise and fall of Hitler and all that he stood for have left vivid memories. The millions who died to ensure his demise have done so, it appears, in vain. A visit to South Africa will bring home the lesson.

The racial problem is not the creation of the Africans. "The Negro did not create the issue of colour, or race, or the condition in which he lives, but he has been moulded by them. The Negro's fundamental loyalty is, therefore, to himself. His situation makes this inevitable."¹ It is natural that he "prefers poverty in freedom to prosperity under slavery". Those of us who believe in freedom can appreciate and encourage it. No one has, so far, succeeded in stifling the voice of liberty. History, world opinion and justice are aligned against South Africa in her attempt to perpetuate the intolerable and obnoxious doctrine of *apartheid*. It cannot be and should not be permitted to make a virtue out of sin. The Afrikaner is aware of this resistance. He is, therefore, running faster and faster, seeking to put out the flames on his clothes. Will he succeed? The answer is anyone's guess.

Sacred to Secret Trust

It is to this country that the League of Nations handed over the Mandate on December 17, 1920. South Africa had conquered it from Germany in 1915. She was anxious to annex it when peace dawned. Then prevailing world opinion and the idealism of President Wilson pre-

1. George Padmore, *Pan Africanism or Communism* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1956), p. 13.

vailed against such an action. Yet, the pressure on President Wilson was so great that he was sometimes compelled to take it as a "natural union". But he did not give in to South Africa completely. "It was up to the Union of South Africa to make it so attractive that South-West Africa would come into the Union on their own free will", and, he asserted, "if successful administration by a mandatory should lead to union with the mandatory, he would be the last to object."² He, however, permitted the Territory to be an "integral portion" of the Union. It was his hope that South Africa would "administer it as an annex to the Union so far as consistent with the interest of the inhabitants."³

It is clear that President Wilson stuck to the laudable principle of "no annexation". To give it up was to discredit the League of Nations. Appetite for annexation, he asserted, was insatiable. It is like the story of a man who kept buying up property on the plea that he "would never be satisfied so long as anyone owned any land adjoining his own."⁴ The Paris Peace Conference came to a reasonable compromise between the opposing points of view. The compromise adopted at Paris was a rejection of annexation....⁵ It was against this background that President Wilson accepted Article 22 of the Covenant drafted by General Smuts. It specifically said that "the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization."

In South-West Africa, we have hardly any proof of this 'sacred trust'. All evidence indicates that South Africa took it as a secret gift⁶. It is a fact that the tax-payers in South-West Africa "benefited from public expenditure in proportion to their contribution to the revenue, contrary to the practice in most civilized communities."⁷ Even the Mandates Commission was severely critical of South Africa and its reports contain constant references to 'complete stagnation' of social work.⁸ It was shocked by the 'apparent assumption by the white population that "Natives exist chiefly for the purpose of labour for the Whites."⁹ "It seemed at time that the Whites in South Africa were so irresponsible that they would not stop at the extermination of the indigenous inhabitants if they had to make a choice between that solution and reversal of the existing state of affairs."¹⁰ The problem is primarily a human problem, the problem of a people.¹¹ "The dreariness and frustration of the African life", wrote an astute observer, "particularly on the locations, is indescribable;

2. H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948), p. 124.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

6. United Nations Document Provisional A/C. 4/SR. 1234, December 6, 1961, p. 2.

7. Lao Marquand, *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 253.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1220, November 25, 1961, p. 8.

11. U.N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1231, December 4, 1961, p. 8.

the shallow reservoir in English of groans and sibilants is a measure of our luck and our complacency, is at a loss for expression."¹² This is the sorry tale of the sorrowing land.

Administration

South-West Africa, for purposes of administration, is divided into eighteen magisterial districts, three detached Assistant Magistracies in which magistrates perform certain administrative functions in addition to their judicial duties.¹³ In the north three tribal areas—Ovamoland, Okovangoland and the Kaokoveld—have indirect rule. The tribes have an extremely modified state of tribal independence under the supervision and surveillance of the government residents.

There is one piece of land that falls outside the above groupings. Welvis Bay is the Goa of South-West Africa. Like Goa, it is a port. Its area is an insignificant 434 sq. miles. It is ruled as a part of the Cape Province, as Goa was an "overseas province" of Portugal. Mr. Louw maintains Walvis Bay "had been part of South-West Africa even at the time of the German occupation."¹⁴ The Portuguese also claimed that Goa was ruled by them when the British ruled India. South African position in the U. N. indicates that they mean to hold on to this port even if they have to surrender South-West Africa. It is unlikely they would learn the lessons of history.

Political Consciousness

The limitations that circumscribe political activity of the Africans are legion. The nationalist movement is led by three parties—South-West Africa Political Organization (SWAPO), South-West Africa National Union (SWANU) and South-West Africa National Independence Organization (SWANIO). All of these aspire to replace the existing administration. Their activities are mainly confined to placing facts before the Trusteeship Council and the Committee instituted by it. The scope for political activity within the country is extremely limited. For the first time,¹⁵ they came marching and singing, when the Carpio Committee visited South West Africa in May last.

The SWAPO is one of the main political parties in the Territory. It has a membership of 90,000.¹⁶ Its existence and propaganda are main-

12. Peter Ritner, *The Death of Africa* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 59.

13. A. Gordon Brown, *Year Book and Guide to Southern Africa*. Ed. (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1962), p. 219.

14. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1226, November 30, 1961.

15. General Assembly, Official Records: Seventeenth Session, *Report of the Special Committee For South West Africa. Annex XI*, Record of the hearings held by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman in South West Africa, U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, September 20, 1962, p. 29.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

tained only through newspapers. It has not held any public meetings.¹⁷ The movement is led by the Chief Hosea Kutako. An octogenarian, the Paramount Chief of the Hereros was born in 1870. In the rebellion of 1904 against the Germans, Chief Hosea was an active participant. He was wounded in the leg and later in the cheek. In 1939, he, on a request by the South African Government, persuaded his followers to enlist in the army. In 1946, the South African Government rewarded his services by ordering him to move to the north with his tribe to enable it to settle returning White soldiers and their families! True to his mettle, Chief Hosea refused to comply with this request and help the Government in its dark designs. Recently, he appeared before the Carpio Committee.

This party has a relatively moderate programme. It wants the U. N. to:

“(a) Terminate the Mandate for South-West Africa immediately, and to entrust the temporary administration of the country to a United Nations Commission composed of African States with a view to arranging free general elections in the country immediately in order to make possible the conditions necessary for South-West Africa to accede:

1. To self-government now, through the establishment of a African Government based on the principle of one man one vote, irrespective of tribe, race, religion, education, sex, property or colour;
2. To independence not later than 1963.

(b) Establish a United Nations Police Force:

1. To facilitate the work of the Administrative Commission of African States;
2. To protect the lives of all inhabitants of the country;
3. To free all political detainees and imprisoned leaders and members of SWAPO and other groups;
4. To disarm all South African military and para-military personnel and to arrange for their immediate repatriation to South Africa;
5. To disarm all organized and private civilian elements;
6. To assist in the restoration of peace and security; and
7. To maintain law and order.”¹⁸

It has further proposed “the creation of an interim non-racial executive council of ten members, six Africans and four Europeans to govern South-West Africa in close collaboration with a United Nations Commission during the transition...,” and “that free general elections be held before the attainment of independence under the direct supervision of

17. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

18. General Assembly, official Records: Sixteenth Session, *Report of the Committee on South West Africa concerning the implementation of the General Assembly Resolutions 1568 (XV) and 1596 (XV)*, U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p. 18.

the United Nations Commission.”¹⁹ By seeking the United Nations’ presence in the Territory, the SWAPO sought to transform the United Nations Special Committee on South-West Africa into an advisory commission.²⁰ The SWAPO has also asked for a United Nations police force with its personnel recruited from “all non-aligned member-States and that the great powers be asked to provide arms, transport and other materials.”²¹

The SWANU has generally the same aims as SWAPO. With a membership of 10,000, it is active and has held a few meetings. It believes that ‘there could never be peace in South-West Africa until the “White settlers from the Republic of South Africa, who are determined to die fighting against the United Nations or any other administration in South-West Africa, had been removed from the Territory.”’²²

Making a clear distinction between political control and administration, the SWANU wants the following arrangements for the first stage of self-determination:

- “(a) Acceptance of the principle that political decisions should be taken by the people of South-West Africa themselves;
- (b) For this purpose, representatives from various regions of South-West Africa should be selected to participate in a constitutional convention, to be held under the auspices of the United Nations, which would provide advisers on problems of technical nature.”²³

The above convention would decide the political arrangements like the form of government and its constitution, the Legislative Assembly representation; the formation of an administration bereft of supporters of South Africa; maintenance of law and order with the United Nations Police Force; and to secure and utilize technical assistance from the specialised agencies of the United Nations.²⁴

There are two other political parties of some significance. They are the South-West African Coloured Organization (SWACO) and the United National South West Party (UNSWAP). These parties offer qualified support to the Government. The SWACO, in its testimony, “expressed the view that the *apartheid* policy was based on traditional practice and was satisfactory.”²⁵ The UNSWP, an official branch of the United Party, is the European opposition party in the Territory. Realising the importance of the non-Europeans, the UNSWP advocates “a qualified franchise based on the principle of giving the vote to every civilised person regardless of race.”²⁶ Race relations are, according to

19. U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, September 20, 1962, p. 64.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

21. *Ibid.*

22. U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p. 18.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

24. *Ibid.*

25. U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1 September 20, 1962, p. 52.

26. *Africa Digest*, London, June 62, p. 199.

Mr. Niehaus (leader of the UNSWP), "still remarkably good by and large."²⁷ To hasten the development of non-Europeans, the UNSWP advocates, in the initial stages, representation to the "coloured" population, the Nama and so on by a member each. The "coloured" people because of their relative accomplishments may elect thier representative; White representatives of Natives should be nominated first and later elected. It prefers to acknowledge South-West Africa as a mandate. Mr. Niehaus claimed that "due to the pressure by the United Nations from outside and the UNSWP within, the government was for the first time beginning to promote Native development."²⁸

But an unfortunate fact glitters and glares. "After forty years, not one single indigenous inhabitant was enfranchised....."²⁹ There is not a single African in the Territory's Legislative Assembly, either nominated or elected. Even the judiciary interferes to curtail the freedom of the individual. According to Chief Goraseb, the magistrate had tried to prevent him from coming to Windhoek³⁰ to testify before the Carpio Committee.³¹ Nevertheless, he defied the order.

"Away with apartheid"

In the early afternoon of 11 May, 1962, a crowd of some one hundred representatives of the SWAPO marched singing and carrying the placard "Away with *apartheid*" before the Carpio Committee. This slogan is the *summum bonum* of the African aspirations. *Apartheid* affects every aspect of an African's life. There are separate gaols for similar crimes committed by a Negro and a White;³² there is segregation even for cows and for their grazing; Negroes cannot even accomodate their guests; in the post offices, there are separate doors for them;³³ and there are, of course, different schools. A Negro policeman cannot arrest a European whom he has caught stealing. All that he can do is to go to the police station and ask for a White policeman to do the job.³⁴ Perhaps the most humiliating and degrading aspects of *apartheid* are to be found in the pass laws.

A pass in South-West Africa is an African's "title to existence", and failure to produce one on demand lands the offender in gaol.³⁵ The complex system of pass laws has uprooted and disintegrated families. It has developed a system of terrorism through intimidation. The police

27. U.N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, September 20, 1962, p. 58.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

29. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1232, December 4, 1961, p. 12.

30. U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, Sept. 20, 1962, p. 70.

31. The Chairman Mr. Carpio (Philippines) and Vice-Chairman Mr. de Alva (Mexico) of the Special Committee for South West Africa visited the Territory in May 1962. The Committee is called the Carpio Committee.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

34. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1221, November 25, 1961, p. 2.

35. U.N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, Sept 20, 1962, p. 46.

are supreme. They can summon a suspected African at night to produce the pass. Under the system of "influx control", people in the reserve cannot move to urban areas in search of employment.³⁶ If an African is fortunate enough to secure one, he is required to produce the identification pass³⁷ and failure to do so disqualifies him. Every African male over sixteen must have a labour contract, which is a type of pass. If an African is ill and fails to report for work, he needs another type of pass, a 'location pass' to remain at home. He needs a pass to visit relatives on a farm or in a reserve and a 'night pass' to go to town at night.³⁸ An African cannot even cross the street without a pass.³⁹

The people, naturally, see little difference between the present regime and the German rule that preceded it. Then they were required to wear the passes around their neck and now carry them in their pockets. The African has learnt to live by these small mercies. But he is biding his time.

Economic Conditions

Apartheid also impinges on economic life. The Africans are being corralled and confined to reserves, which are so small that they look like spots. There are some White people in the Territory owning twenty farms, a much larger area than a reserve. "Yet the South African Government under the Bantustan system, told Africans they would be put in the reserves and the government would build them up until they were capable of helping themselves. That was like giving a person a wire to hang himself with, for the reserves had no minerals, no water, no industries, no fish for food, and unlike the white areas, cattle were limited to 50 head per person."⁴⁰

On such barren territory, the Africans "would be unable to survive by their time-worn arts of stalking and hunting."⁴¹ The hapless Negroes are condemned to serve as menials or as low-paid workers on farms or in mines. As a result, "the Native population, for lack of any remunerative employment and because of the absence of industry or the poverty or adverse climatic conditions in their Native reserves, have no share whatever under the present system in the fruits of commerce and industry or in the exploitation of their agricultural, fishing and rich mineral resources."⁴² Thus, "they lead a bare, spare life with no incentive or sense of purpose."⁴³

Even when African interests are entirely subordinated to those of

36. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

37. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR/1221, November 25, 1961, p. 2.

38. U. N. Document A/5212/Add.1, Sept 20, 1962, p. 67.

39. U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p.15.

40. U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, Sept. 20, 1962. p. 70.

41. Ritrer, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

42. U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p. 4.

43. *Ibid.*

European colonists economically,⁴⁴ their contribution to the treasury is considerable. Although the White man has taken the initiative in "developing the country, *nothing* was achieved without the assistance of the non-White."⁴⁵

Contract Labour

In a country where Africans are confined to thirteen per cent of the total area,⁴⁶ employment opportunities become the main source of subsistence. The other avenue open to Africans—agriculture—has a limited scope, as no African has the right "to acquire title to South African land, not even to land reserved for the indigenous population."⁴⁷ Naturally, "there is hardly any way in which the Native population can earn a cash income except by accepting the onerous conditions of contract labour."⁴⁸

The contract labourers are recruited by the only authorized agency, the New South-West Africa Native Labour Association (SWANLA). According to official procedure, every White settler, who wished to employ an African, is required to make an application to SWANLA accompanied by cheque for £ 12 or 18. The labourer is required to serve him at least for a period of eighteen to twenty-four months. During that time, the labourer has no right to return home, is not entitled to sick pay or to annual leave and his family is not allowed to accompany him. The wage paid to contract labourers is one shilling and three pence per day.⁴⁹ Furthermore, in case of accident, he is not adequately protected by the Workmen's Compensation Act; nor can his labour disputes be arbitrated by trade unions, since the organization and registration of such unions is illegal.⁵⁰

The Africans are driven to sign such contracts. An African within the police zone has to find work in twelve or fourteen days; if he does not, he will face ejection from the urban area or, alternatively, will have to accept any employment offered to him.⁵¹ Even children are not spared. A boy over eleven years can begin work on a farm under the contract system. A contract labourer just works, sleeps, and eats. If he works slowly, his employer has the right to call the police to arrest him on that ground.⁵² There are no fixed hours of work. A contract labourer can work from five o'clock in the morning to midnight.⁵³ If a White

44. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1218, November 24, 1961, p. 14.

45. General Assembly, Official Records: Seventeenth Session, *Report of the Special Committee for South West Africa, Annex XII*, Written petitions and communications received by the Special Committee, U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 2, Sept. 20, 1962, p. 51.

46. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1233, December 5, 1961, P. 5.

47. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR/1234, December 6, 1961, p. 2.

48. U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p. 14.

49. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1217, November 22, 1961, p. 14.

50. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1219, November 23, 1961, p. 17.

51. *Ibid.*

52. U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p. 4.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

farmer kills an African by beating him to death, he is fined £ 50. It is clear that there is no law to protect the Africans.⁵⁴

The workers are also dismissed to compel obedience. For example, to enforce *apartheid* policy, a new reserve has been built around the capital city Windhoek. This reserve is called Katutura. On the night of December 10, 1959, after repeated expressions of opposition by location residents to their removal⁵⁵, police and soldiers tried to force them to move to Katutura. On their refusal, the police opened fire, "killing eleven Africans and injuring at least forty-four others."⁵⁶ Recently, a total number of 250 Africans employed by the Windhoek Municipality still residing in Windhoek were "ordered to move to Katutura within three months under penalty of being sacked from their jobs."⁵⁷ Mr. Ismael Kukuri, a driver, was dismissed by his employer, a former mayor, because he left his work to meet the Carpio Committee, despite the permission granted the previous day.⁵⁸ These are some of the daily occurrences in this unhappy Territory. Its miseries have no limit.

Trade

Land and labour, thus, offer restricted scope to the Africans. A living by trade, too, is denied to them. An African can trade only with his own people, who have no money; he cannot obtain credit, since that is prevented by law; finally, as there are no African wholesalers owing to absence of credit and capital, the African businessman is obliged to buy from White wholesalers who in most cases give priority to their White customers when certain commodities are scarce.⁵⁹

In 1955, the Africans were told that they could not possess live-stock in towns. But Africans living in the reserves were allowed to own a limited number of cattle and small live-stock but were prohibited from selling them outside their respective areas. The only customers they could look to were the White settlers. Being a buyers' market, the Whites normally waited for special auction arranged by the Department of Bantu Affairs. The prices the animals could fetch were pitifully low. An ox would be bought for £8 or less and resold for about £25. The Africans are further handicapped because there are no markets or public auctions in the reserve. Besides, the law does not permit them to bring the cattle within a police zone or to trade among themselves. Trade to an African is an occupation simmering with treacherous prospects.

54. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1222, November 27, 1961, p. 10.

55. General Assembly Resolution 1567 (XV), December 18, 1960.

56. *Ibid.*

57. U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, September 20, 1962, p. 63. The figure quoted as 325 by the SWAPO, *Ibid.*, p. 66.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

59. U. N. Document A/C. 4/1219, November 23, 1961, p. 21.

Social Conditions

In a land where sociability suffers from the application of *apartheid*, social services have no place. That is so in South-West Africa. In health, education and housing, we find discrimination. Africans are treated like slaves. Their residential areas are required to be separated from the adjacent "White" areas by strip of at least 500 yards, in which no development is allowed⁶⁰. By law, the house occupied by an African can never become his property in urban areas, nor can he build and settle permanently there; he has been reduced to the status of a lodger in the land of his birth.⁶¹ Unemployment over a period, failure to follow some lawful occupation and absence from his home for a month without written permission can disqualify a person. The authorities can then declare that he has "ceased to be a 'fit and proper' person to reside in the location."⁶² The cancellation of his residential permit automatically applies also to his family.

In the Native Location, the Africans are not permitted to allow visitors to live with them without payment of rent. They have to pay a monthly rent of 7 sh. 6d. and guests are charged 2sh. 6d. by the Government. No one is exempted from this payment. Even an old woman earning £2. 10 sh. per month is required to make the payment.⁶³ No care is taken to establish convenient communications. For example, the prescribed route to the nearest store at Kamanjab from Sessfontein is 135 miles, while the traditional road was only sixty miles long. The intervening area has been occupied by the Whites. The Negroes are, therefore, compelled to traverse a longer stretch to avoid inconvenience to the Whites.

Education

The system of education of non-Whites is but an apology.⁶⁴ It is under the general control, supervision and direction of the administration.⁶⁵ The establishment of private schools is discouraged. European, African and Coloured children have separate facilities. The education imparted to them is different in content and quality. Segregation is prevalent in schools. The Africans are exposed only to a rudimentary schooling, while the Coloured children receive little better treatment. Yet, the only profession open to the Coloureds is teaching. Further, only five of them are sent each year to a teacher training college in Johannesburg.⁶⁶ It is significant, however, that in forty years, the

60. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

63. U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, September 20, 1962, p.36.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

65. U. N. Document A/C. 4/1222, November 27, 1961, p. 2.

66. U. N. Document A/C. 4/1220, November 20, 1961, p. 4.

Government has not established a single secondary school for Africans.⁶⁷

Even the inadequate and unsatisfactory system has been replaced by a more debased system since 1961. This system is called "Bantu education". While commending this system, Dr. Verwoerd said in the South African Senate in 1954:

"There is no place for him (the African) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. For that reason, it is no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community. Until now he has been subject to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze."⁶⁸ In other words, the African is forced to develop what Nietzsche called the 'frog's perspective'. The object is not only to keep the Africans in a state of subservience to the Whites but also to deny them access to higher education.

This system is worse than the system which preceded it.⁶⁹ To ensure its success the Government prohibits any recruitment of teachers into the Territory from the neighbouring States, including South Africa.⁷⁰ At Sessfontein, Mr. Nicodemus Hendrik explained that he has not been paid for three months at the usual rate of £7.13.1 per month. During the previous year, he had earned £69.⁷¹ At Kaokoveld a school was built in 1944 but the first teacher came only in March 1962.⁷² In enforcing the system, every possible effort is made to discourage enrolment. For instance, in the Epuriko Native Reserve, there are schools, but only two have hostels. Topography permits the children to attend school only within a radius of five miles. A child without transport gets tired by walking to the school each way. Weariness and an empty stomach systematically eliminate many an African child.

Man's inhumanity to man reaches its culmination when we examine health facilities in South-West Africa. This is one of the grave aspects of the situation and will inevitably lead to the extinction of the African people. In Okahomdja, there is no clinic or hospital. The nearest hospital is at Windhoek (40 miles). There are no doctors in the reserves, which have the nearest towns at about 200 miles. To carry the patients to town is "an impossible situation."⁷³ Besides, patients are sometimes discharged prematurely and are ordered to report to hospitals as out-patients irrespective of the distance and inconvenience involved.⁷⁴ The discriminatory nature of health facilities is illustrated by the fact that, in the 1960-61 estimates, £ 150,000 were provided for the erection of an

67. *Ibid.*

68. U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p. 17.

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

71. U. N. Document A/5212/Add. 1, September 20, 1962, p. 41.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

74. U. N. Document Supplement No. 12A (A/4926), p. 17.

African hospital for 250,000 people, while at Windhoek, for 20,000 Whites, the state hospital was built at a cost of £ 1,000,000.⁷⁵ This may look fantastic. But there it is.

This is the way in which South Africa discharges its sacred Trust. The argument that *apartheid* is a mode of living for a multi-racial society is, therefore, preposterous. *Apartheid* is not a prod but a programme to perpetuate the miseries of the Negroes. It is crystal clear that the South African Government prefers persecution to persuasion. Being a "real estate" of the United Nations, South-West Africa cannot be abandoned to South Africa. The hurry in which the Union recently announced the establishment of a high powered commission to look into the developmental aspect of the non-Whites betrays its anxiety. Perhaps, South Africa woke up little too late.

75. U. N. Document A/C. 4/SR 1219, November 23, 1961, p.18.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

by

JULIUS K. NYERERE

President of Tanganyika

The idea of one-party system of Government is catching on among some of the emergent African nations. Mr. Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanganyika, a strong exponent of one-party system, has prepared a thesis supporting the idea. Below we reproduce the thesis as a whole for the benefit of our readers.

—Editor

Democracy is Government by the people. Ideally, it is a form of government whereby the people—all the people—settle their own affairs through free discussion. The appropriate setting for this kind of basic, or pure, democracy is a small community. The City States of ancient Greece, for example, practised it. In larger communities, Government by the people is possible only in a modified form.

After pure democracy, the next best thing is government by the people's representatives. Where the affairs of several million people are to be settled by discussion, it is obviously not possible for all of them to take a direct part in the actual discussion. So instead we have a Parliament in which a number of spokesmen, or representatives, conduct the discussion on behalf of the people. And if these representatives are truly to represent the people, they must be freely chosen by those on whose behalf they are going to speak, i.e., by the people themselves. So free elections are the essential instruments of representative democracy.

The purpose of a general election, then, is to elect these people's representatives. But, because of the historical circumstances of the countries in which representative democracy has been most highly developed, such elections are usually organised on a party basis. The electorate is offered a choice between contending parties. It could be said that the object is not so much to elect representatives as to elect a representative party. The countries where this system works most

successfully are those which have two major political parties. Now the two-party system requires certain disciplines. I will mention two, in particular, which are relevant to the case I want to argue. These affect elections and debate; both vital aspects of any form of democracy.

First, where one party is fighting an election against another, it cannot afford to allow more than one of its members to contest the same seat. If it did, it would split the votes of its own supporters and risk handing an easy victory to the rival party. So the first thing such a party must do is select its official candidate, usually by means of some kind of preliminary balloting within its own organisation. Once this has been done, *all* party members must support the official candidates only, and fight the public elections as a united group. On this point party discipline is very strict.

Secondly, party candidates who have won the elections and taken their seats in Parliament must remain bound by the rules of party discipline. Once their own leaders have decided on a particular line of policy (even though it may be the purely negative line of opposing the policies of another party), the backbenchers must follow that line, for fear that they might increase the strength or prestige of the rival party by appearing to agree with it!

These disciplines, however, do not apply when each party is conducting what is purely party business. When, for instance, party officials are elected, any member may freely oppose another member; or when the official party candidates for election to national bodies are being selected from within the party organisation, fellow-members may compete with one another for adoption. The American Primary is a typical example of this democratic freedom within a party. Another freedom follows from this; when debate takes place within party circles, it is a free and very often heated debate—each member saying exactly what he feels. The British Labour Party goes as far as allowing this kind of debate to be conducted in public. The Conservatives are more reticent, but it may be presumed that their private debates are just as free and, no doubt, at times as heated.

People who are used to the two-party system cannot imagine democracy without it. They ask: "How can you have democracy with a one-party system?" It will therefore sound to them like heresy when they are told that other people, who also claim to be democrats, are now beginning to ask: "How can you have democracy with a two-party system?"

I must confess that, not so very long ago, I myself would have been content to answer the first of those questions. If I had posed the second it would have been in jest rather than in earnest. Recently, however, I have found myself questioning the democracy of the two-party system very seriously indeed.

In Tanganyika, for example, we have adopted the Westminster

type of representative democracy. With it we took over the whole pattern of parliamentary and local government elections designed for a multi-party system. But it soon became clear to us that, however ready we leaders might have been to accept the theory that an official Opposition was essential to democratic government, our own people thought otherwise; for the idea did not make sense to them. As a result of the people's freely expressed choice at the polls we found ourselves with a One-Party system.

Now nobody who knew anything about Tanganyika could deny that, in spite of our having only one party, we were very democratic. But we were more democratic within the Party than we were outside it. When, for instance, we met to elect our party leaders, nothing could have been more democratic. And our members' freedom of expression during our debates at the Party's National Executive meetings left nothing to be desired! But, since we had adopted the method of election to Parliament and Local Government bodies which was designed for a contest between parties, we had to apply the party unity rule. Once we had selected an official Tanu candidate, we required all party members to support him. And if any other member disobeyed this rule and stood in opposition to our official candidate, he had to be punished. Invariably his punishment was expulsion from the Party. As there is only one party in Tanganyika, the inevitable result of enforcing this rule was to make a contested election a very rare thing indeed. Most Tanu candidates for Parliament and for Local Government councils are returned unopposed; which means, in effect, that they are elected by a Party committee. Again, when it came to debates in Parliament, we "naturally" (according to the Book of Rules of the two-party system) had to apply the party unity rule.

Let me try and illustrate what I am talking about by a comparison of our behaviour at a Tanu National Executive meeting and at a sitting of the Tanganyika Parliament. Now, at the meeting of the National Executive we are speaking among ourselves. As individuals within the Party we are free to express our own opinions; to say exactly what we think about the subject under discussion. There is no distinction, at these meetings, between the leaders and the back-benchers. We are all on an equal footing, and the only thing that counts is the value or otherwise of the opinion expressed—not the relative "importance" or "unimportance" of the person expressing it. And this, surely, is just as it should be in any democratically conducted meeting. But what happens when we take our seats in Parliament? Many of us are the same individuals who were expressing our views so freely in the National Executive; but, the moment we enter the Parliament, we are expected to behave quite differently. In Parliament it is no longer permissible for each Member to express his own personal opinion. There is a party line to be followed—the line approved by

the Party's leaders. And, in order to ensure that it is followed, we actually hold a private debate within the Tanu Parliamentary Party before each meeting of Parliament.

Again, because of the absence of any rival party, the membership of the Tanu Parliamentary Party is almost identical with that of the Parliament itself. Yet it is at these private meetings of the T.P.P. and not in the Parliament, that we expect Members to speak their minds freely. Here it is that they learn from their leaders what the "party line" is to be, and just how far they may go in criticising any particular piece of legislation when this comes up for "debate" in Parliament. Fortunately, and I use the word deliberately, this has not so far prevented our Members of Parliament (particularly those who are accustomed to the freedom of speech which is characteristic of the National Executive) from expressing their own opinions in Parliament from time to time with a most "unparliamentary" independence of the party line! Nevertheless, whenever one of them does this, we leaders are rather disconcerted; and we generally feel obliged to rebuke him severely for his lapse from party discipline.

Now if we can encourage this freedom of expression at National Executive meetings, and within the T.P.P., why do we discourage it in Parliament? There is, of course, a good theoretical reason. At the National Executive level we are deciding in broad terms what the Party's policy shall be. This naturally requires a free discussion—to which anybody may contribute his suggestions, objections, counter suggestions and so on. There obviously cannot be a "party line" to conform to at that stage because the policy has not yet been agreed upon. And this is equally true under a one-party system or a two-party system. But when we go into the Parliament we are no longer debating *what* the policy shall be, for by that time it has been settled—at least in outline. Theoretically, then, all that is still open to discussion in Parliament is detail—the question of exactly how, when, in what order of priority and so on, the agreed policies shall be put into effect. And here we assume that the party leaders know best, and therefore the rest of us must support their decisions. But *why* should we assume this? Why should the question of timing and detail be left entirely to the leaders to decide? In a two-party Parliament there would be, of course, the need to avoid giving accidental support or encouragement to the rival party by any lack of unity between the leaders and their backbench supporters. Where there is only one party, the sole reason—apart from sheer habit—is that the leaders (i.e., the Government) are said to have based their decisions on advice made available to them by experts. But this is really nonsense. For there is no valid reason why the relevant information could not also be placed before the people's representatives in the Parliament, so that such decisions were approved after a free and informed discussion had taken place in public. It is not particularly democratic to say,

simply, that the details have been decided by the Government "in the light of certain knowledge which is available to us but not to you people," and to leave it at that. Nor is it particularly democratic if the people's representatives are given this inside information privately. An intelligent public must know that decisions are only reached after argument. Why, then, should we try to fool them by keeping these arguments out of Parliament? In fact, where there is no Opposition party, there is no reason why the debate in Parliament should not be as free as the debate in the National Executive.

Given the Two-Party system, then, some limitation of freedom is essential—both at election time and in debate—in order to enforce party discipline and unity. And we have seen that these restrictions are not necessary where you have only one party. It seems at least open to doubt, therefore, that a system which forces political parties to limit the freedom of their members is a democratic system, and that one which can permit a party to leave its members their freedom is *un-democratic*!

I realise that the political theorists are so attached to the pattern of democracy which depends on the existence of opposing parties, that they are likely to have been shocked by my expressing a doubt as to its being so very democratic after all. I am afraid they may be even more shocked by what I am now going to suggest; that, where there is *one* party, and that party is identified with the *nation as a whole*, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community!

After all, we do have it on very reliable authority that a house divided against itself cannot stand! So it is surely up to the advocates of the Two-Party system to defend their own case more convincingly. It is not enough for them simply to insist that it *is* more democratic than a One-Party system, and then be horrified when we presume to disagree with them!

Now my argument is that a Two-Party system can be justified only when the parties are divided over some fundamental issue; otherwise it can only encourage the growth of factionalism. Or, to put it another way, the only time when a political group can represent the interests of a section of the community, *without* being a faction, is when that group fights to remove a grievous wrong from society. But then the differences, between this group and those responsible for the wrong it fights, are fundamental; and there can therefore be no question of national unity until the differences have been removed by change. And "change" in that context is a euphemism, because any change in fundamentals is properly termed "revolution". What is more, the reason why the word "revolution" is generally associated with armed insurrection is that the existence of really fundamental differences within any society poses a 'civil war' situation, and has often led to bloody revolution. Benjamin Disraeli, who was certainly no advocate of a One-

Party system, once referred to this situation as tantamount to "Two Nations" within a State.

The American Civil War, for example, was fought precisely because the issue of Slavery *versus* Freedom was too grave, too fundamental, to be solved in any other way. In England, a case of deadlock over fundamentals resulting in bloodshed is to be found in the 17th Century struggle between monarch and parliament, which ended in the execution of Charles I. Again, after the Restoration, when Charles II was thought to be hankering after a return to the former pattern of absolute power for the monarchy, and to be seeking the aid of the French King Louis XIV in his design, there was very nearly a fresh outbreak of civil war. On that occasion the issue was settled without bloodshed; but there was no compromise. Charles, more flexible and more of a realist than his father, gave in; and the constitutional supremacy of the parliament was never again seriously challenged by a British monarch.

Incidentally, a rather curious feature of the British Parliament is the title bestowed on the Opposition party nowadays: "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition". That this title is not, as it might sound, an affront to reason, is due to the special position of the monarch as a politically neutral figurehead; a position deriving from that first accepted, reluctantly, by Charles II. But it would hardly have occurred to anybody in Charles' day to think of the emerging Whig Party as His Majesty's Loyal Opposition! And even today, the title is, to some of us, suggestive of at least a mild form of political schizophrenia.

To return, then, to my argument: in any country which is divided over fundamental issues you have the 'civil war' situation we have been talking about. If, on the other hand, you have a Two-Party system where the differences between the parties are *not* fundamental, then you immediately reduce politics to the level of a football match. A football match may, of course, attract some very able players; it may also be entertaining; but it is still only a game, and only the most ardent fans (who are not usually the most intelligent) take the game very seriously. This, in fact, is not unlike what has happened in many of the so-called democratic countries today, where some of the most intelligent members of society have become disgusted by the hypocrisy of the Party Games called politics, and take no active interest in them. They can see no party whose 'line' they could support without reservation and are therefore left with no way of serving their country in the political field, even should they wish to; except, perhaps, by writing a book! For the politics of a country governed by the Two-Party system are not, and cannot be, *national* politics; they are the politics of *groups*, whose differences, more often than not, are of small concern to the majority of the people.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that people who defend the Two-

Party system are actually advocating "football politics"; that they really consider a spirit of purely artificial rivalry, like that which exists between a couple of soccer teams, is appropriate to the relationship between opposing political parties. Indeed I can imagine some of my British friends, if they happen to read this, saying "But of course! You can't have respectable Members of Parliament shouting and throwing things at each other like a lot of hysterical foreigners. What an idea!"

Well, I would of course agree that a parliament is not the best place in which to throw things. But my whole point is that, unless a country is so divided that it is in a state of potential civil war, one would expect the members of its parliament to be men and women who are there in order to co-operate in promoting the welfare of the people as a whole. And in that case their main objectives will be the same, and their differences of opinion are likely to be more over detail than anything else. They will not be the sort of differences which could lead to blows. But the ambition of any political party which finds itself forming the Opposition in Parliament is to bring about the downfall of the Government party and take its place. If they can achieve this by securing a majority vote against the Government on some important issue before the normal four or five years' life of the parliament has ended, so much the better. If not, they will hope to score sufficient minor victories to embarrass the Government, and persuade the electorate to put them in power at the next General Elections. In other words, each party constantly aims at bringing about the defeat of the other. So, of course, do football teams. But, admirable though it may be for a soccer team to thwart its rivals' attempts to score a goal, parallel success on the part of a political party in obstructing Government's efforts to do the job it was elected to do is of more dubious merit. For, whereas the prize for which the soccer teams compete is generally a silver cup, the 'prize' for successful gamesmanship on the part of a political party is the right to govern a country—to influence the lives and welfare of millions of people. And that is not a suitable object for which to play Party Games.

Let us take the case of two major parties which differ only on minor issues. Both have the interests of the people at heart, or so they claim. Both believe that education is a good thing, and that it should be available to everybody; both believe that a fair living wage should be paid to all workers; both believe that medical care should be within the reach of all, and so on. All these things are fundamental, and it is not likely that any political party today would dare tell the electorate it did *not* believe in them. So it is a fairly reasonable assumption that whichever party may win the elections its aim will be to provide the people with as many of those benefits as it can. Is it not a little absurd, then, that every few years the country should be asked to choose which of the 'opposing' parties should do

the job which both agree should be done? Surely, given that fundamental agreement, it would be far more sensible if both sides were to disband their football teams, and let the electorate choose the best individuals from among them all; and if those individuals were then to meet in the parliament to discuss the details of the job and *co-operate in getting it done!*

The theory behind the party-based method of conducting elections is, of course, that the voters choose a policy rather than a personality. Fine. But, where there is no difference over policy (and I repeat that a difference over policy is a difference over fundamentals—which inevitably involves disunity and potential revolution), the only choice which can make sense *must* be a choice between individuals. That is, the choice of the best individual for the job. This, in fact, is what happens when we elect party leaders—party policy having been agreed upon. And this is what *should* happen when we elect national leaders—national policy being agreed upon.

Supposing, on the other hand, that national policy is not agreed upon, *i.e.*, that there *are* fundamental differences between the parties. Let us say that one stands for the privileges of the few, and the other for social equality and the fair distribution of wealth. Here we have the 'revolutionary' situation again. A situation which can only exist where there is some degree of injustice and consequent disunity within society. Now it is obvious that if the people are given a genuinely free choice between two such policies as that, the vast majority will vote for the party which stands for their rights—and only the privileged minority will vote for the other. Therefore, once the revolution is accomplished (in this case by means of the ballot box and not by bloodshed), the party which stood for privilege can have no hope of returning to power in any future elections unless it abandons its former policy and adopts one which advocates fair treatment of the majority. In which case, at the next elections we shall have come back to the choice between football teams!

A third possibility is that fundamental differences exist between two parties which have an equally wide following within the country. Party "A", perhaps, wants what it calls Free Enterprise; it believes that those who have some spare capital should be free to speculate in land, to buy up a controlling interest in public transport, or anything else which can increase their wealth. Party "B", on the contrary, believes that too much Free Enterprise can lead to the exploitation of the worker, and must be controlled. They propose to nationalise land and communications, major industries, and so on. Now, if roughly half the electorate supports Party "A", and the other half Party "B", we may suppose also that there will be a few people who are not sure which policy they prefer, and who will waver between the two. (This is a highly unlikely supposition, because in actual fact if the division is over fundamentals there cannot be a 'floating vote', and a deadlock

such as we are considering here would be more likely to lead to bloody than to peaceful revolution; but, for the sake of argument, let us assume the necessary floating vote). You may thus get Party "B" in power for five years or so, during which time they will go ahead and nationalise everything they can. Then, at the next elections, Party "A" will defeat them, and will proceed to de-nationalise everything again. But, five years later, Party "B" is back re-nationalising! If this sort of thing really could happen, the result would be a bankrupt economy and a country which was the laughing-stock of its neighbours. No; one cannot seriously imagine any electorate stupid enough to endorse a complete reversal of major policy every few years. And a party which could accept the mere possibility of its major policies being regularly reversed by its rivals, would have acquired a degree of cynicism which we have no desire to emulate!

So it must be only artificial divisions—differences over detail—which our friends, the Two-Party System enthusiasts, have in mind. And the division into rival parties on that basis to my mind, must inevitably involve the hypocrisy of "football politics"—with the government of a nation as the "Football Cup".

One often hears people say "politics is a dirty game," or "so-and-so is too honest for a politician"; and these things are not always said in jest. But there is nothing—or certainly, there should be nothing—inherently dirty or dishonest in politics as such; for the just management of the affairs of the society should appeal to the best in men, and should attract the best members of society. Why, then, have so many people come to associate the word "politics" with trickery and dishonesty? It is not, I am sure, that politicians are naturally dishonest set of individuals. But, if you are going to start from the premise that there *must* be more than one party, you may find before long that complete honesty becomes almost impossible to maintain. Of course, if the 'must' is the result of existing inequalities or other fundamental differences in society, then honesty itself will require the need for adjusting such differences to be expressed—if necessary by forming another political party to fight for their adjustment. But, if the 'must' is based solely on a political philosophy, you are bound to run into trouble. Let us say that, as a result of your philosophy, you believe an opposition party to be so essential to democracy that you *must* form one. Now if there are no fundamental differences in your society, the only way you can gain support for your opposition party—if you are honest—is to stand before the public and tell them that you want their votes *not* because you believe the government party's policy to be wrong, *not* because you have a better one to offer, *but simply because democracy requires at least two parties in the parliament*. The trouble is that a completely honest statement like that is not likely to get you very many votes. So what are you to do? According to your belief, democracy demands that you get at least

some of your party into parliament. Complete honesty doesn't seem to be enough to achieve this, so you are faced with the choice of abandoning a little of your honesty or abandoning your idea of democracy. Almost invariably, in such circumstances, it is the former which is sacrificed; and each party is led into conducting its election campaign by the 'political' tactics of evasion, distortion and even downright lies about the other party's motives and intentions. Nor does it stop there. Once in Parliament, as we have seen, members of the opposing parties must still observe the rules of party unity which, in themselves, must inevitably stifle not merely freedom of expression but, indeed, honesty of expression. For a 'party line' which requires all members to oppose a rival party's policies must force them, at times, to oppose something which their conscience tells them there is no good reason to oppose. And, since these things happen to some extent in even the best of Two-Party democracies, it is perhaps not so surprising after all that so many people have come to equate politics with dishonesty or cynicism!

I know that in writing all this as the leader of a One-Party Government, I may be accused of special pleading. But I could easily counter such an accusation by saying that the defenders of the Two-Party system might equally well be accused of the same thing. For, in spite of their professed conviction that democratic Government *demands* an Opposition, I have never heard of a party fighting an election with the object of forming one! On the contrary, each party fights with the hope of winning as many seats as possible. They fail, however, to win them all. And then, having failed, they quite blandly make a virtue of necessity and produce the most high-sounding arguments in praise of their failure!

Our critics should understand that, in Africa, we have to take our politics a little more seriously. And they should also remember the historical difference between parties in Africa and those in Europe or America. The European and American parties came into being as the result of existing social and economic divisions—the second party being formed to challenge the monopoly of political power by some aristocratic or capitalist group. Our own parties had a very different origin. They were not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own people; they were formed to challenge the *foreigners* who ruled over us. They were not, therefore, political 'parties', *i. e.*, factions, but nationalist movements. And from the outset they represented the interests and aspirations of the whole nation. We, in Tanganyika, for example, did not build TANU to oppose the Conservative Party of England, or to support the Labour Party! The divisions of English politicians meant nothing to us. As far as we were concerned they were all colonialists, and we built up TANU as a national movement to rid ourselves of their colonialism. A Tanganyikan who helped the imperialists was regarded as a traitor to his country, not as a believer

in 'Two-Party' democracy!

Now that the colonialists have gone; there is no remaining division between 'rulers' and 'ruled'; no monopoly of political power by any sectional group, which could give rise to conflicting parties. There can, therefore, be only one reason for the formation of such parties in a country like ours—the desire to imitate the political structure of a totally dissimilar society. What is more, the desire to imitate where conditions are not suitable for imitation can easily lead us into trouble. To try and import the idea of a parliamentary opposition into Africa may very likely lead to violence—because the opposition parties will tend to be regarded as traitors by the majority of our people—or, at best, it will lead to the trivial manoeuvrings of 'opposing' groups whose time is spent in the inflation of artificial differences into some semblance of reality "for the sake of preserving democracy"! The latter alternative, I repeat, is an over-sophisticated pastime which we in Africa cannot afford to indulge in; our time is too short and there is too much serious work to be done.

Another thing which should be remembered is that the defence of any system must take account of its origin. Now the origin of a political system will be found either in history or in theory. That is to say, the evolution of the system must depend either on given historical circumstances without which it would not have developed, or on the practical application of some theory of Government conceived as suitable to all conditions and circumstances. So if you want to defend a system which is of purely historical origin, you will find it very difficult if you try to base your defence on political theory. To say, for example, that, given the conditions of such and such a country at such and such a period of its history, the growth of a Two-Party system was inevitable, even desirable, is one thing. It is quite another thing to say that the *necessary condition* of democratic government is the existence of at least two parties. The first of those statements takes account of the origin of the Two-Party system; the second does not.

Let me put this in another way. Democracy, or Government by the people, is a system based on theory—on reason—and can be defended rationally. Given that man is a rational being, and that all men are equal, democracy—or Government by discussion among equals—is indeed the only defensible form of Government. When we in Africa rejected the argument of poverty and lack of education as a valid reason for denying us our right to self-government, we were not appealing to historical circumstances but to pure reason. We were not saying that we had now become wealthy enough, or educated enough, to govern ourselves; we were saying "We are human; ergo, we *must* govern ourselves." Sometimes we phrased our claim in the negative—saying "Nobody has the right to govern us without our consent." Either way, our argument was that of reason, of right, and not of circumstance. Rationally, "self-government" and "democracy" must

mean the same thing; and the appeal to reason to justify them is so strong, so natural, that both the imperialist and the tyrant are forced to deny either the equality or the rationality (or both) of those on whom they have imposed their rule. The 'good' imperialist regards the colonial peoples as children whom it is his duty to teach. The native tyrant persuades himself of some 'divine right' by which he is called upon to lord it over his fellows. Both are attempting to justify their positions 'rationally', for the moment either of them admits the equality of those he rules his position is untenable.

But, while democracy can be justified by an appeal to reason, the Two-Party system cannot. (At least the attempt to justify it rationally requires exceptional courage!). I suggest that it is precisely this difficulty of justifying the Two-Party system by rational argument which has led its defenders to try and evade the issue by equating it in their minds with democracy—which is not the same thing at all. This confusion of terms is illustrated by the statement one often hears, that the conditions for democracy do not exist in such and such a country, when what is really meant is that the conditions for a Two-Party system do not exist there. There may well be many countries in which the conditions for a Two-Party system do not exist; the only place of which it would be reasonable to say that the conditions for democracy did not exist would be an uninhabited island—or a lunatic asylum! For the 'conditions' for democracy (or for self-government, which is the same thing) exist wherever man exists as a rational human being. Hence the need for the tyrant and the imperialist to deny the human qualities of reason and equality to those on whom they seek to impose their will. Hence, too, the embarrassment felt by any genuinely democratic country which may have inherited an Empire!

So, too, those who try to justify the Two-Party system rationally are faced with the need to pick their way round so many pitfalls of unreason that rational argument becomes positively dangerous! That is why I say it is probably their own subconscious awareness of this difficulty which has made them try the shortcut of equating their system with democracy, and then defending democracy. But their 'short-cut' has turned out to be a detour; and it has led them in some rather curious directions. It has led them, for example, to attach such 'conditions' to the existence of democracy as a minimum standard of education, and the existence of a "middle class". These things may be the conditions required for a Two-Party system; they cannot be the conditions for democracy since democracy is independent of any other 'condition' than the equality of man and his nature as a rational being.

Worse still, the confusion of ideas which makes it possible for people to talk about 'conditions' for democracy is responsible for the fact that many of them, who sincerely believe themselves to be demo-

crats, are prepared to tolerate a complete negation of democracy as long as those 'conditions' are absent. And that sort of compromise is the inevitable result of their trying to identify a system which is essentially the product of circumstances with one which is the application of a principle. Democracy—man's right to self-government—is every bit as much a matter of principle as is justice itself. To deny him that right is to deny him justice. To tolerate the absence of democracy anywhere is to tolerate injustice. Would these same people, who prate about the "conditions" for democracy, be equally blind if they were talking about justice? Would they say that justice is an excellent thing, but in such and such a country "the conditions are not yet ripe for justice"? Of course not. Yet that is what they very often do say about democracy. They say that in certain countries "the people are not ready for democracy" or they "do not understand democracy", so for the time being they are better off under a 'Strong Man' (an easier term than 'Dictator' for some democrats to swallow!), or under the rule of a colonial power.

However, I do not mean to suggest all those who talk about conditions for democracy are being deliberately dishonest. Nor do I mean the advocates of the Two-Party system are dishonest when I say that they cannot defend it rationally, and that they therefore sidestep the difficulty by basing their defence on a false premise—the identification of their system with democracy. As I said, it is my belief that they are not consciously aware of the mental juggling of which I accuse them. What is it then that has so convinced them of the rightness of the Two-Party system as to blind them to the juggling which its defence as political theory must entail? I suggest that the answer is HABIT. The existence of a Two-Party system in the older democracies is best explained by reference to the history of those countries; but its source is to be found so far back in their history that a great many people have almost forgotten what that source was. Habit has come to be mistaken for philosophy, and such is its weight that it has become also a psychological barrier to further thought.

I have already mentioned the very different political circumstances in which the African and the European parties were formed, and the consequent difference of purpose and outlook between them. Let us, then, take another glance at the actual circumstances which gave rise to the Two-Party system in countries like England and America. Nonsense though it is to say that the existence of a "middle class" is a necessary condition of democracy, it is true that the genesis of the Two-Party system was a class society. To begin with, the ruling section, or 'class', might be an aristocracy of birth. The members of such an aristocracy were of royal or noble descent—the "blue-blooded"—and nobody who lacked this "blue blood" could hope to join their party without a special dispensation from those who had. Or it might be an aristocracy of wealth. When, sooner or later, their

political power was challenged, the challenge came from the other sections of society—those who did not have the blue blood or the wealth.

In England, for example, even today one of the two main political parties is associated with the rich, and the other with the poor—the workers. In recent years, it is true, the economic and social gap between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ has narrowed, and with it the political differences between the two parties, but at the time they were formed the gap was wide and the differences fundamental. And long before the birth of the Conservative and Labour Parties we know today, there were two major political parties in England. These were both parties of the ‘rich’, and with time their differences had dwindled just as those of their successors are now doing, but at first they too had represented two very different social groups—the ‘blue-blooded’ nobility and a class of well-to-do merchants.

The former group drew its wealth from the hereditary ownership of land. But later there arose this new ‘middle class’ whose wealth came, initially, not from the ownership of land but from trade. The old aristocracy looked upon these people as upstarts, and considered them unworthy to possess landed property—still less to have any say in the government of the country. The ‘upstarts’, however, thought otherwise! And they successfully challenged the right of the nobility to a monopoly of political power. In modern times, the growth of the Trade Union Movement resulted in the birth of the Labour Party. This time it was the working classes which challenged the political power of the wealthy as represented by the Conservative or ‘status quo’ party.

Similarly, in the U.S.A., there are two main parties. Here it would be difficult to tell which is the ‘rich’ and which the ‘poor’ man’s party—for there is no clearly labelled Labour Party, as in England. But still, in the minds of the people, one of these parties is associated with the very rich, and the other with the not-quite-so-rich. And indeed, wherever you find the Two-Party system as an integral part of the political structure of a democratic country, you will find it originated historically in the social and economic divisions of that country. My friends, the Americans, may not like the idea that their own Two-Party system has anything to do with a class struggle. But Thomas Jefferson, writing in 1823, had this to say: “We (the Republican Party) believed that men, enjoying in ease and security the full fruits of their own industry, enlisted by all their interests on the side of law and order, habituated to think for themselves, and to follow their reason as their guide, would be more easily and safely governed than with minds nourished in error and vitiated and debased, as in Europe, by ignorance, indigence and oppression. *The cherishment of the people, then, was our principle; the fear and distrust of them, that of the other party . . .*” That was certainly a very important and

fundamental distinction, and it was the line dividing one American party from the other!

In other words, the parties of our friends in the older parliamentary democracies outside Africa are sectional groups. So, too, are those within Africa which seek to imitate them. Nowadays such parties do not restrict their membership to those who can claim noble birth or to the wealthy; but there are some which restrict it, instead, to those who belong to an equally exclusive aristocracy of the intellect! And in certain such modern 'aristocracies' instead of the blueness of blood which was once the qualification for membership of the ruling class, we now find that it is by the redness of his thought that a man is judged worthy of entry into the ranks of the elite. If the reader were to seek membership of a party of this kind, it would not be enough for him to prove himself a patriotic, humanitarian and law-abiding citizen of his country; what he would have to prove would be that his thought was of an acceptably 'aristocratic' shade of red! But parties of which membership is confined to an elite of any kind neither are, nor are intended to be, national parties. They are sectional groups which seek to rule the rest of society by virtue of their own claim to superiority. It makes little difference if it is the colour of his blood or the colour of his thought which qualifies a man for membership; either distinction is as exclusive as the other in practice. And in all such parties—whether the factional parties of a Two-Party democracy, or the vanguard aristocracies of an ideological dictatorship—it is the leaders themselves who 'elect' each other. The elections, if any, in which the people are permitted to take part, are not for the purpose of choosing their own representatives; they are merely for the purpose of deciding from which sectional group the 'people's representatives' shall be selected for them! Whether such a system happens to produce good leaders is beside the point. It may or it may not. The point is that this sort of pre-selection from within an exclusive clique, or a party caucus, is not an election at all in the democratic sense of a free choice by the people.

Now the reader who has followed my argument so far may think that what I am advocating as an alternative to the Two-Party system is pure individualism. I am not. In any human society compromise between individuals is not only necessary but desirable; for it is the only means of arriving at that common denominator without which the very idea of society would be impossible. But, if compromise is desirable, what makes it so is the common good—not sectional interests. Individualism, therefore, should be tempered with, or subjected to, the good of society as a whole, not merely to the good of a part of society. Indeed, the good of a part is too often sought only at the expense of the whole. In a society which is united, which is like a family, the only differences will be those between individuals; and that is the best starting-point from

which to reach the most mutually valuable compromise between the good of the individual and that of the community. Factionalism, on the other hand, is, by definition, self-interest. Therefore it is bound to be anti-social.

Selfishness is, of course, a not uncommon human failing, and there are sure to be a few selfish individuals in any community. But the individual who puts self-interest before the good of the community is unlikely to do very much harm to anybody but himself; because, for one thing, his motives are usually easy to recognise. The selfishness of a faction is far more dangerous to society; not only for the obvious reason that a group is more powerful than an individual, and therefore more likely to achieve its ends, but because, too, membership of a faction—particularly a political faction may afford a useful cloak under which the selfish individual can serve his own interests while claiming to serve his fellows. It is not uncommon to find two or three different parties in the same country all trying to disguise their factionalism by including the magic word “democratic” in their titles !

It always sounds better to say “We want . . .” than “I want . . .”; but it is seldom as honest. The only socially defensible use of “we” is that which includes the whole of society. Unless you are prepared to deny the equality of man, you cannot rationally defend the use of a “we” which implies the exclusion of a “they” whose interests are of little or no concern to “us”. In human society the only rational distinction is between the individual and the community. Once that is recognised, it is fairly easy to distinguish between self-interest and the genuine good of the individual—which are two quite different things. The former may well conflict with the good of the community; the latter will not.

Let me come back, then, to my contention that where there is *one* party—provided it is identified with the nation as a whole—the foundations of democracy can be firmer, and the people can have more opportunity to exercise a real choice, than where you have two or more parties—each representing only a section of the community. In countries which are accustomed to the Two-Party system it might be difficult to make any drastic change in the method of conducting elections. But what about a country like ours, where the electorate has virtually ruled out the possibility of any inter-party contest? Here, surely, we have a splendid opportunity to give our people a chance of exercising their own choice of leadership through the ballot box. Supposing we accept the fact that there *is* only one party, and stop trying to follow the rules of a multi-party system ; then, as long as TANU membership is open to every citizen, we can conduct our elections in a way which is genuinely free and democratic.

I would go further. I would say that we not only have an opportunity to dispense with the disciplines of the Two-Party system, but

that we would be wrong to retain them. I would say that they are not only unnecessary where you have only one party, but that they are bound, in time, to prove fatal to democracy. We have already seen how severely these disciplines must limit freedom of expression in a two-party parliament. This is bad enough, but at least each party can still allow its members to argue freely within their own party meetings. Party loyalty will rally them behind their leaders when they face the rival party in Parliament. (This party loyalty, indeed, is something which feeds on opposition and makes the task of preserving discipline comparatively easy). In fact, if the only alternative to the Two-Party system were a One-Party system which retained the rules and disciplines of the Two-Party system it would be better to have even an artificial opposition party, despite all the inconsistencies and limitations of freedom this would involve. For the task of imposing party discipline, of limiting freedom of expression in Parliament, with no rival party to help, would sooner or later involve us in something far worse than the factionalism of which I have accused the Two-Party enthusiasts. It would become more and more necessary to limit freedom of discussion within the party itself, until eventually it was almost entirely suppressed. Why? Because you cannot limit freedom of expression anywhere without a reason. People are not fools. They might accept the 'party unity' rules for a time, but the more intelligent Members of Parliament would soon begin to ask why they must always support the Government in public without argument, since there was no fear of being pushed out of power by a rival party. And what reason could we give them? We should have to convince them and ourselves that the 'party line' they were compelled to support was so fundamentally right that any deviation from it would be tantamount to a crime against the 'people'. In other words, we should have to elevate policy decisions to the category of dogma. And once you deal in dogma you cannot allow freedom of opinion. You cannot have dogma without putting contrary ideas on the 'index'.

This, I believe, is not unlike what has befallen our friends the Communists. They have made their policies a creed, and are finding that dogmatism and freedom of discussion do not easily go together. They are as much afraid of the 'other party' as any government in a Two-Party democracy. In their case the 'other party' is only a phantom, but a phantom can be even more frightening than a living rival! And their fear of this phantom has blinded them to the truth that, in a One-Party system, party membership must be open to everybody and freedom of expression allowed to every individual. No party which limits its membership to a clique can ever free itself from the fear of overthrow by those it has excluded. It must be constantly on the watch for signs of opposition, and must smother 'dangerous' ideas before they have time to spread.

But a National Movement which is open to all—which is identified

with the whole nation—has nothing to fear from the discontent of any excluded section of society, for there is then no such section. Those forming the Government will, of course, be replaced from time to time; this is what elections are for. The leadership of our Movement is constantly changing; there is no reason why the leadership of the Nation should not also be constantly changing. This would have nothing to do with the overthrowing of a party government by a rival party. And, since such a National Movement leaves no room for the growth of discontented elements excluded from its membership, it has nothing to fear from criticism and the free expression of ideas. On the contrary, both the Movement itself and the Nation have everything to gain from a constant injection of new ideas from within the Nation and from outside. It would be both wrong, and certainly unnecessary, to feel we must wait until the leaders are dead before we begin to criticise them!

Any member of the Movement (which in this context means any patriotic citizen since it is a national Movement we are talking about) would be free to stand as a candidate if he so wished. And in each constituency the voters themselves would be able to make their choice freely from among these candidates; they would no longer be obliged to consider the party label rather than the individual. Of such elections it could truly be said that they were for the purpose of letting the people choose their own representatives. If that is not democracy, I do not know the meaning of the word!

There would be no need to hold one set of elections within the party and another set afterwards for the public. All elections would be equally open to everybody. In our case, for example, the present distinction between Tanu and the Tanu Government—a distinction which, as a matter of fact, our people do not in the least understand—would vanish. We should simply have leaders chosen by the people themselves to do a job. And such leaders could be removed by the people at any time; there would be no need for a statutory period of so many years to elapse before an unsatisfactory leader could be replaced by them. In this way the Government of the country would be truly in the hands of the electorate at all times. It would no longer be a mere matter of their casting votes for or against 'party' at intervals of four or five years. And anybody who continued to occupy a position of leadership under such conditions would do so because he was protected by a law which made it impossible for them to replace him until the next General Election.

Furthermore, there would be no need to continue with the present artificial distinction between politicians and civil servants—a distinction desirable only in the context of a multi-party system where the continuity of public administration must not be thrown out of gear at every switch from one 'party' government to another. For, once you begin to think in terms of a single national movement instead of a number of rival

factional parties, it becomes absurd to exclude a whole group of the most intelligent and able members of the community from participation in the discussion of policy simply because they happen to be civil servants. In a political movement which is identified with the nation, participation in political affairs must be recognised as the right of *every* citizen, in no matter what capacity he may have chosen to serve his country.

Of course, I know that in spite of anything I can say, this idea that a party and its government should be one and the same thing will be another shock to our political 'teachers' and those who have accepted their teaching without question. But the distinction between the party and the party government is not, in any case, a logical one. Any party government must necessarily be governed by its party. If it were not, it would not be a party government. And if the party government is governed by the party, then it must obviously be the party which governs the country. In other words, the party in power *is* the Government. It must be. If it is not, then it is nonsense to talk about a Labour Government, or a Conservative Government, or a TANU Government, and to say that those governments are carrying out Labour, or Conservative, or TANU policy.

Any government which tries to separate itself from its own party finds there is a perpetual feud between those of its members who are in the legislature and those outside it. And the feud cannot be avoided while this quite illogical distinction is insisted upon. The fact that it *is* insisted upon is, I believe, yet another unconscious evasion of a rational dilemma. It would be very difficult indeed for the advocates of a Two-Party system to explain how factional rule could be the same thing as democratic rule! So, here again, they beg the question. They simply say that a 'party' government is independent of its party! They also claim that a party candidate, once he has been elected to Parliament, should represent *all* his constituents impartially. Quite how the poor fellow is expected to 'represent' that section of his constituents whose main interest lies in hoping for the early defeat of his party by their own is not clear! But perhaps it is unfair to probe too deeply into the embarrassments of a democratically minded people handicapped by a factional system. On the other hand, if you are going to tell people to "Vote for Smith—Vote Conservative", or a "Vote for Jones is a Vote for Labour", is it really fair on Smith (or Jones) to turn round (significance) directly the elections are over and say that he must now regard himself as a non-partisan representative of the people! (except, of course, in parliamentary debate!). If the Smiths and Joneses could indeed turn so complete a mental somersault it would be, I suspect, only because of a subconscious recognition on their part that their party labels had about as much political significance as the different-coloured jerseys worn by players in a Cup-Tie Final. Try to imagine an 18th Century Scottish Covenanter politely listening to the problems

of a group of Jacobites, and agreeing to "take the matter up" on their behalf, and you will see what I mean!

But an advocate of a One-Party system, in which the party is identified with the nation as a National Movement, can admit the parallel identity of the Government with the Movement without any embarrassment at all. And if he happens to be a M.P. he is spared the necessity of turning mental somersaults on every journey between his constituency and the Parliament!

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE

by

K. H. PATEL

EVER since the Congo's independence in 1960, the question of Katanga's secession has been a thorny problem not only for the Central Government of the Congo but also for the United Nations. Mr. U. Thant, United Nations Secretary-General, started his vigorous efforts in August 1962 through his Plan for the reunification of the Congo. With **Katanga Secession Ends** the persistent intransigence of Katanga President Mr. Moise Tshombe launching new provocative military measures against the UN forces in North Katanga in December, the UN had no alternative but to take retaliatory steps which finally led to the capture of Kolwezi, the last stronghold of the Katanga military junta, on January 23, 1963.

Earlier, on January 7, the Congolese Prime Minister, Mr. Cyrille Adoula, had appointed a Leopoldville regime official to head the Katanga administration and had ordered the replacement of Katangese money by Central Government currency. The Union Minister also reached an agreement with the Congolese Government to pay foreign exchange and tax revenues to the Leopoldville authorities. The Katanga National Bank was also taken over by the Central Government. Finally, the arrival of Mr. Joseph Ileo as Minister-Resident in Elizabethville on January 23, marked the restoration of the authority of the Central Government throughout Katanga. The Commander of the Katangese forces, Gen. Norbert Moke, and 22 of his officers also pledged loyalty to the President of the Congo, Mr. Joseph Kasavubu, in a ceremony at Leopoldville signifying the integration of Katanga's gendarmerie with the National Army.

The steps taken by the UN Secretary-General to implement the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the Congo were supported by all members of the African Group in the UN.

The United Nations, no doubt, deserves credit for bringing peace to the strife-torn Congo despite numerous difficulties. India's role in these peace efforts is familiar. She has all along morally supported the Central Government of the Congo against the secession of Katanga, and offered the UN military assistance to the extent of a 5,000-strong contingent of the Indian army. This, as is generally known, has borne the brunt in the fighting and suffered 20 casualties

in its efforts for the preservation of law and order and reunification of the Congo.

FEBRUARY 1, 1963 marks the beginning of self-government in Nyasaland. This brings the country to the threshold of full independence after 60 years of British rule. Dr. Hastings K. Banda, who returned to the country only four and a half years ago, after 40 years of self-imposed exile, to lead the struggle for liberation, took over as its first Prime Minister. Speaking on the occasion, Dr. Banda declared that Nyasaland would secede from the Rhodesian Federation and "our independence will start a chain reaction". He hoped that Southern and Northern Rhodesia would reach the same status as Nyasaland "by peaceful and constitutional means".

Nyasaland Attains Self- Government

As regards his country's foreign policy after independence, he said it would be "discretionary neutralism and alignment, and not alignment with any particular country or group of countries".

Speaking about the arrangements for Nyasaland's secession from the Federation, Mr. R. A. Butler, British Minister for Central African Affairs, said in the House of Commons that matters for consideration by the working party composed of representatives of the Federal and Nyasaland Governments, with a British Chairman—would include the apportionment of the Federal debt and problems affecting members of the Federal public services in Nyasaland. The representatives of Northern and Southern Rhodesia would also be invited to take part in the talks. Mr. Butler added, "The working party will be appointed without delay and, while the problems involved are difficult and complex, I am anxious that the work should be completed with all due dispatch". Thus, Nyasaland is moving quite fast on the way to independence and secession from the Federation.

Northern Rhodesia is also fortunate since the British Government declared on March 29, 1963 that Britain now considered that "none of the three territories can be kept in the Federation against its will and that it accepts the principle that any territory which so wishes must be allowed to secede". Now when the right of secession has been conceded, the Northern Rhodesian African Government leaders are preparing for early talks on self-government.

The situation in Southern Rhodesia, however, is somewhat tangled, as Mr. Winston Field has shown, during his three months as Prime Minister, that he intends to follow a racist policy and is determined to deny the majority of African people fundamental democratic rights. He has agreed to break up the Federation probably because he thinks that this will make it easier for the white minority to resist the pressure of African opinion in his country. However, it will be the responsi-

lity of the British Government to see that, along with the other two territories, Southern Rhodesia is also put on the road to democratic development.

MR. Duncan Sandys, British Secretary of State for the Commonwealth and Colonies, declared on March 8, 1963 that elections for internal self-government for Kenya would be held between May 18 and 26. A final constitutional conference to decide on matters relating to the handing over of power may be held after two months or so, with independence following by the end of the year.

Kenya Constitution

There would be three separate elections—for Regional Assemblies, for an Upper House of the National Parliament and for a Lower House called the House of Representatives.

The Central Legislature will have power in all matters except those in respect of which exclusive power is conferred on the Regional Assemblies. The Regional Assembly will not be able to transfer its law-making functions to the Central Legislature, but the Centre will be able to take over the functions of a Regional Assembly on grounds of its impeding or prejudicing the exercise of executive authority of the Central Government or failure to comply with any law made by the Central Legislature.

During the period of self-government, preceding total independence, the Governor would be responsible for defence, external affairs and internal security. But he would normally act in these matters through a Minister.

Under the new constitution, the country has been divided into seven regions, excluding Nairobi, which will be a centrally-administered capital. Each region will have its own regional assembly, an independent civil service, a separate police force, and so on.

A part of the Northern Frontier District, which has been the subject of dispute between Kenya and the Somali Republic in regard to its right to secession and integration with the latter, has been formed into the "seventh region". Like other regions it will have a considerable measure of local autonomy. This will give the Somalis, who are in a large majority in the region, opportunity to manage their own affairs. However, the Somali Republic reacted sharply against this decision and anti-British demonstrations and mob violence were witnessed in Mogadishu and other provincial towns. The Somali Government has severed diplomatic relations with Britain and the Somali Ambassador has been recalled from London.

The 10-mile-deep Kenya coastal strip, which Britain has leased from the Sultan of Zanzibar for the last 68 years, would continue to be administered as a part of Kenya after the introduction of the new constitution. However, Britain will have further discussions on this

subject with the Sultan before Kenya becomes independent.

The constitution has been received well by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) as well as the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Mr. James Gichuru, Vice-President of KANU, said, "KANU got a bit here and KADU got a bit there. You cannot expect anything else for the good of the country. Mr. Sandys has done very well."

As Mr. Sandys said, the constitution would give Kenya neither a unitary nor a federal system of government "but something in between." This sets the pace for a hectic election campaign by KANU and KADU for an opportunity to become the official party which will lead Kenya to independence.

THE third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held in Moshi (Tanganyika) from February 4 to 11, 1963, was attended by 60 delegations from independent Asian and African nations and 40 observers' delegations from the non-self-governing territories of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Inaugurating the Conference, Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanganyika, said, "The hand of imperialism still grips the peoples of Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Kenya, Zanzibar, South-West Africa and many other small areas like the Spanish Guinea, Portuguese Guinea, Spanish Sahara and so on. The colonial domination must go. There is no room for it in the Africa of 1963."

Moshi Conference

Dealing with South African question, Mr. Nyerere remarked, "We cannot be expected to sit back quietly while our brothers in South Africa continue to suffer under the brutal oppression which operates there We cannot rest until this indignity is wiped out, until the Government of South Africa is replaced by one representative of the people of that country, regardless of their colour."

The Conference's general statement, after declaring that the fight against imperialism must not be restricted to the political field, came out in favour of peace and disarmament and for the banning of nuclear arms and the destruction of those already in existence.

The Conference also passed a political resolution urging the Afro-Asian peoples to co-ordinate their fight against colonialism and imperialism, especially by building up a national united front in countries not yet freed.

Among other thirty resolutions passed by the Conference, the one on Palestine supported the Arab peoples' right to return to their countries. Another resolution appealed to the Afro-Asian countries to effect

economic and diplomatic boycott of Portugal. Some of the other resolutions urged Britain to grant independence to Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and the three territories of the Central African Federation. The United States influence in Formosa was condemned and the right of the Chinese people to free the territory was recognised.

Furthermore, citing the Congo as an example, the Conference expressed its opinion that the United Nations, in its present form, was a vehicle of U.S. imperialism. All Afro-Asian countries were urged to increase their efforts to get the various organisations of the UN transformed so as truly to reflect Afro-Asian aspirations.

Other resolutions were concerned with Aden, the Arab Liberation Front, Okinawa (April 28 is to be observed "Okinawa Day" in support of the Japanese people's struggle for the return of Okinawa to Japan), Ruanda refugees, South-West Africa and West Irian.

A resolution on the Sino-Indian border dispute, moved by the United Arab Republic in the Political Committee, was balked at the instance of the Chinese delegation. In protest, the Indian delegation stayed a walk-out and they returned to the Conference only after they were assured that the U. A. R. resolution, welcoming the initiative taken by the Colombo Powers in solving the Sino-Indian border conflict and calling upon the two countries to accept the proposals, was passed unanimously. However, according to Mr. Chaman Lal, leader of the Indian delegation, Indians were "double-crossed" as the text of the U. A. R. resolution was redrafted after the Indian delegation left Moshi for Nairobi. Instead of the resolution, a "recommendation" expressing appreciation of the efforts of the six Afro-Asian countries at Colombo "to create conditions for promotion of peaceful talks between India and China leading to a peaceful settlement of their border dispute" was adopted. A question why only a recommendation and not a resolution was adopted by the Conference, was countered by Mr. Oscar Kambona of Tanganyika, Chairman of the Conference, by asking: "What is the difference between a recommendation and a resolution?"

Answering the criticism that the Indian delegation should not have participated in the Conference, Prime Minister Nehru said in the Lok Sabha that the Chinese had gone in strength to Moshi to impress the other participants and to canvass support for their stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute. He told the critics to bear the fact in mind that the Chinese would have swamped the Conference if they had none to challenge them. He added, "In the balance of things, it was worthwhile going there. Everything did not happen rightly, but in conditions as they were, it might have been much worse, if they had not gone."

BY February 1963 more than 2,000 Indians had been driven out of Mozambique by the Portuguese authorities. While some 300 Indians are still believed to be under expulsion orders, it is not known how many others have been thrown into jail.

Indians from Mozambique Immediately after the liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu in December 1961, thousands of Indians were interned and their property confiscated. On June 25, 1962, the Portuguese issued a "dragonian" decree denying citizenship rights to even an Indian born in Portuguese territory unless his father and grandfather were also born there. Under this decree, most of the Indians had to lose their Portuguese nationality and the right of inheritance to the property of their parents. When some well-to-do Indians in the colony formed an association called Bharat Samaj to collect funds from the sale of Indian property and use part of the proceeds to finance the repatriation of their compatriots in distress, the Portuguese Government froze the assets of the Samaj as well as its members.

An agreement was arrived at between New Delhi and Lisbon stipulating that the Indian nationals on their departure from the Portuguese territories would be allowed to bring out with them all personal effects, jewellery and cash up to £ 200 per person and the sale proceeds of the rest of their movable and immovable properties minus debts and taxes due from them. However, in complete violation of the agreement, the Portuguese deprived the Indians of their life's savings, and confiscated their property, including liquid assets.

According to a statement published by the Indian Commission in Nairobi, the Portuguese authorities had resorted to a method of serving a few days' notice for expulsion on Indians hitherto residing in the country as peaceful citizens. On the expiry of the notice period, if any Indians failed to leave the country because of non-availability of passage or any other difficulty, they were thrown behind the bars. The refugees reaching Bombay reported that all these atrocities were committed against Indians because "the Portuguese consider themselves at war with India." The liberation of Goa still rankled in their minds.

The Indian Government, on their part, have rendered considerable help to Indians from Mozambique. As India does not maintain diplomatic relations with Portugal, the Government of the United Arab Republic was requested to look after the interests of Indians in Mozambique. Consequently, the U.A.R. Embassy in Lisbon sent their First Secretary to the colony, and he tried to stop the exodus of Indians. In this he was successful only for a time. It is through the U.A.R. Government that the Indian Government is pressing Portugal for payment of compensation to Indians whose property, evaluated at Rs. 60 crores, had been frozen by the Portuguese authorities. Moreover, as stated recently in the Lok

Sabha by Mr. Dinesh Singh, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, the Government is discussing with the Government of Gujarat the question of the rehabilitation of the repatriated Indians as most of them belong to that State.

REACTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO CHINESE AGGRESSION ON INDIA

by

DR. MAHENDRA KUMAR

I

China's attack on India in October last year has stirred criticism, brought disillusionment, and led to a new awareness about international affairs. Every country has certain attitudes and reactions to a world event like the Chinese invasion and a dispassionate study of those attitudes and reactions is not only important in itself but is also necessary for a proper understanding of the new situation which the event creates on the international scene. As a result of the emergence of a number of newly-independent African States, the focus of attention is no longer centralized on the continents of Europe and America. Therefore, it will be well within the range of academic interest to examine the attitudes and reactions of African countries to Chinese aggression on India's northern border areas. This is precisely what the present article seeks to attempt.

It must be stated at the very outset that the selection of the African countries for purposes of this paper has not been made on the basis of the view that only the countries south of the Sahara constitute real Africa. Countries like the United Arab Republic, Libya and Morocco are, therefore, also included here.

There is a section of opinion which maintains that the reaction of African countries to Chinese aggression on India has been inadequate and "extremely cagey" and that even expressions of goodwill and sympathy have fallen short of a demonstration of solidarity. It is true that in the beginning many non-aligned countries of Africa did not say a word in condemnation of the Chinese attack against India. But on a careful scrutiny of the reactions of all the African countries expressed at a comparatively late stage, it appears that the picture is not as gloomy as it seems to be at first sight. As a matter of fact, the response of these countries will fall in either of the two categories—active or passive. To the former category would belong those countries which tried to help in the resolution of Sino-Indian border conflict by mediation or otherwise, while the second category would include those which supported either India or China. The support has been either clear and unequivocal or

tacit and implied. Besides, certain countries have taken a non-committal attitude.

II

Among the countries of Africa that made positive efforts for the solution of the India-China border dispute, the United Arab Republic comes first. As early as 21 October, 1962, President Gamal Abdel Nasser sent a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Chou En-lai asking them to accept conciliation and offering his help and the co-operation of the non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa. On 26 October he proposed a four-point plan to end the border dispute¹: (a) fighting should cease at once; (b) both sides should withdraw to the positions held by them before the clashes started; (c) a demilitarized zone should be created; and (d) negotiations should be opened. Thereafter, Mr. Nasser communicated with the heads of several Afro-Asian countries² inviting them to co-operate to "dissipate the shadow of war". He again wrote a letter to the Chinese and Indian leaders on 26 October reiterating his appeal for conciliation on the border issue³. The UAR "peace plan", as it is called, for Afro-Asian mediation aroused little enthusiasm in India in the beginning because it looked like no more than an attempt to stop the fighting and settle the dispute at any cost to India. But later the UAR specified that negotiations should follow withdrawal to the positions held by India and China on 8 September, 1962. This did not conflict with India's stand, declared immediately after the fighting started and maintained ever since, that she would not negotiate with the Chinese unless they retreated to the positions held by them on 8 September. The Nasser plan was broadly accepted by India but not by China. The Chinese response to it as well as the Chinese counter-proposal that both India and China should withdraw 20 kilometres was treated in Cairo as "unsatisfactory"⁴ and not "helpful"⁵. President Nasser made efforts to mobilize public opinion in uncommitted nations against China unless she agreed to open negotiations after withdrawing from the territory occupied by her since the Chinese offensive of 8 September.

The UAR gave another indication of its anxiety to help in the peaceful resolution of the Sino-Indian border conflict by accepting the invitation to participate in the Colombo Conference of Six Non-aligned Nations⁶ proposed and convened by the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. At the Conference, the leader of the UAR

1. *The Egyptian Gazette*, 27 October, 1962.

2. These countries were: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Algeria, the Sudan, Morocco, Ceylon, Guinea, Cambodia, and Mali.

3. New York Times Despatch from Jay Walz, *New York Times*, 2 November, 1962.

4. *The Times of India* (Delhi), 6 November, 1962.

5. *Sunday Standard*, 4 November, 1962.

6. These nations were: Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic.

delegation, Mr. Ali Sabri, enunciated in his opening speech⁷ the principle that any solution proposed should not involve any fruit of aggression. The proposal sought⁸: (a) the creation of a "buffer zone" 'or "area of disengagement"; (b) patrolling of this zone by unarmed civilian police or an international police force; (c) the settlement of the limits of this zone by mutual agreement between India and China; and (d) a final settlement of the border problem. Ultimately, the UAR delegation agreed on a compromise formula which led to the Colombo proposals put forward by the Colombo Powers for ending the Sino-Indian border conflict⁹.

Prime Minister Nehru's attitude to the UAR's efforts for ending the Sino-Indian border dispute—right from President Nasser's correspondence with Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai to Mr. Ali Sabri's visit to Peking and New Delhi to persuade the leaders of India and China—has been broadly one of appreciation. An overall analysis of the part played by the UAR in the various efforts made for the settlement of the border problem would show that the UAR was perhaps motivated by the principle of the Bandung Conference that international disputes must be solved by means other than force. The attitude adopted by President Nasser dismayed his friends and admirers in India who expected him to have the same spontaneous reaction and sympathetic attitude towards India as India had for Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis. It is true that the UAR did not condemn China or support India openly, although it has been reported that the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in Cairo had been told by President Nasser that China had committed aggression in India¹⁰. If the report is correct, his strange position of a combination of private support and public detachment can be explained only by the UAR's desire to mediate and her faith in the principle that aggression should not succeed. Such tactical manoeuvrings emanate from the basic concept of the neutralist ethics that in the interest of the more urgent and more important political necessities of negotiations for peaceful settlement of international disputes, we should suspend moral judgements about the rightness and wrongness of the issue involved.¹¹ It will be recalled that in September 1961, Prime Minister Nehru deprecated the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union and the United States with equal vehemence, although the initiative was taken by the former.¹² He held that if he cared for who was responsible for it, his appeal for the cessation of tests would lose its weight and that in issues involving threat of war moral judgements were insignificant. Such a view held by India, the foremost champion of non-alignment, is bound to have some impact on those non-aligned countries which preferred to avoid the con-

7. For the text of the speech see *Asian Recorder*.

8. *Ceylon Daily News*, 11 December, 1962.

9. For the text of the proposals, see *Pakistan Times*, 20 January, 1963.

10. See G. H. Jansen's Despatch to *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 5 January, 1963.

11. See an article entitled "Dynamic Neutralism" in *Ceylon Daily News*.

12. *The Hindu* (Madras), 7 September, 1961.

demnation of China as aggressor. Thus, it might be argued that Mr. Nasser did not come out with open condemnation of China because he thought it would weaken the effect of his mediatory efforts. Besides, he also did not want to give the impression of being soft on aggression. The memory of the Israeli attack on the UAR is too fresh to be forgotten. The result was the avoidance of public condemnation of China. But the absence of public condemnation has been somewhat compensated by an editorial in an issue of the UAR official organ, the *United Arab Republic Magazine* and various Cairo newspapers. The leading Arabic paper, *Al Gumhoureya* said in an editorial on 6 November: "Undoubtedly China in her war with India is an aggressor".¹⁴ It also suggested that India should desist from supporting the move to seat China in the United Nations as a measure to "discourage aggression". A Cairo weekly, *Rosal Youssef*,¹⁵ pleaded for banning the supply of Russian weapons to China.

How is the UAR's role favourable or unfavourable to India? One view is that the UAR in trying to help India has gone farther and farther and fared worse.¹⁶ It has been suggested that the UAR should not have attended the Colombo Conference in which case the Conference could have either issued a general appeal or made a pro-Chinese proposal which could have been easily rejected by India.¹⁷ Now that the Colombo proposals are no longer a secret, it is difficult to agree with this view. It is common knowledge that the Colombo proposals together with "clarifications" are favourable to India rather than to China. One can, of course, ask why Mr. Nasser's initial offer of mediation made on 21 October was not prefixed with forthright sympathy and support for India, particularly when India did so much for Egypt in the Suez crisis. The question is pertinent but has to be answered coolly in reference to the fact that Communist China was second only to the Soviet Union in pledging its support to Egypt promising volunteers and granting about five million dollars and the additional fact that the UAR had diplomatic relations with both India and China.¹⁸ The intention here is not to defend the UAR's role after Chinese aggression or to suggest the impression that it could not have been better from India's point of view. The purpose is just to point out that whatever the UAR did for India, with all the limitations of her relations with China and pressures of Afro-Asian countries, cannot be dismissed as insignificant. After all, President Nasser did ask the Chinese to withdraw to the position of 8 September which in fact is the substance of India's condition for nego-

13. See Don Passos, "India and UAR Can Save Non-Alignment", *United Arab Republic Magazine* (January 1963), pp. 3-4.

14. vide *Hindu*, 7 November, 1962.

15. *Ibid.*

16. See G. H. Jansen's Despatch to *Statesman* (New Delhi), 5 January 1963.

17. *Ibid.*

18. See Leon M. S. Slawewski, "The Two Chinas in Africa," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1963, pp. 398-409.

tiations. That is why Mr. Nehru praised Mr. Nasser on more than one occasion, inspite of the fact that the UAR was not one of those 20 odd countries of Asia and Africa which gave India their sympathy and support for which he had asked in his circular letter to the world's Heads of State or Government.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the UAR erred in expecting and trying to bring India and China together to negotiate the settlement of the border dispute as a whole. India's offer has never been for substantive negotiation after the withdrawal of the Chinese to the 8 September position but for talks to ease tension as a preliminary to serious negotiations about the frontier. However, Mr. Ali Sabri rendered great help to India by declaring in his speech at the Colombo Conference that the mere acceptance of arms from any power bloc to defend freedom is not against the spirit and canon of non-alignment.²⁰

Contrary to this was the attitude taken by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, who was "gravely distressed and saddened" to hear that the United Kingdom would give India "every support". He held that "whatever the rights and wrongs", peace could be best served "by refraining from any action that may aggravate the unfortunate situation".²¹ These are the views which Dr. Nkrumah expressed in his letter to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The situation which Dr. Nkrumah called an "unfortunate situation" was not that there was a fighting going on between India and China but that there was naked and premeditated aggression. And the "rights and wrongs" which he dismissed so easily were exactly what the fighting was about. His prescription for a peaceful settlement was nothing more than letting the aggressor achieve his objective and consolidate his position on the plea of negotiations. It is hard to believe that such attempts for a settlement could spring from considerations of friendship for India and peace for the world. The most amazing thing about Dr. Nkrumah's message was that it was addressed to the British Prime Minister. If the Ghana President was so fearful of the dangers of resort to arms, he could have sent the message to Mr. Chou En-lai. It is indeed not easy to explain the attitude adopted by Dr. Nkrumah towards his Commonwealth colleague, an attitude which by no means can be called friendly. The same attitude continued even at the Colombo Conference and at the Moshi Conference of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization held in early February this year. Thus, Ghana's Justice Minister, Mr. Ofori Atta, made an appeal at the Colombo Conference for creating an area of disengagement²² but did not care to look into the seriousness of the

19. *The Times of India* (Delhi), 28 October, 1962.

20. See also *UAR Magazine*, *op. cit.*

21. *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 30 October, 1962.

22. *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 11 December, 1962.

real situation. Again on 23 January this year, he endorsed the Chinese Government's view that the Colombo proposals should form a preliminary basis for negotiations without prejudice to Peking's reservations.²³ One fails to understand the inconsistency between this statement and the spirit of the Colombo proposals.

Now the whole attitude adopted by Ghana on the Chinese aggression offers an interesting case for study. It is common knowledge that since their ideological differences with the Soviet Union, except with Albania, the Chinese have been diplomatically squeezed out of Europe as a result of which they have attempted a counter-move in Africa. The reception given to Dr. Nkrumah by the Communist Chinese during the former's visit to Peking in 1961 was "spectacular". A treaty of friendship has been signed between Ghana and China and an agreement gave Ghana an interest-free loan of 19.6 million dollars. In October 1962, an agreement of technical co-operation was also signed between the two countries, although its implementation still remains to be effected. In addition, Mr. Chou En-lai has also accepted in principle a visit to Ghana. The special relations between Ghana and China developed on the basis of these facts and exchange of many delegations can only explain why Ghana did not come out with outright condemnation of China but they do not explain the attitude it adopted towards India. Ghana's Commonwealth ties with India and its common concern on various issues of importance to Asia and Africa were sufficient to warrant at least a neutral attitude on its part.

A number of newspapers criticized the attitude taken by Dr. Nkrumah. *The Daily Nation* (3 November) of Kenya, in an editorial captioned "Arms and Nkrumah", said that Dr. Nkrumah's appeal to the British Government to stop sending arms to India "is hard to defend or explain". The paper also charged him with being blind to the fact that neutralism and pacifism cannot be equated and warned that if African countries failed to grasp this essential truth, they would soon be faced with the "same bitter dilemma in which India finds herself today". Likewise, *The Chronicle* of Bulawayo (2 November)—published in Rhodesia—came out with a vehement criticism of Dr. Nkrumah's letter to Mr. Macmillan asking the latter to stop arms aid to India. It was criticized as an action with "no precedent in Commonwealth history." The paper characterized the action of Dr. Nkrumah as "a shocking reward for Mr. Nehru's staunch and highly vocal support of black nationalism" which, the paper added, would lead us "to reflect again on the inherent shakiness of the Afro-Asian chorus line".

A point that requires serious consideration in regard to Ghana's reaction—and for that matter of the UAR's also—to Chinese aggression on India is that both these countries are members of the Casablanca

32. *The Times of India* (Delhi), 24 January, 1963.

Group of African States which are considered rather radical States and with which China has, generally speaking, official and formal relations. With all these countries—Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR—China has diplomatic relations. One would notice that generally these countries either avoided taking sides in the Sino-Indian conflict or felt satisfied by expressing sympathy with India, but did not come out with open condemnation of China. Algeria has been a real favourite of the Communist Chinese. Not only did the latter recognize the rebel Provisional Government of Algerian Republic in 1960, but they also played host to many Algerian delegations as also to Ferhat Abbas when he paid a State visit to China in October 1960 as Premier of the Provisional Government. Following Algerian independence this year, China gave the new Algerian Government a gift of 9,000 tons of wheat, 3,000 tons of rolled steel, and 21 tons of medicines. Libya also expressed its sympathy and support for India, though in a rather suppressed tone in the beginning; later it became more vocal and definite and recorded a "sense of shock" at the Chinese aggression.

Mali has expressed its sympathy for India in her border war with China²⁴. It is to be noted, however, that it was only an expression of sympathy and not of sympathy and support both. Further, when President Nasser consulted various Afro-Asian States regarding his mediation offer for the Sino-Indian conflict, Mali did not give a very encouraging response. It was only Algeria, Ghana, and Morocco which expressed their general agreement with President Nasser's stand²⁵. The attitudes of Algeria and Ghana have already been examined, though not at equal length. But in the case of Morocco, it should be remembered that it supported Mr. Nasser's move for mediation probably in order to avoid any unhappy situation arising out of taking sides. This attitude was probably dictated by the fact that Morocco has close diplomatic and trade relations with both India and China.

III

It would be pertinent to examine the attitudes and reactions of another group of African States—the Monrovia Group—which is considered a rival to the Casablanca Group in the struggle for the leadership of Africa. This group consists of 12 countries which are either members of the French Community or have close ties with France and of seven countries which are considered "uncommitted". To the former category belong Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo Republic (ex-French), Dahomey, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and the Voltaic Republic, while the latter category would include Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,

24. *New York Times*, 2 November, 1962.

25. *The Times of India*, 13 November, 1962.

the Somali Republic, Togo, and Tunisia. Due to lack of material at the present stage, it is not possible to examine the attitudes of all these countries in great detail. The only thing that is possible to do here is to point out which of these countries have expressed their sympathy for India or have remained silent. Thus almost all the former French Colonies of Africa have expressed their sympathy for India.²⁶ It must be remembered that all these countries, with the exception of Niger, have only sent their sympathy and not condemned the Chinese aggression. As a matter of fact, even the messages of sympathy came comparatively late because the immediate reaction of those countries was of dissociation from the Sino-Indian conflict. It is surprising why all the former French colonies have not condemned the Chinese aggression. None of these 12 Countries has diplomatic relations with Communist China. Except Ivory Coast and Niger, which do not have any diplomatic relations with either of the two Chinas, all of them have recognized Nationalist China. In fact, Chad, Gabon, Dahomey and the Malagasy Republic are developing closer and closer relations with Nationalist China²⁷. Therefore, the consideration of not annoying Communist China directly which explains to a certain extent the attitude of some more "radical" States of Africa does not help in the proper understanding of the attitudes of the former French Colonies of Africa.

Among the "non-committed" members of the Monrovia Group, Ethiopia has been most vocal in denouncing Chinese aggression. Emperor Haile Selassie called the Chinese "aggressors" in the dispute and said that they had "unlawfully held" Indian territory.²⁸ Likewise, Nigeria's Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, said that China's theory of 'might is right' cannot be tenable and "any country that embraces it would be condemned".²⁹ The Press of Nigeria was still more vehement in its criticism of China. To take a couple of examples: *The West African Pilot* of Lagos (Nigeria), in an editorial captioned "Chinese Dragon", wrote: "Now is the time to contain them[Chinese] through prompt, direct and adequate aid to India—an important member of the United Nations. Aggression against India offers an opportunity for concerted action to cage the dragon".³⁰ Another paper of Lagos, *The Daily Telegraph* (23 October, 1962), said in an editorial headed "Yellow Peril" that India which believed in peace "has been forced into violence by Communist China" and that China "has embarked on an aggression on Indian territory".³¹

26. For a full list of the names of the countries which have sympathized with India or condemned Chinese aggression or have remained silent, see Mrs. Laxmi Menon's statement in Lok Sabha on 21 January, 1963. vide *Hindustan Times*, 22 January, 1963.

27. See Leon M. S. Slawewski, *op. cit.*

28. Robert Conley's Despatch to *New York Times*, 12 November, 1962.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *The Statesman*, 7 November, 1962.

31. See External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, *World Press on Chinese Aggression* (New Delhi), pp. 21-22.

Liberia, the Somali Republic, Sierra Leone and Togo sent ordinary messages of sympathy and support for India. In the case of Tunisia, however, its President, Mr. Habib Bourguiba, did not express sympathy and support for India. Instead, he wrote to Prime Minister Nehru in the last week of October 1962 (expressing his concern over the fighting between the Chinese and Indian forces) that all problems including border problems should be solved by direct negotiations or mediation.

IV

In this section will be considered the reactions of what are called the East African countries—Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. Let us take Kenya first. Actually, one cannot be sure about the sympathies towards India of the Kenyan leaders like Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga, and Tom Mboya. Kenyatta declared on 1 November that his party, the Kenya African National Union, would follow a policy of "positive neutrality" and that it would not allow the Sino-Indian border fighting to "lure us into the Western or Eastern camps".³² He also sent a cable to Prime Minister Nehru expressing the hope that the "dispute" between India and China would be settled peacefully through negotiations.³³ As against this attitude of "positive neutrality", the East African Goan League appealed to all League members to contribute to the Aid India Fund launched by the Kenya Indian Congress. It was also reported that several hundred persons in Nairobi, predominantly Africans, offered to fight for India and that Mr. Ngala, President of the Kenya African Democratic Union, offered to donate blood.³⁴ A few of the newspapers of Kenya adopted an unequivocal attitude in regard to the Chinese aggression. Thus, the *Daily Nation* (1 November, 1962) called Red China "the most ruthlessly aggressive military power in the world."³⁵ The *East African Standard* (6 November, 1962) published an appeal by S.G. Amin: "India is putting up a stubborn defence against a ruthless and unprovoked aggression. It would be a grand gesture on the part of the freedom-loving people of Kenya to unite in helping India to drive the invaders out of her frontiers."³⁶

Whatever the attitude and the reaction of the Press of Kenya, the basic fact remains that the political leaders of Kenya have remained neutral in general on the issue of the Sino-Indian border conflict. Further, there has been a growing feeling in the Left-wing leaders that by raising funds locally for India, the Indians of Nairobi have displayed their first loyalty to India and not to Kenya. Mr. Tom Mboya, Secre-

32. Batuk Gathani's Despatch to *The Hindu* (Madras), 4 November, 1962.

33. It is not certain how far it is true that Kenyatta sent his sympathies and support to India as reported by the *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 12 November, 1962.

34. *The Times of India* (Delhi), 13 November, 1962.

35. External Publicity Division, *World Press on Chinese Aggression*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

36. *Ibid.*

tary-General of KANU, criticized the local Indians for that.

The two other countries of East Africa—Tanganyika and Uganda—have also adopted an attitude which may be called fairly non-committal. They have only expressed their general concern for the peaceful resolution of the Sino-Indian conflict. The newspapers, of course, have come out with a clear and categorical support for India and open condemnation of China. Thus, *Tanganyika Standard*, the only English daily in Tanganyika, said editorially on 29 October, 1962, that "the Chinese government is not only laying claims to considerable areas of what has been undisputably Indian territory but it is seeking to assert those claims by military action."³⁷ An editorial of another issue of the same paper (2 November, 1962) justified the legality of India's case on the border question.³⁸ *The Uganda Argus* of Uganda said in an editorial (23 October, 1962) that "it is certain that the movement of Chinese forces beyond the McMahon Line was a carefully prepared act."³⁹

It would perhaps not be out of place here to record the sympathies and support expressed informally by a few prominent leaders of Africa. Mr. Mzinwandile Piliso, Director of the External Bureau of the African National Congress of South Africa, told a correspondent that China had forcibly occupied not only areas it had claimed but also the parts beyond the claimed areas. He gave assurance of his party's support to Mr. Nehru's stand. The Deputy Chairman of the Northern Rhodesian United National Independence Party, Mr. Chitandika Kamanga, also expressed the support of his party to India and condemned the massive aggression launched against India by China. It is also learnt that the Chairman of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) who is in exile in Dar-es-Salaam issued a statement expressing support for India and said that Chinese action had threatened to create a rift in Afro-Asian solidarity.

V

The foregoing account of the reactions and attitudes of African countries to Chinese aggression on India reveals a number of points on which attention has to be focussed. One of them is the nature of the reactions and attitudes in general. Moreover, the deplorable fact is that some African countries have not openly adopted any attitude at all and that even the attitude of sympathy and support was not spontaneous in all cases. In the first innocent efflorescence of their independence, the African countries preferred to dissociate themselves from the conflict between India and China which was probably taken as a manifestation of cold war. India has allowed herself to be impressed by the indications of friendliness of the Afro-Asian countries. But the poor response

37. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

38. See *The National Herald* (Lucknow), 12 November, 1962.

39. External Publicity Division, *World Press on Chinese Aggression*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

of these countries (of African countries for our purpose) and its implications demand some real official heart-searching. It is true that none of the African Powers could afford to offer, even if they were willing, economic or military assistance or substantial facilities of any kind to help India fight the Chinese and that their response must necessarily be limited to an expression of sympathy. But even the expression of sympathy has not been there in certain cases. It is understandable if a country like the South African Republic does not support India and condemn China but the attitude of the other African countries is un-understandable.

Another point of consideration is that the African countries have not properly appreciated India's stand on the 8 September line. This may no doubt be attributed to a certain extent to the lack of sufficient publicity on India's part about the validity of her case on the border and to that extent it is imperative on the part of the Government of India to explain, clarify and emphasize the main points of the Indian case in as palatable a way as possible. It is also recommended in this connection that the emissary teams like the one which (consisting of Mr. R. K. Nehru and Mr. A. K. Sen) visited African countries after the Chinese aggression should be sent more frequently. But there is also great need that the African countries, particularly the newly-independent ones, may view and assess world affairs in a wider perspective and not merely against the background of anti-colonialism. The emergence of a third force in world politics is undeniably significant and needs to be strengthened--which is not possible without the active collaboration of the African countries. The Chinese aggression on India is a menace to the whole world and, therefore, to Africa, too. If peace is to be preserved, China has got to be, as Mr. Nehru said, "disciplined" and that is possible only under the pressure of world public opinion in the formation of which the African countries have indeed a significant role to play.

BOOK REVIEWS

MY LIFE—Sir Ahmadu Bello, *The Sardauna of Sokoto* (Cambridge University Press, 1962, Pp. 246, \$5.50).

The biggest of the West African territories and with the most heterogeneously-composed population of over 35 million, Nigeria offers quite a peculiar example of democratic functioning. All the three Regions of Nigeria are largely autonomous—the Federal Government stationed in Lagos being only responsible for such subjects as defence, foreign trade, external affairs, civil aviation, banking and currency, telecommunications, railways and harbours, etc. The Northern Region is in sharp contrast to the Eastern and Western Regions both in political outlook and approach. Although the North, which forms the largest slice of the population (it is more than 17,000,000), was comparatively backward in the field of education, it has produced quite a number of able and strong African leaders. Sir Abubakar Tawafa Balewa, the present Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria, is himself a true example of it. Sir Alhaji Ahmadu Bello is another equally powerful, though God-fearing, leader the North is proud of. He never pressed for independence, for his conviction suggested that it would come when God willed it.

This book is primarily an autobiography of Sir Ahmadu. But since the Sardauna, the direct descendent of the great Nigerian Reformer Shahu Usman dan Fodio—has held office as the Premier of the Northern Region, it is also the story of Nigeria's march towards freedom.

After recalling his childhood and school days in the early chapters the elegant style of the author makes a new start, and as he describes his days as District Head, the narrative becomes quite objective. This objectivity hardens as the scene shifts to conferences in Lagos and London. The North is subjected to a scathing criticism by the leaders of the Eastern and Western Regions. The Sardauna comes out boldly to answer all criticisms and strongly opposes the resolution moved by the Southern Regions for the grant of self-government to Nigeria by 1956. Since all the regions were in different stages of development and were faced with heterogeneous factors, it was only proper for the Northern leader to realise their unpreparedness to assume the responsibilities of self-government. They played safe so that they could first prepare their people to take up the responsibilities before these were thrust upon them unawares. The North, therefore, felt it necessary to defer it till 1959, whereas the East and West went ahead alone and achieved self-government in 1956.

Nigeria is such a vast and varied country that it requires the tact of Tollyrand to keep the whole country together. And it was perhaps keeping this in mind that Sir Ahmadu said: "We seek unity but not uniformity. . .," since the latter seemed an impossibility in the context of circumstances prevailing in Nigeria.

As a leader of the Northern People's Congress—the majority party in the Northern Region—the Sardauna found enough opportunity to utilize his political acumen. His eloquent speeches in the House of Representatives and the authority with which he pleaded for his people bear testimony to his thorough knowledge of administrative difficulties, political complexities and a complete understanding of his people. He worked hard for their emancipation and created a new system of education in order to pull them out of the morass of poverty and ignorance. He also modernized the civil service, making, however, some use of the older and experienced persons in the administration.

His amicable attitude toward the British and respect for foreign peoples and cultures have attracted substantial foreign investment for that Region. Yet he is fastidious enough not to be wooed by business magnates in London who throw lavish parties in his honour when he visits England. The refutation comes spontaneously from him: "We are not traders or merchants and have no desire to be such, and, indeed, if we were, would we choose such peculiar conditions to do business, which might involve vast sums of money and other people's money at that?"

Sir Ahmadu is vehemently opposed to corrupt elements in the country. But whereas he would go all out to detest them, he admits that he has "yet to find a country in the world which can honestly and convincingly claim to be absolutely free of corruption." To the European prejudices, that all Africans, African governments and institutions are incurably and profoundly corrupt, he retorts: "As far as I know, Europeans have no general standard of honesty or probity pattern; they vary greatly among themselves."

Although he has an ungrudging word of praise for some British administrators and a high sense of reverence for the Queen of England, he has been quite dexterous in his observations. Commenting on the British attack on Egypt in 1956, he says, "We were greatly relieved to learn that Sir Anthony Eden had to retire from the control of this ridiculous and humiliating disaster—one which need never have happened if there had been little less arrogance on *both* sides."

These basic traits of his personality are fully reflected in his day-to-day activities. For instance, after the General Elections in 1957 when the House was sworn in mid-December, addressing the inaugural session, he patted his critics on the back, saying: "A young man who is allowed to have everything in his own way, and is never subjected to criticism, becomes spoilt and weak." Sir Ahmadu had an exceptional spirit of tolerance and accommodation for others' opinions and a con-

structive approach to criticism—both rare qualities which so often contribute to make a successful leader.

In effect, this autobiography provides sufficient background to contemporary events in Northern Nigeria as also to the main personalities behind them.

M. M. SAULDIE

ANGOLA IN FLAMES: By K. Madhu Panikkar (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962, Pp. 127, Rs. 7.50.)

For the last two years, Angola has made headlines since the Portuguese policy of suppression and extermination of Africans in that colony has touched alarming proportions. The struggle for freedom has culminated in the killing of 30,000 Africans and the driving out of 50,000 people as refugees to the Congo. Portugal continues these repressive policies against the freedom-fighters in Angola.

It could be said that, comparatively speaking, Angola was not much known to the world till February 1961, when the revolt against the Salazar regime broke out. The Portuguese authorities in Lisbon were alarmed by the uprising, for they could not comprehend that the "wind of change" could blow even over Angola. Unmoved by the native sentiments, the Portuguese rulers set out to quell the uprising, once and for all, with the help of the military force. However, the nationalist forces were not to be easily put out. In no time, the struggle spread throughout the country and baffled the Portuguese military authorities.

The liberation movement in the colony is quite fierce today and will become fiercer in the days to come till the last vestiges of Portuguese colonialism are uprooted from the colony. But the outer world has not been much aware of the actual happenings in this small colony in the absence of any sizeable literature on the subject. Mr. K. Madhu Panikkar has, in *Angola in Flames*, drawn readers nearer to that country through his up-to-date account of the Portuguese colonial policy, the dismal state of political and economic conditions of the natives and their heroic struggle for freedom. The United Nations' continuous support to the struggle has been well traced with the help of several resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the Security Council. But ignoring all such U.N. moves, Portugal maintains that Angola is her own province and, therefore, the U.N. has no right whatsoever to interfere in her internal affairs. Salazar has also shown his utter disregard of the United Nations by refusing entry into Angola to its Special Committee which was entrusted with the task of investigating the dangerous situation in that colony that posed a threat to peace and security in Africa.

The author has drawn a similar picture of Mozambique, another Portuguese colony in Africa. The most deplorable aspect of the Portuguese policy there is the export of the African labourers (as goods) to the

Republic of South Africa which the author rightly calls slave trade.

The political movement in the colony, however, is smaller in dimensions when compared with that in Angola. Even then, the Mozambique African National Union and the National Democratic Union are doing their best for the freedom of the country from their headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam.

While discussing India's attitude to Portuguese colonialism, the author says that although India has firm faith in the Gandhian principle of non-violence, she appreciates that it cannot be applied in the case of the Portuguese colonial rule, which is based on ruthless armed force. It was only after India's prolonged efforts to settle peacefully the future of the Portuguese pockets in India failed, that she was forced to have resort to arms. Likewise, it seems Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies can be freed from the clutches of imperialism only through armed action.

K. H. PATEL

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON AFRICA

Compiled by K. H. Patel

This feature is presented every quarter with the object of providing a list of recent publications on Africa. It is hoped that this will be helpful to those who are specially interested in the study of African affairs.

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